nature; and as Dr. Porter already has it, "there is no conscience-faculty." What we call conscience is merely "the product of the intellect and the will passing judgment upon the comparative place we should give to our affections, desires, motives, in view of man's highest ends." Conscience indwelling, abiding with love of the right, as the central power of the soul's moral nature, is thus extinguished, and along with this extinguishment is necessarily blotted out all innate idea of duty, and for lack of native moral sensibilities, like respect for what is excellent and superior in man, and reverence for God, we have no intuitions of duty-all duty is conditioned upon a study of what constitutes the highest good.

On the contra, the doctrine of this treatise is, that man has within him by nature a love for truth and the right; that this feeling or affection of the soul moves the intellect to formulate the principle that we should do right "for sake of the right," or from love of it—a principle that intellect would be incapable of formulating, except the idea were furnished by its perception of the "moral nature," as loving the right.

This principle at once bears upon the Will, which must be governed by it in all its volitions, if it would be a good will.

23. THE FUNCTION OF THE WILL.-The function of the will is to execute or not to the thoughts, the desires and the affections of the soul. These may be with or without a moral element or character.

George has set before him a plum and a pear, to take either. He chooses the plum. Here the will acts, but there is no moral element.

. His mother now comes in and says: "George, you must not eat the plum; you may eat the pear."

Now, there enters into George's choice a moral element, which quite overshadows his choice of the fruit.

He ought to obey his mother; ought to put back the plum, and take the pear. He can, however, disobey and eat the plum, in spite of his mother's order.

In his being able to subject his desire for the plum to the duty of obedience, and also in his being able to do what he ought not to do, namely, to disobey his mother, there is involved the idea or notion of liberty, or of the freedom of the will.

The will, if pure and good, will act, in all moral questions, in accord with the soul's moral consciousness; that is, in accord with the view of duty the soul has through the concurrent intelligence of the pure reason, the understanding and the moral faculties-experience inclusive. The freedom of the will consists in its constitutional ability to obey or to disregard the dictates of the moral conscious

ness.

That sublime harmony that exists between the liberty of the soul and its subjection to law can be conceived of--is a fact of consciousness, but yet is difficult to express.

We say the will acts naturally, according to the constitution of man's nature, when it harmonizes

with the moral nature; but yet it is not necessitated so to act, except by moral necessity.

Physical necessities-laws of nature-man cannot by will escape from. He can, though, from moral necessity; and his will has liberty and ability to go. contra to the law of his own moral nature.

In physical law, the effect is positive, and can be estimated and calculated to a dot; and will not be unheeded, except by a very stupid will.

So in moral law, the effect is sure to follow, but it cannot be certainly estimated and calculated, and will often be unheeded by a proud, haughty, stubborn or depraved will.

When the will acts in accord with and under the guidance of the true and the right, its action is free, voluntary, for the very idea of true freedom' includes that of truth and right.

The true, the right is not by man's constitution foreign to the will, but it is a part of its nature, and his freedom is not abridged, cannot be abridged, by his own proper constitution. It is abridged only by false reasoning, wrong feelings and bad motives.

These are all of the empirical character. The spontaneity and autonomy of the will asserts itself when, acting in virtue of its own true constitutional principles, it sets aside these contra motives, and resolutely pursues the right.

Volitions do not have a time-relation like events,

namely, effects from cause. Volitions are sponta

neous and are not determined. The will is acted upon by a certain determinate train of motives, that have a constant form and effect; but the yielding or

the resistance of the will is not a part of the train of cause and effect.

Will-action is spontaneity originating in the will itself. It is freedom.

Yet we find it difficult to say the will is free, while it is ruled by a sinful disposition; and this difficulty has given rise, on the one hand, to a philosophy of entire independence of the will, as of a faculty or a personality of the soul, that, far from being subject to the strongest motive, has no connection with or relation to motive; and on the other hand has given rise to a philosophy of "denial of freedom," as that of Bain. The idea of freedom. and responsibility, coupled with indisposition, he calls a "metaphysical puzzle."

The true doctrine of the will seems to be that the will represents the determinations of the soul--determinations not as to its judgments, but as to its acts, that the will is influenced and constrained by sundry motives; but is not fettered and bound by them. The indisposition to act in accord with conviction of duty argues moral weakness, not moral inability. It does not, however, abridge the freedom of the will, nor cancel responsibility.

Will Defined: It is very difficult to make a definition to cover every phase of the will; but in accord with the view above given, the will may be defined thus:

The controlling executive power and personality of the soul impelled by sensibility and feeling, yet when well-disposed, obedient to the voice of conscience, to the instructions of the understanding and

to the logic of reason, holding in check under due restraint wayward appetites desires and passions, and so giving moral power and dignity to the

man.

On the contra, the will bad or deficient in force and vacillating allows the propensities to run into excess; fails in every duty and makes a wreck of human nature. (Romans 8: 13.)

As personal, the will is the centre of the spirit in man, well disposed till enticed and led captive by its own fault in "minding earthly things."

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24. APPETITES; DESIRES; AFFECTIONS.-Appetites: Hunger and thirst are appetites.

These lead to or induce instinctive or else intelligent action in order to satisfy them.

Each appetite is a peculiar sensation within the vital organ that craves food or water.

Desires are

1. Primary, as belonging to the constitution of the soul, thus: The desire of property is a desire of accumulation; of power, comes from that of rule, influence, superiority, pre-eminence. We have, too, the desire of knowledge, of esteem and other desires.

The primary desire is abstract, namely: is a feeling or longing for a class of objects abstract from the particular person or thing.

2. Secondary: Secondary desires are concrete, and are the product of other affections.

Love creates a desire for the safety and happiness -or, in general terms, for the good-of the loved object.