of the major questions about this tragic event. A great amount of literature on the subject has been published in recent years and the reader may wish to consult some of this material for detailed information. There is fairly general agreement, however, that the dominance of the militarist group in Japan prevented the more moderate elements among the Japanese from treating with the United States to lessen the tensions between the two nations. Whether more skillful handling of the situation by Washington in the weeks before Pearl Harbor might have saved the fleet from severe damage is a possibility. But it is probable that Japan was determined to strike and that some other target would have been chosen if Pearl Harbor had been more alert.

(45) In effect the Declaration of the United Nations of 1942 was an alliance, but the fiction was preserved in the United States that this and similar wartime agreements were not alliances in the legally accepted use of the term. This reluctance to acknowledge the realities of the situation resulted from the administration's interpretation of the lessons of American history. Actually, the American people were probably ahead of the administration on this point in recognition of the interdependence of the allies in the face of the Axis threat.

(46) The most serious difficulties among the allies as the war progressed involved the Soviet Union and its efforts to induce the Anglo-American combine to open a second front in Western Europe. Soviet dissatisfaction over the rate and quantity of supplies sent to it from Britain and the United States also caused friction. Likewise there were disputes (less serious) between the Free French and their associates over plans to liberate metropolitan France. Some lack of cooperation among the nations of the Western Hemisphere was charged on occasion, but the situation never became grave enough to disrupt the hemispheric unity. In the Far East and Southeast Asia there were troubles, too, mainly involving rival groups maneuvering, for power amid the confusion of total war. In general, the United States avoided factional quarrels, but because of its widespread military, political, and economic commitments it was sometimes unwittingly drawn into local controversies.

(47) Since this study is concerned with foreign policies only brief references will be made to the military actions of World War II. It is assumed that the reader is generally familiar with the major campaigns and the overall military objectives of the opposing sides. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that in World War II the interrelations of military actions with political moves, diplomatic negotiations, and economic matters

were more closely connected than in any previous war in history.

(48) While there was occasional criticism of President Roosevelt for his frequent trips abroad, it is remarkable that little of this opposition was based upon constitutional grounds. The sincere criticism was almost always directed at the danger to the President's health and physical safety of such trips in wartime. The more irresponsible criticism came from those who disliked the President for personal or political reasons and were dissatisfied with anything he did, abroad or at home.

(49) The debate over the Yalta agreements provides one of the most controversial questions left over from the wartime cooperation of the Soviet Union with the United States and Great Britain. It is well to recall that American sentiment generally favored close and friendly ties with Russia during the war. Looking backward that sentiment now appears misplaced. But in the framework of the events of 1945 it is doubtful that any respectable segment of American society would have supported a policy of excluding the Soviets from allied conferences and postwar planning sessions where their geographical and political involvements indicated they were concerned. Moreover, the mood of 1945 was that Russia, weakened by the severe campaigns against the Germans, would not be a threat to world peace for many years and, in fact, might be one of the leaders in the quest for international stability after the war.

(50) It should not be inferred that this was a device employed by the partisans of United States membership in a world organization to commit the Congress in advance. National and Congressional sentiment in favor of United States membership was sufficiently strong to justify these resolutions, both of which were adopted by substantial margins. However, the resolutions did put the Congress on record and were a powerful insurance that the events of 1918-1919 would not be repeated.

(51) Some of the smaller nations provided a number of the abler delegates to the Conference. While the representatives of the large powers were probably better known, representatives from several Latin American, European, Middle Eastern, and Asian nations often dominated the debates because of their personal abilities. In this aspect the San Francisco conference anticipated the sessions of the United Nations in later years when delegates from these lesser countries showed skill and determination in contributing to the deliberations of the new world organization.

(52) Bipartisanship, or more properly nonpartisanship, in foreign policy has given greater

strength to American efforts to promote international peace and American security. It has never meant that political leaders of both parties unreservedly supported the policies directed by the administration in office at the time. Nonpartisanship in foreign affairs leaves a good deal to the individual conscience of the respective statesman. He is still free to criticize and oppose specific courses of action and overall policies. But, opposition for purely partisan reasons is recognized by all foresighted statesmen as having a weakening effect upon the impact of American policies as they are applied to worldwide situations.

(53) Franklin Roosevelt, somewhat like his distant relative Theodore Roosevelt, was a believer in the direct approach to international affairs, preferring to deal with his "high level opposite numbers" among the world's statesmen and rulers. This meant that while the day-to-day work of the State Department went on with very little interference from the President, the Secretary of State and our ambassadors abroad played subordinate roles to the President in the determination and implementation of both broad general policies and, where the President's interest was aroused, in specific instances concerning less important matters. In addition, any relations between a President and his State Department aides always revolve on a basis of personal qualities. By his very nature, Franklin Roosevelt dominated the field of international affairs where he believed he had a special competence. At the beginning of his administration, Mr. Truman laid claim to no such predilection or background.

(54) The Morgenthau Plan has been the basis of controversy throughout the first postwar decade. Critics of the Roosevelt administration and of the New Deal elements in that administration have charged that the Plan was the inspiration of members of a subversive group in various governmental departments during the 1933-45 period. The late Harry Dexter White, an important official in the Treasury Department under Secretary Morgenthau, is pictured as the chief architect of the plan to reduce Germany to impotence. Investigations and accusations have continued to involve individuals in reputed plots to deliver the United States government over to the international communist movement. It has been alleged that by direct means as well as by indirectly playing into the hands of the Soviet Union through a weakening of Germany as a result of such a scheme as Mr. Morgenthau sponsored, these conspirators were nearly successful.

(55) In the atmosphere of 1945-46 there was some justification in combining democratic and communist elements in this fashion. During the war the native communists in many of these countries had been the most valiant and most

effective members of the resistance movements. Together with the democrats they provided the only postwar political party timber which could be regarded as strong enough in its appeal to the populace to build new governments. The Western allies took at its face value the wartime abolition of the Communist International (Comintern) and generally believed that the national communist parties could be absorbed into the socialistliberal groups, or that the local communists would operate independently of control from the Soviet Union. The estimate of the situation was later proved faulty, but at the time the western plan gave promise of succeeding and was deemed worth a trial.

(56) Although it is more a colorful journalistic phrase than an exact international law term, "cold war" serves effectively to describe situations which involve nations in conflict without the large-scale exchange of firepower. All the hostility and all the maneuvering for strategic and tactical advantage which usually mark armed conflict are present in "cold war" except the actual military encounters in force. Often in "cold war" there is shooting by one or both sides, but it does not erupt into the "hot war" which pits the major part of a nation's armed might against that of another nation. However, the victories and defeats of a "cold war" may be just as significant and just as lasting in their effects as those in the usually accepted form of warfare. Inasmuch as our language is a living mirror of our times the term "cold war" is likely to endure even if the circumstances which brought about its coinage should disappear.

(57) As a protest against the collaborationist policies of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco during the war, the UN, influenced mainly by the U.S.S.R., France, and Great Britain, had voted to recommend a type of nonintercourse with Spain. It was hoped that this action would lead to a revival of liberal programs in Spain. Hence, it was not considered desirable to invite Spain to take part in a program for European recovery so long as the Franco regime held undisputed power. The UN "boycott" of Spain was unpopular with a number of influential Senators and other prominent Americans, but the State Department cooperated in its execution for a time. When the exclusion of Spain from the Marshall Plan and from ancillary activities of the UN did not bring about the lessening of Franco's power, numerous UN members began to relax the boycott unilaterally. The United States went farther in the direction of enlisting Franco's support in the struggle against communism than did France or Great Britain.

(58) This oversimplification of the German situation at the close of 1949 neglects many

aspects of the problem which would deserve consideration in a well-rounded discussion. The questions of attitudes within Germany itself toward rearmament, the problems of the Saar basin, the matter of East-West trade, German aspirations for the regaining of lost territories in East Prussia and Poland, and several other vexatious items might be mentioned. And in all considerations, world statesmen always had to calculate just how strong a reunited Germany might become. Twice in the 20th century a strong Germany had held off a powerful allied coalition for several years in a major war. Would history repeat itself if Germany was once again allowed to become greateconomically, politically, and militarily? Both Germans and non-Germans pondered these questions during the years when the Western allies and the U.S.S.R. argued over the German problem.

position

was

(59) Spain's anti-communist scarcely in doubt at the time of the formation of NATO. But opposition to the Franco regime by elements of French, British, Italian, Belgian, and even Canadian and American political leadership made Spain's inclusion in the North Atlantic grouping impossible in 1949. See note (57), above. Sweden had been willing to join a Scandinavian alliance, but did not wish to jeopardize its safety because of its proximity to Soviet Russia by throwing its lot with the new organization. Switzerland, resolutely anti-communist, was anxious to preserve its neutral position for a number of reasons, and there was very little disposition on the part of the Western Big 3 to pressure the Swiss into joining NATO.

(60) The way in which Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman enlisted the assistance of members of the Republican party during their administrations was especially marked. Ever since national political parties had emerged in the United States at the opening of the 19th century, diplomatic posts and high administrative positions in the State Department had been judged the prerequisites of the party in power. Gradually after World War I the diplomatic corps became more of a career service and less of a haven for political appointees. While the appointment of such men as Mr. Dulles and Senator Austin, among others, could not be regarded as a controlling precedent, it was another facet of the bipartisanship in foreign affairs which has been. mentioned before. In more than three years of its existence, the Eisenhower administration has chosen a few Democrats for important governmental posts, but these have almost invariably been individuals who were "Democrats for Eisenhower" in the 1952 campaign.

(61) President Conant's nomination was vigorously opposed in the Senate by Senator Joseph R.

McCarthy (Republican, of Wisconsin) as well as by others of the Eisenhower party. Such opposition, also exhibited in the case of President Eisenhower's nomination of Charles E. Bohlen to be ambassador to the U.S.S.R. and in other instances, indicated the wide differences between the new administration and a number of Republican Senators withholding approval from nominations of persons who, although they were professed Republicans or who had been aloof from partisan political alignment, had been connected in any way with the previous Roosevelt and Truman administrations. The opposition to Eisenhower policies and appointments did not always turn on this point, nor was the opposing group always made up of the same Senators. But, throughout the Eisenhower term there has been an outspoken nucleus of prominent Republican Senators ready to obstruct the course of the Eisenhower-Dulles program in the foreign policy field.

(62) See note (61), above. Attacks by Republican congressmen, led principally by Senator McCarthy, on the activities of the United States Information Agency abroad were frequent during 1953. In response to such attacks books were removed from the shelves of the Agency's libraries in foreign cities, some books were burned or otherwise destroyed, and personnel of the agency were dismissed or transferred, with resultant disruption to the work of the agency. Charges of disloyalty, "guilt by association," inefficiency, and "faulty judgment" were leveled at members of the Foreign Service and other State Department divisions. Resignations and removals followed the publicizing of many of these charges. Although President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles expressed belief in the loyalty of the great majority of State Department employees, and the President condemned "book burning," the attacks noticeably weakened the morale of Department personnel and lessened the all-round efficiency of the Department's operations.

(63) Both the Spanish and Yugoslavian problems deserve more mention than it has been possible to give here. Logic and practice in international affairs are not always found together. While aid to a foreign power need not imply approval of its domestic politics it may be difficult to explain this fact to the public. So, critics of assistance to Marshal Tito accuse the State Department of being "soft toward communism." And opponents of "doing business with Franco" charge the administration with being "reactionary fascists." In both cases, expediency appears to have prevailed over ideal principles, inasmuch as the two dissimilar regimes are opposed to Soviet communism with as much vigor as they are, ideologically, antagonistic toward each other.

(64) The whole matter of fluctuations in American public opinion on questions of foreign policy has necessarily been neglected in this study. To have given the problem adequate treatment would have demanded a reorientation of the entire work. However, the reader is urged to consider the part public opinion has played in the determination and carrying out of our policies during our national history. Why the American public has favored certain nations and certain policies, and why it has formed temporary or continuing antipathies for other countries and policies are subjects for fruitful examination by all students of American foreign policy. Probably in no other nation of the modern world do the people have as much influence upon the actions of their government as they do in the United States. This has become increasingly true in recent years, but it is by no means a recent phenomenon. How and why it has happened, and what it means have been indicated occasionally in this study. But we need to know more about the forces, the formation, and the impact of public opinion on the making and execution of our foreign policy. A good place for the student to begin his acquaintance with this facet of the history of American foreign affairs is, as has already been mentioned, in the writings of Professor Thomas A. Bailey, of Stanford University. His books will provide further clues to an understanding of this problem.

(65) It might be appropriate to note that Secretary Dulles, with apparently indefatigable energy, has traveled about the world more widely and more rapidly than any American Secretary of State in history. Throughout his term of office he has been a great believer in the efficacy of personal contacts with foreign leaders and on-the-spot observation of situations in which American policy is involved. Besides attending international conferences as the chief American delegate, and visiting foreign potentates in their palaces, Mr. Dulles has found time to confer with American diplomats stationed abroad; to spend long hours talking with his opposite-numbers among our allies, to work diligently with his aides. while flying to and from most of the world's capitals, and, on his infrequent stays in Washington, to welcome foreign notables to our own capital. Likewise, he has been in demand as a speaker at dinners, luncheons, and other public occasions in many cities of the United States. On top of all these activities, Secretary Dulles is the executive chief of a large governmental department with manifold responsibilities. The report that he maintains a set of luggage packed with travel requisites constantly in readiness in his Washington office should cause little wonderment. He has clearly given evidence of his need for such a convenience.

(66) The increasing importance of India as a world power might be added as a major factor in Far Eastern international affairs. Whether to put India into the Far Eastern classification or to place it in the Southeast Asia group creates problems. Or should India be nominated as a leader of the South Asia sphere? Wherever it is placed, India exerts a powerful influence in all Asian affairs. Politically, economically, and in matters of religion, India, because of its huge population and its strategic geographic location, profoundly affects many matters relating to Asia. And, since its independence gained in 1950, India has become one of the world's most significant nations. For the purposes of this study, therefore, India is regarded as a factor in Asia as a whole rather than as a particularly Far Eastern nation. The smaller, but important new nation of Pakistan apparently prefers to regard itself as most closely connected with the Middle East region.

(67) The cessation of economic privileges enjoyed by the Philippine Commonwealth, when it was an American protectorate from 1934 to 1946, put Philippine products into competition in the world market and measurably reduced the trade advantages of the islands. In recent years the Philippine economy has suffered serious dislocations, partially as a result of the independence of the country.

(68) An assembly of 3,045 elective members may have represented a new record for size, but it is doubtful that it represented much else. Because of the method of nomination and election only a few members unsympathetic to the Chiang Kai-shek administration gained seats. Moreover, electoral processes in many areas of China were either so primitive as to be meaningless or so corrupt as to be ludicrous. Despite the protestations of Chinese leaders, China in the 1945-1949 period was not equipped to operate as a democratic, representative state.

(69) Mr. Wallace, who since 1933 had been successively Secretary of Agriculture, Vice-President, and Secretary of Commerce, broke with President Truman in 1946. He thereupon became the spokesman of a group of individuals, mostly identified with "Leftist" causes, who favored more friendly relations with international communism. In 1948 this group formed the Progressive Party and nominated Mr. Wallace as candidate for the presidency and Senator Glen Taylor (Democrat, of Idaho), for the vice-presidency. The Progressives polled 1,156,103 votes in the national election but failed to carry a single state. Mr. Wallace later repudiated any sympathy for the communists and virtually withdrew from public life. Because of the split of the Democratic party in 1948 over the states' rights issue, it was thought for a time that the Progressive vote might prove

large enough to prevent either the Democrats or Republicans from achieving the necessary majority of electoral votes to elect their candidates, thus throwing the choice to the Congress. For this reason, the progressive movement was treated with a respect that later returns showed it had not deserved. However, since the Progressives' differences with the Truman administration were largely on matters of foreign policy, the Truman campaigners began by viewing the Wallace candidacy with some apprehension.

(70) Publications by world governments dealing with their foreign relations are often given short or popular titles such as "White Paper," "Yellow Paper," "Blue Book," etc. The color designation has no particular significance other than that of convenience. Originally the color designation may have had some reference to the shade of the cover, or binding. Psychologically, most governments now seem to favor the term "white" as if that terminology connotes "righteousness" or "purity" of motives. However, the reader should not make too much of this inference since the text of the paper is almost invariably printed on white paper stock, even if the quality of the paper is of an inferior grade.

(71) Later attacks by opponents of the Roosevelt-Truman China policy on the White Paper do not alter the fact that its publication, so soon after the majority of events it documented, was an interesting development in the history of diplomatic affairs. Normally, government documents relating to international matters are withheld from publication until long after the events and personalities have passed into history. Occasionally, when a country is conquered or a government falls to revolutionists, documents purporting to show the machinations of the defeated are issued precipitately by the victors. But, for the most part historians have to wait years, often decades, before they can examine the state papers touching on a nation's foreign affairs. The incidents surrounding the publication of the documents of the Malta and Yalta conferences of 1945 in March 1955 are outside the province of this study. However, they do not represent quite the same sort of situation as did the Truman administration's issuance of the China White Paper.

their way through the parliamentary delays by the Soviet bloc delegates. No international conference since the Japanese peace treaty meeting has been so extensively televised. There seems to be some reluctance on the part of many nations represented at such conferences to consent to a public viewing of deliberations of this sort. In cases where the conference may be discussing delicate matters, this unwillingness can be understood. But the value of public appearances should also be considered by the world's statesmen.

(73) Because of the "voluntary" nature of the embargo procedures it was difficult to create a really effective blockade against the movement of war goods to Red China. Inability of various nations to agree upon what were "prohibited items" hampered the program. Legitimate trade between the UN members and Red China was not affected, but no clear understanding was reached, even among those who supported the embargo, as to what constituted legitimate trade in non-warmaking materials. These difficulties led such opponents of American Far Eastern policy as Senator McCarthy and, occasionally, Senators Knowland, Bridges, Jenner, and others, to denounce British shipments to Red China and the alleged administration failures to stop what they called this "blood trade."

(74) Because of their social, cultural, economic, and religious positions in the countries of their residence, people of Jewish ancestry have long formed a powerful and vocal international element. While often among the most patriotic citizens of their own country, many Jews have maintained a sentimental and spiritual attachment to the beliefs and history of their forefathers. This factor has made them sympathetic to appeals by internationally oriented Jewish leaders for support of such movements as the Zionist Organization. Not all Jews, of course, are Zionists, but Zionism gave a coherence to the Jewish aspirations for a homeland in Palestine. Therefore, money and volunteer support for Zionism satisfied the desire of many Jews of different lands to do something to provide a home for those of the Jewish faith who wished to go to Palestine. American Jews were prominent in the work of the Zionists, but equally strong backing came from almost every European country where there was a sizeable Jewish population-especially Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, pre-Hitler Germany, Poland, etc.

(75) American relations with the African colonial powers, in addition to Britain and France, are generally good and have posed very few postwar problems. Belgium and Portugal are NATO allies of the United States, and Spain is linked to the United States by agreements on air and naval bases in the Spanish homeland peninsula. Spain's