As for myfelf, whom I am now only concerned to vindicate, I fhall fet down the two paffages, to which I fuppofe he refers.

In my fermon, [vol. i. p. 32.], I endeavour, among other things, to fhew the unreasonableness of Atheism upon this account : "Because it requires more evidence for things than they are capable of." To make this good, I difcourfe thus: "Ariftotle hath long fince obferved, how unreasonable it is to expect the fame kind "of proof for every thing, which we have for fome "things. Mathematical things, being of an abstract"ed nature, are only capable of clear demonstration. "But conclufions in natural philofophy are to be pro"ved by a fufficient induction of experiments; things "of a moral nature, by moral arguments; and matters of fact, by credible teftimony. And though none of thefe be strict demonftration, yet have we an un" doubted affurance of them, when they are proved by "the beft arguments that the nature and quality of the thing will bear. None can demonftrate to me, that "there is fuch an island in America as Jamaica; yet, upon the teftimony of credible perfons, and authors "who have written of it, I am as free from all doubt

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concerning it, as from doubting of the cleareft mạ"thematical demonftration. So that this is to be entertained as a firm principle, by all thofe who pre"tend to be certain of any thing at all, That when any thing is proved by as good arguments as that thing is capable of, and we have as great affurance that it is, as we could poffibly have fuppofing it were,

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we ought not in reafon to make any doubt of the ex"iftence of that thing. Now to apply this to the pre"fent cafe: The being of God is not mathematically "demonstrable; nor can it be expected it fhould; be"caufe only mathematical matters admit of this kind

દ

of evidence. Nor can it be proved immediately by fenfe becaufe God being fuppofed to be a pure fpi"rit, cannot be the object of any corporeal fenfe. But yet we have as great affurance that there is a God, as the nature of the thing to be proved is capable of, and as we could in reafon expect to have, fuppofing that he were."

L.

Upon

Upon this paffage it must be, if any thing in the fermon, that Mr S. chargeth this pofition (in equivalent' terms) of the possible falsehood of faith, and that as to the chiefeft and most fundamental point, the tenet of a Deity. And now I appeal to the reader's eyes and judgement, whether the fum of what I have faid be not this, That though the existence of God be not capable of that ftrict kind of demonftration which mathematical matters are; yet that we have an undoubted affurance of it. One would think, that no man could be fo ridiculous, as from hence to infer, that I believe it poffible, not withstanding this affurance, that there fhould be no' God. For however in many other cafes an undoubted' affurance that a thing is, may not exclude all fufpicion of a poffibility of its being otherwife; yet in this tenet' of a Deity it moft certainly does; becaufe, whoever is affured that there is a God, is affured that there is a being whofe exiftence is, and always was neceffary; and confequently is affured that it is impoffible he should not be, and involves in it a contradiction. So that my discourse is fo far from being equivalent to the pofition he mentions, that it is a perfect contradiction to it. And he' might with as much truth have affirmed, that I had expressly, and in fo many words, faid, that there is no God.

The other paffage is in p. 118. [i. e. vol. 3. p. 303. 309.] of my book concerning the rule of faith. I was difcourfing, that no man can" fhew, by any neceffary

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argument, that it is naturally impoffible that all the "relations concerning America fhould be falfe. But

yet (say I) I fuppofe that, notwithstanding this, no "man in his wits is now poffeffed with fo incredible a "folly, as to doubt whether there be fuch a place. "The cafe is the very fame as to the certainty of an ancient book, and of the fenfe of plain expreffions. "We have no demonftration for thefe things, and we expect none; because we know the things are not capable of it. We are not infallibly certain, that any "book is fo ancient as it pretends to be: or that it was "written by him whofe name it bears; or that this is "the fenfe of fuch and fuch paffages in it. It is pof"fible all this may be otherwife: but we are very well

b.2.

affured

"affured that it is not; nor hath any prudent man any juft caufe to make the leaft doubt of it. For a bare poffibility that a thing may be, or not be, is no just caufe of doubting whether a thing be or not. It is poffible all the people in France may die this night; "but I hope the poffibility of this doth not incline any "man in the leaft to think that it will be fo. It is poffible that the fun may not rife to-morrow morning; 66. yet, for all this, I fuppofe that no man hath the leaft doubt but that it will."

To avoid the cavils of this impertinent man, I have tranfcribed the whole page to which he refers. And now, where is this avowed pofition of the poffible falfebood of faith? All that I fay is this, That we are not infallible either in judging of the antiquity of a book, or of the fenfe of it: by which I mean, (as any man of fonfe and ingenuity would eafily perceive I do), that we cannot demonftrate thefe things fo as to fhew that the contrary neceffarily involves a contradiction; but yet that we may have a firm affurance concerning thefe matters, fo as not to make the leaft doubt of them.

And is this to avow the poffible falsehood of faith? 'and' yat this polition Mr S. charges upon these words; howjustly, I fhall now examine.

Either by faith Mr S. means the doctrine revealed by God; and then the meaning of the pofition must be, That what God fays is poffible to be falfe; which is fo abfurd a pofition, as can hardly enter into any man's mind; and yet Mr S. hath the modefty all along in his bock to infinuate, that in the forecited paffage I fay as much as this comes to.

Or elfe Mr S. means by faith, the affent which we give to doctrines as revealed by God; and then his fenfe of infallibility must be, either, that whoever affents to, any thing as revealed by God, cannot be deceived, upon fuppofition that it is fo revealed; or elfe abfolutely,, that whoever affents to any thing as revealed by God, cannot be deceived. Now, although I do not, in the paffage forecited, fpeak one fyllable concerning doctrines. revealed by God; yet I affirm, (and fo will any man elle), that an affent to any doctrine as revealed by God,. if it be revealed by him, is impoffible to be falle. But

this is only an infallibility upon fuppofition; which a mounts to no more than this, That if a thing be true, it is impoffible to be falfe. And yet the principal defign of Mr S.'s book is to prove this, which I believe no man in the world was ever fo fenfelefs as to deny. But if he mean abfolutely, that whoever afsents to any doctrine as revealed by God, cannot be deceived; that is, that no man can be mistaken about matters of faith, (as he must mean, if he pretend to have any adverfary, and do not fight only with his own fhadow); this, I confefs, is a very comfortable affertion, but I am much afraid it is not true.

Or elfe, Jaftly, by faith he understands the means and motives of faith; and then the plain state of the controverfy between us is this, Whether it be neceffary tó a Christian belief, to be infallibly fecured of the means whereby the Chriftian doctrine is conveyed to us, and of the firmnefs of the motives upon which our belief of it is grounded? This indeed is fomething to the purpose for though, in the paffage before cited, I fay not one word concerning the motives of our belief of the Chriftian doctrine; yet my difcourfe there was intended to be applied to the means whereby the knowledge of this doctrine is conveyed to us. However, I am contented to join iffue with Mr S. upon both these points.

I. That it is not neceflary to the true nature of faith, that the motives upon which any man believes the Chriftian doctrine should be abfolutely conclufive, and impoffible to be falfe. That it is neceffary, Mr S. feveral times affirms in his book; but how unreasonably, appears from certain and daily experience. Very many Chriftians, fuch as St Auftin speaks of," as aved, "not by the quickness of their understandings, but the

fimplicity of their belief," do believe the Chriftian doctrine upon incompetent grounds; and their belief is true, though the argument upon which they ground it be not (as Mr S. fays)" abfolutely conclufive of the thing" and he that thus believes the Christian doctrine, if he adhere to it, and live accordingly, fhall å undoubtedly be faved; and yet I hope Mr S. will not fay, that any man fhall be faved without true faith. I

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might

might add, that in this affertion Mr S. is plainly constradicted by those of his own church.

For they generally grant, that general councils, tho' they be infallible in their definitions and conclusions, yet are not always fo in their arguments and reasonings about them. And the Guide of Controverfies exprefsly. fays, p. 35. that," it is not neceffary that a divine faith fhould always have an external rationally infallible. "ground or motive thereto (whether church-authority or any other) on his part that fo believes."

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Here

is a man of their own church avowing this pofition, That faith is poffible to be false. I defire Mr S. who is the very rule of controverfy, to do juftice upon this.. falle Guider

I must acknowledge, that Mr S. attempts to prove*: this affertion, and that by a very pleasant and furprifing argument; which is this. which is this. "The profound mysteries

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こ

of faith. (he tells us, Faith vind. p. 90.) must needs "feem to fome (viz, thofe who have no light but their pure natural reafon, as he. faid before, p. 89.) impoffible to be true; which therefore nothing but as "motive of its own nature feemingly impoffible to be falfe, can conquer, fo as to make them conceit them. really true." What Mr S. here means by a motiveof its own nature feeming impoffible to be falfe, I cannot divine; unless he means a real feeming impoffibility. But be that as it will, does Mr S. in good earneft believe, that a motive of its own nature feeming impoffible to be falfe, is fufficient to convince any man, that has and ules the light of natural reafon, of the truth of a thing. which muft needs feem to him impoffible to be true?·· In any opinion, these two feeming impoffibilities are fo e-qually matched, that it must needs be a drawn battle between them. Suppofe the thing to be believed be transubstantiation: this indeed is a very profound my ftery, and is (to fpeak in Mr S.'s phrafe) of its own na~ ture fo feemingly in possible, that I know no argument in the world ftrong enough, to cope with it. And I challenge Mr. S. to inftance in any motive of faith which is, both to our understandings and our fenfes, more plainly impoffible to be falfe, than their doctrine of tranfubftantiation is evidently impoffible to be true. And if he

cannot,