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tions. For many reasons, the League became the liveliest issue of the 1920 presidential campaign; and when James M. Cox, the Democratic candidate, was handily defeated by Warren G. Harding, the Republican nominee, American membership in the League was deemed impossible. This fact was strengthened by the inclusion of restrictive phraseology in a separate treaty of peace with Germany, signed early in the new administration.2

Separate peace with Germany

THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, BERLIN, AUGUST 25, 1921: .. That the United States shall not be bound by the provisions of Part I of that Treaty [of Versailles], nor by any provisions of that Treaty which relate to the Covenant of the League of Nations, nor shall the United States be bound by any action taken by the League of Nations, or by the Council or by the Assembly thereof, unless the United States shall expressly give its assent to such action. . . .

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The failure of the United States to join the League of Nations at its outset was one of the chief contributory reasons for the The League League's ultimate failure to achieve without success. True enough, internal weakthe US doomed nesses in the Covenant provided to failure added reasons for the League's inability to solve the problem of world organization. But without America as a member, the League became in essence a tool of the leading European powers to maintain their control of existing systems and counterbalanced alliances.

Washington Conference of 1921-22

In spite of its rejection of the League, the United States did not withdraw entirely from international commitments. The. United States took the lead in attempts to limit armaments and to discourage resort to war for the settlement of international disputes. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, guided the settlements of the Washington Conference of 1921-1922. In one of a series of treaties resulting from this conference, the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan signed an agreement to limit the number and size of capital ships in their respective navies. (36) They also agreed to scrap some existing ships to reduce the totals to the limits set forth in the treaty. By

On July 2, 1921 the Congress. by joint resolution, declared the war with Germany at an end. Such a resolution in May 1920 had been vetoed by President Wilson.

further agreement, the three major naval powers, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, pledged a limitation on fortifications and naval bases.

THE WASHINGTON TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT, WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 6, 1922: The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions. . . . The maintenance of the status quo implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified. . . .

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Treaty to protect China

The five powers above mentioned were joined by Belgium, China, the Netherlands, and Portugal in another treaty respecting interests in China. This Nine-Power Treaty bound the signatory powers and any later countries which adhered to it to safeguard the independence of China.

THE NINE-POWER TREATY, WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 6, 1922: . . . The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree: (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; (2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; (3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; (4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges. . . . not to support any agreements by their respective nationals designed to create Spheres of Influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory. . Later in the decade following the armistice, the United States was one of the moving spirits behind a campaign to outlaw war which culminated in the Kellogg-Briand Pact. This agreement grew out of the Gedisarmament conference of 1927 at which American delegates attempted to have the 5-5-3 capital ship ratio of the Washington Treaty of 1922 applied to lesser naval vessels. The conference was a failure because of the unwillingness of France and Italy to participate and of Great Britain and Japan to reach a compromise with the United

Geneva Conference of 1927

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States. Efforts of an international lobby of armaments manufacturers also aided in neutralizing the work of the conference. This failure Kellogg-Briand led the United States, through SecPact retary of State Frank B. Kellogg, to accept the invitation of the French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, to join in a declaration to outlaw war. Kellogg suggested that the declaration be expanded to include all interested nations. The resultant Kellogg-Briand Pact (or Treaty of Paris) was signed by fifteen nations and later agreed to by most other nations of the world.

THE TREATY OF PARIS, PARIS, AUGUST 27, 1928: . . . The high contracting parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. ... The high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

American refusal to join the World Court without reservations

Hand in hand with the idealistic internationalism of the 1920's went strong tendencies toward isolationism, marked by the official action of Secretary Hughes in ignoring communications from the League of Nations, and the repeated defeat of efforts to get the United States to enter into membership in the Court of International Justice without limiting reservations.(37)

RESERVATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES SENATE ON MEMBERSHIP IN THE WORLD COURT, JANUARY 16, 1926: . . . Resolved . . . That the Senate advise and consent to the adherence on the part of the United States to .. the statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice(38) (without accepting or agreeing to optional clause for compulsory jurisdiction contained in said statute), and that the signature of the United States be affixed to the said protocol, subject to the following reservations and understandings which are hereby made a part and condition of this resolution, namely: 1. That such adherence shall not be taken to involve any legal relation on the part of the United States to the League of Nations or the assumption of any obligations by the United States under the Treaty of Versailles. 2. That the United States shall be permitted to participate, through representatives designated for the purpose and upon an equality with the other states, members, respectively, of the Council and the Assembly of the League of

Nations, in any and all proceedings of either the council or the Assembly for the election of judges or deputy judges of the... Court or for the filling of vacancies. . . . 4. That the United States may at any time withdraw its adherence to the said protocol and that the statute for the . . . Court . . . shall not be amended without the consent of the United States. 5. That the court shall not render any advisory opinion except publicly after due notice to all states adhering to the court and to all interested states nor shall it, without the consent of the United States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an interest. . . .

United States becomes a creditor nation

...

One of the most troublesome international problems of the postwar period was the question of reparations. Contrary to President Wilson's intentions, the Allies had succeeded in levying upon the defeated Central Powers heavy reparation payments. In the case of Germany this amounted to $33,000,000,000, none of which was assessed by the United States. With a portion of such payments, the Allied nations hoped to be able to repay some of the vast sums they had borrowed in the United States both during the war and after. Most of the European countries taking part in the war, on either side, had been impoverished by the costly process of war and reconstruction. For the first time, the United States had become a creditor nation-by 1922 it had a credit balance of $16,000,000,000. The amount of official government loans to foreign countries shortly after the war stood at $10,350,000,000, while private loans to European countries reached far into the billions.

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about 80% of her debt to the United States. Finally the French reached an agreement with the United States for cutting their debt by 60%. In spite of these liberal reductions, America became

highly unpopular in the European Europe wants countries as a hard bargainer. And debts cancelled from the American standpoint, because these European nations were so ready to plead for total cancellation of debts owed the American taxpayer, Europeans were never so disliked as in the 1920's and 1930's. The rise of isolationist sentiment in the United States after 1920 was rapid, and much of that rise may be attributed to the debt question.

With world-wide economic depressions as a consequence of postwar maladjustments the United States was drawn into international monetary affairs to a degree that made a mockery of isolationism. The situation at home and abroad became so grave in 1929-30 that President Hoover took drastic action to give the debtors a respite.

THE HOOVER MORATORIUM [on debt collections] WASHINGTON, JUNE 20, 1931: . . The American Government proposes the postponement during one year of all payments on inter-governmental debts, reparations, and relief debts, both principal and interest, of course, not including obligations of governments held by private parties. The purpose of this action is to give the forthcoming year to the economic recovery of the world and to help free the recuperative forces already in motion in the United States from retarding influences from abroad.

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sent national policy voiced by such a responsible authority as the Secretary of State.

ADDRESS OF SECRETARY HULL TO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, APRIL 30, 1936: The foreign-trade program of this Government is based fundamentally upon what to us is an indisputable assumption—namely, that our domestic recovery can be neither complete nor durable unless our surplus-creating branches of production succeed in regaining at least a substantial proportion of their lost foreign markets. . . . Our trade-agreements program is thus a standing offer to all the nations of the world to deal with each of them in commercial matters on a basis of equal treatment. . . . In generalizing the duty reductions negotiated in the individual trade agreements, we have sought to place on an equal footing those nations which, in turn, extend equality of treatment to our commerce, and to refuse such equality to those nations which refuse equality to us. . . .

Thus in about seventeen years the United States had moved from a total rejection of international political cooperation to a limited acceptance of economic cooperation. And, as has been indicated, even in the political sphere the United States was not a completely isolated entity. Sponsorship of the disarmament conferences and the advocacy of reciprocal trade are both signs of the changing spirit of American foreign policy in the midst of a strong isolationist trend.

2. Far Eastern Affairs: 1918-1932

The Far East had played a relatively minor part in the war of 1914-18. As an important result of the war, Germany lost all her stations in China. Russia, occupied with domestic revolution, was little concerned with the East. And Japan emerged as a dominant power with the potentiality of reducing China to an economic and political satellite.(40) The Washington conferences of 1921-22 attempted to straddle the issues of the increase of Japanese power and the interests of the United States, Britain, and France in China and in the rest of the Orient. In addition to the Nine-Power Treaty discussed earlier, the United States, Japan, France, and the British Empire had previously signed what became known as the Four-Power Treaty.

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End of the AngloJapanese alliance

China. The Washington conferences saw the termination of the AngloJapanese alliance of 1902, the restatement of America's Open Door policy, and a general reduction of naval armaments among the powers interested in the Far East. Thus the United States succeeded in stabilizing the Pacific situation to this extent. Under the League mandate system Japan gained administrative control over a number of former German island possessions. She was forbidden to fortify these islands, but as is now known, she proceeded to disregard this prohibition and created a string of outlying bases which she used effectively in World War II.

Japan's final emergence as a world power dates from these days after World War I. The clash of

interests between the United States Japanese and Japan became more marked are excluded during the late 1920's and early from 1930's. The Immigration Act of United States 1924, which in effect abrogated the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908, angered the Japanese, who were thereby excluded from entry into the United States, even on a quota basis. Japanese public opinion grew increasingly anti-American, and anti-American demonstrations were frequent.

Japan invades Manchuria in 1931

By the time Japanese had occupied South Manchuria in September 1931, relations between Washington and Tokyo were decidedly cool. The American State Department assumed a leading part in protesting Japanese aggression as these notes sent by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson indicate.

SECRETARY STIMSON TO AMBASSADOR DEBUCHI, WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 22, 1931: ... This situation is of concern, morally, legally, and politically to a considerable number of • These were the islands in the Marshall, Caroline, and Marianas groups (except for Guam), and other small islands in an area between 130° and 175° East Longitude and from the Equator north to the Tropic of Cancer.

nations. It is not exclusively a matter of concern to Japan and China. It brings into question at once the meaning of certain provisions of agreements, such as the nine power treaty . . . and the KelloggBriand pact. . . .

SECRETARY STIMSON TO COUNCIL OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS, WASHINGTON, OCTOBER 5, 1931: ... On its part the American Government acting independently through its diplomatic representatives will endeavor to reinforce what the League does and will make it clear that it has a keen interest in the matter and is not oblivious to the obligations which the disputants have assumed to their fellow signatories in the pact of Paris as well as in the nine power pact should a time arise when it would seem advisable to bring forward those obligations.

When the League Council on October 20 voted to invoke the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the United States was allied with the League authorities in an informal, but active way. Japan refused to halt her invasion of Manchuria and in January 1932 Secretary Stimson, acting independently of the League, but in line with its policy, addressed identical notes to China and Japan. These notes set forth what became known as the Stimson Doctrine.

SECRETARY STIMSON TO JAPANESE AND CHINESE GOVERNMENTS, WASHINGTON, JANUARY 7, 1932: . . . the American Government

The Stimson Doctrine

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deems it to be its duty to notify both the Governments of the Chinese Republic and the Imperial Japanese Government that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China . . . and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the pact of Paris. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew reported from Tokyo to Secretary Stimson, on August 13, 1932, that growing animosity toward the United States. was developing in Japan. He said further that the Japanese military machine would welcome war. Early in January 1933 the Japanese extended the boundaries of their new puppet state of Manchukuo (Manchuria) by occupying the North China province of Jehol. Meanwhile the Lytton Commission, appointed by the League of Nations to investigate the Japanese actions in Manchuria, made an adverse report condemning Japanese aggression. The

United States cooperates with the League

League Assembly adopted the report on February 24, 1933, whereupon the Japanese delegation walked out of the Assembly. Secretary Stimson wrote to the American Minister at Geneva approving in general of the League's action.

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SECRETARY STIMSON TO HUGH R. WILSON, AMERICAN MINISTER TO SWITZERLAND, WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 25, 1933: In the situation which has developed out of the controversy between China and Japan, the purpose of the United States has coincided in general with that of the League of Nations . . . while the League of Nations has been exercising jurisdiction over a controversy between two of its members, the Government of the United States has endeavored to give support, reserving to itself independence of judgment with regard to method and scope, to the efforts of the League in behalf of peace. . . . In the light of its findings . . . the League has formulated a measured statement of conclusions. With these conclusions the American Government is in general accord. . . . In so far as appropriate . . . the American Government expresses its general endorsement of the principles... recommended.

This Stimson doctrine doctrine of nonrecognition5 attempted to create a moral sanction against aggression which it was hoped would be buttressed by support from Britain, The Japanese France, and other European powers. attack The Europeans failed to take up the Shanghai challenge. The Japanese, knowing that the United States, in the midst of a depression and influenced by isolationist sentiment, would not move alone, disregarded the American protests. Soon afterwards, Japan attacked the Chinese at Shanghai, and President Hoover, reluctant to involve the United States in a war, refused to support suggestions for an economic boycott of Japan. With the events of 1931-32 Japan, relatively unopposed, was riding high in the Far East.

3. Inter-American Affairs: 1920-1936

Latin America, long a focal point of American foreign policy, continued to pose problems in the postwar era. The United States was involved in the financial policies of half of the republics to the south in these years; and, in several, forces of American marines were in virtual occupation of

5 Not to be confused with Sec. Stimson's reversal of the Wilson policy on recognition as discussed on p. 69 below.

the country to insure political stability and fiscal responsibility.

Improved relations with Latin America

The policy of Mexico in nationalizing mineral and oil resources stirred up trouble with that republic. Civil war in Nicaragua endangered private American investments there. Gradually, the Coolidge administration, through Stimson in Nicaragua and Dwight Morrow in Mexico, brought about improvements in these two countries. The presence of President Coolidge and Secretary Hughes at the Havana Conference of 1928, and a good-will tour of eleven of the Latin American countries by President-elect Hoover at the end of that same year did much to set relations with the twenty republics on a more friendly course. (41)

US repudiates Roosevelt corollary on Monroe Doctrine

Most significant in this period was the acceptance by President Coolidge and Secretary Stimson of the narrow interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine by Reuben Clark, Undersecretary of State. In this memorandum Clark repudiated the

Roosevelt corollary of 1904.

THE CLARK MEMORANDUM ON THE MONROE DOCTRINE, WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 17, 1928: ... The Doctrine does not concern itself with purely inter-American relations; it has nothing to do with the relationship between the United States and other American nations, except where other American nations shall become involved with European governments in arrangements which threaten the security of the United States, and even in such cases, the Doctrine runs against the European country, not the American nation, and the United States would primarily deal thereunder with the European country and not with the American nation concerned. The Doctrine states a case of the United States vs. Europe, and not of the United States vs. Latin America. Furthermore, the fact should never be lost to view that in applying this Doctrine . . . our Government has over and over again driven it in as a shield between Europe and the Americas to protect Latin America from the political and territorial thrusts of Europe. . . . Nor should another equally vital fact be lost sight of, that the United States has only been able to give this protection against designing European powers because of its known willingness and determination

Stimson, who had been Secretary of War under Presi dent Taft, went to Nicaragua as personal agent of President Coolidge. Morrow was appointed ambassador to Mexico. Stimson later became Secretary of State under President Hoover, and was again Secretary of War under President Franklin Roosevelt. See pp. 51-52 above.

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