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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY in Growth AND ACTION

Canada, and pro-Southern sentiment in Britain ran high. Earl Russell, British Foreign Secretary, sent an ultimatum to Washington demanding release of the prisoners and an apology for the affront to the British flag. France and several other powers supported the British stand. The United States found itself in the role of denying the same principles for which it had fought Britain in 1812, opposition to the search and seizure of individuals aboard a neutral ship.* President Lincoln's cabinet, after long consideration, decided to release the prisoners and make an official explanation to Great Britain. This latter task fell to Secretary Seward who communicated the explanation to Lord Lyons, British Minister in Washington.

SECRETARY SEWARD'S LETTER TO LORD LYONS, WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 26, 1861: ... The British government has rightly conjectured, what it is now my duty to state, that Captain Wilkes

acted upon his own suggestions of duty, without any direction or instruction, or even foreknowledge of it, on the part of this government. . . . The British government will justly infer from these facts that the United States not only have no purpose, but even no thought, of forcing into discussion the question which has arisen, or any other which could affect in any way the sensibilities of the British nation. . . . In the present case, Captain Wilkes, after capturing the contraband persons and making prize of the Trent in what seems to be a perfectly lawful manner, instead of sending her into port, released her from the capture, and permitted her to proceed with her cargo upon her voyage. He thus effectually prevented the judicial examination which might otherwise have occurred. . . . I have not been unaware that, in examining this question, I have fallen into an argument for what seems to be the British side of it against my own country. I discovered that I was really defending and maintaining, not an exclusively British interest, but an old, honored, and cherished American cause. ... If I decide this case in favor of my own government, I must disavow its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever abandon its essential policy. . . . It will be seen, therefore, that this government could not deny the justice of the claim presented to us in this respect on its merits. We are asked to do to the British nation just what we have always insisted all nations ought to do to us. . . .

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This handsome disclaimer by Seward satisfied the British and placated Northern sentiment for punishment of the Confederate agents as well as for a determined stand against the British-a stand which might have led to a war which

See pp. 5-6 above.

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others. Very little secrecy surroundBritain violates ed these ship-building enterprises, the spirit of and the American Minister in Lonneutrality don, Charles Francis Adams, repeatedly called to the attention of the British government this violation of true neutrality as well as of the spirit of the British laws.

However, the partially completed Alabama slipped to sea on July 29, 1862 before any attempt was made by the British to detain the vessel. The Alabama put in at the Azores and there received her equipment and crew sent from England on two other ships. With her sister raiders, the Alabama roved the high seas and burned, sank, or otherwise disabled more than 250 Northern vessels from European to Far Eastern waters. Adams kept the British Foreign Office bombarded with lists of depredations by the Confederate raiders and claims for damages. Finally, in 1863, the British seized the Alexandra, a warship being built for the Confederacy in England. This belated recognition by the British of the violations of its neutrality did not undo the damage already inflicted by the ships, but it did end the construction in Britain of such vessels.

At the same time the Alabama and other ships were being built in England, the Laird shipyards at Birkenhead began the construction of a number of powerful ironclad rams designed to break the Northern blockade of the Confederacy. When the rams were nearly completed, Lord Russell, the British Foreign Minister, issued confidential orders, on September 3, 1863, to detain the rams. Adams, not knowing of Russell's order, protested to Russell.

MINISTER ADAMS' NOTE TO EARL RUSSELL, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 5, 1863: . . . It would be superfluous in me to point out to your

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lordship that this is war. No matter what may be the theory adopted of neutrality in a struggle, when this process is carried on in the manner indicated, from a territory and with the aid of the subjects of a third party, that third party to all intents and purposes ceases to be a neutral. . . . In my belief it is impossible that any nation, retaining a proper degree of self-respect, could tamely submit to a continuance of relations so utterly deficient in reciprocity.

Napoleon III attempts a subterfuge

Adams' note was really "superfluous" as has been indicated. Britain followed its action in detaining the rams by purchasing them for the British navy at a price in excess of their construction cost. The Confederates turned to France as a last hope for the building of four Alabama-type vessels and of two rams. Napoleon III agreed to the transaction but stipulated that the ultimate destination of the vessels be kept secret. In June 1864 the secret became known and the Emperor directed that the builders must sell the ships openly to non-belligerents. This was done and only one of the rams, sold first to Denmark and thence transferred to the Confederates, finally reached American waters, but too late to be used in the war. The detention of the rams built earlier in Britain prevented them from having any direct influence on the events of the war. But the damage done by the Confederate raiders, Alabama, Florida, Shenandoah, etc., led to the postwar claims negotiations which will be dealt with in a subsequent section.5

The Monroe Doctrine involved

During the Civil War two outstanding crises occurred over the Monroe Doctrine. The first was the establishment in Mexico of an imperial government by the French Emperor with Maximilian, an Austrian Archduke as its ruler. The other was the reannexation by Spain of its former possession, the Dominican Republic. The Dominican affair was by far the less serious of the two. There the Republic, suffering from a series of bloody revolutions, asked Spain to take the country back into the Spanish empire. This the Spaniards did in May 1861. Secretary Seward,

in anticipation of the Spanish action, Spain had challenged Spain's right to anreoccupies nex Santo Domingo. The Spanish the Dominican government ignored Seward's note Republic of April 2, 1861, and, upon later

5 See pp. 26-27 below.

protests by Seward, defended its course without mentioning Seward's references to the Monroe Doctrine. Spanish control of the repossessed colony was short-lived. Oppressive measures by the Spanish officials brought on a fierce revolt. The Spaniards voluntarily withdrew from the island in 1865, possibly because of the implied threat of American intervention by Federal troops released from battling the Confederacy. The Monroe Doctrine had been invoked, although the original pronouncement said nothing about the reincorporation of colonies with the consent of the colonials. The Spaniards had refused to admit the existence of the doctrine. And events made a decision unnecessary at this time.

Just before the outbreak of the Civil War, relations between the United States and Mexico were so unsettled that President Buchanan attempted to get Congressional approval for the dispatch of American troops into Mexico to collect indemnities for the destruction of American lives and property. He also tried to purchase territory in Lower California to protect American interests in Mexico. These efforts, as well as a treaty negotiated in 1859 to give the United States a perpetual right of way across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, failed.

Mexico suspends payments on foreign debts

With the United States preoccupied by war, Mexico passed a law on July 17, 1861 suspending payments on the government's foreign obligations for two years. British, French, and Spanish investors protested and in October 1861 a Convention was signed in London by representatives of the three powers which provided for a joint military expedition to collect the defaulted debts. In December 1861 a Spanish force captured Vera Cruz, but the British and Spanish withdrew from the tripartite action after a disagreement with the French. This left Emperor Napoleon III in a position to go it alone. He had already selected Archduke Maximilian as a puppet to head a Latin Catholic monarchy to be erected in Mexico as a bulwark against possible American expansion.

French forces occupied Mexico City, June 7, 1863, and a specially selected Assembly of Notables

Maximilian chosen as Emperor of Mexico

invited Maximilian to accept the crown. The Americans had not paid very much attention to developments in Mexico in 1861 and 1862. But the State Department watched the situation and several times put the United States on record as opposing foreign acquisition of territory in Mexico. As the Civil War neared its close the Americans turned their thoughts to the use of troops to drive the French out of Mexico. Seward used several diplomatic avenues to try to convince Napoleon III to withdraw his forces which were the main support of Maximilian. Finally Seward warned the French minister in Washington, the Marquis de Montholon.

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SECRETARY SEWARD'S NOTE TO DE MONTHOLON, WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 12, 1866: ... it is my duty to insist that, whatever were the intentions, purposes, and objects of France, the proceedings which were adopted by a class of Mexicans for subverting the republican government there, and for availing themselves of French intervention are regarded by the United States as having been taken without the authority, and prosecuted against the will and opinions, of the Mexican people. The withdrawal of the French forces is deemed necessary. .. [The United States] . . recognizes, and must continue to recognize, in Mexico, only the ancient republic. . . . We adhere to our position that the war. . has become a political war between France and the republic of Mexico, injurious and dangerous to the United States and to the republiwe shall be gratified when the Emperor [Napoleon III] shall give to us . . . definitive informations of the time when French military operations may be expected to cease in Mexico. . . . On April 5, 1866 the French government announced that the French troops would be withdrawn from Mexico over a 19-month period. Deprived of French military and financial support, Maximilian's empire crumbled. Maximilian himself fell into the hands of Benito Juarez, the guerilla chief who had carried on a war against the Emperor for three years, and was executed by a firing squad, June 19, 1867.

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doctrine. "The French invasion of Mexico threatened America's national security, and on the basis of self-defense the United States was fully justified in asking the French to leave.... [the doctrine's] principles were implicit in the diplomatic discussion; and not for a single moment did Seward surrender them." With its employment, albeit silently, in this Civil War period, the Monroe Doctrine became acknowledged and respected abroad as well as in the United States.

2. Anglo-American Relations: 1865-1895

Expansion to Canada becomes improbable

During the thirty years following the Civil War the foundations were laid upon which the AngloAmerican accord of the 20th century has been built. Differences between the two great English-speaking powers continued to exist. But in the main, avenues of peaceful settlement of disputes were explored in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and joint effort to reach amicable solutions to the problems. Irritations during and just after the war with respect to Canada have already been mentioned. When the Dominion of Canada was created on July 1, 1867, it was generally recognized that American annexation of that country was no longer a likelihood, in spite of occasional eruptions of expansionist sentiment in the United States and several expeditions across the border by Irish Fenians in attempts to embroil the United States and Britain in hostilities calculated to win advantages for the Irish at home.

After a somewhat unfortunate false start when the American minister in London, Reverdy Johnson, signed a convention with Lord The "Alabama" Clarendon, the British Foreign Minclaims ister, on January 14, 1869, the negotiations for the settlement of the Alabama claims were at a standstill. The Johnson-Clarendon Convention, although it proposed to adjust individual claims on both sides dating back to 1853, did not mention the Alabama or the loss to American shipping from actions by the British-built raiders. The Senate rejected the

Bailey, op. cit., p. 389.

1 See p. 18 above.

agreement, 54 to 1, after a fiery and intemperate speech by Charles Sumner on April 13, 1869.

United States and Britain turn to arbitration

Late in 1869 informal conversations between Sir John Rose, Canadian Minister of Finance, and Hamilton Fish, successor to Seward as Secretary of State, led to further discussion of matters in dispute. Finally a joint commission was created by the United States, Britain, and Canada to examine the situation. Meetings took place in Washington in the spring of 1871. The result was the lengthy Treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871 which went beyond the single question of the Alabama claims. These claims were to be referred to a board of arbitrators consisting of five members, one each to be selected by Britain, the United States, Italy, Switzerland, and Brazil. The inclusion of three neutral members, and the insertion by Britain of an apology for allowing the Alabama to escape to sea were regarded by the Americans as a virtual surrender of the British case. Moreover, the treaty set forth three rules to guide the arbitrators.

RULES EMBODIED IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TREATY, WASHINGTON, MAY 8, 1871:

a neutral Government is bound-First, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a Power with which it is at peace; and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel... as above. . . . Secondly, not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the others, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men. Thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties.

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Other provisions of the treaty referred the northwest boundary dispute relating to the San Juan islands and the line through the Juan de Fuca Straits to the German Emperor as arbitrator. The Americans were given almost unlimited fishing rights along the Canadian east coast and the British and Canadians received similar privileges south to Delaware Bay. A commission was also set up to decide general claims of both sides. The Alabama claims tribunal met at Geneva, Switzerland, on December 15, 1871 and handed

down its final decision the following September. The United States was awarded $15,500,000 upon the finding by the arbitrators that Britain had failed to exercise due diligence in the cases of the Alabama and the two other raiders. Later decisions by other arbitrators provided for by the treaty awarded Britain $1,929,819 for general claims, and $5,500,000 for fisheries claims, while the German Emperor upheld the American rights to the San Juan islands. As Bailey remarks:

In assessing the Treaty of Washington, we may conclude that it was the greatest triumph for arbitral methods that the world had yet witnessed. It provided for four significant arbitrations, three of them of major importance. It was one of those periodic purgations that dispelled every serious cloud in Anglo-American relations.8

AngloAmerican frictions in Cleveland's

The Treaty of Washington did not settle all matters between the United States and Britain, but no new crisis of any significant proportions arose before 1895. There had been troubles over Canadian fisheries and over sealing in the North Pacific. In Grover Cleveland's first administration a minor incident inflamed tempers for a time. This was over the injudicious action of the British. minister in Washington, Sir Lionel Sackville-West, who meddled in the presidential campaign of 1888. President Cleveland demanded the immediate recall of the indiscreet diplomat.(20)

time

For many years the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana had been in dispute. Finally in 1887 the Venezuelans broke off diplomatic relations with Britain because Britain would not submit the issue to arbitration on Venezuelan terms. Early in 1895 both houses of the American Congress adopted a resolution urging arbitration of the dispute. Richard Olney, Cleveland's Secretary of State, sent a note to Thomas F. Bayard, American ambassador in London, protesting what he termed Britain's violation of the Monroe Doctrine in refusing to arbitrate the controversy.

SECRETARY OLNEY'S DISPATCH TO AMBASSADOR BAYARD, WASHINGTON, JULY 20, 1895: ... the Government of the United States has made it clear to Great Britain and to the world that the controversy is one in which both its honor and its interests are involved and the continuance of which it can not regard with indifference. . . . We are now

8 Bailey, op. cit., p. 422.

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concerned ... with that . . . practical application of the Monroe doctrine the disregard of which by an European power is to be deemed an act of unfriendliness toward the United States. The precise scope and limitations of this rule cannot be too clearly apprehended. It does not establish any general protectorate by the United States over other American states. It does not relieve any American state from its obligations as fixed by international law nor prevent any European power directly interested from enforcing such obligations or from inflicting merited punishment for the breach of them. It does not contemplate any interference in the internal affairs of any American state or in the relations between it and other American states. It does not justify any attempt on our part to change the established form of government of any American state or to prevent the people of such state from altering that form according to their own will and pleasure. The rule in question has but a single purpose and object. It is that no European power or combination of European powers shall forcibly deprive an American state of the right and power of self-government and of shaping for itself its own. political fortunes and destinies. . . . Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or good will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized state, nor because wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers. . . . It seems therefore quite impossible that this position of Great Britain should be assented to by the United States, or that, if such position be adhered to with the result of enlarging the bounds of British Guiana, it should not be regarded as amounting, in substance, to an invasion and conquest of Venezuelan territory.. Secretary Olney's strained interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine found favor in America but did not provoke the British to early action. After four months of delay, Lord Salisbury, Britain's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, replied in two notes on November 26, 1895. He asserted that the Monroe Doctrine was not applicable to the Venezuelan situation, that the doctrine was not recognized in international law, and that it was not relevant to the boundary question. President Cleveland drafted a message to Congress, criticizing Lord Salisbury's stand and recommending the creation of a commission to investigate the situation.

Olney strains the Monroe Doctrine

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PRESIDENT CLEVELAND'S MESSAGE CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 1895: . . . If a European power, by an extension of its boundaries, takes possession of the territory of one of our neighboring Republics against its will and in derogation of its rights, it is difficult to see why to that extent such European power does not thereby attempt to extend its system of government to that portion of this continent which is thus taken. . . Practically the principle for which we contend may not have been admitted in so many words to the code of international law, but since in international councils every nation is entitled to the rights belonging to it, if the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine is something we may justly claim it has its place in the code of international law as certainly and as securely as if it were specifically mentioned. .. Assuming . . . that the attitude of Venezuela will remain unchanged, the dispute has reached such a stage as to make it now incumbent upon the United States to take measures to determine with sufficient certainty for its justification what is the true divisional line between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana. When [the investigation com

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Britain seeks agreement with the United States

Cleveland's message, which practically insisted that the United States decide what the boundary line was to be, received loud acclaim in the Congress and from the country. The British, while alarmed by the President's belligerent message and its warm reception in the United States, refused to get too upset over the matter. Occupied with the Boer troubles in South Africa, as well as with the illconsidered action of the German Kaiser in congratulating President Kruger of the Boer republic on his capture of the Jameson raiders, the British were in a conciliatory mood toward the United States. They provided the American boundary commission with data and agreed Britain accepts to a treaty with Venezuela which the Monroe was signed February 2, 1897. This Doctrine arranged for the submission of the boundary dispute to an arbitration board. The board decided, October 3, 1899, that the line would be substantially that which Britain

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