tion of ponderable matter, of the important question of the constitution of the ether, of the history of atomistic theories and of organic and inorganic matter. In the following chapters, so far as the second installment, we have discussions of the porosity of matter, with demonstrations and suggestions of its significance in applied science. Atmospheric pressure is treated, barometers, and manometers fully described, and finally, there is a long and important chapter on aggregate states of matter. The biological and physiological chapters in the first two installments contain a wealth of material, brought down to date. The pathogenic properties of organised matter are treated of here, the conditions of fermentation and of the production of disease by bacteria, with good studies of typical forms of micro-organisms. The bibliography is particularly full and valuable.

The third installment, which has not yet reached our hands, will deal mainly with the science of energetics, including heat, gravitation, radiant and chemical energy, discussing the sources of energy, its laws, the foundations of modern chemistry, and not omitting other branches of physics which are of importance in the propedeutical studies which the author has in view.

ESSAIS SUR LA PHILOSOPHIE DES SCIENces.

μαρκ.

Analyse.-Mécanique. Par C. De

Freycinet. Paris: Gauthier-Villars et fils. 1896. Pages, 336.

M. Freycinet seeks to answer such questions as, What is the exact nature of the notions of infinity and infinitesimal quantities whereon the higher analysis rests? Wherein does the "invention of Leibnitz" differ from the common algebra? What share of the contents of mechanical principles is to be assigned to reasoning and what to experience? What assures the conservation of force and energy? May we predict a gradual slackening of the causes that agitate matter? And so forth.

The notions of Analysis, M. Freycinet contends, are derived directly from the notions of space and time, which for him are necessary, infinite, continuous, and homogeneous. His speculations on this topic are essentially based upon the reflexions of Pascal who, he says, would certainly have invented the Differential Calculus had he not been early called away from science by his excessive religiosity. Infinity is immanent in nature and inherent in mind, escaping intimate comprehension, yet serving accurately our purposes,—a necessary attribute of the world of sense and intellect and hence its power. The parallelism of mind and nature, in fact, runs all through M. Freycinet's book, and furnishes him with a satisfactory key to many metaphysical problems. So here, after an examination of the Calculus and of its applicability to Physics, he finds "that the Infinitesimal Analysis is alike admirably adapted to the phenomena of nature and to the conceptions of human reason, apparently forming a bond of union between the intellect and the outer world, which is the highest commendation one can bestow upon it." And the same consideration is applied to the notions of Mechanics, where it is said that "the human mind and nature form integral parts of the same system, by virtue of which the one is richly equipped for the comprehension of the other;" and he illustrates his idea by the example of the Apollonian discovery of conic sections, centuries before their employment as a model of the planetary system. Generally Mr. Freycinet's reflexions upon the subject of limits and the infinitesimal method are lucid and unobjectionable, and from their simplicity may be re

commended to elementary students. He finds the two ideas of limits and infinitesimals to be conjoint, correlative notions, not at all illogical, and sees the difference of common algebra and the infinitesimal method in the sameness, the simple more-or-less-ness, of the quantities dealt with by the former, and the non-identity, not excluding a sort of homogeneity, of the variables and limits of the latter.

In the chapters on Mechanics, we have numerous elucidative discussions, at times not unmixed with metaphysics. On the ground that the slightest impulse can impart motion to the largest mass, we are led to the statement that "resistance is never in the body but always without the body,"—a proposition full of light and truth, but entirely depending on the definition of "resistance," and when true only equivalent to its premise. After an examination of the circle-argument involved in the description of mass in terms of quantity of matter, mass is defined as "the expression of relative mobility."

One ingenious point is the enunciation of the idea of dynamic capacity,—an analogue of calorific capacity, or of the idea of specific heat. We may say, according to the author, that the same volumes of water, lead, mercury, etc., absorb different quantities of force or "'impulsion," just as they do different quantities of heat. And as we construct scales of specific heats, so we could construct dynamic scales of bodies, which would give what is commonly called their "quantity of matter" or mass. We see here the form Physics might have taken on, had it been possible to start from heat instead of motions of masses. The idea, at least in its order, is not new.1

M. Freycinet insists clearly and repeatedly on the separation of experience from reason in the contents of Mechanics, and also on many other sound fundamental doctrines. We have not time to enter into the physical metaphysics of the latter chapters of M. Freycinet's book; we wish merely to indicate the scope and general aim of the work. M. Freycinet is a distinguished French engineer, a member of the National Institute, and already well known as a writer upon the philosophical aspects of scientific questions. He has always applied himself by predilection to the questions involved in the epistemological foundations of the Calculus and mechanics, and his present work is a continuation of former investigations in this domain. One is constrained to admire the conciseness and directness of his expositions, as also the apt and simple style in which they are conveyed. Altogether we have a very readable book, combining commendable internal and external excellences. T. J. McC.

N. B.-Reviews of works by Dr. Jodl, Dr. Eucken, Dr. Mach, Dr. Ratto, and others have been crowded out of the present Monist, as have also the "Contents of Periodicals."

1 See Mach, Ueber die Erhaltung der Arbeit, Prague, 1872; Popular Scientific Lectures, Chicago, 1894, pp. 168-171.

THE MONIST.

HEGEL TO-DAY.'

1.

PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS have their ups and downs in the

world as well as books. And in no instance is this shown with greater clearness than by the place which Hegel occupies today in philosophy. After having first enravished the intellect of Germany and profoundly contributed to the moulding of her institutions, he was subsequently so far dislodged from his commanding position as to be almost entirely forgotten by the present generation. Undoubtedly his personality still persists in us as thoughts, ideals, and even as words, but his system as a whole now finds but few isolated votaries, and it is not uncommon to find persons who deem it an unfailing mark of scientific acumen to disparage Hegel and to treat him as a pretender in the realm of speculation.

Utterly different is the situation in America and England. Here we see Hegel constantly gaining new friends and constantly extending his influence. More and more his system is becoming the rallying-point of all who stand in need of a comprehensive scheme for combating scepticism, dualism, and utilitarianism; and to many he seems to offer a durable foundation not only for philosophy, but also for the practical conduct of life.

The wide gulf which separates opinion of the philosopher at home and appreciation of him abroad affords tempting material for

'Translated from Professor Eucken's manuscript by Thomas J. McCormack.

discussion. But to treat it we must first sketch as tersely and lucidly as possible the leading characteristics of Hegel's philosophy as well as glance at the historical conditions out of which it grew. Two great intellectual currents are merged in Hegel's system. The first is the philosophy of the great German classical writers, developed in opposition to the rationalistic movement of the eighteenth century, rising in Herder and culminating in Goethe. This philosophy opposed with might and main the exclusive hegemony of the intellect, of ratiocination, of reflexion pure and simple; it sought a more primordial source, a more promising outlook for life. It was not content to interpret the world solely from the point of view of man and to shape it with reference to his special ends, but the things of the world were invested with appropriate potentialities of their own, and reality was conceived as embracing far more comprehensive and purer forms of life than those appurtenant to man individually. Nature and history thus took on a profundity and vitality with which they were never endued before, and to man himself, as the outcome of his widened relations, was opened up a far fuller life and far deeper vistas into the truth than had ever before been held out to him.

The second current of influences which moulded the intellectuality of the thinkers of the nineteenth century proceeded from Kant. In the philosophy of Kant the thinking subject was severed from all outward connexions, and installed in a position of absolute independence as regards the world. Reality was degraded to a realm of purely phenomenal appearances, while the sphere of objectivity, the sovereign domain of the thing-in-itself, seemed utterly and hopelessly beyond man's reach. At first blush, the tenets of the critical philosophy appear to be in violent contrast with the views of the great poets. But closer examination discloses bonds of union. The poets were quite averse to the notion of a completed world; they expressly reserved to their imagination, to their artistic creative faculty the function of imparting new life and higher value to reality. On the other hand, by the "subject" which gives shape and being to the empirical world, Kant does not mean the individual as such, so much as the intellectual organisation of in

dividuals. His discovery-the point he developed-related to the inward constitution of the mind; in his Practical Reason he even created, entirely from within, a realm of absolute reason.

The combining of two movements having such affinities was therefore a perfectly natural step. The world wherein all contrarieties were reconciled, and for which all men longed, was discovered in the human mind itself. Inwardness was made synonymous with universe.

The effort thus briefly sketched constituted the pith and kernel of all speculative philosophy from Fichte to Hegel; the individual bent of each thinker being expressed by the particular operation which he selected as the embodiment of the world and in which he sought the creative action of the mind. Fichte found its typification in ethics, which afterwards assumed with him a religious coloring; Schelling found it in the various leading phases of his individual life, in his physico-philosophical, æsthetical, and religio-historical speculations; Hegel, finally, discovers its embodiment in logic, which grows with him to proportions of omnipotence, dominating the whole cosmos and all history. With logic the movement first assumes its fullest universality, first actually begins to push the entering wedge into the entire broad fabric of reality. And here, therefore, the culminating point unquestionably is reached, and we have only to see the form which Hegel's philosophy assumes, as reared upon these foundations.

II.

Hegel cannot make thought the essence and kernel of reality without lifting it far above immediate subjective reflexion. He does so by rejecting the opinings and longings of individuals as absolutely outside the pale of science; the upshot being that we are obliged to divorce our personal crochets and predilections altogether from research and to consider solely the gist of the matter, as that is shaped by immanent necessity. If this be done, our thought is not something special and isolated, having an allotted place by the side of other sorts of thought, but it is thought itself, pure and simple, and bearing within itself the assurance of abso