Iran appeals to the UN Security Council Britain who, the Russians said, was interfering in the internal affairs of Greece and Indonesia. The debate between Ernest Bevin and Andrei Vishinsky was vigorous, but inconclusive. Finally, on January 30th the Council resolved to await the outcome of efforts by the Iranians and the Soviets to solve the trouble by negotiation. The Iranian Premier went to Moscow in March 1946, but achieved little success. Meanwhile, the scheduled date for troop withdrawal passed. Great Britain, on February 14, had pledged its withdrawal by March 2nd and the British forces were out by that date.5 Soviet delegates “walk out" of Security Council debate on Iran When the Security Council reopened its sessions in New York on March 25th, it placed the Iranian charges on the agenda. On the 27th the Soviet delegation walked out of the Council meeting after the defeat of its motion to postpone discussion on Iran. This was the first of a long series of walkouts by the U.S.S.R. at the UN, although the Soviet Union had already used the veto on February 15, 1946 over another Middle East question, native demands for the withdrawal of British and French troops from Syria and Lebanon. At the close of the discussion of the Iranian question on March 29th, the Council requested both Iran and the Soviet Union to furnish information by April 3rd on the extent to which Soviet troops had been withdrawn. In its reply on April 3rd, the U.S.S.R. said the troops would be evacuated from Iran by May 6th. Andrei Gromyko, deputy Soviet representative at the UN, returned to the Security Council sessions on April 9, 1946, and on the 23rd he announced that the U.S.S.R. would refuse to take part in any further international consideration of the Iranian question. What might have happened had the Soviet Union persisted in this attitude is difficult to say. The prestige of the infant UN was involved. The opening breach between the wartime allies was visible and widening. The United States attempted to gain time Iranian dispute shows breach between wartime allies The American troops had been out of Iran by Jan. 1, 1946. The British and French troops were withdrawn from Syria by May 3, 1946. Russian troops withdrawn by introducing a resolution in the Security Council to defer further action on Iran until May 20th. This resolution passed the Council on May 8. Then, on May 21, 1946, came word from Teheran that the Soviet troops had been withdrawn from Azerbaijan on, or before, May 6th-the date promised by Russia on April 3rd. Thus the crisis was averted. The UN could take credit for bringing the question into the open where world opinion could play upon the differing viewpoints. The United States could accept some of the credit for keeping the British from by-passing the UN. And the United States and Britain together had faced up to the Soviet Union's first major postwar threat of expansion. Taken all in all, the Iranian question appeared at the time of its settlement in May 1946 to be a notable victory for collective security and open diplomacy. Although the United Iranian States was involved in most of the issue helps big power negotiations and the UN establish debates over Iran, it was not directly prestige of UN concerned with the events inside Iran. So, the introduction of the United States to Middle Eastern affairs was not yet a matter of major concern for the administrators in Washington. That was left for a later date and another area-the new nation of Israel. through the next two decades. American interest in Palestine up to the time of World War II was largely emotional and religious. Diplomatic contacts were few, and most Americans, without thinking deeply on the subject, were sympathetic to the aspirations of world Jewry toward the building of a Jewish homeland in the region of the ancient areas symbolically connected with the religion of Judaism.(74) The fact that these same areas had religious significance for Christians and Moslems interested, but did not unduly complicate the issues for most Americans. The American government was generally content to recognize Great Britain's prior and paramount political influence in this sphere and to remain aloof from questions relating to the political complexion of the eastern Mediterranean. During the British mandate, and especially after the wave of Jewish persecutions in Germany under Hitler, immigration of European Jews to Pales tine increased markedly. Everywhere Jews in there was open or undercurrent conPalestine flict between the incoming Jews and support the resident Arabs.8 American conallies in cern with the problem during this World War II period was largely confined to financial support of the Palestine Jews by American Zionists and others sympathetic to the Jewish programs. In World War II the Palestine Jews vigorously supported the allied cause, not only out of enmity toward Germany but also because of the hopes of independence which participation in the conflict held out. The mounting American interest in the Middle East led President Roosevelt to define American policy toward Palestine in a letter to King Ibn Saud, of Saudi Arabia in 1945. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S LETTER ON PALESTINE, WASHINGTON, APRIL 5, 1945: . . Your Majesty will recall that on previous occasions I President Roosevelt defines American policy on Palestine, 1945 communicated to you the attitude of the American Government toward Palestine and made clear our desire that no decision be taken with respect to the basic situation in that country without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. . . . during our recent conversation I assured you that I would take no action. . . which might prove hostile to the Arab people . . . 8 The generic term "Arab" is used here to indicate the Moslem inhabitants of North Africa, the Arabian peninsula, and the Levant. Many nationalities are included under the designation, from Moroccan Moors to Iraqi tribesmen and Iranian oilfield workers. Arab leaders oppose Jewish migrations to Palestine At the close of World War II the World Zionist Conference asked Great Britain to open Palestine to 1,000,000 Jews, mostly refugees from Nazi terror in Europe. On August 31, 1945 President Truman wrote Prime Minister Attlee, supporting Jewish demands for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine. However, on October 18, 1945 Secretary Byrnes reiterated the American stand that no definite conclusion should be reached on the question of Palestine without consultation with Jewish and Arab leaders. On the 20th several of the principal Arab nations sent a joint note to Secretary Byrnes warning that the establishment of a separate Jewish state in Palestine would result in armed conflict in the eastern Mediterranean." And, on November 10th, the Council of the Arab League, composed of a number of the Moslem nations of the Middle East,10 approved of a common policy to be followed in dealing with the Palestine question. AngloAmerican Committee of Inquiry on Palestine created, 1945 At this juncture the United States and Great Britain agreed December 10th upon the creation of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. The American Congress-the Senate on December 17, 1945 and the House on December 19-adopted a resolution urging the United States to exercise its "good offices" to secure the opening of Palestine to the free entry of Jews. The Anglo-American Inquiry Committee met in Washington on January 7, 1946 and held sessions there, in London, in various parts of Europe, in Palestine, and in other Middle Eastern countries, and finally in Lausanne, Switzerland. The committee's report was issued from Lausanne on April 1946. 20, REPORT OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY ON PALESTINE, LAUSANNE, APRIL 20, 1946: . . . We have to report that such information as we received about countries other than Palestine gave no hope of substantial assistance in finding homes for Jews wishing or impelled to leave Europe. But Palestine alone cannot meet the emigration needs Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon joined in sending this note. 10 The League of Arab States was formed Mar. 22, 1945 in Cairo by representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Yemen. The Inquiry Committee reports of the Jewish victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution. . . . We . . . recommend that our Governments together and in association with other countries, should endeavor immediately to find new homes for all such "displaced persons". . . . We recommend (a) that 100,000 certificates be authorized immediately for the admission into Palestine of Jews. . . . (b) that these certificates be awarded as far as possible in 1946 and that actual immigration be pushed forward as rapidly as conditions will permit. . . . We regard it as essential that a clear statement of the following principles should be made: . . . That Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine. . . . That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state. .. Palestine must ultimately become a state which guards the rights and interests of Moslems, Jews and Christians alike. ... We recommend that, until . . . [the] hostility [between Jews and Arabs] disappears, the government of Palestine be continued as at present under mandate pending the execution of a trusteeship agreement under the United Nations. . . . We recommend that the mandatory or trustee should prepare measures designed to bridge the gap which now exists and raise the Arab standard of living to that of the Jews. . . We recommend that . . . it should be made clear beyond all doubt to both Jews and Arabs that any attempt from either side, by threats of violence, by terrorism, or by the organization or use of illegal armies to prevent . . . [the] execution [of the terms of this report if it is adopted], will be resolutely suppressed. ... ... The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom asked both the Arab and the Jewish groups to give their views on the report. U.S. advocates immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine But before receipt of these opinions the State Department on May 22, 1946 announced its support of the proposal to admit 100,000 Jews to Palestine immediately as the policy of the United States. The Arab leaders, meeting in Cairo, on May 30th agreed to oppose further admittance of Jews to Palestine.11 President Truman, in an effort to arrive at a solution of this vexing problem, on June 11 created a special cabinet committee, composed of Secretary Byrnes, Secretary of War Robert Patterson, and Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder, to advise him on the matter. Cooperation between the British and American governments was believed to be one 11 They also announced their determination to secure freedom for Libya, complete independence of Egypt from the United Kingdom, and liberation of other Arab countries from European controls and influences. of the ways to approach the problem, but AngloAmerican harmony was not helped British the next day by remarks by Foreign Secretary Bevin to the effect that the Americans supported Zionism in its campaign to gain entry to Palestine for Jewish settlers because the Americans did not want too many Jews to come to New York. On June 13 the Arab League, official voice of the group of Arab nations, requested the United Kingdom to start negotiations to set up a new regime in Palestine under the terms of the UN Charter. The League also protested the attempts of the United States to inject itself into a matter which the League regarded as a purely Middle Eastern affair. In this atmosphere, the publication of the Arab League's views on the Anglo-American Committee report on June 19th mainly served to feed the flames of conflict. Arab League opposes U. S. policy President Truman further antagonized the Arab bloc by announcing on July 2, 1946 that he favored the immediate admission to Palestine of Britain opens round-table discussion of Palestine problem 100,000 Jews. This appeal was complicated on the 25th of July by an Anglo-American proposal of a federal constitution for Palestine with the admission of the 100,000 Jews conditional upon the adoption of this federal plan. At the same time the United Kingdom government invited the Arab League members and Jewish representatives to a round-table discussion of the situation to be held in London. Although the Jewish Agency, unofficial spokesman for the Palestine Jews, refused to attend the London parley, the talks opened on September 10, 1946. No solution was reached and the sessions broke up on the 16th. The Arab group presented a set of proposals in line with its views, but they were not acted upon. President Truman cabled Prime Minister Attlee, on October 3rd, regretting the breakdown of the talks and reiterating his support of the admission of a large number of Jews to Palestine. King Ibn Saud, of Saudi Arabia, criticized Truman's stand and the President replied to him on October 28. ... It is only natural, therefore, that this Government should favor at this time the entry into Palestine of considerable numbers of displaced Jews in Europe. . . . nothing would contribute more effectively to the alleviation of the plight of these Jewish survivors than the authorization of the immediate entry of at least 100,000 of them to Palestine. . . . At the same time there should, of course, be a concerted effort to open the gates of other lands, including the United States, to those unforunate persons. With regard to the possibility envisaged by Your Majesty that force and violence may be used by Jews in aggressive schemes against the neighboring Arab countries. . . I am convinced that responsible Jewish leaders do not contemplate a policy of aggression. ... in the past this Government . . . has given assurances that it would not take any action which might prove hostile to the Arab people, and also that in its view there should be no decision with respect to the basic situation in Palestine without prior consultation with both Arabs and Jews. I do not consider that my .. [statements and actions] in any sense represent an action hostile to the Arab people. . [or] in any way a failure on the part of this Government to live up to its assurance that in its view there should be no decision without consultation with both Arabs and Jews. defended his course before the House of Commons in debate. UN establishes a special committee on Palestine The Palestine question continued to plague the Middle Eastern powers through much of 1947. On March 22 King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan announced that his troops would occupy any part of Palestine evacuated by British garrisons.12 Meanwhile numbers of Jews gained entry into Palestine by covert means and the mandatory power, Great Britain, on April 7 asked France, Italy, and Sweden to cooperate by preventing illegal emigration from their ports to Palestine. The General Assembly of the UN, on May 13, 1947, by a vote of 47 to 7, with one abstention, adopted a resolution establishing a Special Committee on Palestine to study the situation and report to the Assembly not later than September first. The committee held its first meeting in Jerusalem on June 16 and after extensive investigations and inspections issued its report which was made public by the Assembly on September 3, 1947. Recommendations of the UN committee This report recommended the termination of the British mandate and asked for an independent Palestine at the earliest practicable date. During the necessary short transitional period between mandate and independence, Palestine was to be the responsibility of the UN and under its authority. Recommendations for preserving the sanctity of the Holy Places in Palestine were to be contained in the resulting constitution or constitutions of the new state or states. Prior to independence adherence to the principles and purposes of the UN for preserving international peace must be assured. The Arab League almost immediately denounced these recommendations. The Jewish Agency accepted the principles of the report on October 2nd, but Arabs in Palestine engaged in a strike as a protest against the committee's findings. Considerable unrest characterized the latter months of 1947 in the Middle East over the Palestine question. The danger of open conflict 12 Trans-Jordan which had been a type of British protectorate since World War I was given virtual independence early in 1946 and on Mar. 22, 1946 an alliance and mutual assistance pact were signed by the UK and Trans-Jordan. On May 25, 1946 the independence of the country was proclaimed and Emir Abdullah chosen as King. He retained a British soldier, Glubb Pasha, as military advisor and de facto army commander. UN resolution asks acceptance of partition plan was apparent and the tension was not eased when the UN General Assembly adopted on November 29th a resolution calling upon the United Kingdom, and all other UN members, to accept and facilitate a plan of partition for the division of Palestine according to recommendations before the Assembly. On December 5, 1947 the United States placed an embargo on the shipment of arms to the Middle East in an effort to discourage resort to violence in the area.18 On the 14th a crowd U. S. of 30,000 demonstrated in Cairo embargoes against the proposal for a partition arms shipments of Palestine. And on the 17th the to Middle East Arab League Council announced that its members had decided to use all necessary measures to prevent the division of Palestine as recommended by the UN. In the United States approval of the partition plan was general among those interested in the creation of a Jewish homeland. But opposition to the arms embargo was widespread on the part of those who feared it would operate against the Jews and for the Arabs. Representative Jacob Javits, of New York, with 29 of his House colleagues, on February 10, 1948, addressed an inquiry to Secretary of State Marshall, asking what the official position of the United States was on this issue. From the Secretary, Javits and his associates received this reply: SECRETARY MARSHALL'S STATEMENT ON MIDDLE EAST ARMS EMBARGO, WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 12, 1948: . . . This Government has no information . . . indicating that to date the continuance of British treaty shipments [of war-like materials] has interfered with the carrying out of the recommendation of the General Assembly at Palestine embodied in its resolution of November 29, 1947. . . . there have thus far been no overt acts which, Secretary Marshall defines U. S. policy on Palestine in the decision of the Security Council . . . have been determined to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. . . . The United States has consistently proclaimed its determination to see the provisions of the United Nations Charter complied with.... Until the Security Council has received and studied the report of the Palestine Commission ... and has reached a decision it is not possible for 1 Great Britain, obligated by military pacts with Egypt, TransJordan, and Iraq, continued to ship materiel to those Arab countries. this Government to determine in advance the steps which may be necessary to carry out such a decision. ... As the President and I have on several occasions made clear, we regard the solution of this immensely difficult problem as a United Nations solution.. Security Council calls for end to Palestine disorders On March 2, 1948 the Security Council adopted a resolution calling for a cessation of the disorders which were reaching serious proportions in Palestine.14 Instead of calming the turmoil the resolution appeared to have set new fires. On March 13th the Arab League proclaimed that a state of war existed between its members and the Jews of Palestine. The League announced that it would send forces to invade the Holy Land as soon as the British mandate was ended. Once again Secretary Marshall indicated that the United States favored UN action in Palestine, but that, if necessary, some prodding by the big powers might be useful. SECRETARY MARSHALL'S STATEMENT ON UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE PALESTINE CRISIS, LOS ANGELES, MARCH 20, 1948: The primary and overriding consideration . . . is the need to maintain the peace and to pre Secretary Marshall restates American policy vent chaos and widespread disorder upon the termination of the mandate on May 15, 1948. . . . The interest of the United States in a peaceful settlement in Palestine arises not only out of deep humanitarian considerations but also out of vital elements of our national security. The United States supported the partition plan for Palestine last autumn. .. We sought to have the Security Council accept the plan as a basis for its own action in the matter. This it refused to do on March 5, 1948. We then sought to find through consultations among the five principal powers some basis of agreement. . . . These consultations were unsuccessful. . . . Informal consultations with other members of the council have made it clear that the Security Council would not now pass a resolution to proceed with partition. In addition . . we have attempted by diplomatic means to obtain a wider degree of acceptance of the recommendation of the General Assembly. These efforts did not lead to any substantial result. . . . A truce is essential. The United States suggestion is that a temporary trusteeship should be established. . . . without prejudice in any way to the eventual settlement. . . . we are seeking a solution within the framework of the United ... 14 See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XVIII:344, Mar. 14, 1948. |