Of all the nations on the globe, the United States has in the fullest measure the opportunity, the duty, and the capacity to prove this fact. In every aspect of its position in the world the United States is equipped to offer this more attractive alternative. Because of its economic wealth and its high standard of individual achievement the United States is able to do more than just struggle to maintain a day-to-day existence. Because of the vitality and resourcefulness of its peoples, the United States is prepared to supply the leadership needed to direct the course of world affairs in the direction of greater freedoms. And because of its proven adherence to the ideals of justice, humanity, and sacrifice, the United States stands pre-eminent, although not alone, as a leader daring to venture forward into ways that may be dark, but are believed to be right.

This is said not in a spirit of boastfulness or of juvenile chauvinism. One may praise his own nation without obscuring the fact that all wisdom, righteousness, and greatness do not reside therein. Many of America's attractions are ours despite ourselves

The United States must measure up to its greatness

witness the way we have wasted our natural heritages. Others are ours because of the contributions of peoples from scores of lands across the seas. It was not entirely in jest that an

American statesman pointed out to a body of ancestor-worshipers that all Americans are immigrants or descendants of immigrants.2 Whether the fact is popular with the rest of the world or not, the United States is a great nation. And as a great nation its responsibilities are great. Success or failure in foreign policy, as in its domestic affairs, will come to the United States in the degree to which it measures up to the demands of greatness or falls short of the standards it has set for itself.

We have tried to indicate what might be termed the grand design of American foreign policy by showing you how that policy has developed and how it is being carried out at the present time. We have also attempted to indicate that the scope of this policy has increased until today there is scarcely a corner of the globe where its effects are not

You have a vital stake in the defense of our foreign policy

felt and where, in turn, events do not have an impact upon it. If you have stayed with the story to this point, you have been very patient and we hope you have been rewarded. You must have gathered that you, and all Americans, have a vital stake in the future of our foreign policy. Everyone of us may be called upon at any time to defend our country because of it. But we must understand why.

To demand perfection in the creation and execution of American foreign policy is to expect the miraculous. But to ask that American foreign policy at once reflect and influence the standards by which the United States shall submit its cause to judgment is not unreasonable. The best defense of American foreign policy is a full discussion of its development and of its underlying purposes.

2 Anthropologists include even the American Indians as immigrants to this continent. Possibly the Indians might be termed "original settlers" and all who came after them "immigrants."

In order to make the text of this publication more useful to the reader it has been deemed desirable to include certain explanatory notes. So that these notes will not impede the reading of the text they are contained in this separate section. The text, therefore, may be read continuously without diverting attention from the narrative. At such points as further explanation seems appropriate, the reader may refer to these notes, either as he reads, or for review after the reading has been completed.

Each note is keyed to a particular page for ready reference. An effort has been made to keep such notations to a minimum. It is probable that the reader will wish to add further notes and queries of his own as he studies and reviews the material under consideration. The literature of the history and development of American foreign policy is large. Since adequate bibliographical references are to be found in the standard textbooks on the subject it has not been thought necessary to include such references herein. However, mention should be made of the fact that The Record of American Diplomacy, 3rd edition, edited by Ruhl J. Bartlett (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), has been consulted frequently to check the texts of documents not readily available elsewhere.

Attention is also called, specifically, to the publication Strategic Briefs (3rd edition) prepared by members of the Documentary Research Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, and issued in 1954. This edition contains pertinent data on most of the areas and countries of the world where American foreign policy is presently confronted with problems of strategic importance. If the contents of Strategic Briefs are read in connection with the material in this discussion of the development of American foreign policy, the groundwork for an understanding of the history of that policy and of the current implications of American action will have been laid.

Notes

(1) It should be realized that these main elements are stated in terms of the present but

that they represent, as well, continuing purposes, many of which date from the earliest years of American history. For a current restatement of these purposes see p. 302.

(2) This, of course, is the basic purpose of the foreign policy of every nation. In nations bent upon aggression this basic purpose is perverted to selfish ends and is often cited as the excuse for actions which, at bottom, do not involve threats to national security or territorial integrity. However, it is difficult to distinguish hypocritical resort to such a purpose from actual belief in its applicability. The reputation of a nation for honorable dealing is the test. And the degree of faith and credit extended to the nation's pronouncements by the opinion of mankind is the measure of the nation's success in defending its true independence.

(3) The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 is the second formal alliance entered into by the United States. See pp. 141-42. It is the first peacetime alliance in American foreign policy history.

(4) The distinction between neutrality and isolation is a practical as well as a legalistic one. Neutrality means impartiality-the same official attitude displayed toward both sides in a dispute and a scrupulous observance of the rules of fair treatment toward each of the belligerents. Isolation involves a withdrawal from contacts with the outside world-an attitude which actually may be unneutral in the case of a war. Isolationism can operate in peacetime as well as in time of war. Neutrality as used herein is primarily a wartime situation.

(5) Neutrality was abandoned in the period of the War of 1812 (See pp. 5-6) and in the case of World War I (See pp. 59-60) when circumstances forced the United States to become a belligerent. In the instances of Japanese aggression against China in 1931-32 and 1937, the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-36, and the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39, the United States successfully maintained a neutral position. By 1939-40 the American neutrality policy had undergone several alterations which added the concept of "benevolent neutrality." See pp. 74-76.

(6) The relation between domestic politics and foreign policy formulation in the United States is an aspect of American history with which this study deals only in isolated instances. For such exclusions an apology must be made. The whole field of this relationship is one of the most fascinating and most revealing in which explorations should be made. In the American system of government the two elements cannot be divorced

completely. In his writings on American diplomatic history Thomas A. Bailey gives constant attention to the relationship. On the existence of such writings and on the limitations of length involved in this study are based the twin justifications for the apparent neglect herein. No student of the development of American foreign policy should fail to consult Bailey's writings for enlightenment on the interactions of domestic politics and foreign policies.

(7) The consequences of the strong American stand on the maritime rights of neutrals played into hands of the British and French during the Civil War, 1861-65. See pp. 23-25. The American practice was also of importance in World War I. See pp. 55-56 and 58.

(8) The purchase of Louisiana also served to enlarge the interpretation of the Constitution since the powers of the president were expanded to include acquisition of territories outside the existing area of the United States.

(9) At the time of the annexation of Texas, J. Q. Adams had changed his position and opposed the action. Such reversals are not unusual, given different circumstances and, as in Adams' case, long service in public life.

(10) This was the first instance of territorial annexation by joint Congressional resolution— another example occurred in the case of Hawaii in 1898. See p. 38.

(11) It is important to note that although the United States occasionally considered the acquisition of noncontinental territory and even of territory in Central America, at no time before the Civil War did it move into territory not already contiguous to existing possessions. This is in direct contrast to the colonial programs of European powers. Geographical factors played a part in this American policy. But, in addition, the American policies of the pre-Civil War era were based on the belief that acquisition of noncontiguous territory was contrary to democratic tradition.

(12) Russian interest on the Pacific coast was one of the underlying factors in the announcement of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. While the United States held no territory on the Pacific at this time, it did have extensive fishing and sealing activities all along the shores from Bering Sea southward. In the 18th and early 19th centuries Russia was engaged in an eastward expansion somewhat analogous to the westward expansion of the United States. There is some belief that Russia had overextended her expansion by crossing to Alaska and California.

(13) This illustration of the power of the House of Representatives to exercise influence in the determination of foreign policy indicates the ramifications of democratic political processes. Several times in American history an administra

tion's desires in the foreign policy field have been thwarted, modified, or delayed by the reluctance of the House to vote appropriations necessary to carry out policies already decided upon or deemed desirable. This has special reference to future programs for foreign aid.

(14) It is interesting to note that in every instance of territorial acquisition, the United States used an argument with a moral basis. That some of the arguments were contestable cannot be denied. But the patterns employed were all ones recognized as legitimate in the temper of the times. In no instance has the United States deprived the inhabitants of annexed areas of substantial rights and freedoms which they enjoyed under the rulers from whom the United States took over. While the communists would probably claim even more than this with respect to their own expansion and annexations, the examples of the Soviet satellites prove the reverse to be true.

(15) Corollaries, like the original doctrine, were merely statements by responsible officials of enlargements or restrictions. They had no more legal standing or binding power than the doctrine upon which they were based. See the Theodore Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, pp. 51-52.

(16) See p. 54 for a reversal which marked a return to established American policy in the case of Latin American nations. The failure of the United States to recognize Soviet Russia from 1917 to 1933 is a particularly important example of a reversal of established policy. See pp. 70-71. The unwillingness of the American government to recognize the present Red government of China. has special implications, but it is another instance of a variance in American policy.

(17) Examples of this are the provisions of the various neutrality acts preceding World War II, the embargo on shipments of oil to Japan just before Pearl Harbor, and other embargo actions of the 1930's and 1940's. Likewise, trade restrictions and embargoes have been used to considerable effect during the "cold war" period of recent years. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Red China have been the objects of such restrictions in the last few years.

(18) See pp. 26-27. The part played by the United States in the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 has been omitted from this study for reasons of space. American support of the programs established by the Hague meetings was of importance, but the reservations insisted upon by the American adherence to a policy of nonintervention in European affairs somewhat diluted the effectiveness of the Hague Conventions.

(19) Great Britain, although it could not have anticipated the fact in 1861-65, made good use of

this precedent during World War I. See pp. 55-58. (20) The general principle is that a diplomat in a foreign country is only useful so long as he is persona grata, or acceptable in every respect to the country to which he is accredited. While his actions may be defended by his home government, he obviously loses his usefulness if he is no longer regarded favorably by the country in which he serves. The United States has on a number of occasions, and for varying reasons, felt it necessary to ask the recall of foreign diplomats. Likewise, American representatives abroad have been ordered home when the foreign governments to whom they were accredited requested their recall.

(21) The term "yellow press" characterized a type of journalism prevalent in America at the time. In order to boost circulation, many publishers resorted to sensational presentations of the news, often using a cheap, yellowish grade of newsprint to cut costs and increase profits. Competition among the publishers led to attempts to increase the sale of periodicals by using flamboyant illustrations, inflammatory headlines, and other mass appeal tactics. The age of "yellow journalism," of course, has not reached its close, either in the United States or abroad. But the period from 1880 to the end of World War I was perhaps its most flourishing one.

(22) Note the use of the term "open door." This indicates that the phrase was an accepted one before its popular application to the case of China in 1900. See pp. 41-43.

(23) In 1902 Secretary Hay negotiated a treaty with Denmark for the purchase of the Virgin Islands. The United States feared that Germany might acquire the islands and thus sought to forestall possible German action. The Danish parliament rejected the Hay treaty. During World War I American belief that Germany might try to buy or even occupy the Danish West Indies caused the State Department to renew efforts to purchase the islands. By a treaty of August 4, 1916, Denmark agreed to sell the islands to the United States for $25,000,000. The islands came into the possession of the United States as a territory in 1917. Their annexation was a security measure and can scarcely be regarded as an evidence of imperialism. The Virgin Islanders were given American citizenship in 1927. In 1931 administration of the islands was transferred from the Navy to the Interior Department. The Governor of the Virgin Islands is appointed by the President, and universal suffrage is granted citizens over 21 who can read and write English. The islands have a popularly elected legislature.

(24) The United Nations Trusteeship Council in 1947 continued the assignment made by the League of Nations. Western Samoa is now a UN

trust territory with New Zealand as administrator. (25) Secretary Sherman's objections were popular. But there had been occasions on which the United States was willing to undertake joint action. For example, the case of Samoa is somewhat in point.

(26) Such internal political upheavals as have occurred in Cuba since 1934 have been largely domestic in nature and origin. The action of any outside power to take advantage of Cuban unrest would be a cause for united inter-American intervention under the Act of Chapultepec of 1945 and the Rio Pact of 1947, as well as by the Caracas agreement of 1954. See pp. 279-80 and 290-92.

(27) See note (23), above, for a reference to the possibility of German designs on the Virgin Islands in 1902.

(28) An example of the use of dollar diplomacy in another part of the world-the Far Eastoccurred at this same time. At the suggestion of Willard Straight of the State Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Taft and Knox encouraged an American banking group headed by J. P. Morgan to loan large sums to China to enable the Chinese to buy into the Russian-controlled Chinese Eastern Railway and the Japanese-controlled South Manchuria Railway. Russia and Japan, in 1909-1910, joined forces to resist this use of dollar diplomacy. The United States did not wish to use military strength to back its policy and the effort to extend American capital to Manchuria was largely unsuccessful in this instance.

(29) It is proper to point out, however, that several of the interventions of the Wilson administration were the results of legacies from previous administrations. Moreover, the interventions were more often to protect life and carry out legitimate treaty provisions, than to extend the influence of American capitalists or to guarantee the profits of American imperialistic investors.

(30) See pp. 16-17. See p. 69 for an instance of the return to the traditional American policy of recognition.

(31) The Allies were often referred to as the Entente Powers. This was based upon the Entente Cordiale, a system of alliances linking France and Great Britian with Russia. Belgium and Great Britain also had an alliance. And Russia was pledged to support Serbia, a kingdom which then included part of what today is Yugoslavia.

(32) Practically all news dispatches originating in Europe had to pass through British-controlled cable offices to reach America, unless resort was had to the much slower mail service. In time, through its supervision over wartime shipping between Europe and America, Great Britain also

exercised a censorship control on international mail.

(33) The unwillingness of the United States to enter into a formal alliance is an illustration of the power tradition has to influence reality. To all intents the United States was an ally of the powers facing Germany. But officially no alliance existed and American tradition was preserved.

(34) Wilson's neglect to include members of the Senate in his peace delegation has been assigned as one reason for the failure of the Senate to ratify the peace treaty. President Wilson included a Republican in the group-Henry White, a former diplomat. But White was not a leading member of the Republican party. To have chosen Hughes, ex-President Taft, or even ex-President Roosevelt, might have been an adroit political move. But Wilson believed he should act above politics in this matter. The failure to choose two leading Senators, one from each party, is less understandable. Here again, Wilson probably acted on his belief in the supremacy of the president's office in matters of foreign relations. Presidents Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower have been careful to include Senators of both parties in many important international conferences and foreign policy transactions.

(35) Some of the same arguments were voiced when the United Nations arrangements provided separate memberships for the Ukraine and Byelorussia, two of the federated republics of the U.S.S.R. See p. 90.

(36) The ratio of 5-5-3 was arrived at for the three principal naval powers. Five capital ships. were allowed each for the United States and Britain to three for Japan. France and Italy were assigned a ratio figure of 11⁄2 each on the same basis.

(37) Both President Harding and President Coolidge favored United States membership in the International Court, but the Senate in voting for adherence attached limiting conditions.

(38) Although the United States several times agreed to participate in the work of the World Court, the agreement was always conditional and with such reservations as were unacceptable to other nation-members of the Court.

(39) The role of tariffs in hampering or facilitating the conduct of foreign affairs has not been treated in any detail in this study. Nevertheless, tariffs have played an important part in determining the relations between the United States and other nations. High protective tariffs to foster domestic industries or agriculture have often led to unfriendliness abroad. Lowering of tariff rates has similarly been used to encourage agreement with American policies. Tariff restric

tions and tariff concessions have served as political footballs in foreign affairs. Examples are too numerous to cite here, but the cases of Cuban and Hawaiian sugar, Argentine beef, Canadian wood pulp, as well as manufactured products from Europe and Japan, afford illustrations of instances where the shutting off behind high tariff walls of foreign competition influenced foreign policy or was motivated by certain foreign policy attitudes.

(40) While the European nations were preoccupied with the war, Japan had presented China, on January 18, 1915, with the Twenty-one Demands. These were a series of demands which openly threatened Chinese sovereignty and violated the principle of the Open Door. Secretary Bryan notified both Japan and China on May 11, 1915 that the United States could not recognize any move which impaired Chinese sovereignty or ignored the Open Door. In 1917 Secretary Lansing and Viscount Ishii concluded an agreement which recognized that, because of geographical propinquity, Japan had special interests in China. Japan formally endorsed the Open Door policy. This was the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of November 2, 1917. In a secret protocol both nations promised not to take advantage of the war to seek special rights or privileges in China at the expense of other friendly powers. The 21 Demands were never fully acceded to by China, but Japan largely accomplished her purposes by actions at the time or in the 1930's.

(41) These events marked the real beginnings of the good neighbor policy although the name itself was not widely used until 1933. See p. 69.

(42) This appeal of April 14, 1939 included all the nations of Europe, except Albania and Czechoslovakia, as well as Iraq, the Arabias, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iran.

(43) The pact signed by the Soviet Union and Germany on August 24, 1939 pledging the two nations not to aggress against each other for a 10-year period shocked American opinion. The spectacle of V. M. Molotov, for the U.S.S.R., and Joachim von Ribbentrop, for Nazi Germany, agreeing to have their respective countries free one another from the fear of invasion seemed to the American people a callous exhibition of the opportunism of dictator states. With this pact in force, Germany was assured that it could attack Poland without retaliation from Russia. And the U.S.S.R. was safeguarded against German action when the Soviets attacked Finland. Hitler broke the nonaggression pact June 22, 1941 when his armies attacked Russia.

(44) The continuing controversy over who was responsible for the failure of the American military and naval authorities at Pearl Harbor to avert the disaster of December 7, 1941 settles none