harmony, and so producing what is called an enlightened consciousness, which, being subject to the imperfection and bias of human nature, gives at best only an incomplete ideal, and so affords ground. for a necessary intervention of Divine instruction through laws written or uttered, and through the teaching and power of the Spirit.

2. All considerations as to duty and the ground of duty lead to the underlying idea of right, as that upon which the idea of duty is necessarily imposed; and that this idea of right must have its foundation in the constitution of that Supreme Being who is in himself the archetype of every true idea and existence; whatever is false having been wrought out by the vain imagination and disobedience of the crea

ture.

3. That a just conception of Him-the ground of right-as of the Holy One, who is of "purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on iniquity" (Habakkuk 1:13), is essential to insure in man a just idea of right and duty in all moral relations.

4. That the ground of right, the ground of duty, the function of conscience, the chief-good, the ultimate-good, are all and severally distinct ideas, not to be confused, as sometimes happens, in philosophic investigations.

5. Though the ordinary desires and affections excite intellect and will to action, the moral element in this excitation is furnished solely by the presence of the moral nature acting through its faculties as a moral-sense giving out moral sensations, analogous to sensations from the outer world, finding access to

the intellect and exciting to cognition and thought, a condition not possible were there no outer world nature. So nothing is possible in moral cognition without the inner world of the moral nature. Intellect and will sympathize with the moral nature, but do not originate it.

33. EXPOSITION

OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS. This could be found in the preceding exposition of principles, but it is desirable to show distinctly what is meant by metaphysics of morals, and to give a summary view.

If we look for definitions in the dictionaries we find metaphysics to mean, after or beyond physics, from meta, beyond or after, and plusis, nature.

It is said that the name metaphysics was given by Aristotle to some of his writings which he could not class with his physics, namely, with his writings upon the science of nature--this term science of nature, in Ancient philosophy, being limited to the determination of the elements and laws of the material universe, including man's physical nature, but not extended to include the intellectual and the moral nature of man--so that these subjects of inquiry came under the head or classification by Aristotle of metaphysics, and have since retained that nomencla ture, which even though given in the first instance much by accident, is a happy accident, for the word is quite appropriate, as the intellectual and the moral. are quite distinct from the material or corporeal in man, as well as from those desires that have their seat in the lower affections of the soul.

After this general explanation of the meaning of metaphysics, let us consider what is meant by the metaphysics of morals. This is best done by taking an example to illustrate.

Achan coveted a wedge of gold, stole it and bur ied it in the earth in his tent. Now, in this transaction, which faculties of the soul were brought into action?

I. There was the desire to possess, to acquire something. This desire, when directed to a proper object, is a good propensity of the soul. It is to be regulated, not discouraged nor expelled from the soul's constitution. It acts, and should act, when not restrained for cause. The desire, then, for gold, or for aught else, is not chargeable with wrong, if any, in a natural desire.

The second faculty of the soul concerned in this transaction was the will of Achan.

Desire says, I want it; Will says, take it. This determination of the will may have been instantaneous under the pressure of strong desire, and with little opposition on the part of other faculties; or it may have been after deliberation. In either case the will is the executive of the soul's desires and determinations.

The act, even though done on the spur of the moment, must have been briefly debated, as to its propriety, and then approved or condemned. This brings into view those faculties of the soul whose function it is to sit in judgment as to the quality of this act of Achan in taking the gold. The moral sensibility of Achan's soul lifts up its voice and says,

Achan, you should, love the right and do what is right. The reasoning faculties of Achan say, this wedge of gold, Achan, is not yours; you know you have no right to it.

Conscience, the consensus of the united voices of the moral faculties, is now aroused; yet desire is strong, the will is bad, and the bad deed is done.

But Achan is seized with fear and remorse and confesses his guilt and meets his fate. Now, the higher faculties that are here introduced into this scene, as actors, are the will, as having an independent action; the moral emotion or sensibility which is constituted to love the right--what is true and right; and the intellect which is able to perceive and state the conditions or circumstances which should determine the will to let or not to let the soul have what it desires. These three, the will in its autonomy, or as having freedom to do as it pleases to do, right or wrong; the moral emotion of the soul as loving the right; the intellect with its idea of the ground of right and of duty, and its intuitive and logical judgments as to what is right, all belong to the higher nature of man, as a spirit, and not to his lower corporeal, physical nature, like those appetites, affections and desires that are intended to minister to the wants of the body; these are physical, but those are spiritual, and so metaphysical.

Hence, the metaphysics of morals is that part of moral science which determines its higher elements and laws. These elements are said to be à priori in character, because they are ultimate principles, independent, cannot be referred to anything higher,

though the moral element has the pre-eminence, because the will, though at liberty to do as it pleases, should please to do right in accord with the moral ; and, too, the intellect should subordinate its thinking to this dictum of the moral-the ought.

All three, when acting together, rightly make a moral-imperative—a categorical-imperative, so far as relates to the formal law of duty, right for sake of the right, and so far as particular duties are intuitively discerned.

From this it appears that the will is a prime factor or element in the metaphysics of morals; for however wise the moral reason may be, it is destitute of authority without concurrence of the will, which concurrence it will have provided there is a good will. Hence, the attainment of a good will is the highest end of moral instruction and discipline. When this chief-good is reached, is possessed, we readily gain possession of the minor joys of life, such as the pleasures of the imagination, of æsthetic and intellectual pursuits, of society, of friendship, and, in general, those that arise from a faithful discharge of the common duties of life, including the practice of the virtues, and above all those enjoyed in the possession and cultivation of a true religious sentiment and faith; but without the goodwill, no other good thing, however good in itself, can have for us any value.

An absolutely good will may not be attainable in this life; but a comparatively good will can be attained to.

Suppose we have this, and that the elements in