In E. C. Benecke.-ANSELM'S ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF and Circumstances Co-ordinate Factors in Human Life, or is Either Sub- THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. V. Nos. and 5. THE RELATION OF INTUITIONISM to the Doctrine of Self-REALISATION. By Prof. Henry Calderwood.-THE FOURTH DIMENSION OF SPACE. By Prof. J. H. Hyslop.-MORALITY THE LAST OF DOGMAS. By Antonio Llano,DISCUSSIONS: I. Self-Consciousness, Social Consciousness, and Nature. By Prof. J. E. Russell; II. Mr. Balfour and Transcendental Idealism. By Prof. R. B. Johnson; III. The Intensive Statement of Particular and Negative Propositions. By Prof. Margaret Washburn. IS MORALITY WITHOUT RELIGION POSSIBLE and Desirable? By Prof. Otto Pfleiderer.-THE IDEALISM OF SPINOZA. By Prof. J. Clark Murray.—ON THE RELATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY to Other SciENCES. By Dr. Harold Griffing.-THE CAUSE AND FUNCTION OF CONSCIENCE. By Prof, S. E. Mezes.BOOK REVIEWS, ETC.-(Boston, New York, Chicago: Ginn & Co.) In the most notable and timely article of the September number of the Philosophical Review, Professor Pfleiderer sums up his reflexion on the relations of morality and religion as follows: One must strive for the reformation of the church "in the name of the eternal religio-ethical idea. This can only be done from "within, along the line of historical development. Hence it can only be accom"plished with the help of a scientific theology. Societies for Ethical Culture, which "despise these methods, are as helpless and impotent against the church as a band "of robbers before a strongly defended fortress. The only result of their efforts 'will be that the religious sentiment of the community will suffer. Either there "will be a loss of religious and ethical convictions, and a consequent ethical retro"gression, or their efforts will indirectly contribute to promote a reaction, having "as its consequence a relapse into dogmatism and ecclesiasticism. In both cases "the effect will be contrary to what they really desire. It is evident, therefore, "that those who are in earnest in demanding a truly ideal morality and a truly eth"ical community must labor, not for a morality outside of the church, but for a "reformation within the church." THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. VII. No. 4. ON MUSCULAR MEMORY, By Theodate L. Smith.-A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF SOME OF THE MOTOR PHENOMENA OF MENTAL EFFORT. By Ernest H. Lindley.-LIGHT INTensity and DepTH PERCEPTION. By T. B. Robinson, A. B. -ATTENTION, EXPERIMENTAL AND CRITICAL. By Frank Drew.-PSYCHOLOgical Literature.—Notes.—(Worcester, Mass.: J. H. Orpha.) THE MONIST. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. VOL. III. No. 5. STUDIES FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY of the University of Iowa: On the Effects of Loss of Sleep: G. T. W. Patrick, and J. Allen Gilbert.— STUDIES FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY OF HARVARD University: I. The Relations of Intensity to Duration of Stimulation in Our Sensations of Light: James E. Lough. II. Normal Motor Automatism: Leon M. Solomons and Gertrude Stein.-ON THE CONDITIONS OF FATIGUE IN READING. By Harold Griffing and Shepherd Ivory Franz.-THE ACCURACY OF OBSERVATION AND OF RECOLLECTION IN SCHOOL-CHILDREN. By Shepherd Ivory Franz and Henry F. Houston.-DISCUSSION, ETC.-(New York: Macmillan & Co., 66 Fifth Avenue.) ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE. Vol. II. No. 3. ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNES- UEBER KOMBINATIONSTÖNE und einige hierzu in Beziehung stehende Akus- Versuche über das Vergleichen von Winkelverschiedenheiten. By Dr. ORGANE. UEBER DEN EINFLUSS VON Lichtstärke uND ADAPTATIon auf das Sehen des Dichromaten (GRÜNBLINDEN). By J. v. Kries and W. Nagel.-DIE GEOMETRISCH-OPTISCHEN TÄUSCHUNGEN. (Vorläufige Mitteilung.) By Th. Lipps. -NEUE METHODE ZUR HERSTELLUNG HOMOGENER GRAUER FLÄCHEN VON VERSCHIEDENER HELLIGKEIT. By Karl Marbe. — LITTERATURBERICHT. — (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.) THE MONIST. THE LOGIC OF RELATIVES. §1. Three Grades of Clearness.-The third volume of Professor Schröder's Exact Logic,1 which volume bears separately the title I have chosen for this paper, is exciting some interest even in this country. There are in America a few inquirers into logic, sincere and diligent, who are not of the genus that buries its head in the sand, men who devote their thoughts to the study with a view to learning something that they do not yet know, and not for the sake of upholding orthodoxy, or any other foregone conclusion. For them this article is written as a kind of popular exposition of the work that is now being done in the field of logic. To them I desire to convey some idea of what the new logic is, how two "algebras," that is, systems of diagrammatical representation by means of letters and other characters, more or less analogous to those of the algebra of arithmetic, have been invented for the study of the logic of relatives, and how Schröder uses one of these (with some aid from the other and from other notations) to solve some interesting problems of reasoning. I also wish to illustrate one other of several important uses to which the new logic may be put. To this end I must first clearly show what a relation is. Now there are three grades of clearness in our apprehensions of the meanings of words. The first consists in the connexion of 1Algebra und Logik der Relative. Leipsic B. G. Teubner. 1895. Price, 16 M. the word with familiar experience. In that sense, we all have a clear idea of what reality is and what force is,-even those who talk so glibly of mental force being correlated with the physical forces. The second grade consists in the abstract definition, depending upon an analysis of just what it is that makes the word applicable. An example of defective apprehension in this grade is Professor Tait's holding (in an appendix to the reprint of his Britannica article, Mechanics) that energy is "objective" (meaning it is a substance), because it is permanent, or "persistent.' For independence of time does not of itself suffice to make a substance; it is also requisite that the aggregant parts should always preserve their identity, which is not the case in the transformations of energy. The third grade of clearness consists in such a representation of the idea that fruitful reasoning can be made to turn upon it, and that it can be applied to the resolution of difficult practical problems. § 2. Of the term Relation in its first Grade of Clearness.-An essential part of speech, the Preposition, exists for the purpose of expressing relations. Essential it is, in that no language can exist without prepositions, either as separate words placed before or after their objects, as case-declensions, as syntactical arrangements of words, or some equivalent forms. Such words as "brother," "slayer," "at the time," "alongside," "not," "characteristic property" are relational words, or relatives, in this sense, that each of them becomes a general name when another general name is af fixed to it as object. In the Indo-European languages, in Greek, for example, the so-called genitive case (an inapt phrase like most of the terminology of grammar) is, very roughly speaking, the form most proper to the attached name. By such attachments, we get such names as "brother of Napoleon," "slayer of giants,” “inì Ελλισσαίου, at the time of Elias,” “ παρὰ ἀλλήλων, alongside of each other," "not guilty," "a characteristic property of gallium." Not is a relative because it means "other than "; scarcely, though a relational word of highly complex meaning, is not a relative. It has, however, to be treated in the logic of relatives. Other relatives do not become general names until two or more names have been thus 66 affixed. Thus, "giver to the city" is just such a relative as the preceding; for "giver to the city of a statue of himself" is a complete general name (that is, there might be several such humble admirers of themselves, though there be but one, as yet); but "giver" requires two names to be attached to it, before it becomes a complete name. The dative case is a somewhat usual form for the second object. The archaic instrumental and locative cases were serviceable for third and fourth objects. Our European languages are peculiar in their marked differentiation of common nouns from verbs. Proper nouns must exist in all languages; and so must such "pronouns," or indicative words, as this, that, something, anything. But it is probably true that in the great majority of the tongues of men, distinctive common nouns either do not exist or are exceptional formations. In their meaning as they stand in sentences, and in many comparatively widelystudied languages, common nouns are akin to participles, as being mere inflexions of verbs. If a language has a verb meaning "is a man," a noun "man" becomes a superfluity. For all men are mortals is perfectly expressed by "Anything either is-a-man not or is-a-mortal." Some man is a miser is expressed by "Something both is-a-man and is-a-miser." The best treatment of the logic of relatives, as I contend, will dispense altogether with class names and only use such verbs. A verb requiring an object or objects to complete the sense may be called a complete relative. A verb by itself signifies a mere dream, an imagination unattached to any particular occasion. It calls up in the mind an icon. A relative is just that, an icon, or image, without attachments to experience, without "a local habitation and a name," but with indications of the need of such attachments. An indexical word, such as a proper noun or demonstrative or selective pronoun, has force to draw the attention of the listener to some hecceity common to the experience of speaker and listener. By a hecceity, I mean, some element of existence which, not merely by the likeness between its different apparitions, but by an inward force of identity, manifesting itself in the continuity of its apparition throughout time and in space, is distinct from every |