OF THE PRINCIPLES AND ORIGINS OF NATURE, ACCORDING TO THE FABLES OF CUPID AND HEAVEN: OR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PARMENIDES, TELESIUS, AND PARTICULARLY OF DEMOCRITUS, AS EXHIBITED IN THE FABLE CONCERNING CUPID. But certain light of the Divine Word has shone upon men. That chaos therefore which was coeval with Cupid, signified the confused and disordered mass or collection of matter. matter itself, with its power and nature, in a word, the elements of things were shadowed out in Cupid himself. He is introduced without a parent, that is, without a cause: for cause is, as it were, the parent of effect; and in tropical discourse nothing is therefore more usual than for the parent to stand for cause, and the offspring for effect. But there cannot be in nature (for we always except God) any cause of the first matter, and of its proper influence and action, for there is nothing prior in time to the first matter. His Therefore there is no efficient nor any thing more known to nature; there is therefore neither genus nor form. Wherefore whatever primitive matter is, together with its influence and action, it is sui generis, and admits of no definition drawn from perception, and is to be taken just as it is found, and not to be judged of from any preconceived idea. For the mode of it, if it is given to us to know it, cannot be judged of by means of its cause, seeing that it is, next to God, the cause of causes, itself without a cause. For there is a certain real limit of causes in nature, and it would argue levity and inexperience in a philosopher to require or imagine a cause for the last and positive power and law of nature, as much as it would not to demand a cause in those that are subordinate. THE fables of the ancients repecting Cupid or Love, cannot be made to agree in one and the same person. They indeed profess to speak of two Cupids of two different periods, the one the most ancient of the gods, the other of a much later era. At present we will treat of the ancient Cupid. They relate that this Cupid was the most ancient of the gods, and therefore of all things, excepting chaos, which is said to have been coeval with him. This Cupid had no parent, but being united to heaven, was the father of the gods and of all things. Some indeed would derive him from an egg over which Night brooded. Different atttributes are ascribed to him, so that he is represented as a boy blind, naked, winged, and armed with darts. chief and especial influence is over the uniting of bodies. To him were given the keys of the earth, the sea, and the sky. Another and younger Cupid is also celebrated in fable, the son of Venus. To him are ascribed the attributes of the ancient Cupid, besides many peculiar to himself. This fable, with the sequel respecting heaven, seems to embrace in a concise parable the doctrine of the elements of things and of the origin of the world, and to agree with that of Democritus, except that it appears somewhat closer, more reasonable, and clearer. For the observations of that confessedly acute and accurate philosopher nevertheless were of a too diffusive nature, and did not seem to keep their proper limit, and to confine and support themselves sufficiently. And indeed these dogmas, which lie veiled in the parable, although better regulated, are yet of such a nature as to appear to have come from the mind left to itself, and not uniformly and gradually assisted by experience; for this seems to have been the common fault of antiquity. But it must first be remarked, that the opinions brought forward in this part of my treatise were the conclusions and productions of unassisted reason, and rested on perception alone, the failing and imperfect oracles of which are deservedly rejected, now that the higher and more On this account the ancients have fabled Cupid to be without a parent, that is, without a cause. And they did so not without design. Nay, perhaps there is not any thing more important; for nothing has more corrupted philosophy than the seeking after the parents of Cupid; I mean, that philosophers have not received and embraced th elements of things as they are found in nature, as a certain fixed and positive doctrine, and as it were by an experimental trust in them; but have rather deduced them from the laws of words, and from dialectics and slight mathematical conclu sions and common notions, and similar wander- fire, nor any other thing, the body of which is ings of the mind beyond the bounds of nature. perceptible by sense, or open to the touch." And This, therefore, must be constantly in the philoso-again he says of their nature, "but it is requisite pher's thoughts, that Cupid is without parents, the elements in the work of creation, should put lest perchance his understanding turn aside to forth a secret and dark nature, lest any contrarious empty questions; because in universal percep- and opposing principle arise." Therefore atoms tions of this kind the human mind becomes dif- are neither like sparks of fire, nor drops of water, fusive, and departs from the right use of itself nor bubbles of air, nor grains of sand, nor the and of its objects, and, whilst it tends toward minute particles of spirit or ether. Nor, is the things more distant, falls back upon those that power and form of them a something heavy or are nearer. For when, through its own limited light, or hot or cold, or dense or rare, or hard or capacity, it is accustomed to be most affected by soft, as are found in larger bodies, since those those things which occur familiarly to it, and powers, and the rest of that order, are compounded which can enter and strike the mind suddenly; it and wrought together. And, in like manner, the comes to pass that when it stretches itself toward natural motion of an atom is neither that motion those things which, according to experience, are of descent which is called natural, nor a motion for the most part universal, and, nevertheless, is opposed to that force, nor a motion of expansion unwilling to rest satisfied, then, as if desirous of and contraction, nor of impulsion and connexion, something more within the reach of its know- nor the rotatory motion of the heavenly bodies, ledge, it turns itself to those things which have most nor any other of the greater motions simply. But, effected or allured it, and imagines them to be more notwithstanding this, in the body of an atom are causative and palpable than those universals. the elements of all bodies, and in the nature of an Therefore, it has been now laid down that the first atom the beginning of all motions and natural essence of things, or Cupid, is without a cause. properties. But, yet, in this very point, namely, the motion of an atom as compared with the motion of greater substances, the philosophy of the parable appears to differ from that of Democritus. For he is not only opposed to the parable, but inconsistent, if not contradictory in his more copious assertions on this head. For he should have ascribed a heterogeneous motion to an atom not less than a heterogeneous body and power. But, he out of the motions of greater substances, has chosen two, to ascribe them as primitive motions to atoms, namely, the descent of heavy and the ascent of light bodies, (which he explained by the striking or the percussion of the more heavy, in forcing upwards the less heavy bodies.) But the parable all along preserves the heterogeneous and exclusive nature it ascribes to atoms, as well in speaking of its motion as of its substance. But the parable further intimates, that this exclusion has its limit, for night does not brood over the egg forever: and it is certainly proper to the Deity, that in our inquiry into his nature by means of the senses, exclusions should not terminate in affirmatives. And there is another reason for this, namely, that after the due exclusions and negations, something should be affirmed and settled, and that the egg should be produced as it were by a seasonable and mature incubation; not only that the egg should be brought forth by night, but also that the person of Cupid should be delivered of the egg: that is, that not only should an obscure notion upon this subject be originated, but one that is distinct. Thus much upon demonstrations, as far as they can be given, upon the first matter, and I think in accordance with the parable. We have now to inquire into the mode of this thing which is uncaused; and the mode of it is likewise very obscure, which indeed the fable elegantly hints in Cupid being hatched beneath the brooding wing of night. So at least the inspired philosopher saith, "God hath made all things beautiful in their seasons: He hath also set the world in their heart, yet so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning unto the end." For the great law of essence and nature which cuts and runs through the vicissitudes of things, (which law seems to be described in the compass of the words, "the work which God wrought from the beginning even to the end,") the power lodged by God in the primitive particles, from the multiplication of which, the whole variety of things might spring forth and be composed, may indeed just strike, but cannot enter deeply the mind of man. But, that saying concerning the egg of night, is very aptly referred to those proofs by means of which our Cupid is brought to light. For those proofs which are concluded by means of affirmatives, seem to be the offspring of light; those which are concluded by means of negatives and exclusions, may be called the offspring of darkness and night: and Cupid is in truth the egg sprung from night; for all the knowledge we can gather respecting him comes by the way of negatives and exclusions. But a proof gathered by exclusions has still some degree of ignorance in it, and is a kind of night as to that which is included in it: whence Democritus admirably remarked, that the atoms or seeds and their properties were like nothing that falls under the observation of sense, and held them to be of a dark and secret nature. He therefore pronounced of them, They are neither like 66 We come now to Cupid himself, the primitive matter and its properties, involved in so great moved. Hence it is that forms, as they are called, seem to exist more than either matter or action, because the one is hid, the other glides before us; the one is not so strongly impressed, the other constantly inheres. But forms, on the other hand, are deemed evident and lasting, so that the primitive and common matter seems as it were an accessory, and to be in the place of a support to them; but every sort of action only an emanation from the form, and forms, therefore, to be in every respect worthy of the higher rank. And hence, also, seems to be derived the kingdom of forms and ideas in essences, by the addition of a kind of fantastic matter. Some things moreover have grown out of this superstition; (from want of judgment having, as might have been expected, followed this error;) abstract ideas and their powers have been introduced with such confidence and authority, that this troop of dreamers had nearly overpowered the more sober class of thinkers. But these follies have for the most part disap darkness; and let us see what light the parable | mostly present to the human understanding which can throw upon it. And here I am aware that it most imbibes, and with which itself is most opinions of this sort the most incredible have entered men's mind. Certainly was this danger incurred here by the philosophy of Democritus itself upon atoms, which, from its seeming acuteness and profundity, and for its remoteness from common notions, was childishly entertained by the vulgar, but unsettled, and nearly overthrown by the arguments of other philosophies which came nearer to the vulgar comprehension: and yet he was the admiration of his age, and was styled Pentathlus for his multifarious erudition, and was deemed by universal consent the greatest of natural philosophers, and obtained the name of a wise man. Nor could even the opposition of Aristotle (who, like the Ottomans, could not feel firm upon his throne until he had murdered his brother philosophers; and who was solicitous, as appears from his own words, that posterity should not doubt his dogmas) effect by his violence, nor the majesty of Plato effect by reverence the demolition of this philosophy of Democritus. whilst the dicta of Aristotle and Plato were cele-peared, although one person in our age, with more brated with applause and professorial ostentation in the schools, the philosophy of Democritus was in great repute amongst the wiser sort, and those who more closely gave themselves to the depths and silence of contemplation. It kept its ground and was approved in the era of Roman letters; for Cicero everywhere makes mention of him with perfect approbation; and soon after we read the panegyric of the poet, who appears to echo after the manner of the poets the sentiment of his times, whose wisdom shows that in a land of dulness and beneath a Boeotian sky, the greatest and the most illustrious men can spring up. (Juv. Sat. 10, v. 48.) But Neither Aristotle, therefore, nor Plato, but Genseric, Attila, and the barbarians were the ruin of this philosophy. For, then, after that human learning had suffered shipwreck, those records of the Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy, as being lighter and more inflated matter, were preserved and came down to our times, whilst the more solid sank and went into oblivion. I cannot but consider, on the other hand, the philosophy of Democritus worthy of being rescued from neglect, especially since it agrees in most things with the authority of antiquity. In the first place, then, Cupid is described as a certain person, and to him are attributed infancy, wings, arrows, and other attributes, concerning which we will afterward speak separately. But this we assume in the mean while, that the ancients laid down the primitive matter (such as can be the origin of things) with a form and properties, not abstract, potential, and informal. And certainly that matter which is stripped and passive seems altogether an invention of the human mind, and to have sprung thence, for those things are For daring than advantage, made it his endeavour to But Plato subjected the world to his contempla- ties in the unfixed and distributable nature of the tions, and Aristotle his contemplations to terms: for the studies of men were at that time verging toward logomachies and disputations, and leaving the severer investigation of truth. Wherefore dogmas of this nature are rather to be condemned in the mass than refuted in detail. For they come not from a desire of knowledge, but of much speaking and that abstract matter is not the matter of the universe, but matter for disputation. For a true philosopher will dissect, not sever nature, (for they who will not dissect, must pull her asunder,) and the prime matter is to be laid down joined with the primitive form, as also with the first principle of motion, as it is found. For the abstraction of motion has also given rise to innumerable devices concerning spirits, life, and the like, as if there were not laid a sufficient ground for them through matter and form, but they depended on their own peculiar elements. But these three are not to be separated, but only distinguished, and matter is to be so treated (whatever it be) in regard of its adornment, appendages, and form, as that all kind of influence, essence, action, and natural motion may appear to be its emanation and consequence. Nor need we fear that from this that inquiry should stag-things; so that none thought of asserting this of nate, or that variety which we perceive should become incapable of explanation, as will be shown hereafter. And that the first matter is possessed of form, the parable teaches in making Cupid a definite person. Yet so that matter in the mass was at first without form: for chaos is without form, Cupid is a person. And this perfectly agrees with Holy Scripture. For it is not written that God created in the beginning the matter of chaos, but the heavens and the earth. same element. The second is of those who maintain an element one in substance, and fixed and invariable, but derive a diversity of entities through the various magnitudes, figures, and positions of this kind of element. The third is of those who maintain more elements, and a diversity of entities, on the ground of their temperament and commixture. The fourth, of those who lay down an infinite, or, at least, very numerous body of elements of things, but with their species and forms; and these have no need of inventing something to lead things to a various principle, seeing they already separate nature from a primitive element. Among these, only the second sect seems to me to set forth Cupid as he is, native and unclothed. The first introduces him as veiled, the third with a coat, the fourth with a cloak and mask. There is also subjoined a description of the state of things as it was before the work of the days, in which distinct mention is made of the heaven and earth, which are the names of forms, but yet, that the mass according to the whole was without form. But Cupid is introduced into the parable personified, yet so as that he is naked. Therefore, after those who speak of matter as abstract, they err next (though in a contrary way) who speak of matter as not unclothed. And, on this topic I have inserted some remarks, in treating upon what kind of proofs are suited to the subJect of the first matter, and upon the heterogeneous nature of the first matter. But the proper place for this subject, upon which we shall now enter. We will examine, therefore, who of those who attributed the origin of things to matter endowed with form, held a native and bare form of matter, and who, on the other hand, a form spread over it and shapen. There are, in all, four sects of those who have hazarded opinions on this subject. The first is of those who maintain one element of things, but set up a diversity of enti For the better explication of the parable, I will make a few remarks on each. In the first place, then, of those who have laid down but one first element, I find none who affirm that of the earth. The nature of the earth, indeed, was against it; quiet, and senseless, and inactive, but yielding to the influence of the heavens, of fire, and other the earth. Yet, the wisdom of the ancients assigned to the earth the next place after chaos, making it first the parent, then the bride of the heaven, from which union proceed all things. But we are not to suppose from this, that the ancients ever thought of the earth as the principle of essence, but as the element, or rather origin of the system. We, therefore, leave this subject to the parable on heaven that follows; where we will inquire into the origin of things, which inquiry comes after that of their elements. Thales made water the prime element. For, he saw that matter was mostly disposed in moisture, and that in water. But he deemed that it was right to make that the element of things in which the virtues and powers of entities, especially the elements of generations and renovations, were mostly found. He remarked that the generating of animals was by moisture, and that the seeds and kernels of plants, as long as they vegetated and were not dried up, were moist and tender. He remarked that metals melted and flowed, and were, as it were, the thickened juices of the earth, or rather a kind of mineral waters. He remarked that the earth itself was enriched and renewed by showers or the irrigation of rivers; and that the earth and loam seemed nothing but the dregs and sediments of water; but that the air was very evidently the expiration and expansion of water, and that fire was not conceived of itself, nor altogether continued, or was kept alive of itself, but from and through moisture; and, moreover, that that fat of moisture, in which the fire and flame are supported and live, discriminates the impressions and notes of harmonic, and, what is by far more remarkable, of articulate sounds, which enters without confusing the differences of scents, not only those general ones of pure and fetid, of dull, acute, and the like, but also the peculiar and specific, as of the rose or the violet; which accommodates itself equally to those remarkable and very powerful qualities of hot and cold, also of wet and dry, in which aqueous vapours, dense fogs, spirits of salts, fumes of metals, fly suspended in the height; lastly, in which the rays of light and the closer agreements and variances of things move and make a noise; so that the air is, as it were, a second chaos, in which so many seeds of things move, wander, try their powers, and are vivifying power, which conducts you to the elements of things and manifests them, they seem to be also the more excellent parts of the air, so that the words air, spirit, and life, are often used as if they were synonymous. And, with reason, since some degree of respiration seems the inseperable companion of life a little more advanced, (excepting those little beginnings of life in embryos and in eggs,) so that fishes are suffocated by the congealing of water. Also, fire itself, unless kept alive by the surrounding body of air, is extinguished, and seems only worn-out air irritated and inflamed; as water, on the other hand, can appear to be the conjunction and reception of air. Nor is there any necessity to maintain that the earth constantly exhales the air, nor that it passes through water into the form of air. But Heraclitus, who was more acute, but not so much to be relied upon, held fire to be the element of things. For it was not a middle nature, which is wont to be extremely uncertain and corruptible, but the highest and most perfect nature, which is a considerable bound, as it were, to corruption and change, which Heraclitus sought for instituting the origin of things. appeared a kind of maturity and concoction of water; and, that a body and mass of water was spread through the whole as a common fuel; that the sea surrounded the land; that there was a very vast and subterraneous force of sweet waters, whence come springs and rivers, which, like veins, carry the waters through both the face and bowels of the earth; and that, in the heights above were immense congregations of vapours and waters, and, as it were, another universe of waters, for the reparation and renovation of the waters below, and of the sea. He, moreover, thought that those waters and vapours fed the heavenly fires, for that those worlds could not subsist without some nourishment, and that this was the only nourishment that they could possess. He remarked that the figure of water, as seen in drops or particles tried. Lastly, if you consider its genial and of water, was that of the universe, round and | spherical, and that the undulation of water was apparent even in air and fire; lastly, that the motion of water was suited to its nature, neither too slow nor too quick, and of all generations the most numerous was the generation of fishes and water animals. But Anaximenes chose air for the one sole element. For, if bulk is to come into consideration in treating upon the elements of things, air seems by far the most bulky, and to occupy the greatest space. For, unless a separate vacuum be given, or the superstition of the heterogeneous nature of the heavenly and sublunary bodies be resorted to, whatever is extended from the globe of the earth to the furthest region of the heavenly expanse, and is neither star nor meteor, seems to be filled with aerial substance. And the abode of this earthly globe is thought to be as a point, in comparison of the circuit of the heavens. But in the ether itself, how very small a portion is besprinkled with stars, when in the nearer spheres they are seen single, in the last, although there is a great number of them, yet, considering the interstellar spaces, but a small part of space seems to be occupied by stars; so that they all appear to swim in one immense sea he saw that the greatest variety and perturof ether. Nor is that part of ether and spirit in-bation of things was found in solid and conconsiderable, which has its seat and settlement sistent bodies. For such bodies can be organic, in the waters and the hollow places of the earth, and, as it were, a kind of machines, which acquire whence the waters receive their tides. They are, innumerable variations according to their shape, moreover, extended, and swell; but not only has as the bodies of animals and plants. Even among the earth its porousness, but also its tremors and these, such as are not organic upon a closer agitations, evident signs of wind and air pent up inspection, are found to be very dissimilar. For, within it. But if a middle nature is proper to how great is the dissimilarity between those very elements, in order to the being susceptible of so parts of animals which are called similar! the great a variety, that is certainly found in air. For brain, the crystalline humour, the white of the air is, as it were, the common bond of things, not eye, the bones, membranes, cartilages, nerves, only because it is everywhere close at hand, and veins, flesh, fat, marrow, blood, sperm, breath, takes the place of other things, and possesses chyle, and the rest; also between the parts of itself of void spaces, but so much the more from vegetables, roots, barks, stalks, leaves, flowers, its appearing to have a middle and a diaphorous seeds, and the like! But fossils are not certainly nature. For this is that body which receives and organic, but yet are variously mixed together in conveys light, darkness, and the tints of all colours one kind, and show mutually a very great variety. and shades, which, by its admirably nice motion, Wherefore, that base of the diversity of entities, Now, |