race than the discovery of its object would have been, or as the wild and eager search after the fountain of youth developed continent after continent of undreamed-of richness and beauty, so the desperate shifts and vigorous efforts to escape the sharp spear of pain have won for the race a knowledge, a power, and a happiness beyond their wildest dreams.

As to the uses and value of pain in the moral realm, these have been so fully and constantly insisted upon by prophets of every creed that nothing more than the merest allusion is needed here. Indeed its importance has, if anything, been exaggerated, but even upon the soberest view of the subject it must be rated very high.

For instance it is obvious that without pain or the possibility of it there could be no true courage, no patience, no self-denial or devotion, without hardship, no endurance or fortitude, without tribulation, no faith.

It is not too much to say that without suffering no true character or virtue could be developed any more than muscle and vigor without hunger and cold; that the choicest of the saints are and ever have been "they that have come up out of great tribulation."

Pain is by no means the only or even the chief influence in moulding the destiny of man, indeed as our next contention will be, its antithesis, joy, is equally necessary and even more potent, but it is the keen and biting chisel under whose edge alone can the figure of the perfect man be hewn out of the lifeless marble.

WOODS HUTCHINSON, M. D.

UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO.

MAN AS A MEMBER OF SOCIETY.

PART III. OF THE SERIES SCIENCE AND FAITH.

OU

UR INTRODUCTION to the present chapter has been long.1 It could hardly have been otherwise, seeing that we presented there the broad initial thesis that man is of the same nature as the other animals and subject to the same laws, and that the points wherein he differs from the nearest mammals are only matters of form and of degree.

One of the propositions which resulted from our inquiry was this impressions engender acts, dependent or not dependent upon the will; these acts by repetition become habits, which are handed down from generation to generation, and becoming established form what are called instincts. We have followed the evolution of three of these, viz.: (1) the instinct of self-preservation,-that self, which in the invertebrates is represented by scattered egos or by egos that are predominant at certain points, and which in the vertebrates has its seat in a special organ and is centralised in a single ego of which the physiological characteristic is egoism; (2) the instinct of reproduction, differentiated in the birds and mammals into the sexual instinct and the family instinct, which latter in its turn is differenced into a maternal instinct highly consolidated and free from all impurity, into a paternal instinct feebly consolidated and complex, and into a filial instinct maintaining a mean in the matter of consolidation and purity; (3) the social instinct which

'See The Monist, Vol. VI., No. 4, Vol. VII., No. 2. Translated from Dr. Topinard's manuscript by T. J. McCormack.

has for its foundation the need of relations with one's fellow beings, or altruism—an extremely variable and complex instinct, scarcely more consolidated than the paternal instinct, yet one which has given rise to a multitude of animal societies from the primitive and negative stage known as indifferent assemblages, up to a form which already reaches a high plane in the Cynocephali and the Cercopitheci. We have seen the variations of these societies. Some are intermittent, others are permanent; some are of the family type, pivoting about a polygamous male, others are formed of families more or less amalgamated.

We were

We have now to continue our inquiry with man. The field is quite different. With wild animals, -the only ones we were obliged to consider,—our information was as a rule insufficient. fortunate if we were able to reconstruct the approximate social type of the genus or the species. It was impossible for us to consider the variations according to groups, environments, and a fortiori, with few exceptions, according to periods. The question of the evolution of social forms throughout the course of centuries was inaccessible. With the exception, perhaps, of the bees and the ants, science can establish the sociology proper of no animal.

With man it is different. Although all the knowledge we might wish is not always forthcoming, yet generally speaking it is considerable. Man speaks and can personally give us information concerning his manners, customs, and sentiments. He has his history, his archæology, and his legends. He is spread over the whole surface of the globe and divided into an infinite number of groups, frequently having no communication with one another. In his case the problem is no longer that of describing a social type, but of describing a multitude in time and space, where it is our task to determine both the differences and resemblances. Human societies give rise thus to a human sociology proper if not to a comparative human psychology, the scope of which is broad and which involves an endless number of problems. Let us recall the position which this science occupies in the general body of human knowledge.

The second branch of anthropology is divided into two parts:

first, descriptive anthropology, or ethnography, in which the facts are gathered and classified according to two methods, by tribes or nations, and by particular subjects; secondly, speculative anthropology, or ethnology, in which are established the concatenation of the facts so reached, their causes and consequences, and the laws or general truths which flow from them.'

Similarly, human sociology is divided into sociography and sociology properly so-called. It occupies itself particularly with the facts gathered by ethnography, as these bear upon the family, society, and morals. It studies in man the associations between individuals free to move and to act, just as in invertebrates we study the associations between the merids or zoids that adhere together. A third part is the complement of the foregoing-social science, that is to say, the applications of sociology to the present phases of human societies, which it is incumbent upon us to correct and to perfect, or, as some say, to remodel, so as to secure the greatest happiness of all or of nearly all consistent with the greatest possible equity. The present article will deal with the first and second parts.

What was man at his origin? How were his first societies constituted, and how have they been evolved, in attaining the present phase? Such are the questions on which we shall have to dwell.

Thus considered, the history of human societies is arbitrarily divided as follows: (1) primitive societies in the true sense of the word; (2) prehistoric societies; (3) the lowest savage societies as yet discovered; (4) the more or less barbarous societies; (5) the more or less civilised societies of Central America on the one hand, of China, India, and Egypt down to Greece and Rome on the other; and (6) societies subsequent to the Christian era down to the present.

Darwin, Spencer, and some others, have sought to reconstruct the primitive man. To start with, he has been progressively formed at one or at several points of the globe at the expense of one or of

'Dr. Daniel Brinton has excellently remarked: "It is the aim of ethnography (Ovos, people, and ypápe, to describe) to depict, and that of ethnology to explain."

several precursors. According to the first hypothesis, he was subsequently differentiated into branches which, to judge from the morphological facts in our possession, may be reduced to five or to nine at least, viz.: (1) the blacks with woolly hair, divided into the dolichocephalic and the brachycephalic; (2) the blacks with straight hair, designated by Huxley as Australoids; (3) the yellow races divided into the dolichocephalic and brachycephalic; (4) the browns or Melanochroids of Huxley, small and dolichocephalic ; (5) the blonds or Xanthochroids of the same author, large and dolichocephalic. Both hypotheses are tenable, but that of the unity of the types is the most probable. All the primitive varieties of the human species may be said to have been produced by differentiation, adaptation, and crossing in the same manner as the present varieties of the domestic dog according to the palæontologists are sprung from the Canis familiaris fossilis. The initial progenitor is said to have been black, dolichocephalic, and prognathous.

The characters which essentially distinguish man from the anthropoids are four in number (The Monist, 1895, Vol. VI., pp. 3344), two of which are physical-perfect adaptation to the vertical posture, and a greater development of the brain in volume, convolutions, and inward structure—and two of which are physiological: speech and reason.

We say reason so as to conform to usage. In reality, at the beginning it does not deserve that name. The animal species, from whose bosom primitive man has sprung, presented, like any high or low group of present men, a scale of very extensive variations. There were found here incapable individuals, absolutely refractory to new acquisitions, indifferent individuals forming the large majority, and finally, individuals evincing some endowment and talent. The latter were the most active, remembering best their sensations and their prior acts, and seeking the hardest to understand things. Some fact attracted their attention, they stopped to consider it, compared other prior facts with it, drew from their comparison

'The word "straight" is ill chosen but is consecrated by usage. "yellow" has the same fault.

The word