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Pythian Apollo, who enjoins us 'to know ourselves," namely, to know our own capabilities; and "this must include knowledge of those pursuits of life that are best suited to a virtuous enjoyment of life."

That we are created with desire for this knowledge is evident when we regard the manner of children in their play and work; for inquiry and observation is a part of their nature, and they are influenced by those virtues, the root of which is implanted in their very constitution.

Ancient philosophy, as expounded by Cicero, sought a principle for man that preserves man; a principle for nature that preserves nature; but the true, the right, the honorable, as a principle, is an uncreated element that lies in the constitution of the Creator, and there has its seat and abode; and this element or principle is honored and cherished by the Creator for its own sake. It is the essential element of his being. It preserves the being of God himself, for without it God would not be. We cannot, however, assume that God cherishes and honors this principle of the true and the right merely from the motive of self-preservation; but purely because from the entire holiness of his constitution he loves the true and the right for its own sake--for its own intrinsic beauty and value.

Just so is it in man, as the image of the Creator. Man obeys this principle-if, ethically,' he obeys at all, for itself—and not because the principle is preservative of himself or of nature; for unless the true is obeyed for its own sake, it is not truly obeyed.

The principle or element of the right preserves

nature; it does not reside within it; it dominates nature. The principles or laws of nature in themselves have no influence in making life happy. Contra to this, happiness comes from obedience to those principles, in virtue of a distinct element or principle, to-wit: the true, the right, which must rule and dominate in all the relations of the soul to the principles of nature.

It is only when we are controlled by this moral element that the principles and laws of nature have influence or are effective in producing happiness.

Knowledge is good or evil, just as it is or is not dominated by virtue.

5. THE LABYRINTH OF THOUGHT.-In the labyrinth of thought, opinion and doctrine in Ancient philosophy' what clue is there to lead to truth and knowledge? All follow nature as the guide to wisdom.

The Epicurean' sees pleasure in nature; so pleasure is his chief-good. The Stoic follows nature, for his first principle is, that "those things that accord with nature are to be chosen for their own sake." This attitude towards nature they call kathëkon, the fit, the becoming, or the duty of maintaining oneself in his natural condition, for man's attraction is to what accords with nature; and by knowledge and reasoning he comes to place the chief-good in what the Stoics call omologia, agreement; and this is to be sought for its intrinsic worth.

"Duties," says Cicero, "proceed from first princi-*

ples of nature; so that it may be fairly said that all duties must be referred to the end of arriving at the principles of nature."

Cicero here overlooks the fact that this is true only if there be no self-evident principles of nature. It is true that duties are referred to principles of nature, but not in the sense of "arriving" at principles, so far as they are intuitive, for in this case obeying the principles of nature conveys a more fitting idea of duty.

The Peripatetic follows nature, for his "happy life" is made complete by circumstances consonant with nature. Thus a sound and shapely body contributes to the happy life; and an honorable act free from loss is more to be desired than honor with loss.

The Stoic does not think so: with him virtue is the only possible chief-good. Herein is the happy life, which pain nor poverty can modify. Worldly goods, though desirable, have no value at all as compared with virtue, and hence in Stoic-logic cannot be a factor in the happy life.

It is not alone nature external to man that we are to follow, but man himself is born with adaptations to the virtues, justice, temperance, and all others; also with a love of truth and a desire of knowledge, as is evidenced by the inquiring minds of children, always in pursuit of some new thing. Men, too, are born for companionship, for society and the civil state; hence that branch of morals which the Greek calls politikos.

But it is a knowledge of heavenly things that imparts modesty, and it inspires magnanimity to

contemplate. the works of God; and justice, when we come to know the power, wisdom and will of the Supreme Ruler of the Universe.

From the foregoing, we see that Ancient philosophy, from following nature to find the "highest good"--the summum bonorum-comes naturally upon the trail to man's characteristics, man's soul-nature, as the true path in its discovery. The sentiments, feelings and acts of men show that there is a moral nature-born in them is their instant praise of the noble and the good, as is also their instant condemnation of the mean and the bad.

The great search of Ancient philosophy was for the chief-good, the highest end of man's life; but whatever this be-pleasure, knowledge, virtue, religion, a life according to nature-all agree that the chief-good in its fullness and completion is unattained, if indeed it be attainable. The cause for interminable discussion and unsatisfactory results in Ancient philosophy lies in the fact that the objective chief-good they sought necessarily depends on man's reason, which is liable to error.

The same fault, from the same cause, characterizes the major part of Modern philosophy. But for a science of morality we are in need of a principle that is attainable; that can be characterized as necessary and universal.*

6. KANT: HIS ETHIC GROUND-PRINCIPLE.— Kant calls the law of the moral nature, through which the soul is impressed with the ideas of the right and of duty, the categorical-imperative,' mean

ing thereby a universal law' that gives form to the intuitions of the soul about itself, and its relations to other thinking, sensitive existences-such form as determines and makes the man conscious that there must be in these relations a necessary element-the true and the right.

The method of the Critical' philosophy gives an à priori character to knowledge. It is also the method of the Practical philosophy, namely, Kant's Ethical System. As morality relates not to the material, or to objects of sense, but relates to what is rational, sentimental and spiritual-"the true," "the good," "the beautiful" in harmony-all desirable for themselves-separate and apart from aught else, there is for the ethic-principle yet wider ground for predicating an à priori character.

In the theory of our understanding,' the cognitive relates to the empirical"-must have for its object an object of sense. This is the condition of knowledge-a sensuous" content. But in the moral intuition" there is indeed an object, but it is no object of sense. The object is found in the moral relations of the soul. Hence Kant was justified in giving positive certitude" to the ethic ground-principle-to the categorical-imperative—with its character of necessity and universality."

The understanding, aided by the moral sense, conjoined with the good-willed soul, intuits the selfevident in the field of morals, and solves such questions as it cannot intuit.

The first intuition is of oneself-one's own character.

The second is of the Creator-the Supreme