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FIRST KIND OF PRIMARY KNOWLEDGE.

INTERNAL KNOWLEDGE.

1. Our Knowledge of Internal Things or Inter nal Knowledge is learned by observing what our own minds do, and the manner in which it is done. It also includes those new truths, drawn from truths already known by the mental process called Reasoning, Reflecting, or Thinking, and hence it is often called Rational Knowledge.

2. In acquiring Internal or Rational Knowledge, we use all of the Mental Processes except Sensation.

Thus, I may perceive, remember, imagine, reason, and judge, concerning my own mental operations in perceiving, remembering, imagining, reasoning, and judging, or the whole may be used on those new truths, derived from what has been already learned and stored up in the mind, as food for thought," as these same mental processes were used at first in regard to the sensations themselves.

3. Again, not only can the Mental faculties be applied to our knowledge of the External and thus cause it to be the basis of our Internal or Rational Knowledge, but it is absolutely necessary that these faculties be so applied; since without the External or Sensuous as a basis, no Internal or Rational Knowledge can b developed.

If we wish to get a personal knowledge of the position elevation, and waters, of the state of New York, we must visit the state itself, and thus obtain our knowledge of these things by the aid of our own sensation, perception, and memory. The knowledge, thus obtained, is External or Sensuous, and is the FIRST KIND of Primary or Personal Knowledge.

Now, if we wish to learn the evenness and the inclination of the Surface of the state, we recall our perceptions of its elevations; remember that we perceived mountains, hills, table-lands, valleys, and plains; imagine a surface thus diversified; reason, that whenever a surface is thus diversified, it must be rough or uneven, and hence judge or decide, the surface of the state of New York to be uneven.

To find the inclination of its surface, we examine our conceptions of its elevations and of its internal waters; those in the southern and eastern parts of the state flowing southerly, while those in the northern and western parts flow in a general direction west of north; and thus we perceive that a line drawn from a point a little below the northeastern to another point in latitude 42d degree, near the southwestern corner of the state, would divide the sources of these waters; then a little reflection would show us that the surface of the state has two general inclinations or "Watersheds." The one Southerly, the other West of North. Thus, we learn the Inclination by reflecting, or thinking, or reasoning on our external or sensuous Knowledge of the surface, and the Knowledge thus learned is called, "Internal" or "Rational," and is one part of the Second Kind of our Primary or Personal Knowledge.

SECONDARY KNOWLEDGE OR TESTIMONY.

1. Our Secondary Knowledge or Knowledge Derived from Testimony is that, which is discovered by others and is taught to us. This constitutes by far the greater part of what we know.

We know that there are such Cities as London, Paris, and Pekin, and such Countries as Russia, Austria, and California, not because we have seen them for ourselves, but through the testimony of others, who have seen them.

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WE MUST TEST SECONDARY KNOWLEDGE.

2. This Secondary or Derived Knowledge is of two Kinds; First, that whose truth or correctness we can test for ourselves; and Second, that whose truth or correctness we can not test or examine for ourselves.

3. That Secondary Knowledge, which we can test for ourselves, is mainly such as we find in the Sciences. When we do examine and test its truthfulness, it becomes a part of our Primary Knowledge.

Thus, if I learn by being told, or from a book, that an acid and an alkali in solution will bubble or effervesce when mixed together, I may believe it without further proof, because I have confidence in the wisdom and truthfulness of the source, whence I received it; but if I stop here, then my knowledge of this subject is only Secondary, or, as it is sometimes familiarly called, "Knowledge at second hand." If, however, I do not stop here but try the experiment for myself and find the statement true, then I know it personally and it becomes a species of Primary knowledge. In the former case, my knowledge is of the Science or Theory, or Theoretical Knowledge; in the latter, it is a Knowledge of the Art also, or Practical Knowledge.

4. Hence the following Rule. Test by experiments or by demonstrations those Propositions, which claim to be statements of scientific truths or principles.

Knowledge made familiar by experiment is always of the most interesting and the most useful kind; and hence the Natural Sciences should always be presented both Theoretically and Practically. Now, it often happens in teaching, that the Natural Sciences, probably from the trouble of making the experiments, are generally made too theoretical, while the Mathematics, from the want of text-books, in which the science is properly arranged, are made too practical, and, therefore, neither is as profitable and interesting as it might and would be if properly presented.

While it is impossible for each one to discover all that is necessary for each to know, it is perfectly possible and easy for each to examine or to investigate all the statements and reasonings, which it is necessary to accept from others. It has been said that "a single intellect may investigate the facts and reasonings of scientific truths in less time, than a million intellects employed in their discovery."

5. That kind of our Secondary Knowledge, which we can not test or examine for ourselves, is chiefly such as is found in history, biography, travels, &c.; and most especially that, which pertains to our future state.

6. When we can not examine the statements for ourselves, we must examine the Evidence or Testimony concerning them. In so doing, we follow certain Rules called the Laws of Testimony.

7. The Laws of Testimony relate; first, to the CHARACTER; Second, to the CAPACITY; third, to the MOTIVES; fourth, to the MEANS OF KNOWING; and fifth, to OUR OWN PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE.

FIRST LAW OF TESTIMONY. Our previous knowledge of the CHARACTER of the person, from whom we receive the statements, must be such, as to give us confidence in his HONESTY and CANDOR.

Is he honest? That is, do we know him to be so habitually truthful as never to state that for the truth, which he knows to be untrue.

Is he candid? Will he speak his true sentiments unswerved by fear or by favor? If we can answer both of these questions in the affirmative, we may receive his state

ments.

Our knowledge of a future state is learned directly from revelations, made to us by God himself, and we can place full confidence in his statements, because we can have the most entire confidence in his honesty and candor. The only

chance for error is in our own liability to misunderstand him.

Since we can not have the same degree of confidence in the characters of our fellow-men, as in the Divine Character, it follows that we can not accept their statements with the same confidence; hence while it is the perfection of human wisdom to accept the Divine Word with the most entire confidence, it is the height of human folly to accept that of our fellowmen without attempts to prove it.

When two men differ, we give preference to the statements of the one, whom we believe to be the better man. We have confidence in CHARACTER.

SECOND LAW OF TESTIMONY. We must know that the person has sufficient intellectual capacity to inestigate the subject.

If a person, whom we know to be utterly ignorant of the science of Astronomy, were to predict certain eclipses of the sun and give as his authority, that "He had calculated them for himself," we would be very likely to reject his statements at once; yet if one, known to be versed in astronomy, foretold the same, we would at once accept them. We have confidence in CAPACITY.

THIRD LAW OF TESTIMONY. We must be sure that the person has no motives or interests, which would induce him to mislead us.

Suppose that A recommends a certain part of the country for the excellence of its soil, its climate, and its inhabitants; and, at another time, B says the same things of it, we would think B's the better testimony, if we knew that A owned a large amount of property there, while B owned none. We could easily see that A had or might have a motive, while we could see none on the part of B, and, therefore, would be the more disposed to believe his statements.

Our confidence in Testimony is affected by the presence or absence of MOTIVES.