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ness.

tions from within, is used rather as material for judgment of what is without, the fruit of which is self-sufficiency and leanThe skill is that furnished by dissection, guiding by an external law; not the power of an internal life, which demonstrates its perfection by its results. There is a just sense, in which an artist is to be led on and possessed by his work; that is, it must be in such a way, as shows that he is master in the process, and is not subject to it. There is an interpenetration of the fact, in which lies the capacity for symbolic significance, and the mind, which discerns and shapes the truth of representation, of which the fact is capable; and it is the just balance of these, which manifests in the work the Idea of the artist, as paramount throughout. The power of a decisive Mesothesis, (to use the language adopted by Coleridge,) places a man at the helm of knowledge, so far as this depends on just discrimination; for, dropping the scholastic term, this just means, that the man, as a person, rising above both the thing contemplated, and his own passive thoughts of it, mediates between them, so as to bring out the highest and best result for the work in which he is engaged. It was the vigor of this inner life, unsystematized, beclouded, unpurged, and mostly instinctive, as it was,-which gave to former ages their robust power in literature and art. The decay of it in the present, shows itself in these departments in various forms,—such as, in the excessive elaboration of critical principles, and undue engrossment with them, while the substance they relate to is starved and meager,-in the subjection of the man under the material he works in,-in subserviency to pleasurable excitement,-in the delineation of particular humors and morbid affections, tending often to caricature, instead of the broad. features of humanity,-in the exhibition of mere undergrowths in the byways of life, for universal human interests,—and in the substitution for truth and inward depth, of artistic skill and mechanical polish. The result is much pretension, but real inward weakness and barrenness, with lack of moral power, over the whole field of mental occupation; and of this the Fine Arts manifestly partake.

We will conclude with a single word of caution. There is, we

believe, nothing detrimental to the principles of religion and virtue in the pursuit of the Fine Arts, provided the mind is rightly disciplined. But if otherwise, there is a seductive power in the subject, which may lead to the substitution of the sentiment of taste, and of the thoughts of material grandeur and beauty, for the searching and purifying truth of Christianity, and which may thus insinuate a secret Sybaritism into its votaries. Something of this kind is painfully perceptible in Willis' Tale of "Paul Fane ;" and a similar spirit appears, more subtly, but not less truly, in some of the lighter parts of modern English literature, such as Mrs. Browning's "Aurora Leigh."

NOTE REFERRED TO ON PAGE 608.

It is much to be regretted that Coleridge did not fulfill the intention, often mentioned by him, of preparing a treatise on Polar, or Criterional, or Constructive Logic, or the Logic of Premises, or of Ideas,-for by all these names he designates it in different places. He had thought much on it, and it seems to have been the chief instrument of the wonderful powers of analysis which he possessed. He speaks of it in the highest terms. "The Logic of Ideas," he says, "is to that of syllogisms, as the infinitesimal calculus is to common arithmetic; it proves, but, at the same time, it supersedes." "The Criterional Logic, or the Logic of Premises, is of course much the most important, and it has never been treated." His published works contain only hints, and incidental illustrations, of this mode of investigating and unfolding truth; which, however, like everything of this writer, are so pregnant with meaning, as to make us wish that something more detailed had remained. The following notice of the subject, taken from what he says, can only be general and brief.

Common logic, or that of syllogisms, affords no test of truth. It merely gives rules for determining, whether specified conclusions can, or cannot, be deduced correctly from assumed premises; but whether the premises are just, it gives no information. It tells in a formal way, what good sense will tell without form; and its chief value consists in showing how to place propositions so that their agreement or disagreement may be at once seen and judged of. Hence, it is of much use in education, as discipline to the mind for the right order of the thoughts, and for freedom in managing them.

It is the part of criterional logic to try the value of principles, by bringing them into relation to other truths. Every truth is, as it were, organized under relations to others, and none is isolated. The relations being real, the application of the test throws a flood of light upon everything subjected to it. One of the most important of those relations is that of opposition,-such as, Likeness and Unlikeness, Sameness and Difference, Thing and Thought, mentioned in the Essay,-in each of which, if the former term be stated as Thesis, the latter is

Antithesis, and vice versa. Terms so related spring from a common root, Prothesis, or the Identity of the two, "which," says Coleridge, "is neither, because in it, as the transcendent of both, both are contained, and exist as one. Taken absolutely, this finds its application in the Supreme Being alone, the Pythagorean Tetrachtys, the ineffable Name, to which no image can be attached; the point, which has no (real) opposite, or counterpart. But, relatively taken, and inadequately, the germinal power of every seed might be generalized under the relation of identity." Next, Thesis and Antithesis suppose the Mesothesis, or the Indifference, of the two, which is either, in relation to the other, or both at once, only in different relations: for instance, (to take the illustration dwelt on in the Article,) a painting, in relation to the Thought of the subject represented, is a Thing, but, in relation to that subject itself, it is no more than a Thought. "To which," Coleridge continues, "if we add the Synthesis, or Composition [of Thesis and Antithesis,]—in its several forms of equilibrium, as in quiescent electricity, or neutralization, as of oxygen and hydrogen in water, and predominance, as of hydrogen and carbon, with hydrogen predominant, in pure alcohol, or of carbon and hydrogen, with the comparative predominance of the carbon, in oil,—we complete the five most general forms of constructive logic." Observe, that Prothesis differs from Synthesis, in this respect, that it represents the essential ground of Thesis and Antithesis a priori, but Synthesis, the combination of the two a posteriori, and, consequently, the former contains a unity much more profound.

Coleridge considered, that all creation, material and immaterial, has these principles entering into it as governing rules, according to which every part was constituted, and operates; and that they will be found the key to all science. For instance, in regard to Chemistry, he regards the different kinds and combinations of matter, as being means for exemplifying their operation; and he rejected what is called the Atomic Theory, as materialistic, holding that the clue to the interpretation of matter exists in mind, and not in itself.

He explained the principles of language thus: Prothesis, the Verb Substantive, Sum, as expressing the identity, or co-inherence, of act and being, 2. Thesis, Noun, Res, expressing being, 3. Antithesis, Verb, Ago-Patior, expressing act, 4. Mesothesis, Infinitive, Agere, which is either substantive or verb, or both at once, but in different relations. And 5. Synthesis, Participle, Agens, implying both being and acting. To which add, 6. Adnoun, or the modification of the noun by the verb, and 7. Adverb, or the modification of the verb by the noun. Every language, he says, must have the first five of these parts of speech; and none can have more than the seven; for he held prepositions and conjunctions to be resolvable into the other forms, and interjections to be the expression of sensations only, and not of thoughts, and therefore merely sounds and not parts of speech. He subjected colors to similar distinctions.

These explanations may convey some notion of the Logic of Ideas, which Coleridge prized so highly, and warrant the regret, that he did not show in detail the applications and qualifications of the system, illustrated from his abundant resources in the whole range of the sciences and of philosophy.

Coleridge makes an important use of the principles of the Logic of Ideas, in the expositions, which occur in various parts of his writings, of the doctrine of the Trinity. Those who believe that this doctrine contradicts the fundamental

laws of the mind, (as Socinians pretend,) cannot receive it on any authority, and, were their objection well founded, would be justified in denying, that it could have been revealed by God. Those who rightly believe in the Trinity (that is, the Tri-unity) of God, have a clear conviction, that it involves no such contradiction; while yet some may be perplexed by the intellectual enigma. Now, the principles of the Polar Logic show, that the apparent inconsistency in the resolution of one into three, and the co-inherence of three in one, is in unison with the profoundest consciousness of reason. Accordingly, Coleridge says, in "Aids to Reflection," "I am clearly convinced, that the Scriptural and only true idea of God will, in its development, be found to involve the idea of the Trinity. But I am likewise convinced, that, previously to the promulgation of the Gospel, the doctrine had no claim on the faith of mankind; though it might have been a legitimate contemplation for a speculative philosopher, a theorem in metaphysics valid in the schools." Coleridge's views of this subject will be found more fully expressed in the Omniana at the close of the concluding volume of his Marginalia, pp. 383 and 395; and they seem to coincide substantially with those of Thomas Aquinas, set forth in his "Summa Theologiæ," Questio 27.

ARTICLE VI.-THE CONGREGATIONAL POLITY AND A BIBLI

CAL THEOLOGY.*

Reports and Doctrinal Volumes of the Congregational Board of Publication.

THIS Board seeks to combine under the term Congregational, the Polity and the Theology of the Puritan fathers of New England. Though this term strictly has reference only to polity-so that any covenanting body of believers which maintains the autonomy of the local church, is Congregational, whatever its particular confession of faith or its usages in worship and ordinances, under the gospel-yet both the historical and the controversial use of the word have associated with it the theology as well as the polity of the fathers of "the Congregational way." There is reason and propriety in this usage. We often trace, in ecclesiastical systems, a logical connection between polity and doctrine. Devout veneration for a hierarchy, the official sanctity of a priesthood, require the doctrine of sacramental virtue as distinguished from justification by faith. And while a single element of the mass as a sacrifice by priestly hands is retained in the administration of the Lord's Supper, the "real presence," whether by transubstantiation or consubstantiation, or vague mystification, will be there also. Though we may not go fully with John Wise, of Ipswich, in ascribing the Arian heresy of the fourth century and the general apostasy of the middle ages to "the frowns of

This Article was prepared in the form of a Discourse, founded upon Titus i, 9: "Holding fast the faithful word as he hath been taught, that he may be able by sound doctrine both to exhort and to convince the gainsayers." And 1 John, iv, 1: "Beloved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God; because many false prophets are gone out into the world." In this form it was delivered before the Congregational Board of Publication at its Anniversary in Boston, May 30th, 1860. This will account for the rhetorical cast of some portions of the Article.

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