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soft, apart from the experience of some mind.1 Even Locke the very apostle of "Common-sense"-saw that the "secondary qualities" of objects were not in the least like the "ideas" which they produce in us. The Idealist contends that a little more reflection will make it equally plain that the primary qualities of objects-their magnitude, figure and solidity-imply as clear a reference to our conscious experience as the secondary qualities. The sensation of touch, the apprehension of shape by touch, the feeling of pressure resisted-these have as obvious a reference to something which is experienced or might be experienced by a mind as the sensation of heat or of loudness. When we say "the tree is green," though no one is looking at it, we mean that, if anyone did look at it, he would experience a sensation of green: when we say that the door is solid, we mean that if anyone put his hand into the portion of space occupied by the door, he would experience a sensation of touch; and that, if he pressed, he would experience a certain muscular sensation of pressure resisted. Things are made up, as we may express it, of perceptual matter2. It is true that we think of things as having certain qualities when we are not deriving any sensation from them. We must beware of the sensationalistic mistake of supposing that, when I say "the tree is green," the green of my predicate is a sensation. "Green" no doubt is a Universal, not a particular sensation or a decaying relic of past sensation. I can think green without at this moment seeing it; indeed, the green which I think is a green that no eye has ever seen or ever will see. What I see must be light green or dark green: the green that I think is an abstract green-green in general. Nobody has ever experienced a sensation of green in general. But still, the green that is thought would mean nothing except to a mind which

1 This is denied by some distinguished American Realists. Their position in the matter seems to me extraordinarily difficult, but it becomes less easy to convict them of inconsistency.

2 Cf. the earlier chapters of Mr. F. H. Bradley's Appearance and Reality.

had at some time or other experienced particular sensations of green. There is no content in my thought about things which is not ultimately derived from actual perception, or which would have any meaning apart from such perception. Take away from things as known to us everything but the qualities which would be unintelligible in a perceptionless world, and you will have nothing left. Therefore, the Idealist contends, it is unreasonable to suppose that the things which we know could exist in a world in which there is no perception, and therefore we may sav that ultimately, though, for reasons which I shall express hereafter, we must lay stress on that "ultimately," nothing real exists except mind and that which mind experiences. Everything we know about the things has meaning and exists in reference to some actual or possible spiritual experience; and unless we are to admit that things come into existence when you or I see or feel them, and disappear when you or I cease to see or feel them, it must be supposed that, even when no human being actually sees or feels an object, the object somehow exists in and for a single allknowing Consciousness. This line of argument, which, as it appears to me, is involved in any intelligible Idealism, leads us with rigorous necessity to the existence of God, and constitutes the most logically irrefutable of all arguments for that great conclusion.

In saying that all we know about things is something given in perception, I have not in any way identified myself with the Idealism of Berkeley, though in this city and University I hope I may be allowed to speak of Bishop Berkeley with reverence as the true father of all Idealism, even of that sort of Idealism which most strenuously repudiates its obligations to him. Things are undoubtedly more than "bundles of ideas" (or sensations) as Berkeley called them. Knowledge is something much more than the experiencing of isolated sensations. Berkeley, as is generally admitted by the modern Idealist, almost entirely overlooked the important part that relations play in knowledge. But the

relational element of things, as it appears to the Idealist, is as manifestly relative to consciousness as the sensational or perceptional element. And relations are clearly not things-in-themselves. If that which is related is something which cannot be supposed to exist except in and for a mind, that must equally be the case with the relations which connect them together. The Universe is not "an unearthly ballet of bloodless categories." We undoubtedly think of things as substances occupying space-as involving the categories of substance and accident. But if every quality that we can apply to a substance implies experience of a kind which can only be supposed to exist in a mind, it is pretty clear that bare substantiality by itself cannot be supposed to be something which exists independently of mind. If it is admitted that that which occupies space is something perceptual, it can hardly be supposed that the spatial relations themselves are a thing-in-itself capable of existing in a mindless world. Or even if anybody does suppose that empty space is quite independent of mind, empty space is something very different from the hard, solid things-inthemselves which constitute the reality of the world for the Realist. Once admit that the qualities of things are inconceivable apart from the apprehension of them in some consciousness, and you have abandoned Realism, whatever you may hold as to the possibility of relations apart from our knowledge of them. However, I must not attempt to develop further the difference between the sensationalistic Idealism of Berkeley and the rationalistic Idealism of the post-Kantian Idealists. I must assume that this is common knowledge to the student of philosophy, and I have said as much as I have done just in order to indicate what is the kind of Idealism which I am defending. I will now go on to what I propose to make the real subject of my two lectures the arguments which it has recently become fashionable to urge against Idealism and in favor of Realism.

II

(1) The first line of objection which is taken up by our new Oxford Idealists is something of this kind3. The older kind of Realism-the Realism of Descartes, of Locke, and of all the Empiricists who followed in the train of Lockestarted with the assumption that the mind knows immediately nothing but its own ideas. We first have "ideas" which are something in our mind, and then by some process of inference go on to conclude that there exist outside the mind real things which give us those ideas. It is admitted by the new Oxford Realists that against such a position Berkeley's attack is triumphant. Once admit that what we immediately know is something mental, and you have not the slightest right to infer the existence of anything non-mental. There must of course be a cause for my perceiving now something red and hard, now something blue and soft; but the cause of these experiences may be something quite as purely mental as the effect. Berkeley provides an adequate cause for my experiences-when I do not will them myself— in the will of God. But say the objectors, the fundamental fallacy-the Tрŵтоν eûdоs-of Idealism lies just in this assumption that what we know immediately is our "ideas"something mental. What we immediately perceive is not, they urge, an idea but a thing. The perceiving mind is in immediate contact with the thing, and it knows immediately that the thing is what it is independently of anyone knowing it. What I perceive, when I see and touch a red wall, is not an idea of redness and an idea of flatness and an idea of solidity, but a thing-in-itself which is red and flat and solid.

There is nothing at all novel in this line of argument. It is the line of argument which you will find expressed as well as it can possibly be expressed in the really great Scottish philosopher Reid. In Reid's view a true theory of 3 Prichard, Kant's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 133 sq.

perception is not representative but presentative. I do not perceive ideas in my mind which represent to me a thing which is other than what I immediately perceive. It is the real thing that is immediately presented to my mind, not a representation of the thing. There is nothing new in this line of argument, but arguments are none the worse for being old, though one cannot help being a little amused when they are produced as a temporis partus maximus a century and more after they had become familiar to all students of philosophy. The question is, how we are to answer them.

The first point I shall take against this line of objection is to admit that it is quite valid as against Berkeley: and Reid, it must be remembered, was arguing against Berkeley, and knew nothing of any other form of Idealism. Kant and Reid were contemporaries, but they knew nothing of each other. The post-Kantian Idealist will readily admit that what we immediately apprehend in perception is not merely an idea or ideas, if by that is meant sensations. We don't first have ideas in the mind, and then by some process of reflection or inference project them out of ourselves and infer that they are things or represent things. We do immediately know objects. And we do think of the object as distinguishable from the subject which knows it. But because one thing is distinguishable from another, it does not follow that it can exist apart from that other. We do think of the thing as occupying space as a permanent substance which supports changing accidents. For the post-Kantian Idealist to know is not merely to have sensations. Thinking is more than feeling. It involves the categories of substance and accident, and all the intellectual relations which constitute spatiality. These are just as much part of the thing which is known as the sensible qualities such as red or hard. And it is quite true that this thing is apprehended all at once. We don't, as the language of Kant himself at least in the earlier part of the Critique of Pure Reason is apt to suggest, first have sensations and then clothe them

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