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Russia nor Japan made a satisfactory reply, but the belligerents stayed away from China proper and no neutrals intervened in behalf of either of the fighting powers.

Japan handily defeated the Russians in battle, but exhausted her resources in doing so. On May 31, 1905 the Japanese secretly asked Presi

Roosevelt mediates in the RussoJapanese War

dent Roosevelt to mediate the quarrel. Roosevelt received assurances from Japan that it adhered to the principle of the Open Door in Manchuria and favored the return of this potentially rich province to China. On this basis Roosevelt persuaded the Russians to discuss peace. The peace conference met at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on August 5, 1905. Roosevelt succeeded in getting the Russians and Japanese to accept a treaty which really satisfied neither power. Japan did not receive the huge indemnity which she believed her due. But she did strengthen her position in Korea, and she did secure the Liaotung leasehold in Manchuria from Russia, as well as the South Manchurian Railroad and numerous economic Beginnings of privileges. In effect, the treaty rectroubles ognized Japan's primacy in the Far between East, although the Japanese people United States felt that Roosevelt's efforts had and Japan been more in the nature of a brake upon Japan's realization of the fruits of victory than the friendly mediation they had expected. Thus, one of the first elements of the hostility between the United States and Japan that was to grow in later years had been created out of American involvement in a foreign question.

Relations were improved, temporarily at least, by an agreement reached by Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, in Tokyo on July 29, 1905. In this agreement Prime Minister Taro Katsura of Japan disavowed any aggressive designs on the Philippines and in return the United States recognized Japanese suzerainty over Korea. On November 23, 1905 the Japanese notified the United States that Tokyo would control the foreign affairs of the Korean kingdom. Secretary of State Elihu Root announced that the United States mission had been withdrawn from Korea

and that the United States in the future would deal with Japan in matters relating to Korea. The Japanese greeted this announcement with pleasure, and relations between Tokyo and Washington were on an improved basis. However, the United States had taken another step backward from the Open Door.

The immigration problem

One of the more disturbing after effects of the Russo-Japanese War was an increased emigration of Japanese to the United States, particularly to the rich agricultural lands of California. The Californians, with their experience of cheap Chinese labor in mind, reacted violently to the influx of Japanese. In October 1906 the San Francisco Board of Education passed an order requiring all Oriental children to attend a segregated public school. This inflamed the raceproud Japanese. President Roosevelt, unable to interfere in the internal concerns of a member state of the Union, voiced his disapproval of the San Francisco action. The Westerners were obdurate in their refusal to alter the school order,

The Gentlemen's Agreement as a further limitation on Oriental immigration

but in February 1907 Roosevelt achieved a compromise. In return for a promise by the San Franciscans to modify their segregation policy, the President agreed to seek a limitation of Japanese immigration into the United States. These actions were ratified by the so-called Gentlemen's Agreement of 19071908 a series of diplomatic notes whereby Japan agreed to issue no more passports to laborers wishing to go directly to the American mainland. Congress concurrently set regulations on the immigration of Japanese from Hawaii and other American possessions to the continental United States. Certain classes of Japanese, especially students and businessmen, were exempted from these prohibitions. The question of Japanese already in the United States was left to the individual states and several of them set up or reinforced legislation of a discriminatory character. While the Gentlemen's Agreement lessened the frictions for a time, the Japanese people continued to resent the implications that the subjects of a now great nation were regarded as inferior individuals by the white people of America.

American battleship fleet tours the world

To demonstrate to the Japanese that his friendliness in their behalf during the school issue was not a sign of fear of Japan, Theodore Roosevelt decided on a bold stroke. The President proposed to send the entire United States battleship fleet on a voyage around the world. This was more than a training exercise and Roosevelt knew that the Japanese would see in it a display of American strength. The fleet left in December 1907 and was received with warmth and admiration wherever it called. Especially in Japán was the welcome an enthusiastic one. After circling the globe, the fleet returned to the United States on February 22, 1909. The voyage impressed more nations than just Japan. To South Americans, Asiatics, and Europeans the power of the United States was visibly indicated by this round-theworld cruise.

A temporary agreement reached

Partially as a result of the Japanese cordiality to the fleet, relations between the two countries improved. Several proposals by Japanese envoys to Washington were finally incorporated in an understanding which was not a treaty but merely an executive agreement. Thus, it was binding only upon the administration which concluded it. The Japanese ambassador in Washington signed for his country and Secretary Root for the United States.

THE ROOT-TAKAHIRA AGREEMENT, WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 30, 1908: . . . the Governments of [Japan and the United States]. . are animated by a common aim, policy, and intention in

[the Pacific Ocean]. . . . The Imperial Government have authorized me to present to you an outline of their understanding of that common aim, policy and intention: 1. It is the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean. 2. The policy of both Governments. . . is directed to the maintenance of the . . . status quo in the region above mentioned and to the defense... of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China. 3. They are... firmly resolved . . . to respect the territorial possessions belonging to each other in said region. 4. They are also determined to preserve the common interest of all powers in China by supporting the independence and integrity of China and equal opportunity for commerce and industry of

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California restricts Japanese landholdings

respect to the Far East. One episode involving China-railway concessions in several areas of that country-properly belongs in a later discussion of dollar diplomacy.38. Another, relating to Japan-the Magdalena Bay controversy-will be mentioned in connection with Latin American affairs.84 In the first year of Woodrow Wilson's administration the embarrassing question of anti-Japanese legislation in California came to the fore again. The Californians, partly through Republican efforts to make matters difficult for a Democrat in the White House, were determined to pass laws to debar Japanese from owning land. In spite of Wilson's action in sending Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan to California in April 1913 to counsel moderation, the California legislature adopted repressive measures which prohibited Japanese ownership of land. The law as passed adroitly side-stepped an actual violation of existing treaties with Japan, and Japanese pride took some comfort from the ambiguity, although the Tokyo government protested several times to Washington. All the Wilson administration could do was to express its sympathy with the Japanese and to point out that the federal government could not intervene unless the constitution, a treaty, or a federal law was involved.

33 See pp. 52 and 307 below. 34 See p. 53 below.

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At the outbreak of World War I in 1914 the American position in the Orient was relatively stable. Relations with the Japanese, although strained and suspicious at times, were in a quiescent stage. The Chinese revolution had left matters on the mainland unsettled but not especially worrisome. The Philippine Islands were developing slowly, but on the whole peacefully, under American tutelage. Russian interests in the Pacific area were not in conflict with those of the United States. The European colonial powers with Far Eastern holdings engaged our attention in Europe rather than in Asia. While the United States was not inclined to ignore the Far East in 1914, it certainly did not regard it as a major center of concern.

7. The Acquisition of the

Panama Canal Route

One of the most controversial issues ever raised in connection with American foreign policy involved the construction of a passageway across the narrow land of Central America to link the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. A glance at a map will show that the logic of such a passageway is inescapable. Circumnavigation of the South American continent, even by the fastest vessels, is a time-consuming process. Circumnavigation of the North American continent is scarcely feasible. With the bridge joining the two continents in mind, the site for an interoceanic passageway is pretty much confined to topographically possible routes somewhere between the Isthmus of Panama and the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in southern Mexico. Until nearly the middle of the 19th century, consideration by the United States of such a waterway was largely speculative. But with the acquisition of territory on the Pacific coast, the discovery of gold in California, and the need to

establish more rapid communication with the Far West, Americans recognized the vital nature of a trans-Isthmian route.

British interests in Central America

The government of New Granada (as the republic of Colombia was then called) feared the increasing power of Great Britain in Central America in the 1840's. New Granada extended from Colombia's present holdings in South America, along the Isthmus of Panama, to Costa Rica. The British had important Caribbean possessions-Jamaica, British Honduras (then called Belize) and several smaller island areas. Conflict between the British and Colombians appeared inevitable as the British expanded their political and commercial influences. In December 1846, the United States minister in Bogota, the Colombian capital, signed a treaty with New Granada. This treaty granted the United States transit rights across the Isthmus of Panama in return for an American promise to maintain the neutrality of the route so free transit of the Isthmus would not be interrupted.

British activity alarms the Americans

The 1846 treaty did not appeal to British ideas of what was proper in Central America. In 1848 the British seized the Mosquito Coast of Nicaragua which controlled the mouth of the San Juan River, then considered the most desirable route to the interior. A year later a British naval officer seized Tigre Island in the Gulf of Fonseca on the west coast of Nicaragua-an island regarded as strategically placed to command the western terminus of a practical trans-Isthmian canal route. The London government disavowed this seizure, but the United States recognized the danger of British influence in that region.

The British were ready to achieve some sort of settlement through diplomacy. After long negotiations, the British minister in Washington, Henry Lytton Bulwer, signed a treaty with the American Secretary of State, John M. Clayton.

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neither will ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same, or in the vicinity thereof, or occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America. . . ARTICLE V. The contracting parties further engage that, when the said Canal shall have been completed, they will protect it from interruption, seizure or unjust confiscation, and that they will guarantee the neutrality thereof, so that the said Canal may forever be open and free. . . . ARTICLE VIII. The . United States and Great Britain . . . hereby agree to extend their protection, by Treaty stipulations, to any other practicable communications, whether by Canal or railway, across the Isthmus which connects North and South America. . . . Bailey characterizes the Clayton-Bulwer treaty as "the most persistently unpopular pact ever concluded by the United States."35 Opponents of the

Britain draws back in the Caribbean

treaty said it was a self-denying arrangement which would limit American action in Central America. They also claimed that it was a weakening of the Monroe Doctrine in that it recognized British encroachments. However, a contrary view is that the treaty put an obstacle in the way of further British expansion and that it "marked the first important acceptance by a foreign Power of the principles underlying Monroe's noncolonization clause."36 In any event, the treaty removed the likelihood of Great Britain's building a canal on her own. And, in spite of troubled relations in the next decade, Great Britain withdrew from several of her extreme positions in Central America. In 1859 she recognized the sovereignty of Honduras over the Bay Islands which lay off the Caribbean coast of that republic. And in 1860 Britain relinquished to Nicaragua her claims to the Mosquito territory.

The attention of the United States was diverted from the canal question for some years after 1850, as has been indicated in earlier sections of this

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French company, headed by Ferdinand de Lesseps, who had built the Suez Canal, began to raise funds to build a Panama canal. President Hayes declared, in a message to Congress on March 8, 1880, that the policy of the United States was to consider any trans-Isthmian canal a part of the coast line of the United States and that such a canal should be under American con

trol. Although Hayes' message was directed against a private French company, it was clear that the United States was commencing to find the restrictions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty embarrassing. Just before the close of the Hayes administration, the House of Representatives formally resolved that steps should be taken to abrogate the treaty.

In 1881 the incoming Secretary of State James G. Blaine attempted to induce the British to modify the agreement. The British declined to follow Blaine's recommendations. But he had laid the groundwork for a reconsideration of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. There the matter rested for some years. But the events of the SpanishAmerican War revived American interest in an interoceanic canal.

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and when the Senate insisted on amendments to the treaty to remove this objection, the British declined to accept the revised version.

The British ambassador pursued the matter with Secretary Hay, and in a second treaty met the American objections. This is the agreement generally referred to as the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, although the earlier pact bore the same designation as well.

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THE HAY-PAUNCEFOTE TREATY, WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 18, 1901: . . . The High Contracting Powers agree that the present Treaty shall supersede the [Clayton-Bulwer Treaty] of . . . 1850. . . . It is agreed that the canal may be constructed under the auspices of the Government of the United States . . . and that . . . the Government shall have and enjoy all the rights incident to such construction, as well as the exclusive right of providing for the regulation and management of the canal. . . . The United States adopts, as the basis of the neutralization of such ship canal, the following Rules. . . . The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing these Rules, on terms of entire equality.... The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of war be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within it. The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder. the transit of vessels... [of war of a belligerent] through the canal shall be effected with the least possible delay. . . . No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, munitions of war, or warlike materials in the canal. . . . Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not remain in . . . waters [adjacent to the canal, within 3 marine miles of either end] longer than twenty-four hours at any one time but a vessel of war of one belligerent shall not depart within twenty-four hours from the departure of a vessel of war of the other belligerent. The plant, establishments, and all other works necessary to the construction, maintenance, and operation of the canal... in time of war, as in time of peace, shall enjoy complete immunity from attack or injury by belligerents, and from acts calculated to impair their usefulness as a part of the canal. . . .

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to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and by pulling out much of her strength in the area, Britain recognized the supremacy of the United States in the regions so vital to American security. Combined with settlements of the Venezuelan controversy and the demonstrations of British friendship during the Spanish-American War, the concellation of the 1850 treaty marks a high point in Anglo-American collaboration.

Nicaragua route preferred

American opinion was divided upon the question of the best route for the canal. Both the Panama and the Nicaragua routes had vigorous champions. The de Lesseps venture had ended in failure in Panama and the New Panama Canal Company, successor to the de Lesseps group, asked $109,000,000 for its holdings. On November 16, 1901, the Walker Commission,87 an engineering survey board appointed in 1899 by President McKinley, reported in favor of the Nicaraguan route.38 The Panama company dropped its price to $40,000,000. President Roosevelt urged the Walker Commission to change its recommendation. On January 9, 1902 the House of Representatives voted in support of the Nicaraguan canal by 308 to 2. Nine days later the Walker Commission revised its finding to favor the Panama proposal. After some Lobbying for adroit lobbying by Philippe Bunauthe Varilla, former chief engineer of the Panama route de Lesseps venture and a large stockholder in the successor company, as well as by Mark Hanna, chairman of the Republican National Committee, the Senate amended the original House bill on the Nicaragua canal. The new act provided that the President was to secure a right of way across Panama from the Colombian government. If this could not be done on reasonable terms and in a reasonable time the President was to proceed with negotiations for a Nicaraguan canal.

Secretary Hay got the signature of Tomas Herran, Colombian chargé d'affaires in Washington, to a treaty on January 22, 1903 by which the

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