Goethe, again, is continually represented as the Monistic philosopher of Germany. Yet it would appear that the author was somewhat uneasy in his references; else why add1 that 'it is wrong to conclude from isolated quotations from Goethe that he occasionally betrayed the dualism of Schiller in his opinions. Some of the remarks in this connexion that Eckermann has left us from his conversations with Goethe must be taken very carefully,' as being 'quite inconsistent with his character, and more or less perverted.' But is there any real ground for this sneer at the mediocre Eckermann'? None whatever, beyond the fact that he testifies to many sayings of Goethe which flatly contradict Haeckel's representation of him as 'renegade non-Christian' and a 'great heathen whose creed was pure monism

72

เ

V. Let us, however, leave this section also incomplete, to make mention of another matter. 'Pure philosophy,' we have been told, 'aims at a knowledge of the truth by means of pure reason.' It is to be assumed that this includes clear reasoning. Faulty logic surely means a very wide rent in any philosophic garb. Yet let us take but one or two specimens of what we should find if for 1 Wonders of Life, p. 458.

* Dr. Dennert has an instructive chapter hereupon in his Die Wahrheit über Ernst Haeckel und seine Welträtsel. Here I can only give one sentence: Von Goethe sind so viel Stellen bekannt die dagegen sprechen dass er ein Kind Haeckelschen Geistes gewesen wäre, dass es sich kaum verlohnt, sie noch einmal zu zitieren. Nur eins! Er sagt einmal: "die Zeit des Zweifels ist vorüber, es zweifelt jetzt so wenig jemand an sich selbst als an Gott "' (p. 49).

such purpose alone we went seriatim through these volumes.

1

We will glance only at one or two in The Riddle. At the outset we are informed that 'the anthropistic view of the world is in irreconcilable opposition to our monistic system, indeed, it is at once disproved by our new cosmological perspective.' This is a fair statement of the constantly recurring pseudo-logic of these pages. The anthropistic view is 'disproved ' by the Monistic view, and the Monistic view is demonstrated by our opinion.' How there could be a more flagrant instance of the fallacy known as petitio quaestionis it is difficult to conceive.

We are afterwards told that 'all the phenomena of the psychic life, without exception, are bound up with certain material changes in the living substance of the body, the protoplasm.' In The Riddle the particular part of the protoplasm concerned is called 'psychoplasm.' In the later volume3 it reappears under the new name of 'phronema.' But whatever the name the doctrine is the same. 'We

' p. 5. I cannot in these pages transcribe the whole of Haeckel's volume; but lest it should seem that in any such quotation I do injustice to the text, the whole of the next paragraph is here presented. It makes no real difference to what is above suggested.

'Not only the three anthropistic dogmas, but many other notions of the dualistic philosophy and orthodox religion are found to be untenable, as soon as we regard them critically from the cosmological perspective of our monistic system. We understand by that the comprehensive view of the universe which we have from the highest point of our monistic interpretation of nature. From that standpoint we see the truth of the following cosmological theorems, most of which in our opinion have already been amply demonstrated.'

2 p. 39.

3 Wonders, p. 16.

consider the psyche to be merely a collective idea of all the psychic functions of protoplasm.' The intended inference is simple. Consciousness, will, &c., are bound up with changes in psychoplasm; therefore they are nothing more than changes of psychoplasm, and the soul is nothing more than the 'idea' of these changes. The grounds of such inference are even simpler. 'We consider' it so. What more is required? We will only make one suggestion here-as we must return to it afterwardsin the words of the manual of psychology which is specially recommended.1

Why cannot we simply affirm that consciousness is a function of the brain? The objection is that we do not make the two things the same by applying the same word to them, when in their own nature they are radically and essentially different When we say that digestion is a function of the stomach, we mean that digestion is the stomach engaged in digesting. But if we describe the brain at work there is no need to mention consciousness at all and in naming and describing conscious processes, there is no need to mention the brain. The function of the brain as a physiological organ is to move the body. If consciousness is supposed to be produced by the nervous process, the production is simply creation out of nothing.

Further. Not without reason has attention been drawn to the contents of p. 77 of The Riddle, as embodying some remarkable statements. Consider now but one:

Every single object in the world which comes within the sphere of our cognizance, all individual forms of existence, are but special transitory forms-accidents or modes of substance. These

2

1 Manual of Psychology, by Professor Stout, p. 49; Wonders, p. 297.

By Mr. R. Christie, in a thoughtful article in The Contemporary Review for April, 1904, which merits careful study.

modes are material things when we regard them under the attribute of extension or occupation of space, but forces or ideas when we consider them under the attribute of thought.'

Now, if material things' and 'ideas' and 'forces' are thus identical, language ceases to be significant, and thought becomes a mere chaos of consciousness. But if these three are-as they assuredly are-to be distinguished, we are invited to understand that the very same 'modes' are transmuted from the one to the other by our varying consideration of them. This is miracle-working indeed. For if an idea be not immaterial, it ceases to be an idea. If, however, its immateriality be conceded, by what process is it transformed into a 'material thing'? If it be said that they merely become such to us, 'when we regard them,' then not only is that other than is here stated, but Monism is reduced to pure subjectivity. Moreover, when a man regards himself— which he is assuredly capable of doing-it would be interesting to know whether he is a material thing, or a force, or an idea. And it would be still more interesting-when we learn, as above, that 'the real organs of mental life in the grey bed of the brain, are those highest instruments of psychic activity that produce thought and consciousness'—to be told how these 'instruments,' any more than any other instruments, can 'produce' anything without a producer to employ them. Possibly the author knows of an organ that plays itself, or a printing machine that sets up its own type.

1 The italics are mine.

In another sphere of thought Professor Haeckel identifies himself and Monistic scientists with the alleged statement of Calvinistic theology, to the effect that if man with his free will were to act otherwise than God had ordained, God would not be all-mighty and all-knowing.' Such a procedure

is worthy of the philosopher whose 'scrupulous honesty' in regard to matters Christian consists in adopting as theology the gibes of a Saladin, but it is unworthy of any earnest thinker. The sentence, indeed, sufficiently answers itself; for if the 'omnipotence and omniscience of God' had 'predetermined the conduct of man,' how could he be possessed of 'free will'? Strange that such writers cannot seesurely they could if they would-that, as regards almightiness, divine 'omnipotence' does not include a contradiction in terms. Whilst as to omniscience, it is always and necessarily the 'foreknowledge' which is conditioned by the conduct, and not the conduct compelled by the foreknowledge; for the foreknowledge which also predetermined would not be foreknowledge, but predestination, which is an entirely different thing. Whether this latter can be attributed to Christian doctrine is sufficiently discussed, and, one may add, disproved, elsewhere.

Surely also it is anything but sound reasoning to affirm that when the notion of immortality has been 'displaced by progressive culture,' 'man has lost nothing but gained much as regards his life on earth. Convinced that there is no eternal 1 Riddle, p. 46.