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us out of war." Charles Evans Hughes, an associate justice of the Supreme Court, was selected by the Republicans to oppose Wilson.45 Hughes, an able jurist, was a poor campaigner and he tried to avoid the clear-cut issue of war. The ensuing election was so close that for a day it appeared that Hughes had won. Late returns swung the tide in Wilson's favor. His election was regarded by many in the country as a command to the President to continue the policy of neutrality. The voters- or a great number of them did not face the reality that events might be too strong for Wilson to resist, or that America was being drawn into the war by pressures beyond her power to control.

A doubtful mandate for an improbable neutrality

With a second term in the White House assured, Wilson made another effort to achieve peace and thereby fulfill his party's campaign slogan. He readied identical notes to Wilson's the two belligerent groups asking peace proposals them to state their respective war

aims. Before he could send the notes, the Germans announced that they were willing to discuss peace terms. This German declaration of December 12, 1916 took some of the strength from Wilson's request, but he sent the notes anyway on December 18. The replies received by Washington from the belligerents led Wilson to address the Senate, outlining the essential terms of peace as he saw them.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S ADDRESS TO THE SENATE, WASHINGTON, JANUARY 22, 1917: . . . The Central Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace. The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely. . . . We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the peace. . . . that much nearer the discussion of the international concert which must thereafter hold the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. . . . It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. to add their authority

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45 The tradition of keeping the judicial branch outside of partisan politics was preserved by the resignation of Justice Hughes from the Supreme Court bench. In 1930 Mr. Hughes once more became a member of the court. He was appointed chief justice by Pres. Hoover at that time.

and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. . . . I . . . take it for granted that mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves. . . . It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation . . . could face or withstand it. . . the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small. No peace can last . . . which does not recognize that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. . . . every great people should be assured a direct outlet to the . . . sea. And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. . . .There can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue . . to be built up and maintained. . . . I am proposing that the nations should . . . adopt the Doctrine of... Monroe as the doctrine of the world. . . . that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances. [that there shall be] government by the consent of the governed. . . . These are American principles, American policies. . . They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.

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Peace without victory and a vision of world cooperation

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Such a statement of aims could leave little doubt that the United States was advocating a peace which would be without victory for either side, since in the elements of victory and and defeat would lie the seeds for further international quarrels. This neither the Allies nor the Central Powers were willing to accept. So the war went on. But America's viewpoint had been made clearer by Wilson's strong statement of peace aims.

The Germans by now were desperate in their fight to offset the blockade. On January 31, 1917 the German government announced that it would

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February 3, 1917, President Wilson appeared before Congress and told that body that he had taken steps to sever diplomatic relations with Germany. This move met with widespread popular approval. But it meant that any overt act by Germany would unquestionably provoke a declaration of war.

The President, on February 26, 1917, requested authority from Congress to arm American merchant ships. A small clique of Senators, called by Wilson "a little group of wilful men," filibustered to delay passage of the legislation. The President, basing his action on constitutional powers, went ahead and issued the order to arm American vessels anyway.

German plot to influence Mexico and Japan

In the midst of this tense situation came the revelation, on March 1, 1917, that the German Foreign Minister, Arthur Zimmermann, had instructed the German envoy to Mexico that, in the event of war between Germany and the United States, he should try to make an alliance with Mexico. The reward for Mexico would be the recovery of Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. And to make the alliance more effective the President of Mexico was to enlist Japan as a member. This revelation aroused American opinion, but was not considered by the administration sufficient cause for

war.

On March 12, 1917 the Algonquin, an unarmed American merchant vessel, was sunk without warning. A week later three more unarmed ships were sent to the bottom by German submarines. The overt acts had occurred. President Wilson went before Congress and delivered his war message.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S WAR MESSAGE, WASHINGTON, APRIL 2, 1917: . . . I deem it my constitutional duty . . [to] advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it. . . . let us be very clear. . . what our motives and our objects are. to vindicate the principles of peace and justice as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of

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purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles. . . . We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states. We have no quarrel with the German people. . . . It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this war.. It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war. . . . But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight ... for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Government, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth. . . . God helping her, she can do no other. The Senate voted 82 to 6 on April 4, 1917 for passage of the war resolution. The House followed on April 6 by a vote of 373 to 50. America goes The United States had entered the to war largest and costliest war of its history, impelled by German attacks on merchant shipping. Many other elements contributed to the causes for America's entry-but the central fact is that Germany provoked the war.

Once in the war, America pursued its task of building a war machine with characteristic speed,

waste, fumbling, and the ultimate United States triumph of sheer richness and techavoids alliances nical proficiency. President Wilson

reiterated his peace aims. He realized that the United States would be in a strong position to make its influence felt at the peace table. The United States was not officially one of the Allies-American opinion shied from a formal alliance. (83) She was an "associated power," a term which was more easily acceptable to the Americans. But she was in the war and not on the outside looking in. Therefore, the United States was

inevitably to be a vital force in makThe 14 points ing the peace. Wilson wanted the

peace aims of the Allied nations to rouse the whole world to support the cause of peace above that of the cause of victory in itself. In an address to Congress in January 1918 the

President set forth fourteen items which he believed should be included in the discussions of peace.

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PRESIDENT WILSON'S ADDRESS TO CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, JANUARY 8, 1918: What we demand in this war. . . . is that the world be made fit and safe to live in. . . . we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The programme of the world's peace... is this: I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed frankly and in the public view. II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas ... alike in peace and in war. . . . III. The re

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moval . . . of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions. . . . IV. Adequate guarantees ... that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. V. . . . impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon . . . the interests of the populations concerned. VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and a settlement of all questions affecting Russia. VII. Belgium. must be evacuated and restored. . . . VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine ... should be righted. . . . IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy along clearly recognizable lines of nationality. X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary... should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development. XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea.... XII. The Turkish portions of the ... Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations. XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected

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again his insistence that the keystone of a permanent peace was to be an organization of

nations. Various names were used to denote this organization, but the most commonly accepted designation came to be the phrase, a league of nations. Propaganda leaflets setting forth the fourteen points and enlarging upon their contents were dropped by airplanes over the fighting fronts and behind the lines in great quantities and in several languages. Virtually everyone in the Allied and opposing countries who could read or could be reached by other means was aware of the peace aims voiced by President Wilson.

Defeat of Germany

Various factors-military, economic, political, psychological-led to the defeat of the Central Powers by the Allies. In October 1918 the German military leaders convinced the Berlin government that the best course was to ask President Wilson to call a conference to make peace on the basis of the fourteen points. Wilson insisted that peace could be made only with the German people-that the Kaiser and his militarists would have to be repudiated. The German nation met this demand and forced the Kaiser to abdicate on November 9, 1918. Although the Allies, with victory in sight, were reluctant to give unconditional support to the fourteen points, they finally agreed on two conditions that they would reserve liberty of action on the proposition of freedom of the seas, and that the restoration of evacuated territory should include compensation for damages to the civilian populations. Wilson accepted these conditions with some disappointment. An armistice was signed on terms proposed by the Allied High Command and became effective on November 11, 1918.

Watering down the 14 points

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However, he went, and he received tremendous ovations from the peoples of England, France, Belgium, and Italy, wherever he traveled. The peace conference met at Versailles, just outside Paris, on January 12, 1919. Through almost four months of deliberation and negotiation the Allies hammered out the provisions of a treaty which was finally signed by the German representatives on June 28, 1919, seven weeks after it had been presented to them for study.

The story of the public and behind-the-scenes sessions of the peacemakers has been the subject

of much research and literature. It A disappointing would appear sufficient here to repeace mark that President Wilson did not achieve his desires in Paris and that the Treaty of Versailles was not in accord with the fourteen points. But it did include as an integral

part of its terms the fourteenth point-a League of Nations. To this extent, Wilson was vindicated and the United States had asserted its power to act as one of the world leaders in attempting to prevent a recurrence of a catastrophe like the war of 1914-1918.

Thus, in the short space of twenty years the United States had shifted from a position of uncertain leadership in the Western hemisphere to a nation with world-wide responsibilities. By 1919, it appeared that the United States faced a future wherein it was irrevocably committed to act in concert with the major European and Asiatic powers to maintain world peace. That the United States was not yet ready to play its part in this cooperative venture will be seen in the section which follows.

The United States Calculates The Price Of World Leadership

1. The Aftermath of World War I

For more than twenty years after the close of World War I the United States pursued an uncertain course in international affairs. America had become a world power, but it frequently shrunk from the need to admit this fact. At other times it acted boldly to assume its place among the leaders of the world. These two decades, therefore, were a period of alternate advance and retreat by the United States. In some fields and in some instances, America daringly took the lead in settling vexatious problems. But in other equally important instances she shied away from the responsibilities of a mature nation. The story of this backing and filling, this venturing and hiding, forms the burden of this part of the study of the development of American foreign policy.

Opposition to the Versailles Treaty

Even before the signing of the Treaty of Versailles there arose in the United States strong opposition to many of the treaty provisions, and especially to the establishment of the kind of League of Nations, embedded in the text of the document. Much of the opposition was partisan and anti-Wilson, but loyal Democrats and respected internationalists also had doubts about the Treaty and the League. The weight of opposition centered around Article X of the Covenant of the League.1

THE VERSAILLES TREATY, VERSAILLES, JUNE 28, 1919: . . . Article 10. The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.

President Wilson's action in taking the League

1 The term "covenant" is said to have been specially favored by President Wilson, who was descended from Scotch Presbyterians, as having stronger implications than "constitution" or some other term more generally used.

issue to the country in September 1919 helped to break his health, and the Senate reservations sponsored by Senator Lodge, Wilson's most bitter opponent, provided a rallying point for the foes of the Treaty and the League.

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THE LODGE RESERVATIONS, WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 10, 1919: The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between nations -whether members of the League or not-under the provisions of article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide. The United States assumes no obligation to be bound by any election, decision, report, or finding of the council or assembly in which any member of the league and its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of empire, in the aggregate have cast more than one vote, and assumes no obligation to be bound by any decision, report, or finding of the council or assembly arising out of any dispute between the United States and any member of the league if such member, or any self-governing dominion, colony, empire, or part of empire united with it politically has voted.

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The feature of the League organization which allotted six votes to members of the British Empire and only one to the United States, a fact to which the latter part of the quotafrom Senator Lodge tion. Lodge's reservations leads the fight alludes, added fuel to the opposito defeat tion.(35) In November 1919 an atthe League tempt to achieve ratification of the treaty in the Senate was defeated. Another vote in March 1920 failed to rally the necessary two-thirds margin for approval. Both of these votes included action on the Lodge reserva

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