President Truman appeals to Mossadeq ance of Mr. W. Averell Harriman, administrator of the mutual aid program, as advisor and mediator.55 Premier Mossadeq, in his reply of July 11th, accepted the offer of Mr. Harriman's services, but would not agree to further concessions. Mr. Harriman arrived at Teheran on the 15th. He immediately began conferences with the Iranians and with the British mission in Teheran. These talks proved fruitless and the negotiations were suspended by the British on August 22, 1951. On September 12th Mossadeq sent an ultimatum to the British, dispatching it through the State Department, a barely disguised insult to the British.56 Complete occupation of the Abadan oil facilities by the Iranian government began on the 27th and on the following day the United Kingdom appealed to the Security Council to examine the question. The Council began debate on the issue on October 1, 1951.57 Britain places oil issue before the UN Security Council During the week of October 15-19 the Security Council held daily meetings on the question. Premier Mossadeq, at the invitation of the Council, appeared in behalf of his position twice. He argued that the Council was not competent to hear the British complaint. But, he said, he was willing to resume direct negotiations with the British government if London would recognize the matter as a domestic dispute and not an international matter. When the British failed to agree, the Council on October 19 voted 8 to 1 (the U.S.S.R. in opposition and the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia abstaining) to defer decision until the International Court ruled on its own competence to hear the case. Mr. Mossadeq then decided to make a personal appeal to the United States government. He arrived in Washington on October 31st and for almost two weeks conducted a campaign of histrionics, public and private arguments, and threats-all of which failed to win him the goal he sought. Mossadeq makes a personal appeal to the United States 55 See ibid., XXV:129-30, July 23, 1951, for Pres. Truman's letter to Mossadeq. 56 See U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXV:547-50, Oct. 1, 1951, for the exchange of US-Iranian messages. See ibid., XXV:615, Oct. 15, 1951, for Mr. Austin's statement justifying UN consideration of the dispute. The year 1952 was marked primarily by internal conflicts within the Iranian government and by the demonstrable failure of the Iranians to make a success of operating the petroleum U.S. continues facilities taken over in the nationaliaid to Iran zation move. Insofar as IranianAmerican relations were concerned the two countries proceeded much as before the crisis. The Point Four program for Iran was promised additional funds on January 19, 1952, but on March 20th it was announced that a final judgment on further aid to Iran would be postponed while the oil question remained unsettled. It was made clear by the United States, however, that the granting of financial aid would not be conditional upon Iran's acceptance of any specific terms. On April 1, 1952 the United States and Iran signed a supplementary Point Four agreement; on the 7th it was announced that the United States was extending emergency financial aid to Iranian students stranded in the United States by shortages of funds, and on the 24th the State Department announced that military aid to Iran would be continued. So, Iran could not complain that the intransigeance of Mossadeq toward Britain had lost Iran any particular advantage with the United States. Mossadeq granted dictatorial powers The dispute went on. On June 9th Mossadeq presented the Iranian side of the case to the International Court. Then ensued a puzzling series of domestic political happenings in Teheran. Mossadeq resigned as Prime Minister on July 5th. On the 11th he was asked by the Shah to form a new cabinet. On the 16th he was out again, replaced by Ahmed Qavam. By the 21st Qavam was out and Mossadeq was back in power on the 22nd. The decision of the International Court, on that same date, to the effect that it had no jurisdiction to Iran breaks relations with U. K. October 16th Mossadeq announced that Iran was breaking off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, effective the 22nd. Assistant Secretary Byroade, in an address at Chicago on October 5, 1952, referred in passing to the oil crisis, restating the American position that it wished the two disputants would settle the issue, but that Iran should have full consideration for the development of its natural resources. However, he pointed out that since nearly one-half of the world's proven oil reserves are in the Middle East area, any prolongation of the stoppage of production would that "the industries of our allies would be paralyzed and our own would be overworked."81 The following day the State Department announced that the United States government would not buy Iranian oil to aid the faltering Iranian economy. If private American oil companies wished to bargain with the Iranian government for purchase of the oil, the United States would not interfere, but it would not encourage such negotiations. U. S. views stoppage of Iranian oil production with alarm mean With the new year internal troubles increased in Iran, due in part to the worsening economic situation with the government unable to operate the oil facilities at anything near their normal capacity. After putting down riots in Teheran, January 2-4, 1953, Mossadeq got a vote of confidence from the Majlis on the 6th, and on the 19th the parliament extended the Premier's dictatorial powers for a year, to February 9, 1954. Meanwhile, the Iranians sought to sell oil in world markets and shipped some on non-British tankers. The Anglo-Iranian company, acting with the support of the British government immediately claimed the right to seize the oil and several vessels carrying the "hot oil" were halted at British-controlled ports in the Middle East. New riots broke out in Teheran in February 1953 and on the 28th Mossadeq narrowly escaped U. S. decides to suspend aid to Iran On May 5, 1953 Mossadeq appealed to the United States government for economic aid. However, Secretary Dulles and Harold Stassen, in the Middle East on a survey trip at the time, studiedly avoided visiting Iran.62 At the end of June, the United States announced that it had contributed $47,000,000 in aid to Iran since 1947, exclusive of military assistance, but apparently the Iranian government was not content with this appreciable sum and was constantly seeking further funds to supplement the inadequate returns from its diminished oil production program. On July 3rd, Iran made an agreement with Italian and Japanese companies See U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXVIII:831-35, June 15. 1953, for Sec. Dulles' report on his trip. See also p. 248 above. to sell $20,000,000 worth of oil annually to them. The State Department, thereupon, made public, on the 9th, a letter President Eisenhower had written on May 29th, telling the Iranians that the United States could give no further financial aid to that country. On July 14, Mossadeq became the undisputed ruler of the Iranian government when twentyseven of his followers resigned from parliament, leaving the Majlis without a quorum with which to operate. Anti-Mossadeq riots broke out in Teheran. on the 21st and on the 25th the Mossadeq cabinet abolished secret voting in the country's imminent elections. Mossadeq overthrown, arrested, and charged with treason A week later Mossadeq dissolved the Majlis and on August 10th his action was approved by the majority of the voters casting ballots in a controlled, non-secret election.63 This led to more rioting in the capital and in midAugust Mossadeq was deposed as premier, being succeeded by Major General Fazollah Zahedi who had the support of the Shah. A group of royalists and army officers combined to capture Mossadeq and on August 24 he was imprisoned on charges of treason. The new Zahedi cabinet took over control of the government and Zahedi at once began talks with Mr. Loy Henderson, American ambassador, on the subject of possible American aid to his country. On the 26th President Eisenhower promised a resumption of United States aid,64 and on September 3rd it was announced that $23,400,000 for technical and military assistance would be made available shortly. Two days later Washington revealed that $45,000,000 additional aid under the Mutual Security Act would be granted to Iran, bringing the total grants during the fiscal year up to $97,500,000. U. S. decides to resume aid to Iran With Mossadeq out of circulation, political conditions in Iran became more tranquil, although occasional riots and demonstrations indi 63 On Aug. 10 the Iranian government announced that it would soon open high level talks with the Soviet Union. A one-year trade pact between the two nations had been signed June 12, 1953. * See U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXIX:349-50, Sept. 14, 1953, for the text of the exchange of letters. Sec. Dulles, July 28, 1953, had reported that the U. S. was worried over the possible advantage the Communists might take in the troubled situation in Iran. President sends Herbert Hoover, Jr. to Iran to seek settlement of oil issue cated that serenity was not to be expected. At least the Zahedi government appeared more friendly to the United States and seemed willing to talk about the oil situation once more. President Eisenhower announced on October 15th that the State Department was sending Herbert Hoover, Jr., to Iran to study the situation. And on December 5th relations between the United Kingdom and Iran, broken off by Mossadeq in October 1952, were resumed. After a prolonged and noisy trial exPremier Mossadeq was convicted on December 21, 1953 and sentenced to three years in prison. For the time being he seemed to have lost his influence in Iranian politics and the western nations believed they had more reasonable men with whom to deal. On April 10th 1954 the Iranian government announced that it was ready to begin negotiations with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and other interested concerns, looking to a set U. S. and Iran tlement of the issues. These talks discuss occupied much of the spring and defense pact early summer of 1954. While they were in process, it was reported that the United States and Iran were engaged in discussion of a mutual defense pact. The Soviet Union, on July 8th, demanded an explanation of the proposal, saying it would be a violation of the 1927 Soviet-Iranian friendship treaty. To this demand Iran replied, on July 18th, that it had a sovereign right to enter into any defense arrangement it chose to negotiate. Premier Zahedi, July 27th, urged that his country end its isolation and open the way for alignment with the free world. At last, on August 5th came the news that the Iranian government and eight oil companies from several Western nations had concluded agree President Eisenhower praised Mr. Hoover for his work in a statement issued August 7th.66 And the Iranian leaders echoed their pleasure on the 9th with thanks for President Eisenhower's good offices.67 As an evidence of their appreciation the Iranian government offered a contribution for the relief of the victims of the New England hurricanes of the late summer. Now it was the turn of the United States government to express its thanks to Iran and this the President did on September 10, 1954.68 So, the long and often acrimonious conflict over the oil question seemed at an end. Iranian oil once again began flowing through Oil shipments the pipelines to the Abadan refinerfrom Iran ies, and thence to the tankers that resumed were to carry it to America's western allies. The resumption of oil shipments from Iran relieved the pressure on United States domestic sources and on such areas of production as Dutch Guiana, enabling reserves to be kept at higher levels and stockpiling to go on without the danger of depletion of known fields. This "case study" has been presented in some detail to show how the United States almost automatically became involved in what looked to be a private controversy between a Middle East government and a corporation "protected" by the United Kingdom. As soon as Britain was involved, the United States had to face the question of what to do to support the British who needed the oil to maintain their role in the partnership of NATO, or to support the Iranians who sought to assert their rights to independence and the control of their one great natural resource. Outright favoritism for either side in the quarrel would have alienated the other. If the United States had thrown the full strength of its influence to Britain, Iran might easily have turned to the Soviet Union for protection. If Washington had demanded a settlement on Iranian terms, the dangers to the Western alliance would have been great. While both adversaries gave occasional cause for aggravation, the United States and its diplomatic agents tried conciliation, argument, and aid in • Ibid., XXXI:266, Aug. 23, 1954. • Ibid., XXXI:266-67, Aug. 23, 1954. • Ibid., XXXI:396-97, Sept. 20, 1954. The Majlis ratified the oil agreement, the lower house on Oct. 21, 1954 and the upper chamber on the 28th. The first shipment left the Abadan refineries in an Anglo-Iranian company tanker Oct. 31. various measures for both parties. In the end this course paid dividends and as a result Iran is, at present, retained in the camp of the free world, not by compulsion but by a willingness to serve in its own best interest. 5. Britain and the United States-The Another area of the Middle East where British interests and American policy became closely involved during the postwar period was in Egypt. Although American involvement here was less direct than in Palestine and Iran, it was nonetheless significant. A bit of background is necessary to set the scene. To quote from a recent publication: From 1882 to 1914 Egypt, although dependent upon Turkey, was virtually a British possession, with British troops garrisoned in Egypt to maintain order and to guard the [Suez] Background Canal. In 1914 Egypt was proclaimed a of the British protectorate and in 1922, as a Anglo-Egyptian result of Egyptian nationalist pressures, controversy was recognized as an independent kingdom. Still the British stayed on to protect the canal. A treaty between Egypt and the United Kingdom, in 1936, affirmed the special interest of Britain in safeguarding the canal and Nile Delta, but provided for the withdrawal of British troops from other parts of Egypt. In World War II Egypt was neutral but became a battleground when Axis forces attempted to capture Suez.70 Throughout this period to 1945 the United States had only minor interests in Egypt and these were dealt with usually by consultation with South of Egypt proper the British and Egyptians held joint control over the vast Anglo-Egyptian Sudan through a condominium arAmericans rangement reached in 1898. In this in the Sudan area, too, principally at Khartoum during at the junction of the White and World War II Blue Niles, and at El Fasher in the western Sudan, American Air Force personnel were present in numbers during most of World War II. So, it is safe to say, the beginning of general awareness of British-Egyptian problems on the part of Americans dates from the period of America's alliance with Britain in the Second World War." 71 There were many roots of discontent in the Egyptian situation during the period of British dominance there. Mainly they were characteristic Britain's trade routes require control of Suez Canal of the times, with anti-colonialism a potent factor in that part of the world just as it was in so many quarters in the first half of the 20th century. Egyptians resented the presence of British troops in their country and they aspired to complete independence. On the other hand, Britain, wishing to be rid of the burdens of overseas commitments, did not see how control of the vital shipping route through the Suez Canal could safely be left to a politically unstable and economically weak country such as Egypt. So long as Britain's world position depended on international trade and colonial markets the British had to be assured that the Suez waterway would remain open and in competent hands. Numerous other irritants vexed British-Egyptian relations, but the Suez issue was the principal one. In the main, the position of the United States in 1945 was that Britain was to have free rein in this area and that the United States would support British actions. However, WashU. S. generally ington reserved freedom of choice supports and, of course, hoped that Britain British policy would use its dominance wisely, for in Egypt there was ample sentiment in the United States in favor of an end to colonialism wherever it existed. The entry of the 71 American technicians and diplomatic personnel journeyed to many of the remote portions of Egypt and the Sudan during the war period in pursuit of their duties. United States into the Anglo-Egyptian controversy did not occur for several years after the end of World War II. During that time a series of events divided the two countries, Britain and Egypt, to a point where reconciliation seemed impossible. Egypt asks modification of 1936 treaty Shortly before VJ-Day the Egyptian government, speaking as a charter member of the United Nations, asked the United Kingdom to modify the 1936 treaty, to evacuate all British troops from Egypt, to end British control of the Suez region, and to allow the annexation by Egypt of the Sudan. The newly installed Labour government of Prime Minister Attlee, while committed to a policy of reducing controls over dependent areas, was not yet ready to acquiesce in the Egyptian request. At the opening of the Egyptian parliament, November 12, 1946, King Farouk stressed the determination of the Egyptians to secure the withdrawal of foreign troops from their country. And on December 16th the Egyptian government renewed its demand that the British begin negotiations for revision of the 1936 treaty. To this the British replied on January 28, 1947 that they were agreeable to reviewing the treaty. Thereupon the Egyptian nationalist party, the Wafd, announced that it would not be bound by the results of the negotiations with the British and Britain votes to withdraw troops from Egypt would press for rapid and complete removal of all British influence in Egypt and the Sudan. Cairo students, always violently political, rioted in disapproval of the government's plan to negotiate and supported the Wafdist demand for action. During a week of rioting, British troops, defending British property in Egypt, fired on Egyptians and the situation became worse. On March 7th a new Egyptian premier, Ismail Sidky Pasha, agreed to proceed with the treaty revision talks without bowing to the Wafdist pressures.72 And on the eve of the opening of the discussions, the British House of Commons voted 327 to 158 to withdraw Britain's troops from Egypt.78 For a time a peaceful solution seemed attainable. On November 1, 1946, Sidky Pasha who had 72 The former premier Norasky Pasha had resigned in the midst of the disorders. 73 The vote came on May 7, 1946; the meetings began on the 9th. |