trale; that is, "a stage good." But of Riches the poet saith: "Me people hiss abroad, But I myself applaud." And of Pleasure, "Your welcome joys within let stifled lie; The fallacy of this appearance is somewhat subtile, though the answer to the example be ready: for Virtue is not chosen propter aurem popularem, for the applause of the people; but contrariwise, Maximè omnium teipsum reverere, a man ought to stand most in awe of himself; so that a virtuous man will be virtuous in private, and not in public only: though perchance it will be more strong by glory and fame; as an heat, which is doubled by reflection. But that denieth the supposition, it doth not reprehend the fallacy, whereof the reprehension is a law, that Virtue (such as is joined with labour and conflict) would not be chosen, but for Fame and Opinion: yet it followeth not, that the chief motive of the election should not be real, and for itself; for Fame may be only the impelling or urging cause, and not the constituting, or efficient cause. As if there were two horses, and the one would do better without the spur than the other: but again, the other with the spur would far exceed the doing of the former, giving him the spur also; yet the latter will be judged to be the better horse: and the form as to say, "Tush, the life of this horse is but in the spur," will not serve as to a wise judgment for, since the ordinary instrument of horsemanship is the spur, and that it is no matter of impediment or burthen, the horse is not to be accounted the less of, which will not do well without the spur ; but the other is to be reckoned rather a delicacy, than a virtue. So Glory and Honour are the spurs to Virtue and although Virtue would languish without them, yet since they be always at hand to attend Virtue, Virtue is not said to be the less chosen for itself, because it needeth the spur of Fame and Reputation. And therefore that position, "That the mark of a thing chosen for opinion, and not for truth sake, is this, That one would not do it, if he thought it would not be known," is determined. SECTION 4. "That which keeps a matter safe and entire, is good: but what is destitute and unprovided of a retreat, is bad. For, whereas all ability of acting is good; not to be able to withdraw oneself, is a kind of impotency." HEREOF Æsop framed the fable of the two Frogs that consulted together in the time of drought, (when many plashes that they had repaired to were dry) what was to be done : and the one proposed to go down into a deep well, because it was likely the water would not fail there; but the other answered, "Yea, but if it do fail, how shall we get up again?" And the reason is, that human actions are so uncertain, and subject to perils, as to make that seem the best course, which hath most passages out of it. Appertaining to this persuasion, the forms are, " You shall engage yourself:" on the other side, "Take what lot you will;" or, you shall keep the matter in your own hand. The result of it is, that examining and resolving in all actions is necessary. For, as he saith well, "Not to resolve is to resolve;" so many times it breeds as many necessities, and engageth as far, in some other sort, as to resolve. Thus it is but the covetous man's disease translated in effect; for the covetous man will enjoy nothing, because he will have his full store, and possibility to enjoy the more: and for this reason, a man would then execute nothing, in order that he might be still indifferent, and at liberty to execute any thing. But then, necessity, and this once having cast the dice, hath many times an advantage; because it awaketh the powers of the mind, and strengtheneth endeavour, which are able to deal with any others, and master them upon necessity. SECTION 5. "That which consists of more parts, and those divisible, is greater, and more One, than what is made up of fewer; for all things, when they are looked upon piece-meal, seem greater; whence also a plurality of parts makes show of a bulk considerable. Which a plurality of parts effects more strongly, if they be in no certain order; for it then resembles an infinity, and hinders the comprehending of them." THIS appearance seemeth palpable; for though it is not plurality of parts, without majority of parts, that maketh the total greater; yet nevertheless, it often carries the mind away; yea, it deceiveth the sense; as it seemeth to the eye a shorter distance of way, if it be all dead and continued, than if it have trees, or buildings, or any other marks, whereby the eye may divide it. So when a great monied man hath divided his chests, and coins, and bags, he seemeth to himself richer than he was. And therefore the way to amplify any thing, is to break it in several parts, and to examine it according to several circumstances. And this maketh the greater show if it be done without order; for confusion maketh things muster more. And besides, what is set down by order and division, doth demonstrate that nothing is left out or omitted; but all is there: whereas, if it be without order, both the mind comprehendeth less that which is set down, and besides it leaveth a suspicion, as if more might be said than is expressed. This appearance deceiveth, if the mind of him that is to be persuaded, do of itself overconceive, or prejudge of the greatness of any thing; for then the breaking of it will make it seem less, because it makes it to appear more according to the truth. And therefore, if a man be in sickness or pain, the time will seem longer without a clock, or hour-glass, than with it for the mind doth value every moment ; and then the hour doth rather sum up the moments than divide the day. So in a dead plain the way seemeth the longer, because the eye hath pre-conceived it shorter, than the truth: and the correction of that maketh it seem longer than the truth. Therefore, if any man have an over-great opinion of any thing, and if another think, by breaking it into several considerations, he shall make it seem greater to him, then he will be deceived. And therefore, in such cases, it is not best to divide, but to extol the entire still in general. Another case, wherein this appearance deceiveth, is, when the matter broken, or divided, is not comprehended by the sense, or understood at once in respect |