completed in the middle of 1902, and throughout August and the early part of September of that year the river levels were unprecedently bad, and considerable anxiety prevailed in Upper Egypt regarding the irrigation of the basin lands. In some places the situation became so serious, as the proper time for sowing crops was nearly past, that it was decided to close the new Assiout Barrage on the 15th August. The result was to raise the water level upstream of it some 5 feet, and, by forcing the water into the canals feeding some of the basins, to inundate tracts, the land tax on which would have otherwise been remitted. Mr. Webb, the Director-General of Reservoirs, stated: "It is very difficult to estimate accurately the money value of the benefits gained during the flood from the construction of this Barrage; but it may be safely assumed that the direct and indirect gain was not less than E. 600,000* The cost of the Barrage was £E. 720,000. It will therefore be seen that the works practically repaid their cost in the first year after their completion."

The problem of providing stored water for Egypt has not, however, been solved by the construction of the Assouan dam. In order to ensure the irrigation of existing perennially irrigated tracts, a quantity of stored water of 70,000 million cubic feet is required. The lowering of the Assouan dam, in deference to the wishes of Archæologists, reduced the quantity that could be stored from 70,000 million cubic feet to 37,500 million cubic feet-a little more than half that originally estimated for. For its full development, Egypt requires 200,000 million cubic feet of stored water, and where all this is to come from is the problem at present. Various proposals for providing extra storage have been made. It is unlikely that a proposal to heighten the existing dam at Assouan would be entertained, nor would even this provide for the storage of the desired quantity of water. The old proposal to utilise the Wady Rayan has been mooted. Were Egypt alone in question, it would perhaps be possible to obtain the required quantity of water by building works at the third or fourth cataract in the Soudan. The prosperity of Egypt is now, however, closely allied with that of the Soudan, and such expensive works must in future be designed to benefit the Soudan as well as Egypt. It is, then, probable that the solution will be found eventually by damming the outlet from Victoria Nyanza, so as to raise its level and conserve water in it. This, however, is a problem much too large to be discussed in the present paper.

While investigations regarding the storage of water were proceeding, it was recognised that the head of water to which the Barrage below Cairo could be safely subjected was insufficient. During the summer, when all the discharge of the Nile must be diverted into canals taking off upstream of the Barrage, the regulating gates are tightly closed and caulked. When, about the end of June the first effects of the flood begins to be felt, the level of water

upstream of the Barrage is allowed to rise till the head on the work reaches the safe limit. This level is then maintained by gradually opening the gates as the flood discharge increases until all the gates are fully open; the subsequent rise above this level follows the natural rise of the Nile. It thus happened that, although the demands for water increase greatly at this period, from about the end of July until such time as the gates are fully open and the upstream level at the Barrage begins to rise with the natural rise of the river, which usually happens about the end of August, the discharge into the canals cannot be increased, although a large quantity of water is running to waste down both branches of the Nile. It was obvious that, under these circumstances, the work could not properly take advantage of the water stored in the Assouan reservoir, unless that reservoir could supply enough water to bring the Nile at Cairo into a condition of flood. This it could not do.

Further expensive operations on the foundations of the work were considered undesirable, and Sir Hanbury Brown conceived the idea of constructing solid submergable weirs downstream of the Barrage, which, by maintaining a constant back pressure of water on it, would enable the upstream level of water to be raised above what had been formerly possible, without imposing any increased strain on the structure. This work was commenced in 1898, and finished in 1901. By the completion of these weirs, which enable the old Barrage (originally projected in 1833) to take full advantage of the arrival of the flood, and of the Assouan dam, which, to some extent, supplies the deficiencies of the summer discharge of the Nile, but cannot alter the date or character of its flood in any way, the perennial irrigation of Lower Egypt may be said, after 100 years, to be more or less assured.

During the construction of the large works above referred to, a third Barrage was built across the Damietta branch of the Nile, near the town of Zifta, about half-way between Cairo and the sea. Although it is a work of considerable magnitude, its functions relate more to the better distribution of water to the northern half of Lower Egypt than to the general management of the Nile, and, consequently, it is of comparatively little consequence in the general question.

The work of the Irrigation Engineers in Egypt is not, however, confined to the preparation and construction of large projects. The investigations of them occupied one or two of the senior officers of the staff, while the construction was undertaken by a special staff engaged temporarily under one of the senior officers of the Department.

The every-day duties of the staff were to improve and remodel the canal system under their charge with due regard to the extra supply of water which would be available eventually from the large projects, to see that water was distributed fairly in proportion of the areas under cultivation, and to advise the civil authorities regarding disputes about water. A law was passed in 1894 defining

in the clearest manner the mutual obligations of the users of water, and providing for the imposition of penalties on those who contravened its regulations. The law is a judicial one only, the administration of water is left entirely to Government. This may appear a drastic measure, but, in the management of a large irrigation system, liable to shortage of water, is very necessary, in order that the spirit, as well as the letter, of fair distribution to all may be carried out. All disputes between users of water are, however, decided by a sort of moving water court, composed of the Governor of the Province, who is an Egyptian, two prominent men of the district, nominated by both contending parties, and the Irrigation Officer. This last advises on issues of fact for the information of the "water court, which then gives its decision in accordance with the terms of the law.

Now, Egypt and South Africa have not a single point in common, either in their physical features or in the characteristics of their inhabitants.

In Egypt, irrigation of a primitive kind, but extensive in amount, has been practised from the earliest times. In South Africa, or, at any rate, in the Transvaal, irrigation such as will enable the natural resources of the country to be fully utilised is not possible under the present water law. There is an oft-quoted proverb relative to the natural tendency of man to insist on purchasing his own experience; an expensive process. It is to be hoped that South Africa, with the mistakes of other countries to guide it, will not insist on taking the circuitous route to prosperity that they have done, but will display sufficient acuteness to take the obvious short cut to extensive irrigation which, if not absolutely necessary for, is, at least, a powerful aid to agricultural development that a good water law affords. In spite of the dissimilarity between the two countries, and, assuming that extensive irrigation in South Africa may be permitted, some useful lessons can be drawn from Egypt that are applicable to this country.

The first of these is that the study or construction of large schemes is not inconsistent with the execution of small ones. The investigation of the Nile as a whole, and the construction of large works on it in no way interfered with numerous small works being constructed to distribute water fairly to every cultivator, some of whom owned not more than half an acre. Similarly in South Africa the construction of large works need not, if properly carried out, interfere with small ones for individual farmers.

The second is that engineering details should not be interfered with except by engineers. Had Mehemet Ali and the rulers that succeeded him allowed the French engineers to build the Barrage. in their own way, instead of insisting on an original and somewhat peculiar method of treating foundations, that structure would have been capable of doing its work in 1861, if not before. Egypt, consequently, would have reaped the benefit of it at least twenty years before it did. Instead of this, the work stood, a monument of

amateur interference, until 1890, and is still a source of constant anxiety and expense. Few who have not seen it can thoroughly realise the destructive power of water, and if disasters are to be avoided in this country, irrigation works in it must be made secure and sound, even if the precautions, that appear to the uninitiated unnecessary, are costly. The third is the control by the State of large streams. Under the old regime in Egypt, water was not thoroughly used, and all sorts of canals were dug, that, while benefiting the land of, probably, one rich owner, ruined, or tended to ruin, the land of his poorer neighbours by infiltration.

Under a clear law which, whether drastic or not, at any rate metes out equal treatment to all, regardless of influence or social position, the people are content, and full use is made of the

water.

Under the present law in South Africa, the water is incapable of being fully utilised for irrigation, and will continue to be so unless controlled by the State, or by some other body that can be trusted to administer it in a perfectly unbiassed and impartial manner, and with a view to its thorough utilisation.

The fourth is the necessity for regarding irrigation development on broad lines, and not as a petty matter of politics. Egypt in this respect has been fortunate. Its Government is autocratic, and

it has been possible there to carry out the large development of the country without the constant and vexatious interference in matters of general policy that are almost sure to arise under a popular and party form of Government.

Had the construction of the Barrage in 1833, or its repair in 1833, been decided on by popular vote, it is morally certain that the inhabitants of a country already burdened with debt would have refused to incur further liabilities. Egypt then would have continued to produce staple crops of beans and barley instead of the rich one it now exports. It is also almost certain that a plebescite would have vetoed the construction of the dam at Assouan, or other large works designed to improve, in a way they did not understand, the summer supply of water.

South Africa has a more intelligent population than Egypt, and any irrigation schemes in it will be much smaller and more obvious than those in that country. Still, there is a little danger that irrigation schemes may be blocked for want of funds, due to the desire of particular districts that the money should be distributed among them for farm improvements or very small dams for stock. Such improvements are not inconsistent with expenditure on larger works, but unless the subject is looked at from the standpoint of general development, it may happen that sums subscribed by the general taxpayer may be used solely for the benefit of particular individuals without materially increasing the general wealth of the country, and that the available water will not be made thorough use of, which would practically entail the loss of a national asset.