... . solved when it refused to give approval to a Communist-contrived law. . . . The master plan of international communism is to gain a solid political base in this hemisphere. It was not the power of the Arbenz government that concerned us but the power behind it. If world communism captures any American State... a new and perilous front is established. . . . This situation in Guatemala had become so dangerous that the American States could not ignore it. At Caracas. [they] adopted a momentous statement. This Caracas Declaration precipitated a dramatic chain of events. . . . In the face of these events... the nations of this hemisphere laid further plans to grapple with the danger. The Arbenz government responded with an effort to disrupt the interAmerican system. Because it enjoyed the full support of Soviet Russia ... it tried to bring the matter before the Security Council. It did so without first referring the matter to the American regional organization as is called for both by the United Nations Charter itself and by the treaty creating the American organization.. the Security Council decided not to take up the Guatemalan matter but to leave it in the first instance to the American States themselves. That was a triumph for the system of balance between regional organization and world organization.... The American States then moved promptly to deal with the situation. . . . Never before has there been so clear a call uttered with such a sense of urgency and strong resolve. . . . We can all be grateful that we showed at Caracas an impressive solidarity in support of our American institutions. [and] that the Organization of American States showed that it could act quickly and vigorously in aid of peace. There was proof that our American organization is not just a paper organization, but that it has vigor and vitality to act. . . . The need for vigilance is not past. But . . . one grave danger has been averted. . . . The United States pledges itself not merely to political opposition to communism but to help alleviate conditions in Guatemala and elsewhere which might afford communism an opportunity to spread its tentacles throughout the hemisphere. . . . With these events, the Guatemalan revolt was soon over. On July 2, 1954, a junta composed of End of the Guatemala revolt ... Señor Elfego Monzon and Colonel Armas took charge. Ambassador Peurifoy was instrumental in arranging the armistice and the peace which followed, and it is reported that he influenced Armas to accept second place in the junta set up to rule the republic. The OAS voted 18 to 1 to postpone the scheduled Rio meeting indefinitely.32 Troops directed by Colonel 32 Argentina cast the negative vote. Ecuador abstained from voting. Much of credit for settlement in Guatemala owed to U. S. actions The United States was generally regarded as having moved quickly and successfully in the Guatemalan situation. The work of the State Department received much needed praise at a time when American foreign policy had taken some severe blows in the Far East and in Europe. It was popularly held that firm and intelligent action by Secretary Dulles, Ambassador Peurifoy, and others had enabled the American States to meet a direct threat by the Soviet expansionists in their attempt to capitalize on a foothold in Central America. With the downfall of the Arbenz government, the communists not only lost their foothold, but also their best chance of extending their controls to neighboring countries and, possibly, to the Panama Canal Zone itself. Guatemala still a troubled area It would be fortunate if this chapter could end on this cheerful note. However, it must be added that the situation in Guatemala has not continued to improve with the hoped-for rapidity. An attempted army rebellion occurred there in early August 1954 and on August 11th President Armas replaced the 1945 constitution with a temporary statute. The internal situation continued unsettled throughout the summer and autumn. It remains to be seen whether the removal of the threat of outside intervention by Soviet agents and the eradication of communist influence within the country will leave the anticommunist forces with enough vitality and unity to improve economic and social conditions which led so many Guatemalans to be attracted by the communist-directed program. Canada and the U. S. are interdependent Fundamental to the development of a sound foreign policy leading to security for the United States has been the reliance upon the cooperation of Canada. This reliance gives the United States assurance that in the defense of North America against possible attack Canada will stand firm. And it affords Canada an equal assurance that its powerful neighbor to the South can be counted on to help defend Canada from aggression. During World War II relations between Canada and the United States were close and friendly. After the war they continued on the same basis, and, if anything, they are today even more cooperative than they were in wartime. Although there have been occasional differences between the two nations since 1945, they have been on such a minor scale and have been so readily resolved that they may almost be regarded as nonexistent. If relations with other foreign countries, both neighbors and distant powers, could be as peaceful and mutually advantageous, the problems of conducting foreign policy out of Washington would indeed be on a happy footing. Canada's position as a member of the worldwide British Commonwealth of Nations affects but rarely complicates her relations with the 33 Domestic unrest, political scandals, and personalities plagued Brazil during this period. After yielding to military pressure to vacate his office on August 24, 1954, President Vargas killed himself. In the riots which followed Vargas' suicide, many demonstrators aimed their protests at United States installations and business firms. Reports accused communists of instigating the anti-United States incidents. The dual position of Canada United States. Canada, a self-gov erning country with virtually com- but moves in relation with the United States, within the UN, and within the British union as a free and undominated individual. Canada has her own flag and her own citizenship, and sends her own ambassador to the United States, as well as her own delegations to the United Nations, where she has an independent vote just as do the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, all, in one or another status, fellow-members of the Commonwealth. It is clear, therefore, that while Canada retains a certain allegiance to the British crown, Canadian-United States relations are a separate matter reserved for friendly discussion between neighbors living on adjoining plots of real estate.84 Canada exposes the Soviet spy-rings For the first few years following World War II relations between the United States and Canada dealt mainly with routine matters. Both countries were occupied with readjusting domestic economies and recovering from wartime strains. Canada early became aware of the Soviet threat to world peace through the disclosures of Igor Guzenko, code clerk in the Soviet embassy in Ottawa. Guzenko's information on the activity of Russian spy rings in Canada and the United States alerted the Canadians, and brought on a series of investigations and trials which demonstrated the Canadian government's intent to deal firmly but in a just and unsensational manner with those who had participated in espionage activities. The Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, and his subordinates kept the United States informed of such aspects of the case as affected the interests of the United States. The report of the Royal Commission, issued on July 15, 1946, was a factual and revealing testimony to the extent and skill with which the espionage rings operated. In 1947 the two neighboring nations began to take more active measures for coordinating their 34 Canada still has a governor-general appointed by and representing the Crown. But his appointment is made subject to Canadian government consent. Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander was Governor-General from July 31, 1945 until he was succeeded by Vincent Massey, a native Canadian, Feb. 28, 1952. defense efforts. U. S. and Canada agree on joint defense facilities Governor-General Alexander visited President Truman in Washington, February 4th to 6th and shortly afterwards, on the 12th, it was announced that there would be "mutual and reciprocal availability of military, naval and air facilities" between the United States and Canada.35 Some criticism of this statement was voiced in Canada, but Mackenzie King told his countrymen that the arrangements did not endanger Canadian sovereignty, and added that no plan for ceding bases to the United States was involved. However, the agreement did make possible the setting up of nine joint weather stations in the arctic and a joint base at Churchill, on Hudson Bay. President Truman paid a visit to Ottawa early in June and was invited to address President the Canadian parliament. His reTruman visits marks, although rather general in Ottawa nature, did set forth some of the basic factors of Canadian-United States relations. The last PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S ADDRESS TO THE CANADIAN PARLIAMENT, OTTAWA, JUNE 11, 1947: ... Canada and the United States have reached the point where we no longer think of each other as "foreign" countries. We think of each other as friends, as peaceful and cooperative neighbors on a spacious and fruitful continent. war brought our countries into even closer collaboration.... The Permanent Joint Board on Defense will continue to function. . . . The Board was created, and will continue to exist, for the sole purpose of assuring the most effective defense of North America. . . . The record proves that in peaceful commerce the combined efforts of our countries can produce outstanding results. Our trade with each other is far greater than that of any other two nations on earth. . . . Some of our greatest assets are still to be developed to the maximum. . . . The St. Lawrence project stirs the imagination of men long accustomed to majestic distances and epic undertakings... The benefits of our democratic governments and free economies operating side by side have spread beyond our countries to the advantage of the whole world. . . . We count Canada in the forefront of those who share. [the] objectives and ideals [of the United States]. With such friends we face the future unafraid. President Truman's mention of the St. Lawrence Seaway project emphasized the one most 35 See U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XVI:361, Feb. 23, 1947. Background of the St. Lawrence seaway project aggravating source of difficulty between the two countries. From the 1920s onward every American president had urged the creation of a joint CanadianUnited States undertaking to harness the power of the St. Lawrence River and to improve nagivational facilities along the river so ocean vessels could go from the Atlantic to the ports of the Great Lakes, thereby avoiding the cost and delay of transshipment of goods at the ocean ports. And at almost every session of Congress the St. Lawrence project was killed in committee or voted down on the floor of the House or Senate.36 What years of Communist threat points need for seaway argument had not accomplished, the threat of international aggression by a powerful Soviet Union might make clear that development of the St. Lawrence gateway to the interior of the continent was vital to the defense and economy of both the United States and Canada. Canadian governments had long advocated development of the seaway and after World War II increasingly made it plain that if the United States would not cooperate in the project, Canada would seek means of carrying out a lesser scheme entirely within Canada's own boundaries. Later in 1947 Canada sought to curtail dollar expenditures and made arrangements to borrow $300,000,000 from the Import-Export Bank. Canada's economic problems were involved because of conflicting relations with the British sterling area bloc and with the across-the-border trade with the United States. When Life magazine editorially called for a Canadian-United States customs union, on March 15, 1948, Canadian newspapers and politicians criticized the suggestion as an attempt by American interests to dominate the Canadian economy. But the flurry soon died down when no further encouragement was given the idea. It became increasingly evident in 1948 that Canada's defense needs were closely allied to those of the United States. On June 24, 1948 Canadian 36 United States opposition to the St. Lawrence project came from various sources, among them railroads serving the Atlantic ports, ocean steamship lines, power companies, isolationist elements in and out of Congress, industrial and commercial pressure groups, and other interested organizations and individuals. Defense and diplomatic officials in general supported the project. Canada a charter member of NATO Defense Minister Brooke Claxton Canadian-U. S. declared that the defense policy of defense talks his country was based on cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom. When the preliminary talks were held in Washington on July 6th for plans to erect a North Atlantic defense system Canada was included as a vitally interested party. James Forrestal, American Secretary of Defense, visited Ottawa in August to continue consultations with Mr. Claxton and when planning for NATO was resumed in Washington on December 10, 1948, Canada was again a party to the discussions. Louis St. Laurent had succeeded Mackenzie King as Canadian Prime Minister on November 15th, but there was no change in Canadian government policy on cooperation with Washington in defense arrangements.37 Canada was one of the original twelve nations to sign the North Atlantic Defense Treaty on April 4, 1949. Further evidences of Canadian-United States coordination during 1949 were the creation, on April 12th, of a joint Industrial Mobilization Committee to exchange information and to arrange cooperation with the Joint Defense Board established during World War II; the signature of a bilateral air agreement on June 5th; and several conferences, which also included the United Kingdom, on financial cooperation, atomic energy policies, and standardization of non-atomic weapons. 38 Secretary urges approval of seaway The need for action on the St. Lawrence seaway proposal brought the State Department into the fore once more as a supporter of the plan. Secretary Acheson voiced the case for the project in his appearance before the House Committee on Public Works. SECRETARY ACHESON'S TESTIMONY IN FAVOR OF THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY, WASHINGTON, APRIL 25, 1950: The construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway and the development of the power potential of the International Rapids section of the St. Lawrence River are both vitally important to the economy and defense of the United States. we must not overlook the fact that both ... 31 The new Prime Minister paid a state visit to Washington on Feb. 12, 1949. The US-UK-Canadian Combined Policy Committee on Atomic Energy, set up in 1943, carried on a series of secret discussions from Sept. 20, 1949 through most of October. of these projects are of equal concern to Canada. [and] because those measures which make Canada more prosperous and better able to defend itself add also to the prosperity and security of the United States, so the proposal. . . becomes doubly important to the United States. The present St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project was agreed upon by Canada and the United States on March 19, 1941. . . . ... The agreement. [provided] a completion date not later than December 21, 1948. It is clear that a new date must be fixed for the completion of the construction. . . . The long-overdue development of one of the world's greatest waterways and power sources by Canada and the United States will further expand the economics of both countries. . . . Partisan politics and influential pressures exerted by opponents of the plan prevented any favorable action during 1950. In fact, the only area in which the two neighbor nations moved forward together during the year, except for Canada's ready and important support of the UN action in Korea, was in an agreement reached on October 26th for a coordination of economic efforts. This agreement was embodied in a document titled "Principles for Economic Cooperation."39 41 A joint United States-Canadian civilian defense. planning program agreed to on March 27, 1951 further pointed up the growing realization that the fates of the two nations were New commonly shared. And on May arrangements 1st, an agreement was readied by for U. S. the two countries with respect to bases in United States bases in NewfoundNewfoundland land.42 These bases had been secured when Newfoundland was a 39 See U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXIII:743, Nov. 6, 1950, for the terms of this agreement. 40 On Feb. 5, 1951 Defense Minister Claxton announced that Canada was embarking upon a 3-year defense program to cost more than $5,000,000,000. 41 See U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXIV:588, Apr. 9, 1951, for terms of the agreement. 42 Ibid., 813-14, May 21, 1951, contains the terms of this agreement. separate dominion. When Newfoundland became the tenth province in the Canadian Confederation on April 1, 1949, new arrangements had to be made to safeguard the interests of both the United States and Canada, as well as to insure the continuance of tenancy by the United States Air Force on these strategic outposts in the North Atlantic. In spite of these indications of closer accord in economic and defense matters, Canadian impatience over the delays in the St. Lawrence seaway Foreign Secretary Pearson warns of too great reliance on U. S. project and concern over the possibility that actions taken in Washington might bring on a third world war caused frictions between the two nations. Mr. Lester Pearson, Canadian Foreign Secretary and Canada's leading delegate to the UN, warned in a speech at the UN on April 10, 1951 that there was danger in the tendency of the international organization to become "too much the instrument of any one country." He obviously had the United States in mind for he said on the subject of CanadianUnited States relations: "The days of relatively easy and automatic relations with our neighbor are, I think, over." "43 Mr. Pearson's fears were not realized, but there was no doubt that, for cne reason and another, dissatisfaction with the United States was present north of the border. And when Prime Minister St. Laurent was in Washington on September 28, 1951 he made it plain that Canada would go it alone on the St. Lawrence project-in fact was prepared to do so immediately in view of the failure of the American Congress to act on the proposal. The Prime Minister, however, was quick to acknowledge, on a later visit to the United States on November 19th that Canada recognized the leadership of the United States in the struggle to preserve the free world and that his country would continue to support the position of the United States in that fight. Canadian Premier says Canada may go-it-alone on seaway project 43 New York Times, Apr. 11, 1951. 44 Canadian dairy interests were annoyed at the import quotas for dairy products set up by the Defense Production Act approved by Congress on July 13, 1951. U.S. Senate delays action on seaway because of 1952 campaign As the presidential elections of 1952 approached, the administration became more active in its desire to get approval for the St. Lawrence plan. President Truman sent a letter to Congress on April 19, 1952 urging early enactment of the proposal.45 But the Senate, mindful of the coming campaign, on June 18th, passed the buck once more to the next Congress by voting 43 to 40 to recommit a resolution sanctioning the 1941 agreement. On June 30th the Canadian and United States governments asked the International Joint Commission to authorize engineering works for power development in the section of the river known as International Rapids. This application was approved by the Commission on October 29th and plans were pushed to get at least this much of the project under way, despite the opposition of the Congress to the formal arrangements for joint development of the seaway. The election of Dwight Eisenhower received with general approbation in Canada. He was personally popular there and had worked with Canadians both during the war and when he was Supreme Commander of the NATO forces. Moreover, he was a strong supporter of the seaway proposal and could be counted upon to exert his influence with the Congress to get the measure considered. After a visit at the White House by Prime Minister St. Laurent and Foreign Secretary Pearson on May 6-8, 1953, it was announced that the President and his Cabinet approved unanimously a report of a committee of the Cabinet endorsing the seaway plan. The Prime Minister's hand in Canada was strengthened during the summer when the August 11th parliamentary elections gave his party 171 of the 265 seats in the House of Commons. Once more the two governments were in accord on this important matter and it remained for the American Congress to demonstrate its support of the President's position. President Eisenhower supports seaway was Late in the autumn of 1952 it was announced that a joint Committee on Trade and Economic 45 See U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXVI:719-20, May 5, 1952, for the text of the letter. |