indeed be looked upon with mortal eyes, would, as Plato says, excite in us wonderful desires for wisdom's ways; for what is more desirable than wisdom! What more excellent; what better for man; what worthier of man! Hence those who seek this are called philosophers. Nor is philosophy any other thing if you will to define it- than the love and the study of wisdom. To say that there is no science of things chief in interest, while none of those of least moment are destitute of art, and independent of skill and knowledge, is the speech of men lacking in consideration and erring in matters of the highest import.

3. ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.- Ancient philosophy comes very near to a true science of morals when it inquires of nature for principles. Plato' sought in nature herself the philosophy of right living, and held that the chief-good consists in receiving from nature everything requisite for life, to-wit: health, strength and beauty for the body; and as to the excellences of the mind, he noted a natural aptitude. in learning, and faculties or disposition suited to the comprehension of virtue, by which a continued advance is made toward virtue. Virtue completed is a perfection of nature as to the mind-and is the chief-good.

This philosophy placed a happy life in virtue alone, yet not the happiest possible unless the good qualities of the body are added to it; namely,, those things that should increase and maintain virtue; wealth, power, influence, society, the state, and

whatever else helps or aids in acquiring a habit of virtue.

From this view and exposition of the highest end in morals there arises a certain principle of action in life, and principle of duty, which consists in the preservation of those things which nature prescribes. In the doctrine of Plato, three kinds of good tend to make the chief-good:

1. Living well in obedience to nature.

2. Excellences of the mind, including the disposition.

3. Conditions which unite men in social relations under favoring circumstances. From this third kind Plato elaborated his ideal republic."

The educational scheme of Plato commenced with a course of study having special regard,

1. To the moral training of youth.

2. To the training of their bodies-the due development of the physical powers.

The first, the moral training, consisted largely in music and poetry selected with strict reference to its moral tone. Truth in literature was required by Plato, and truth to man's highest nature was required in the nature and character ascribed to the gods-the heathen divinities worshiped by the Greeks.

Thus Plato's idea of education was something more than a drawing out and development of the child's mental faculties. It meant not only this, but it meant also a purified soul, by excluding whatever was low, vulgar, frivolous in song and poetry, and whatever is unreal, untrue, fictitious and false in

literature and art, and whatever tends to intemperance and excess; and by exercising the vocal, mental and moral faculties in the contemplation, study and use of whatever in music, literature and art was recommended by sound reason and good taste. For further development of the mind in truth and the love of it, Plato prescribed the study of exact science-geometry. The logical use of the reasoning faculty completed the course of the young man destined to take part in the conduct of political affairs, and as a ruler in the service of the state.

Value of this Ideal: Plato's scheme is good and true so far as it goes. It is chiefly defective in its narrow view of the needs of the State, which require not only cultured rulers, but cultured citizens as well.

The morals of the Greeks and of the heathen world at large, in Plato's view, and as all see it, were indexed and strongly determined by the character ascribed to their gods-necessarily endowed like men with the virtues and the vices of men—a mere deification of the good and the gross in man.

Hence the heathen god is no beau-ideal of virtue; and the tendency is to reconcile men to those vices which they see in their gods.

4. THE LEADINGS OF NATURE.-Greek philosophy endeavors to show the way to the source of the chief-good by citing us to the leadings of nature, in the animal and vegetable kingdoms; thus, “every animal loves itself and labors to preserve itself, for this is its first natural impulse. Each animal, aç

cording to its own peculiar nature, has its own peculiar chief-good-the lion one way or use of life; the lamb another way. Yet there is a generic sense in which the chief-good is common to all, namely, to live according to nature.

Hence we can understand that the chief or highest good to man is to live according to the nature of man, when that nature is perfected and in need of nothing.

Now, to apply this principle to self-preservation and a life according to nature, to man's ethic character, we can say that man through his moral nature loves to preserve himself as a moral being.

The Grape-Vine in Allegory': This doctrine of man's living according to nature is finely and forcibly presented and illustrated in Cicero's De Finibus 2 by an allegorical representation of the condition and needs of the vine-first in its own vegetable kingdom and native state, as a wild vine with little capacity and power to preserve and develop itself, and as needing the care and aid of an expert vine-dresser to trim its tendrils, and to bring out its latent vigor of growth and capacity for producing its own generous fruit. Now, in lieu of the vine-dresser and his cultivating hand, let us endow the vine itself with hands and with instinctive sense-faculties wherewith to take care of itself. The vine has now taken on and added to its vegetable nature an animal nature; and its province, interest and care will embrace, to a limited extent, not only the culture formerly given to it by the vine-dresser, but also the care of those limbs and sense-faculties, just now original nature.

added to its

And if now we add to these sense-faculties, to this vegetable-animal nature, the faculty and gift of reason, the vine has intellect, and has become an intelligent existence, as well as a vegetable-animal; and now the vine is able to take care of itself: to nourish and cultivate its original vegetable nature, with all the knowledge, wisdom and skill of the experienced vinedresser. And while this must be regarded as its primary and leading duty, yet not less is the vine interested for its own good, and is under obligation to preserve intact and pure, and to protect and cultivate those sense and reasoning faculties, by means of which it is able effectually to maintain its original nature. And the vine, too, will soon discover that though each and every part of itself is essential to itself, yet that, if any part of itself is better than another, its wisdom faculties have the pre-eminence.

This allegory of the vine, it is readily seen, represents the condition and duty of man-himself from the beginning not only a vine-dresser--a cultivator of the vegetable kingdom, but much more-the cultivator also of a nature sensuous, intellectual, moral and religious.

The entire range of known faculties and powers is embraced in his province of culture and duty; and the chief-good, as Cicero views it, consists in giving to each and to every part its due and proper cultivation.

But the discernment of this precept as to the chiefgood, and of this due and proper culture, has been regarded as beyond the unaided ken of man, and so an appeal for aid is made to the divinity--to the