what is it? But 'more stress,' we are told, is laid ' on force than on matter.' Wherein, then, does 'force, as expressed in molecular motion, give us anything other than movement'? If the mind is 'nothing more than the function of psychoplasm,'' and the pyschoplasm' is nothing more than 'cerebral' matter in motion (physical or chemical), what is 'mind' more than 'movement'? Perhaps an interesting variety of definitions may help our perplexity. 'Mind,' says our author, is 'that part of the life of the soul which is connected with consciousness and thought.'" One would have thought that a philosopher would have given us a little more information here about the connexion. But we are also informed that 'soul' is 'merely a collective idea of all the psychic functions of protoplasm.' So that the 'soul' is merely a physiological abstraction like assimilation or generation.' Further, it is but a potential function of the plasm.' So that, fitting these latter definitions into their proper place in the former, we are brought to what the Monistic champion styles 'this very clear and scientific reasoning.' 'In the human brain, on physical principles, we must expect a manifestation of force vastly different from all that we find elsewhere. We find mind.' Then the writer insists, with caustic emphasis, that 'vastly' different does not mean 'specifically' different. So 1 4 1 Riddle, p. 39. • Wonders, p. 328. Haeckel's Critics Answered, p. 55. that the manifestation of force' is still necessarily physical, that is, mechanical—and yet is not movement! What, then, do we find, when 'we find mind'? According to the above definitions, we find 'that part of the life of the collective idea-or physiological abstraction-of all the psychic functions of protoplasm which is connected with consciousness.' The ordinary reader will wonder what the 'life of an idea' is, and, still more, which 'part' of it merits the appellation of 'mind.'1 Now Professor Stout, whom Mr. McCabe recommends us to read, says that 'to explain, is to exhibit a fact as the resultant of its factors.' Well, the fact of mind is sufficiently manifest in the literature of the world, to say nothing of social intercourse. Are we to regard it as explained by the above? The average man, of fair intelligence and education, will naturally ask, in regard to this vaunted 'evolution of mind,' how consciousness can arise with no breach of continuity from the unconscious; 3 how thought can spring spontaneously from non 3 'Here Professor Paulsen's words irresistibly suggest themselves: Ich bitte den Leser um Verzeihung, das ich in dieser Breite ihm dies zu lesen vorsetze: aber ich musste Haeckel selbst reden lassen, um von dem Mass von Verwirrung, das in seinen Gedanken herrscht, eine Vorstellung zu geben. Man fasst sich an den Kopf: was meint er denn? 'Die variierende Wiederholung dieser sinnlosen Verbindung von Wörtern macht ihren Inhalt nicht vorstellbarer.'-Philosophia Militans, pp. 158, 139. 2 Manual of Psychology, p. 46. This Mr. McCabe affects to treat as a trifle. On p. 58 we read: But you cannot derive the conscious from the unconscious, say several critics. The objection is childish.' That should settle the matter. But thinking matter; how matter or motion, or both combined, can give rise to that which is neither motion nor matter. But he will find that to all such queries Haeckel's monism will supply only the mockery of an answer. He will obtain no account of the essence of consciousness; no explanation of its origin; no notice, let alone explanation, of the unity of consciousness in personality; and, in the comparison of the human mind with that of animals, the dogma that there is only a difference of degree, not kind, supported by nothing but plentiful after this magisterial dismissal, he condescends to enlighten our weak minds as follows: If we are to explain anything, as Sir A. Rücker said, we cannot explain it in terms of itself; the conscious must be derived from the unconscious. And as a fact Mr. Mallock points out, you do get consciousness out of the unconscious every day-in the growth of the infant; or, as Lloyd Morgan puts it, in the development of the chicken from the egg.' Now, to begin with, the uninformed reader would think from this that both Professors Rücker and Morgan were convinced Monists. We shall see in due course that they are nothing of the kind, but distinctly the opposite. Then note once again the Monistic jugglery. We cannot explain the conscious in terms of the conscious, therefore the conscious must be derived from the unconscious.' Now here are two tacit affirmations. First, the conscious can be derived from the unconscious; which is the very matter under dispute. Secondly, it can only be derived from the unconscious; that is to say, there is in the whole universe nothing but unconscious matter and force from which it could be 'derived'; which again begs the whole question in hand. To attempt to clinch this with a 'must' is to fling science to the winds. Do the suggested illustrations warrant this tall talk? They do just the opposite. For both of them--infant and chicken alike-receive the potentiality of their growing consciousness by direct heredity from the parental consciousness. In other words, these pseudo-similes are evasions and not illustrations at all. What should be both proved and illustrated is best expressed in Professor Lloyd Morgan's own words: 'I here protest against the erroneous view that out of matter and energy consciousness and thought can be produced by any conceivable evolutionary process' (The Contemporary Review, June, 1904, p. 784). assertion and hypothesis. Now, if one intelligent person should ask another what the faculty of sight is, as possessed by human beings, would it be accepted as an answer and an explanation, to draw up a long list of reasons for believing that it has developed from an original infolding of a portion of the epidermis?1 If such an answer would be deemed a mere evasion, what else can be said of the case' for the evolution of mind which is now said in the name of Monism to be 'for ever established'? For what is this alleged 'establishment' when fairly scrutinized? First, we have the acknowledgement that consciousness is the central mystery of psychology,' which every tyro knows. Then, that of all wonders of life, consciousness may be said to be the greatest and most astounding,'3 which sounds modest enough, but is somewhat difficult to reconcile with bald assertions elsewhere that 'the ' Professor Schoeler sums up the case admirably: Was Bewusstsein ist und wie es zustande kommt, wollen wir wissen'-that is the question! 'Schlägt man hierüber die naturwissenschaftlichen speziell entwicklungsgeschictlichen und monistischen Werke nach, so findet man eingehende Untersuchungen und Erörterungen über Psychoplasma und Atomseelen, über Zellseelen und Seelenzellen, psychophysiologische Protistenstudien und Beobachtungen über die Stufenfolge der Seelenentwicklung im Tierreiche, die, für sich betrachtet, geistvoll und interessant sind. Aber nicht das wollen wir wissen. Nicht ob Bewusstsein auf dieser oder jener Stufe vor handen sei oder nicht, und wie es in der aufsteigenden Skala der animalischen Evolution an Intensität zunimmt : sondern worin das Wesen desselben besteht, wodurch sich ein bewusstes von einem unbewussten Zustande unterscheidet, und wie es möglich ist, wenn das Bewusstsein eine physiologische Funktion des Gehirns ist, dass eine solche zur Produktion einer immateriellen Vorstellungswelt führen kann?'-Probleme, p. 93. * Riddle, p. 61. : Wonders, p. 24. neurological problem of consciousness is but a particular aspect of the all-pervading cosmological problem of substance'1; that 'consciousness itself is only a special form of nervous energy'; and that 'in any case the ontogenesis of consciousness makes it perfectly clear that it is not an immaterial entity, but a physiological function of the brain, and that it is consequently no exception to the general law of substance.' 3 If we venture further to inquire how this is all so 'perfectly clear,' in spite of the avowed mystery, we are promptly informed that it is nothing but a case of continuous development from a suitable germ. It turns out-conveniently for Monism-that the original atoms from which ultimately everything is mechanically derived,* are already endowed with '5 sensation, memory, will, and soul. Hence nothing more is needed, than that these should be 'mechanically' extended by 'necessity.' Thus we are informed that The two fundamental forms of substance, ponderable matter and ether, are not dead, and only moved by extrinsic force, but they are endowed with sensation and will (though naturally of the lowest grade); they experience an inclination for condensation, a dislike of strain; they strive after the one, and struggle against 1 Riddle, p. 65. Wonders, p. 464. $ Riddle, p. 66. cf. Confession of Faith, p. 19: 'Monism strives to carry back all phenomena, without exception, to the mechanism of the atom.' From which, of course, it is 'perfectly clear' that we may pass with tolerable ease,' by means of a due admixture of necessity and chance, without mind, to everything, 'without exception,' that is human. The phrase is that of Professor Turner, quoted with eulogy by Mr. McCabe, Haeckel's Critics Answered, p. 58. It is certainly suggestive. |