section of biology. The soul of man is a physiological function of the phronema.'

1

3. As regards the thought of immortality, it is nothing but an 'irrational dogma' and 'a deplorable anachronism.' Or more plainly, here' Or more plainly, here we come to that highest point of superstition' in regard to which 'we have to say the same of athanatism as of theism : both are creations of poetic mysticism, and of transcendental faith, not of rational science.' So that 'if we take a comprehensive glance at all that modern anthropology, psychology, and cosmology teach with regard to athanatism, we are forced to this definite conclusion: the belief in the immortality of the human soul is a dogma which is in hopeless contradiction with the most solid empirical truths of modern science.' From all of which, only one conclusion is possible.

4. Concerning free-will, as an item of Christian philosophy, the case becomes yet more emphatic. In the very first chapter of The Riddle the matter is 'settled by our conception of substance the freedom of the will is not an object for critical, scientific inquiry at all, for it is pure dogma based on an illusion and has no real existence.' After this, one would have expected no further allusion to it. But it seems that the dead requires to be slain over again, and the foregoing dictum is repeated in the following terms:

The great struggle between the determinist and the indeterminist, 5 p. 6.

Confession, p. 54. 2 Riddle, p. 67.

3 Riddle, p. 72.
4 ' p. 75.

between the opponent and the sustainer of the freedom of the will, has ended to-day, after more than two thousand years, completely in favour of the determinist. We now know that each act of the will is as fatally determined by the organization of the individual and as dependent upon the momentary condition of his environment as every other psychic activity.'

In the latest volume a still further stage of settlement is reached by the avowal that it is immaterial whether or not 'one believes in the freedom of the will, according to the antiquated creed of indeterminism.'

5. So, finally, as to the Christian doctrine of Providence. The premature death of the brilliant young physicist, Heinrich Hertz,' we are assured, 'is one of those brutal facts of history which are enough of themselves to destroy the untenable myth of a wise Providence and an all-loving Father in heaven.' Thus it is not surprising to find later on that 'it is just as impossible for the impartial and critical observer to detect a wise Providence in the fate of individual human beings, as a moral order in the history of peoples. Belief in a loving Father is absolutely impossible. That is at once perceived on laying aside the coloured spectacles of faith, and reflecting rationally on the subject.' Equally comprehensive is the reiteration in the later volume.

4

We are bound to point out that reason cannot detect the shadow of a proof of the existence and action of this conscious Providence or loving Father in heaven." I have been unable to discover throughout the whole world a single trace of a moral order or a beneficent Providence."

On our part, weighing all these and many other similar utterances, we too 'are bound to point out' that no other conclusion is possible therefrom, than that all who do not share his 'monistic views,' are either irremediable fools or downright hypocrites. But such a result can only be enforced by a dogmatism which is as far from true philosophy, as a Pope of Rome is from a rationalist.'

II. If, however, by way of throwing a sop to Cerberus, we should concede that all the foregoing is simply the ordinary way of expression in adult literature,' there are other rents in this pseudophilosophic robe which cry aloud for repair. It is a strong saying, confessedly, that 'the book teems with unwarranted assumptions.' But is it true? This, though only by specimen, few instances for many, we must now proceed to answer.

If we take the three volumes in chronological order, a fairly good start is made by the sweeping assumption (which is none the less dogmatic in that it calmly begs the whole question under discussion) that'the conception of a personal God, creator and ruler of the world, does not give the slightest help towards a truly rational view of the world.'1 And the main reason why any 'rational' man does not need 'the God hypothesis' is that we can with more or less probability ascribe a number of eternal and inalienable fundamental attributes to the original mass-atoms-the ultimate discrete particles of inert "ponderable matter." They are probably everywhere 1 Confession, p. 69.

เ

in space, of like magnitude and constitution.'

Here, it is interesting to note how the final foundation of the 'faith of a man of science' is a 'probably.' 2

3

But when The Confession expands itself into The Riddle, we find ourselves in a perfect forest of similar assumings of just what is necessary for the Monistic theory. Physical science,' we are informed, with the easiest assurance, at the outset, 'is so much more important than all other sciences, and, properly understood, really embraces all the so-called moral sciences.' Hence naturally 'the monistic philosophy is ultimately confronted with but one simple and comprehensive enigma-the problem of substance.' The sweet simplicity of this is easily explained. 'In my opinion the three transcendental problems(1) the nature of matter and force; (2) the origin of motion; (3) the origin of life—are settled by our conception of substance.' Thus we are enabled to perceive how useful a 'conception' may be. It first dismisses all other 'problems' than itself, and then settles itself as infallible, by conceiving itself. Truly a philosophic conception!

With such a 'method' it is easy enough to proceed. Any child can thus apprehend (1) that 'the universe, or the cosmos, is eternal, infinite, and illimitable;

1 Confession, p. 26.

2 Handelt es sich nach Haeckel um heuristische Hypothesen, welche die Richtung des Weges angeben sollen, auf dem die Forschung "wahrscheinlich " am besten vorzudringen hat.'--Schoeler, p. 65.

Riddle, p. 4.

4

p. 5. As showing how perfectly simple and self-evident is this assumption on the part of the apostle of Monism, it may be interesting to transcribe just one paragraph from a most recent authority who,

(2) its substance, with its two attributes, matter and energy, fills infinite space and is in eternal motion.' Whence of course it follows that 'this infinite and eternal machine of the universe, sustains itself in eternal and uninterrupted movement.'1 The translator, however, has added to the complexity of this simplicity by informing the English public that 'the duration of the world is equally infinite and unbounded, it has no beginning and no end, it is eternity. From which the average reader, knowing nothing of the significance of the German. 'Weltzeit,' but knowing well that in our tongue 'the universe' is the whole of which 'the world' is only the tiny planetary part, will be faced with the further assumption of the infinitude of this our comparatively little globe.

But the truth is that assumptions such as these, every one of them equally unwarranted, SO constitute the very pith and marrow of these pages that the problem where to begin to take examples, being farthest removed from the hated orthodoxy,' will be so much the more acceptable to Haeckelian monists. In Mr. Carl Snyder's New Conceptions in Science, p. 97, we read: The first principle with investigators of nature, said von Helmholtz, must be that nature is intelligible for us: otherwise it would be folly to try to study it. If the cosmos of which we are a part is infinite, it is not intelligible, for the infinite is beyond our understanding. If it is infinite in extent, infinite in bulk, it would contain infinite forces, attracting over infinite spaces, and moving objects with infinite speeds. If its parts are infinitely divisible, the combination of these parts would be infinite in variety and action. There is simply nothing in natural phenomena to suggest such conclusions.' I would commend this whole chapter upon The Finite Universe,' to those who are carried away by the superstition that all modern scientists think alike in fundamental' matters.

1 Riddle, p. 87.