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is not sufficiently extensive to do any mischief; in truth, however, it is much larger than it seems. Entails very rarely expire; the first heir of entail, when of age, joins with the existing possessor in resettling the estate, so as to prolong the entail for a further term. Large properties, therefore, are rarely free, for any considerable period, from the restraints of a strict settlement; and English entails are not, in point of fact, much less injurious than those of other countries.

In an economical point of view, the best system of landed property is that in which land is most completely an object of commerce; passing readily from hand to hand when a buyer can be found to whom it is worth while to offer a greater sum for the land, than the value of the income drawn from it by its existing possessor. This of course is not meant of ornamental property, which is a source of expense, not profit; but only of land employed for industrial uses, and held for the sake of the income which it affords. Whatever facilitates the sale of land, tends to make it a more productive instrument for the community at large; whatever prevents or restricts its sale, subtracts from its usefulness. Now, not only has entail this effect, but primogeniture also. The desire to keep land together in large masses, from other motives than that of promoting its productiveness, often prevents changes and alienations which would increase its efficiency as an instrument.

$ 4. On the other hand, a law which, like the French, restricts the power of bequest to a narrow compass, and compels the equal division of the whole or the greater part of the property among the children, seems to me, though on different grounds, also very seriously objectionable. The only reason for recognizing in the children any right at all to more than a provision sufficient to launch them into life, and enable them to find a livelihood, is grounded on the

expressed or presumed wish of the parent; whose claim to dispose of what is actually his (or her) own, cannot be set aside by any pretensions of others to receive what is not theirs. To control the rightful owner's liberty of gift, by creating in the children a legal right superior to it, is to postpone a real claim to an imaginary one. To this great

and paramount objection to the law, numerous secondary ones may be added. Desirable as it is that the parent should treat the children with impartiality, and not make an eldest son or a favorite, impartial division is not always synonymous with equal division. Some of the children may be more capable than others of providing for themselves, or may have fewer wants, or possess other resources; and impartiality may, therefore, require that the rule observed should not be one of equality, but of compensation. Even when equality is desirable, it is not precise or pedantic equality. The law, however, must proceed by fixed rules. If one of the coheirs, being of a quarrelsome, litigious disposition, stands upon his utmost rights, the law cannot make equitable adjustments; it cannot apportion the property as seems best for the collective interest of the family; if there are several parcels of land, and the heirs cannot agree about their value, the law cannot give a parcel to each, but every separate parcel must be either put up to sale or divided; if there is a residence, or a park or pleasure-ground, which would be destroyed, as such, by subdivision, it must be sold, possibly at a great pecuniary sacrifice, and with the destruction to the whole family of local ties and attachments. But what the law could not do, the parent could. By means of the liberty of bequest, all these points might be determined according to reason and the general interest of the persons concerned; and the spirit of the principle of equal division might be the better observed, because the testator was emancipated from its letter. Finally, it would not then be necessary, as under the compulsory system it is, that the

law should interfere authoritatively in the concerns of families, not only on the occurrence of a death, but throughout life, in order to guard against the attempts of parents to frustrate the legal claims of their heirs, under color of gifts and other alienations inter vivos.

In conclusion; all owners of property should, I conceive, have power to dispose by will of every part of it, but not to determine the person who should succeed to it after the deaths of all who were living when the will was made. Under what restrictions it should be allowable to bequeath property to one person for life, with remainder to another person already in existence, is a question belonging to general legislation, not to political economy. Such settlements would be no greater hindrance to alienation than any case of joint ownership, since the consent of persons actually in existence is all that would be necessary for any new arrangement respecting the property.

§ 5. From the subject of Inheritance I now pass to that of Contracts, and among these, to the important subject of the Laws of Partnership. How much of good or evil depends upon these laws, and how important it is that they should be the best possible, is evident to all who recognize in the extension of the coöperative principle the great economical necessity of modern industry. The progress of the productive arts requiring that many sorts of industrial occupation should be carried on by larger and larger capitals, the productive power of industry must suffer by whatever impedes the formation of large capitals through the aggregation of smaller ones. Capitals of the requisite magnitude, belonging to single owners, do not, in most countries, exist in the needful abundance, and would be still less numerous if the laws favored the diffusion instead of the concentration of property; while it is most undesirable that all those improved processes, and those means of

efficiency and economy in production, which depend on the possession of large funds, should be monopolies in the hands of a few rich individuals, through the difficulties experienced by persons of moderate or small means in associating their capital. Finally, I must repeat my conviction that the industrial economy which divides society absolutely into two portions, the payers of wages and the receivers of them, the first counted by thousands and the last by millions, is neither fit for, nor capable of, indefinite duration; and the possibility of changing this system for one of combination without dependence, and unity of interest instead of organized hostility, depends altogether upon the future developments of the partnership principle.

Yet there is scarcely any country whose laws do not throw great, and in most cases, intentional obstacles in the way of the formation of any numerous partnership. In England it is already a serious discouragement, that all or most differences among partners are, practically speaking, only capable of adjudication by the Court of Chancery, which is often worse than placing such questions out of the pale of all law; since any one of the disputant parties, who is either dishonest or litigious, can involve the others at his pleasure in the endless expense, trouble, and anxiety, which are the unavoidable accompaniments of a prolonged chancery suit, without their having the power of freeing themselves from the infliction even by breaking up the association. Beside this, it required, until lately, a separate act of the legislature before any joint-stock association could legally constitute itself, and be empowered to act as one body. By a statute passed only a few years ago, this necessity is done away, and the formalities which have been substituted for it are not sufficiently onerous to be very much of an impediment to such undertakings. When a number of persons, whether few or many, freely desire to unite their funds for a common undertaking, not asking

any peculiar privilege, nor the power to dispossess any one of property, the law can have no good reason for throwing difficulties in the way of the realization of the project., On compliance with a few simple conditions of publicity, any body of persons ought to have the power of constituting themselves into a joint-stock company, or société en nom collectif, without asking leave either of any public officer or of Parliament; and this liberty, in England, they cannot now be fairly said not to have, though they have had it but for a little more than three years. As an association of many partners must practically be under the management of a few, every facility which law can give ought to be afforded to the body for exercising the necessary control and check over those few, whether they be themselves members of the association, or merely its hired servants; and in this point the English system is still at a lamentable distance from the standard of perfection, though less, I believe, owing to the defects of the law, than to those of the courts of judicature.

§ 6. Whatever facilities, however, English law may give to associations formed on the principles of ordinary partnership, there is one sort of joint-stock association which it absolutely disallows, and which can still be only called into existence by a special act either of the legislature or of the crown. I mean, associations with limited liability.

Associations with limited liability are of two kinds; in one, the liability of all the partners is limited; in the other, that of some of them only. The first is the société anonyme of the French law, which in England has no other name than that of "chartered company;" meaning thereby a joint-stock company whose shareholders, by a charter from the crown or a special enactment of the legislature, stand exempted from any liability for the debts of the concern, beyond the amount of their subscriptions. This form of

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