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colonies in Africa are of minor importance, and Portugal's holdings are only slightly more significant at the present time. Wherever the interests of the United States may become involved in the near future in any of these colonial regions, the belief is that friendly relations between the United States and the parent country will help to ease the path toward settlements of difficulties and will enable the United States to count upon whatever utilization of Belgian, Portuguese, and Spanish colonial areas and resources seem required for mutual security.


(76) The United States is not involved in the troubles in Kenya. That area is still a colony of Great Britain and as such comes under the control of the Colonial Office in London. Very few Americans have settled in Kenya and any questions involving Kenya that may arise in connection with American policies are dealt with between Washington and London. So far these questions have been very infrequent. However, since Great Britain, our NATO ally, is building its African and Middle Eastern defense system with Kenya as one of the keystones the possibility of future American involvement in problems arising out of the Kenya colonial troubles is a likelihood. The British are not apt to give up Kenya, but the tragic events of the past few years make it evident that some liberalization of Britain's colonial policies will be necessary if Kenya is not to become an unprofitable battleground in the struggle between the white settlers and the aroused natives.

(77) This request by the United States caused considerable surprise among the European maritime nations. They were sympathetic to the American desire to prevent war materiel from reaching Guatemala, but they could not agree to the surrender of their sovereign rights by allowing U.S. naval patrols to stop their vessels on the high seas. Several of the European countries expressed their willingness to supervise shipments to Central America, but they pointed out that the American proposal was contrary both to international practices and to oft-declared American principles of freedom of the seas. After the declinations by the European nations, the American proposal was dropped by the State Department.

(78) One of the interesting developments of the Guatemalan incident was the establishment by the OAS of a system of aerial patrols of the border areas. American aircraft were used in this patrol to observe and report evidences of hostile behavior on the part of both Guatemalan factions as well as in neighboring Central American border regions.

(79) In this brief review of U.S. policy in regard to Latin America, only a few of the outstanding developments have been discussed. A

full treatment would have to analyze the reasons for the decline of American prestige in Latin America since World War II. Many of the reasons have, of course, been purely local and beyond the control of State Department policymakers. But, there is some evidence to suggest that recent American diplomatic representation in a number of the leading Latin American countries has not been as effective as necessary. Several countries have been favored with our best diplomatic talent, but in others appointments have gone to political supporters of the administration. Tariffs, economic policies, and unilateral decisions have also undermined American influence with certain Latin American nations. Apology is also made here for not discussing more fully American relations with Mexico, Cuba, Brazil, Argentina, Panama, and other nations of the area.

(80) Late in 1954 and early in 1955 some indications that Canadian foreign policy was not exactly in harmony with American policy, especially in respect to the Far East, occurred. Canadian sentiment was strong in favor of settling the explosive Red China-Nationalist China issues by arranging for the neutralization of the Formosa straits and the recognition of the existence of "two" Chinas. Such differences tended to be magnified by both Canadians and Americans, but they did not alter the basic facts of the interdependence of the two countries. Other areas of disagreement lay in the economic field where American tariffs and import restrictions operated against Canadian products and where American mass production threatened to upset the smaller and less advantageously situated Canadian home industries. Likewise, Canadian economic ties with the British Commonwealth affected markets and prices in Canada when American goods sought to enter the competition.

(81) Examples are so numerous that merely to mention them would require much space. In the postwar era, for instance, questions relating to the Austrian peace treaty, incidents involving the satellite areas of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and the long series of frustrating negotiations with the Soviet Union might be cited as topics to which not enough attention has been given. On this latter subject it might be well to note that to detail the efforts of the United States to treat amicably with the Russians would emphasize the underlying theme of postwar American policy-unceasing effort to communicate to the rulers of the Soviet Union the determination of the free world to resist aggression while seeking through every honorable means to reach solutions of the tensions created in large part by Soviet unwillingness to respect the decencies of international relations.

(82) There is in a democracy no place for the belief that "Theirs not to question why; theirs but to do and die." Eternal vigilance upon the part of the public toward the actions and utterances of their leaders is one of the fundamentals of a free society. To criticize and oppose are not disloyal-but these devices must be founded on facts. And only when the policymakers adequately inform the people can they expect the kind of support for our foreign policies that will afford those policies the kind of backing required for success. Deceit, planned or unconscious, on the part of leaders is not only foolhardy, it is dangerous. Whenever it is practiced either by withholding legitimate information or by "doubletalk" the policy invites failure. Likewise, when the public by impassioned or unreasoning pressure forces its leaders into untenable policies, the results are almost inevitably disappointing, and often disastrous.

(83) Recall, if you please, such expressions as "No entangling alliances," "Freedom of the seas," "Fifty-four, forty, or fight!" "Remember the Alamo!" "The reannexation of Texas," "Remember the Maine!" "Perdicaris alive, or Raisuli dead!" "Too proud to fight," "Make the world safe for democracy," "The Fourteen Points," "Quarantine the aggressors," "The Four Freedoms," "Unconditional surrender," "Let the dust settle," "Containment," "Situations of strength," "Roll back

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the Iron Curtain," "Unleashing Chiang Kaishek," "Instant and massive retaliation,' and scores of others. One notable phrase which deserves much more attention than it receives as a guiding precept for the carrying out of American foreign policy is Theodore Roosevelts favorite, "Speak softly, but carry a big stick." It is ironic that the most famous user of this phrase did not accept its wise counsel as often as judgment might have dictated.

(84) Perhaps the single most significant fact of present-day American foreign policy is the reliance by the United States upon "allies." This dependence represents the greatest reversal, or advance, in our nation's history. After a century and a half in which we avoided formal alliances the United States has come full circle and built a series of binding alliances linking our country with nations as diverse as Pakistan and Peru, Thailand and Turkey, Denmark and the Dominican Republic. NATO, OAS, ANZUS, SEATO, and the pacts with Japan, Nationalist China, the Republic of Korea, the Philippine Republic are as revolutionary in their meaning for American foreign policy as anything that has occurred since we became a nation. Not even our membership in the UN indicates so basic a change in how the Americans view the place of our country in the community of nations.

Air Force-McGregor & Werner, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia, 3,000, 4-13-56

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