proved the greatest As Kant says, transcen

dental hypothetical entities have obstacles to the advance of reason. dental hypotheses render fruitless the exertions of reason in its own sphere, which is that of experience, "For when the explanation of natural phenomena happens to be difficult, we have constantly at hand a transcendental ground of explanation which lifts us above the necessity of investigating nature."

Human personality is a compound of body and mind. Disembodied personality is no personality in the real sense of the term.* Poverty of language and practical sufficiency permit the use of such expressions as a truncated cone, a cube with bevelled edges, disembodied personality, which involve contradictions. Personality or the ego is, as has been so often repeated, really a complex of sensations, ideas, &c. But because it is possible to take away constituent parts in thought without destroying the capacity of the residual image to stand for the whole, we give the same name to the residuum. Thus has arisen the practice of regarding the ego as being made up of volitions, emotions, ideas, &c., only of a nama without a rupa. Even then what is of importance in personality is not the "I" but the elements which constitute it and the manner in which they are connected. If this does not satisfy us, and we ask, Who or What has these volitions, emotions, &c. ?, and then assume the existence of a transcendental or noumenal self, an ātman, we have only succumbed to the primitive habit of treating an unanalysed complex as an indivisible unity, like the Fiji islander who ascribes a soul to a cocoanut. This primitive habit of treating the unanalysed complex of personality as an indivisible unity has manifested itself in remarkable ways in psychology. From the body the nervous system is first isolated as the seat of psychical activity. In the nervous system again the brain is chosen as the part best suited to be the organ of the mind,

"If the immortal life," says a recent writer on immortality, "is to be more than a name for a shadow, it must be a life where men are members one of another, not less, but more than they are here. We desire an immortality which shall signify a personal life in the full sense of these words, not the existence of a disembodied spirit,' or a 'pure indivisible, immaterial substance,' and a personal life must be an embodied life."

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and finally to preserve the supposed psychical unity-imagined to be like the mathematician's point without parts or magnitude some small part of the brain, such as the pinealgland, is chosen as the seat of the soul. The crudity of such conceptions is made clear by the following analysis taken from Avenarius's Menschliche Weltbegriffe. "Let an individual M denote a definite whole of 'perceived things' (trunk, arms, hands, legs, feet, speech, movements, &c.) and of ' presented thoughts' as I,......then when M says 'I have a brain,' this means that a brain belongs as a part to the whole of perceived things and presented thoughts denoted as I. And when M says 'I have thoughts,' this means that the thoughts themselves belong as a part to the whole of perceived things and presented thoughts denoted as I. But, though thorough analysis of the denotation of I leads to the result that we have a brain and thoughts, it never leads to the result that the brain has the thoughts. The thought is, no doubt, a thought of my ego,' but not a thought of my brain' any more than my brain is the brain of 'my thought.' That is to say, the brain is no habitation, seat, generator, instrument or organ, no support or substratum of thought. Thought is no indweller or commander, no other half or side, and also no product, indeed not even a physiological function, or so much as a state of the brain."

So long as one regards the "I" as a real mysterious entity behind the elements which alone are accessible, he must puzzle himself with all sorts of contradictions and perplexities. But if we regard the ego as a more strongly linked group of elements, which are themselves less strongly linked to other groups, we no longer meet with difficulties and absurdities. We then clearly perceive how the subjective feeling of unity has been generated by the ease with which the imagination runs along those of our ideas which are closely knitted with one another through the bonds of association, and what purpose this assumed unity of the ego serves. This suppositious unity serves to delimit the ego, and thus discharges a valuable function in practical life. Just as caste bias, race prejudice, national pride, narrow patriotism may have a high value for certain purposes, so the narrowing of the limits of the ego is highly

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serviceable to the intellect in the work it does for the pain-avoiding, pleasure-seeking will. Nevertheless, this practical unity of the ego has neither sharply defined limits nor is it unalterable. Each one of us knows how he is striving to alter the content of his ego. Is it not a change in this content that is sought after in every attempt to alter the character of a person? If the world consists of the same elements as one's ego, and if every element in the world can become a constituent of that ego, why should not that ego be so extended as ultimately to embrace the entire world? Because the elements which constitute an individual are more strongly and closely knitted among themselves than with those which constitute other individuals, he imagines himself to be an indissoluble unity independent of others. But the life of the individual has no meaning apart from collective life. That which is truly human in each one of us, the true, the beautiful, the good, has something of the universal, and is created and realised only through the communion of minds. Moreover, when the content of an ego is sufficiently wide, it generally breaks through the shackles of individuality, engrafts itself in others, and pursues an over-individual life. It is the dissolution of individuality which contributes to the greatest happiness of the artist, the discoverer, the social reformer, and all others who co-operate in the welfare of the many, and live, as Schiller says, in the whole. Says the Blessed One in the Mālunkyaputta Sutta: "The man whose heart is set on the dissolution of individuality feels cheerful, happy, and elated, like the mighty man who has swum unhurt across the swollen Ganges from the one bank to the other."

The denial of a separate self, an ātman, does not obliterate the personality of a man, but liberates the individual from an error that is liable to stunt his intellectual and ethical development and hinder his attainment of perfection. The Dharma removes from life the vanity of self, which is the result of an erroneous belief in the existence of ātman and karma as separate entities. As what constitutes a man's personality is his own deeds and aspirations, he that holds his person dear should keep himself free from wickedness. The Blessed One has said:

"Let any one who holds self dear,
That self keep free from wickedness;
For happiness can never be found
By any one of evil deeds.

"Assailed by death, in life's last throes.

At quitting of this human state,
What is it one can call his own?
What is it follows after him?

"Nought follows him who quits this life;
For all things must be left behind:

Wife, daughters, sons, one's kin, and friends,
Gold, grain and wealth of every kind.

"But what a mortal does while here,
With body, or with voice, or mind,
"Tis this that he can call his own,
This is what follows after him.

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Deeds, like a shadow, ne'er depart:
Bad deeds can never be concealed;
Good deeds cannot be lost and will
In all their glory be revealed.

"Let all, then, noble deeds perform,
A treasure store for future weal;
For merit gained this life within

Will yield a blessing in the next.”—Samyutta-Nikāya.

IN

DEATH AND AFTER.

N his complete nature man is a complex of skandhas. Only in thought can we separate him into body (rupa) and mind (nāma). Language reveals to us the true nature of personality. One speaks not only of one's body but also of one's mind. Who then is the possessor of both body and mind, if it is not the complete man, the complex? Just as we are in the habit of saying 'the wind blows,' as if there were the wind existing apart from the act of blowing, so also do we say, by a license of speech, that a person owns body and soul, performs actions, directs the emotions, controls the impulses, and so forth. But in reality the totality of all these constitutes the person. Whatsoever a man does with his body, with his voice, with his mind, it is that that constitutes his person. "I am," says Professor Josiah Royce, "what on the whole I am conscious of having done, and what I propose to do." On one occasion the Blessed One was asked by some disciples: "What are old age and death? And what is it that has old age and death?" The Blessed One replied: "The question is not rightly put. To say: 'What are old age and death? And what is it has old age and death?' and to say: 'Old age and death are one thing, but it is another thing that has old age and death,' is to say the same thing in different ways. If the dogma obtain that soul and body are identical, then there is no holy life (for the soul would perish with the body); or, if the dogma obtain that the soul is one thing and the body another, then also there is no holy life (for, if the soul were a distinct entity, an immutable ātman, it would not be influenced by conduct and become better, and then there would be no use in leading a holy life). Both these extremes have been avoided by the Tathāgata, and it is a middle doctrine he teaches On birth depend old age and death.”

So long as the skandhas are united, we have being ; when the skandhas dissolve, the being disappears and we have death. Just as fire, though not lying hidden in the two