Изображения страниц
PDF
EPUB

'No philosopher, with the possible exception of Aristotle, has been more lauded for his rigorous logic than Spinoza. In truth, few philosophers have included more fallacies in the exposition of their systems. The pages of the Ethics swarm with paralogisms, all veiled under the forms of rigid mathematical statement. His fundamental definitions, whatever verbal precision may belong to them, are, as regards the realities of being, unproved assumptions. His reasoning, from beginning to end, is vitiated by the realistic presupposition that the actual existence of a being can be inferred from the definition of a word.

'Pantheism, in resolving personal being into a mere phenomenon, or a phase of an impersonal essence, and in abolishing the gulf of separation between the subject and the object, clashes with the first and clearest affirmation of consciousness.'

FISHER, Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief, pp. 64, 66.

'The statement "This scheme is faultless in its consistency and is therefore true," is not logic, it is an act of pure faith. This unlogical faith which permeates science is very plain to see. Why should there be a system at all? Why should we feel that the universe must be a perfect harmony? Why should there not be seventy or eighty elements as well as one only? The answer is not forthcoming. It is a matter of faith, bred in the bone of science.'

PROFESSOR R. K. DUNCAN, The New Knowledge, p. 255.

'There can be no controversy as to the reality of these "new departures" in nature. They are facts that cannot be resolved into one another, nor expressed in terms of one another. Closely interwoven as they are in their processes, they are yet absolutely distinct in their essence. In what sense, then, may we speak of the "continuity of nature"? Not, certainly, by attempting to reduce the higher of these orders of fact into the lower; but by positing a deeper and more ultimate unity out of which both orders spring. This unity must be conceived of, not as a bald and formless entity, but as unimaginably rich and potent; not as limited by the categories and antinomies of human thought, nor yet as altogether above our apprehension, but as Someone with whom we come into real relations through the phenomena of the Universe, while at the same time He transcends our highest conception and ideal of Him.'

E. GRIFFITH JONES, The Ascent through Christ, p. 34.

VIII

SUBSTANCE

LIKE other philosophers who have a preconceived theory to carry through, Professor Haeckel not seldom contradicts himself. Thus at one time he speaks of:

The great law of nature which, under the title of the 'law of substance,' we put at the head of all physical considerations was conceived as the law of 'the persistence of force' by Robert Meyer, who first formulated it, and Helmholtz, who continued the work.1

Here, we note, there is no mention at all of the conservation of matter.' But at the commencement of this same chapter he says distinctly:

Under the name of the 'law of substance' we embrace two supreme laws of different origin and age; the older is the chemical law of the conservation of matter, and the younger is the physical law of the conservation of energy.'

Yet again we find him declaring, concerning the 'law of the conservation of substance,' that 'this belongs also to scientific articles of faith and could stand as the first article of our monistic religion.' • Confession, p. 99.

Riddle, p. 82.

2 p. 75.

It must remain for his co-monists to say which of these three is the 'supreme and only cosmological law.' In regard to that assumed blending, however, which we have just considered, he avers that—

Sceptical objections have a semblance of justification only in so far as they relate to the fundamental problem of substance, the primary question as to the connexion between matter and energy.1

So that, whilst we entirely deny the accuracy of his assumption that 'only one comprehensive riddle of the universe now remains-the problem of substance'' -and dismiss as altogether unworthy the reiterated attempts at contumely in regard to Du Bois Reymond, under this head, it seems necessary to follow down to its final foundation the 'system' which vaunts itself as the only true and hopeful theory of the universe. Here will be found room, even more than in the case above quoted, for the reminder of Romanes, that 'an elaborate structure of argument becomes wholly disintegrated when its fundamental hypothesis is proved untrue.'

We have first to ask, what this 'gloomy problem

1 Confession, p. 99.

2 Riddle, p. 134. As a specimen of Monistic accuracy, or rather falsity, it is well matched by the assertion of his champion that 'modern apologists have been driven to deny that there is any real distinction between God and nature' (Haeckel's Critics Answered, p. 78), when there is not one single Christian apologist to be found who has ever said anything of the kind. Or the sneer (p. 36) at a 'straggling line of preachers and leader-writers in The Methodist Luminary'—when such a journal has never existed. If Monistic advocacy needs such

helps as these, it is to be pitied.

of substance' means; then, we must face its implications; finally, we will investigate its truthfulness.

I. In face of Haeckel's vigorous affirmations, and the vivacious rhetoric of his champion, one wonders where the 'gloomy' element comes in. The sprightliness of perfectly self-satisfied assertion characterizes every statement of the Monistic case.

We adhere firmly to the pure unequivocal monism of Spinoza: Matter, or infinitely extended substance, and spirit (or energy), or sensitive and thinking substance, are the two fundamental attributes or principal properties of the all-embracing divine essence of the world, the universal substance.1

This reads very simply, but unfortunately it is no more true to Spinoza than it is either to science or to sense.

1 Riddle, p. 8.

2 We cannot, of course, branch off here into a full discussion of the philosophic views of the 'God-intoxicated' philosopher of Amsterdam. But the thoughtful reader may be asked to study the recent article by Professor McGiffert in The Hibbert Journal for July, 1905, and if possible also the summary by Professor Paulsen in his Philosophia Militans, pp. 139-46. Just a word or two will show his drift. 'Wir lesen die formel noch einmal: eine Substanz (das Weltwesen) hat zwei Substanzen als Attribute, die Materie und den Geist, für den man aber auch die Energie setzen kann. Seltsam, die Worte kommen uns aus dem Spinoza bekannt vor, aber die Verknüpfung! sollten sie durch den Setzer verschoben sein?-Wir fassen uns an die Stirn: wo sind wir denn nun eigentlich ?—Materie, Ausdehnung, Bewegung, Kraft, Energie, Denken, Geist, das alles ist ein und dasselbe, blos verschiedener Wörter fur Dieselbe Sache!'

Dr. Adickes (Kant contra Haeckel, pp, 11, 12) moreover says: 'Daher halte ich mich bei solchen " 'Kleinigkeiten" der Terminologie nicht lange auf, sondern stelle nur fest, dass (1) die Gleichsetzung von Geist und Energie (Geist die allumfassende denkende Substanz-Energie) durchaus nicht Spinozistisch ist, und dass (2) einer der wichtigsten Glaubens-artikel Spinozas; seine einheitliche unendliche Substanz (ens

Let us, however, mark well another and fuller statement:

This universal substance, this 'divine nature of the world,' shows us two different aspects of its being, or two fundamental attributes-matter (infinitely extended substance) and spirit (the all-embracing energy of thought). Every single object in the world which comes within the sphere of our cognizance, all individual forms of existence, are but special transitory formsaccidents or modes-of substance. These modes are material things when we regard them under the attribute of extension (or 'occupation of space'), but forces or ideas when we consider them under the attribute of thought (or 'energy'). Matter (spacefilling substance) and energy (moving force) are but two inseparable attributes of the one underlying substance.1

The form of monism which I take to be the most complete expression of the general truth is now generally called hylozoism. This expresses the fact that all substance has two fundamental attributes; as matter it occupies space, and as force, or energy, it is endowed with sensation. Extension is identical with real space, and thought with (unconscious) sensation.'

And seeing that Mr. McCabe professes not only to defend but to expound his master, we may as well allow him to complete the delineation: 3

Haeckel is convinced that matter and spirit are not two distinct entities or natures, but two forms, or two aspects, of one absolute infinitum) von Haeckel aufgegeben wird: aus beiden Gründen ist die Beziehung auf jenes System ganz unberechtigt und unangebracht. -Eben darum hat aber Haeckel's Anschaungsweise mit der Spinozas auch nicht die entfernteste Ähnlichkeit. Spinoza betont die Einheit und Einheitlichkeit seiner Substanz so sehr, dass die Einzeldinge darüber ihre Selbständigkeit verlieren. Bei Haeckel ist der letzteren Selbständigkeit so gross, dass von Einheit überhaupt nicht mehr die Rede sein kann.'

In the light of this criticism, which is equally cultured and, so far as religion is concerned, impartial, we may see what worth to attach to Haeckel's calm assumption-'All the changes which have since come over the idea of substance are reduced, on a logical analysis, to this supreme thought of Spinoza's.'

1 Riddle, p. 77.

3 Haeckel's Critics Answered, p. 20.

2 Wonders, p. 84.

« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »