Setting out in search of matter as that which is alien to mind, science ended by discovering only law and order, which are the sure marks of mind. All that science then could do-even if it were complete-would be to enable us to forecast not what the future will be, but what it would be if present tendencies persisted unmodified; if every agent in the world became fossilized into a creature of habits. In a word, the application of pure science to the actual world is wholly hypothetical and tentative.' PROF. JAS. WARD, Hibbert Journal, Oct. 1905, p. 97. 'We must not mistake the utterances of men of science for the voice of science as such. For on this borderland of science and philosophy, it need not be surprising if men only familiar with the method of investigation which science pursues, and not greatly at home in the varied and complex history of philosophical thought, should sometimes incline to a hasty inference when the borderland is reached, should overlook the fact that their science and its method have necessary limits, and in philosophy take the view which an illegitimate extension of their method would indicate.' DR. HOWISON, The Limits of Evolution, p. 82. 'Je tiefer wir in das histologische Labyrinth des Centralnervensystems und in das physiologische Triebwerk seiner Funktionen eindringen, desto unfasslicher wird uns das Rätsel, wie das Gehirn-die sichtbare und greifbare Korperseele-dieser sich auch im lebenden Zustande kühl anfühlende, selbst gefühllose Breiklumpen, Erzeuger und Schauplatz der unsichtbaren Geistes-und Gemütswelt sein kann!' SCHOELER, Probleme, &c., p. 81. Aber 'Die Formel Klingt als hätten die Materialisten von Kant gelernt. Zwischen Erscheinung und Ding an Sich unterscheiden sie. das Ding an Sich ist die bewegte Materie: die Erscheinung-das Bewusstsein. Unwillkürlich fragt man: wem oder wo erscheint die Bewegung so? Die Antwort könnte nur lauten: in einem Bewusstsein. Diese Frage und die einzige Antwort, die es darauf giebt, genügten eigentlich Schon, um den Materialisten ad absurdum zu führen, wenn er Gründen überhaupt zugänglich wäre.' PROF. E. ADICKES, Kant contra Haeckel, p. 27. II PHILOSOPHY IN TATTERS 1 In his latest volume Professor Haeckel loudly complains that 'the most violent attacks' have been 'directed against my monistic theory of knowledge, or against the method I followed in seeking to solve the riddle of the universe.' 'Critical philosophers of the modern Kantian school' are said to vie with 'orthodox theologians' in 'misrepresentation, sophistry, calumny, denunciation. These heated partisans may continue to attack and calumniate my person as they will: they will not hurt the sacred cause of truth in which I labour.' This certainly sounds meek enough. But apart from the quiet assumption here that none of his opponents cares for the sacred cause of truth,' such an attitude no more accords with the matter of his philosophy than-as we have already seen-with his mien towards those who do not accept it. It is indeed not easy to reconcile with the avowal of his English champion: 'If he cares to invade every department of thought in search of anti-theological arguments, and to throw out scores of positive explanations in 1 Wonders of Life, Preface, p. ix. the teeth of the theologian, he must of course expect battle. It is just what he desires.'1 Let us, however, lay aside all that tends to 'the heat of battle,' and endeavour with calm frankness to do him justice. His 'method' is confessedly difficult to follow, because he claims to write both as a man of science and a philosopher. He strongly protests against being content with science per se: The man who renounces theory altogether, and seeks to construct a pure science with certain facts alone, must give up the hope of any knowledge of causes, and consequently of the satisfaction of reason's demand for causality.? Unfortunately, his acknowledged eminence in certain branches of science becomes almost inevitably his ground of authority to speak for all other branches, and the reason for attaching especial weight to his deliverances as a philosopher. But Sir Oliver Lodge says truly that, as a philosopher, Professor Haeckel can claim no particular weight for his opinions more than those of any other philosopher.' 3 And seeing that Haeckel himself has defined for us who this other philosopher is-'In my opinion, every educated and thoughtful man who strives to form a definite view of life is a philosopher'-we are free to render all due respect to eminence in 1 Haeckel's Critics Answered, p. 125. I may be forgiven for pointing out how these words of Mr. McCabe corroborate my estimate in the scorned British Weekly articles: Haeckel's much-belauded volume is really neither a work on science nor a philosophical treatise, but a virulent tirade against Christianity in the name of science and under the guise of philosophy' (August 6, 1903). 2 Riddle, p. 106; so too Wonders, p. 5. • Hibbert Journal, January, 1905, p. 333. See p. 11 above. biology without being at all bound to pay special heed to, let alone accept, the philosophy which he associates with it. 'Pure philosophy,' he tells us,' 'aims at a knowledge of the truth by means of pure reason, as I explained in the first chapter.' Turning to this we find that the only paths recognized as profitable' are those of experience and thought-or empirical knowledge and speculation.' 'Two other muchfrequented paths'-emotion and revelation-are to be rejected as false, because 'both of these are in opposition to reason.' Now we may overlook for the moment the quiet though enormous petitio principii of the last clause, and consider fairly the two paths alleged to be profitable. The first of these, 'empirical knowledge,' need not detain us long. Beyond the reminder that Weismann's theory of heredity, however severely mauled by Spencer and criticized by Romanes, is by no means demolished or defunct, be the consequences to Haeckel's monism what they may, we need enter upon no discussion of his biological allegations. Such differences of statement as experts alone are competent to make, do not here concern us. The question is not as to the facts, but as to the worth of the facts. Thus we come to what he himself terms 'speculation.' Now if this were confined to the synonym which Sir Oliver Lodge suggests, viz. 'brilliant guesswork,' and were on all occasions put forth, as such, with the genuine modesty befitting all suggestions Wonders, p. 472. 2 Hibbert Journal, January, 1905, p. 320. |