are absolutely in the hands of the Washington Government, which have also a veto power over legislation increasing the Cuban debt, while it reserves to itself the right to intervene "for the preservation of Cuban independence, and the maintenance of a Government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty." Naval and coaling stations, too, have been demanded and ceded. Cuba, in short, while virtually a sovereign State in the management of its domestic affairs, is for all other purposes under a very strict American suzerainty. Such arrangements are seldom satisfactory. Sooner or later the desire to be all one thing or all the other is almost sure to upset them, and though there may be reasons of geography and relative strength why what has happened between us and the Boers need not necessarily be repeated between the Americans and the Cubans, still it will be surprising if their present relations continued indefinitely or even for any considerable period.

The Free Cuba, an independent and sovereign State, which was the dream of her revolutionary leaders, has been definitely abandoned, and a Cuba of limited powers -an American Protectorate-has arisen, not dissimilar to the protectorate which England exercises over Egypt.

It rests mainly with the Americans themselves to say whether the experiment will succeed. The United States are the obvious market for Cuban produce. In the old days, Spain provided an outlet, but that outlet has now been stopped by the action of the United States in releasing the island from Spanish rule. All the more reason why Americans should make up the deficiency by admitting Cuban sugar and tobacco at

reduced rates. President Roosevelt has urged this course upon Congress with all his force and earnestness, as a policy to which the country stands committed by every consideration of duty and honour. He has pressed for fifty per cent. reduction of the Dingley tariff in favour of Cuba. Governor Wood has certified that a reduction of 333 per cent. is the very least that will benefit the island. Yet the Senate, at the bidding of the beet-sugar and other "interests," has refused to vote a remission of more than 20 per cent. This is a most ominous and significant step; it shows that the Senate has yet to learn the true spirit of empire. It is trying to govern Cuba in the interest of Americans instead of in the interests of Cubans. The consequence is that in its general commercial position the island is little better off to-day than it was under Spanish rule: and unless Americans speedily make some substantial concessions, the first President of the Cuban Republic may also be the last.

President Roosevelt's Cuban policy by no means commends itself to all his supporters. Nevertheless, it were strange if his power and influence, backed by his Cabinet and the House of Representation were not able to prevail over the Senate and open the gates of the tariff to Cuba. Curiously enough the Democrats unanimously support the President in his insistence that America is bound in honour to give commercial assistance to Cuba. Consequently there may be some foundation for the widespread belief that the Sugar Trust is the cause of the deadlock; but it is much more likely to be the Senate's desire to display his power over a President whom they cannot control, and whose sudden

exaltation the party leaders of Hannatype view with dismay. If so, they are making a dangerous experiment: the President's steadfastness in the Cuban policy has already won him the regard of the nation at large, with whom the Upper Chamber is not, to put it mildly, popular.

Cuba's annexation is a foregone conclusion, if the capitalists and jingoes have their way, and it will not be the worst thing that could happen to the island. The wonder is that it has not fallen long before into the hands of the Great Republic. John Quincy Adams, in 1823, when Secretary of State, predicted an annexation within fifty years.

"From a multitude of considerations," he wrote " Cuba has become an object of transcendent importance to commercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position, the nature of its productions and of its wants, give it an importance in the sum of our national interests with which that of no foreign territory can be compared, and little inferior to that which binds the different members of the Union together. Also, if it be not annexed, what is to be feared, and doubtless on good grounds, are the periodical revolts and miserable pronunciamientos which have distinguished the political history of all the other Latin-American republics. Why should Cuba be exempt from these? Her origin, her history, her people, her climate are the same."

On the other hand, I am ready to admit that, if the President's policy fail, Cuba, assured of the support of the other Latin nations of the Western hemisphere, who distrust and dislike America, may drift away, first commercially, and then politically, from the latter's domination.

CHAPTER IV

IMPERIAL RESPONSIBILITIES

THREE years elapsed after the war with Spain, and America still found herself in the dilemma regarding the status of the annexed peoples. When we come to consider the antiquated constitution and the modern Supreme Court, we will see how inevitable it was that the latter body should come to the rescue and relieve the country from its embarrassment.

The constitution was made for the United States, not the United States for the constitution. It had been pointed out that to hang the entire administration of colonial possessions upon the single grant of power "to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory" of the United States, is to suspend an empire by a very slender thread.

In a letter addressed to Gallatin on the proposed purchase of Louisiana, Jefferson wrote

"There is no constitutional difficulty as to the acquisition of territory, and whether, when acquired, it may be taken into the Union by the Constitution as it now stands will become a question of expediency."

Up to 1901 the great check on America's expansion beyond her geographical boundaries, or her power of conquering feebler States, was the general belief that

such territory, whenever annexed, was a potential State, and must ultimately be included within the Union.

It was thought that the constitution offered no alternative, and this being so, the American people regarded the admission of millions of coloured voters, or Catholic voters, or voters disaffected towards democracy, with alarm. How to get out of the difficulty?

They did not know the elastic nature of their constitution, its adaptability in the hands of clever men to any situation which may conceivably arise.

Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court came to alter completely the fundamental relations, of President and Congress, to the people of the American transmarine dependencies, so well to the inhabitants of the territories.

The first of these was that in the case of De Lima v. Bidwell (collector of the port of New York), in which it was ruled that instantly upon the cession of Porto Rico by Spain to the United States that island became part of America, and that duties could not be lawfully exacted upon merchandise coming thence after the cession and prior to special legislation on the part of Congress.

In the second case, Downes v. Bidwell, it was held that Congress could constitutionally impose duties not uniform but discriminative, throughout the United States, upon merchandise coming from Porto Rico after such legislation, because the latter was "not part of the United States within the meaning of the revenue clauses of the constitution." "

1

1 I.e. "that all duties, imposts and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States."