13 Sim. 91; Hamilton v. Buckmaster, L. R. 3 Eq. 323; Titley v. Wostenholme, 7 Beav. 425; Ashton v. Wood, 3 Sm. & Giff. 436; Stevens v. Austen, 3 E. & E. 685; Osborne v. Rowlett, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 774.

That a deed not delivered, but retained by the vendor until payment of the purchase money, was an escrow. Sloper v. Fish, 2 V. & B. 146. See Hull v. Noble, 40 Me. 459; Stark v. Wilder, 36 Vt. 752.

That a recovery may be suffered by a tenant in tail of lands, the reversion of which has vested in the crown by the attainder of the reversioner. Blosse v. Clammorris, 3 Bligh, 62.

Bristow v.

That a covenant ran with the land. Wood, 1 Coll. C. C. 480; Smith v. Kelley, 56 Me. 64; Lydick v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 17 W. Va. 427.

That a presumption arises from non-payment of tithes. Rose v. Calland, 5 Ves. 186.

That a devise of an undivided moiety and of all of testator's other interest, etc., in the premises. authorizes a sale of the whole tract. Stapylton v. Scott, 16 Ves. 272.

That trustees took a fee or only a fee determinable on the payment of debts and legacies and the death of a legatee. Collier v. McBean, L. R. 1 Ch. App. 31. See Laurens v. Lucas, 6 Rich. Eq. 217.

That the vendor's grantor was a lunatic, his deed being dated February 14, 1854, and that a commission of lunacy issued in December, 1854, found that he was and had been insane from the month of February or March, 1854. Francis v. St. Germain, 6 Grant's Ch. 363; Hinchman v. Ballard, 7 W. Va. 152. See Frost v. Beavan, 17 Jur. 369; Elliott v. Ince, 3 Jur (N. S.) 597.

That the premises are subject to an easement. Krousbien v. Gage, 10 Grant's Ch. 572; Boulton v. Bethune, 21 Id. 110, 478; James v. Freeland, 5 Id. 302; Wardell v. Trenouth, 24 Id. 465; Hymers v. Branch, 6 Mo. App. 511.

That the terms of the instrument authorizing the sale have not been pursued. Cooper v. Denne, 1 Ves. 565; Wrigley v. Sikes, 21 Beav. 337; Collard v. Sampson, 16 Beav. 543; 4 De G., M. & G. 224; Alexander v. Mills, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 124; Rede v. Oakes, 32 Beav. 555; 4 De G., J. & S. 505; Cooper's Case, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 802.

That a prior conveyance amounted to an act of bankruptcy. Lewis v. Lusk, 14 Ves. 547.

That doubts existed whether limitations after an estate for life were contingent remainders or executory devises. Roake v. Kidd, 5 Ves. 617.

That an ordinary devise passed estates of which the testator had been trustee. Marlow v. Smith, 2 P. Wms. 198.

That it was questionable whether a trust was executed or executory. Jervoise v. Northumberland, 1 J. & W. 559.

That an assignment of a term to a mortgagee was protection against a judgment prior to the mortgage. Freer v. Hesse, 4 De G., M. & G. 495.

That a devise "of all my estates," to the use of

three daughters, to be divided in equal shares, and in case of either of them dying, to the children of the decedent; but if no children, then to the surviving daughters forever, gives a fee. Rogers v. Waterhouse, 4 Drew, 329. See Vreeland v. Blauvelt, 8 C. E. Gr. 483.

That a condition of sale, on a sale by a mortgagee under a power entitling the vendor to rescind the contract in case he should be unwilling or unable to answer any requisition of the vendee as to the title or otherwise, is so far depreciatory as to prevent performance. Falkner v. Equitable Society, 4 Drew, 352; Cordingley v. Cheeseborough, 4 De G., F. & J. 379: Jones v. Clifford, L R. 3 Ch. Div. 779.

That commissioners authorized by statute to exchange lands of one kind of tenure, can exchange for lands of another. Minet v. Leman, 1 Jur. (N. S.) 410; Cattell v. Conall, 4 You. & Coll. 228.

That certain phrases in a will constituted an estate tail, upon which the vendor, by suffering a recovery, could pass the fee. Willcox v. Bellaers, Turu. & R. 491.

That an executrix having power to mortgage lands for her maintenance, can sell them. Cook v. Dawson, 3 De G., F. & J. 127; 29 Beav. 123.

That a presumption arises from mere lapse of time. Emery v. Grocock, 6 Madd. 54; Barnwall v. Harris, 1 Taunt. 430; Canston v. Macklew, 2 Sim. 242; Martin v. Cotter. 3 Jon. & La Touche, 496; Magenius v. Fallon, 2 Moll. 566; Bolton v. School Board, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 766; Dutch Church v. Mott, 7 Paige, 77; Hillary v. Waller, 12 Ves. 239 [denied in Byrne v. Frere, 2 Moll. 177; State v. Franklin Falls Co., 49 N. H. 255]; Thompson v. Millikin, 9 Grant's Ch. 359; Jones v. Fulghum, 3 Tenn. Ch. 193; Belmont v. O'Brien, 12 N. Y. 394.

That mere possession for a long time is sufficient. Sedgwick v. Hargrave, 2 Ves. Sr. 59; Prosser v. Watts, 6 Madd. 59; Eyton v. Dicken, 4 Price, 303; Lewis v. Herndon, 3 Litt. 350; Chapman v. Lee, 55 Ala. 616; Seymour v. De Lancey, Hopk. 436; Hartley v. James, 50 N. Y. 38; McLaren v. Irvin, 63 Ga. 275; Shober v. Dutton, 6 Phila. 185; Crooks v. Glenn, 8 Grant's Ch. 239; Dewitt v. Thomas, 10 Grant's Ch. 21; Tillotson v. Gesner, 6 Stew. Eq. 323; Beckwith v. Kouns, 6 B. Mon. 222; Hightower v. Smith, 5 J. J Marsh. 542; Cunningham v. Sharp, 11 Humph. 116; Scott V. Simpson, 11 Heisk. 310.

That a devise of all of testator's real estate includes an advowson purchased by testator after executing his will. Weddall v. Nixon, 17 Beav. 160. See Lloyd v. Eastern, etc. R. Co., 2 Pug. & B. (N. B.) 194; Hamilton v. Buckmaster, L. R. 3 Eq. 323.

That an underlease is sufficiently described as a lease. Darlington v. Hamilton, Day, 550; Madeley v. Booth, 2 De G. & Sm. 718; Hayford v. Criddle, 22 Beav. 477; Camberwell v. Halloway, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 774; Flood v. Pritchard, 8 Rep. 512.

That an encumbrance remains uncanceled on the record. Young v. Collier, 4 Stew. Eq. 444;

Jones v. Fulghum, 3 Tenn. Ch. 193; Allen v. Atkinson, 25 Mich. 351; Tharin v. Fickling, 2 Rich. 361; Kenny v. Hoffman, 31 Gratt. 442; Gans v. Renshaw, 2 Pa. St. 34; Spohn v. Ryckman, 7 Grant's Ch. 388; Welsh v. Barton, 24 Ohio St. 28; Colwell v. Hamilton, 10 Watts, 413; Nicol v. Carr, 35 Pa. St. 381.

That a sale of lands under a partition between three tenants in common in fee and two tenants for life, with remainder to their children, had been made. Young v. Rathbone, 1 C. E. Green, 224. See Maxwell v. Goetschius, 11 Vr. 383; Bumberger v. Clippinger, 5 Watts & S. 311.

That a written agreement existed to transfer lands bought in at sheriff's sale for the benefit of the vendor. Dobbs v. Norcross, 9 C. E. Green, 327.

That there were doubts whether lands were conveyed for the use of a particular church (the vendor), or for all the churches in the same town. St. Mary's Church v. Stocktyn, 4 Hal. Ch. 520.

That the lands agreed to be sold were not within a testamentary power of sale. Chambers v. Tulane, 1 Stock. 146.

That a power of sale was a personal trust in the executor, and could not be exercised by his executor. Chambers v. Tulane, 1 Stock. 146; Dominick v. Michael, 4 Sandf. 374.

That a lis pendens was filed after part of the consideration had been paid and possession taken by the vendee. Earl v. Campbell, 14 How. Pr. 330; Pratt v. Bull, 4 Giff, 117; 1 De G, J. & Sm. 141; Bull v. Hutchens, 32 Beav. 615.

That the boundary lines are in dispute. Voorhees v. De Myer, 3 Sandf. Ch. 614. See Walsh v. Hall, 66 N. C. 233; Tamplin v. James, L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 215; Bruck v. Tucker, 42 Cal. 346.

That one of the deeds in the chain of title is not genuine. Seymour v. De Lancey, Hopk. 436; 5 Cow. 714.

That there is a failure of title as to an undivided portion of the land. Bates v. Delevan, 5 Paige, 299; Arnold v. Arnold, L. R., 14 Ch. Div. 270; Ashton v. Wood, 3 Sm. & Giff. 436; Evans v. Kingsbury, 2 Rand. 120; Bailey v. James, 11 Gratt. 468; Hendricks v. Gillespie, 25 Gratt. 181; Curran v. Little, 8 Grant's Ch. 250; Luckett v Williamson, 31 Mo. 54; Buchanan v. Alwell, 8 Humph. 516; Terrell v. Williamson, Walk. (Mist.) 417; Love v. Camp, 6 Ired. Eq. 207; Swepson v Johnston, 84 N. C 449; Bader v. Neal, 13 W. Va. 373; Goddin v. Vaughn, 14 Gratt, 102; or, of one of several lots purchased together. Mott v. Mott, 68 N. Y. 246. See Osborne v. Bremar, 8 Desauss. 486.

That there was a mistake in the description of the lands contained in a former conveyance. Smith v. Turner, 50 Ind. 367.

That a suit against the vendor as a surety on an official bond, had been begun after part payment of the purchase money and possession by the vendee. Snyder v. Spaulding, 59 Ill. 480. See Secrest v. McKenna, 1 Strobh. Eq. 356.

That a lien for military services was prior in

time to a title by pre-emption. Kelly v. Bradford, 3 Bibb. 320. See Palmer v. Locke, L. R., 18 Ch. Div. 381.

That there were two rival claimants to he lands by pre-emption. Young v. Lillard, 1 A. K. Marsh, 481.

That there had been possession of lands for twenty-seven years, under a paper writing acknowledging that one tenant in common had sold his interest to another. Owings v. Baldwin, 8 Gill, 337.

That a guardian had sold the lands, and his deed was not executed or delivered until after the time limited in the order of sale. Richmond v. Gray. 3 Allen, 25.

That the heirs of an owner of the equity of redemption of lands, who took an assignment of the mortgage to himself as trustee, had not shown a discharge thereof. Sturtevant v. Jaques, 14 Allen, 523.

That there are doubts whether a proviso in a deed creates a condition or a restriction. Jeffries v. Jeffries, 117 Mass. 184. See Whitlock's Case, 32 Barb. 48; Post v. Weil, 8 Hun, 418.

That the vendor's title was under a sheriff's sale against one who had sold the lands two years before such sheriff's sale, but his vendee's deed was not recorded until after the sheriff's. Speakman v. Forepaugh, 54 Pa. St. 363.

That there was a defect in one of several leases included in the contract. Freetly v. Barnhart, 51 Pa. St. 279. See Camberwell Society v. Holloway, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 754.

That lands of a wife had been sold under a judgment confessed by the husband and wife. Swayne v. Lyon, 67 Pa. St. 436.

That lands of an infant had been sold under a partition, in which no guardian was appointed for such infant. Swain v. Fidelity Trust Co., 54 Pa. St. 455; Vail v. Nelson, 4 Rand. 478.

That lands sold to a vendee had been afterwards sold under execution on a prior judgment by confession by the vendor waiving an inquisition. Kostenbader v. Spotts, 80 Pa. St. 430. See Massey v. Mellwain, 2 Hill's Ch. 421.

That a building restriction was not removed by a subsequent judicial sale for taxes. Lesley v. Morris, 9 Phila. 110. See Boyd v. Schlesinger, 59 N. Y. 301.

That a deed executed in trust to the vendor for the purpose of satisfying his vendor's creditors, did not specify which creditors. Butler v. O'Hear, 1 Desauss. 382.

That six co-heirs informally partitioned their ancestor's estate, one plantation falling to C; that no conveyances was made, and afterwards W, one of the co-heirs, died, leaving an infant heir. Thompson v. Dulles, 5 Rich. Eq. 270.

That a lien was insignificant and stale. Belmont v. O'Brien, 12 N. Y. 394. See Kimball v. Took, 64 Ill. 380; 70 III. 553; Richards v. Mercer, 1 Leigh. 125.

That the vendor can not give a good title until a pending suit is determined in his favor. Par

sons v, Gilbert, 45 Iowa, 33; Johnston v. Jarrett, W. Va. 230,

That one of vendor's former title deeds has the grantor's name in the body of the deed "Edward," and is acknowledged as "Edward," but signed "Edmund." Middleton v. Findla, 25 Cal. 76.

That a judgment against a former owner, although satisfied, still remains on the record, and that a third person is in possession of part of the premises, although only a squatter. Hoyt v. Tuxbury, 70 Ill. 331. See McHugh v. Wells, 39 Mich. 175; Blakemore v. Kimmons, 8 Baxt. 470; King Knapp, 59 N. Y. 462.

That the title is derived through a defective chancery proceeding against unknown heirs. Tevis v. Richardson, 7 Mon. 654.

That an amendment to vendor's bill had been proposed to prove that a deed had been acknowledged and recorded properly, although not so appearing on its face. Bartlett v. Blanton, 4 J. J. Marsh. 426.

That a statement in a deed that cersain persons conveying 1 nds by order of a court are the heirs of one who died seized, did not also state that they are the only heirs. Barnett v. Higgins, 4 Dana. 565.

That lands taken by municipal authority fer a park, and paid for by bonds issued therefor, which are declared by statute to be a lien on such lands, can be sold in fee, free from that lien, because such lands were not afterwards included within the park. Brooklyn Park v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234.

That the certificate annexed to one of the title deeds fails to set out that the official taking the acknowledgment was personally acquainted with the grantor. Mullins v. Aiken, 2 Heisk. 535; Fryer v. Rockefeller, 63 N. Y. 268. See Brown v. Witter, 10 Ohio, 142; Ludlow v. O'Neil, 29 Ohio St. 131.

That a devise of the premises was to W for life, then to W's sons for their lives, remainder to their children in fee. W survived the testator, and at his death the lands devised were divided among his sons, J, the vendor, being ene. Lowry v. Muldrow, 8 Rich. Eq. 241. See Miller v. Macomb, 26 Wend. 229; Williamson v. Field, 2 San lf. Ch. 533; Kelso v. Lorillard, 85 N. Y. 177.

That infant's land sold under a decree was bought by the infant's next friend, who sold it, and through a subsequent purchaser complainant became the owner. Collins v. Smith, 1 Head,251.

The lands were sold for partition without notice to the heirs. Littlefield v. Tinsley, 26 Tex. 353; Mar in v. Porter, 4 Heisk. 407; Shields v, Allen, 77 N. Y. 375.

That a deed for one-sixth of the premises can not be found. Griffin v. Cunningham, 19 Gratt. 581. See Thompson v. Millikin, 9 Grant's Ch. 359.

That a tenant by the curtesy sold tne fee, and the sale had been confirmed by court as to remaindermen. Linkous v. Cooper, 2 W. Va. 67.

See Bage v. Millard, 12 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 57; Oliver v. Dix, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 158; Cody v. Gale, 5 W. Va. 547.

That a devise was to a daughter for her sole and separate use, notwithstanding any future coverture, with a power of testamantary disposition, and she marries, and with her husband conveys fee. Sternes v. Allison 2 Head. 221.

That the sale was by a tenant for life and a contingent remainderman. Sohier v. Willams, 1 Curtis, C. C. 479. See De Saussure v. Bollman, 7 Rich. (N. S.) 329.

That lands had been sold by a sheriff and a deed delivered therefor, although such sale was defective. Morgan v. Morgan, 2 Wheat. 290.

That the lands out of which the ground rent sold issued, had been encumbered by taxes. Mitchell v. Steinmetz (Pa.), 24 Alb. L. J. 197.

That one who had been seized and had never legally conveyed the premises, had estopped himself to claim title by encouraging the vendee to purchase the premises. Mullins v. Aiken, 2 Heisk. 535.

That an inchoate right of dower of one of the vendor's predecessors in title had not been released, except by the vendor's statement as a witness. Coray v. Matthewson, 7 Lans. 80.

That a prior deed contains a power in trust that may be exercised. Ford v. Belmont, 7 Rob. (N. Y.) 97, 508.

That a person having an interest in the premises has been absent and not heard from for more than seven years. McDermot v. McDermot, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 451.

That a defect in a lease agreed to be assigned can not be cured by the assignee procuring the reversion. Bensel v. Gray, 12 Jones & Spen. (N. Y.) 372; 62 N. Y. 632; 80 N. Y. 517. See Mayer v. Adrian, 77 N. C. 83.

That the premises had been sold for taxes assessed pending a litigation between the vendor and vendee over the premises. Wilson v. Tappan, 6 Ohio, 120.

That executors had a questionable power of sale, and that one of them had refused to join in the deed. Finley v. Burgoyne, Dud. (S. C.) Eq.

133.

That a deed of trust had been executed to the sole use of M for life, with a power of testamentary disposition, and in default thereof in trust for M's next of kin, with power in the trustee to sell and re-invest, subject to the same trusts. The trustee sold and re-invested in lands, the deed for which expressed no trusts. M sold the lands in fee, and the trustee released all his interest in the premises. Monaghan v. Small, 6 Rich. (N. S.)

177.

That the premises were liable for an uncertain amount of dues to a building association, which could not be ascertained without a suit in equity and an account. Christian v. Cabell, 22 Gratt. 82.

That a testator's will contains a devise of the premises, "after my just debts are paid." Garnett v. Macon Brock. 185.

The case of Pyrke v. Waddingham, 10 Hare, 1, was approved in Mullings v. Trinder, L. R. 10 Eq. 449, so far as the principles laid down there extend, but under precisely the same facts, a specific performance was decreed. It was also limited in Bull v. Hutchens, 32 Beav. 619.

If necessary, the court may inquire into matters of fact. Smith v. Death, 5 Madd. 370; Lyddal v. Weston, 2 Atk. 19; Breybroke v. Inskip, 8 Ves. 417; Burroughs' Case, L. L. 5 Ch. Div. 601; Lowes v. Lush, 14 Ves. 547; Spencer v. Topham, 22 Beav. 583; Hayes v. Harmony Grove, 108 Mass. 400; Seymour v. De Lancey, Hopk. 436; Schermerhorn v.Niblo,2 Bosw.161; Winne v. Reynolds, 6 Paige, 407; Miller v. Macomb, 26 Wend. 229; Murray v. Harway, 56 N. Y. 337.

Specific performance has been refused even after an issue on the very title had been sent to the King's Bench and decided. Sheffield v. Mulgrave, 2 Ves. 526; Morrison v. Barrow. 1 De G., F. & J. 633. See Rushton v. Craven, 12 Price, 599; Rose v. Calland, 5 Ves. 186; Seymour v. De Lancey, Hopk. 437; 5 Cow. 714; Stevens v. Austen, 3 E. & E. 685; Jeakes v. White, 6 Exch. 873; Simmons v. Heseltine, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 554.

The late English rule seems to be that the Court of Appeal, in a case before it, will decide on the validity of the vendor's title, and, irrespective of the decree below, direct a conveyance or not accordingly. Beioley v. Carter, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 230; Sheppard v. Doolan, 3 Dr. & War. 1; Bell v. Holtby, L. R. (15 Eq.) 178; Bull v. Hutchens, 32 Beav. 619; Radford v. Willis, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 7; Alexander v. Mills, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 124; Wrigley v. Sikes, 21 Beav. 348; Cook v. Dawson, 3 De G., F. & J. 127. See, further, Osborne v. Rowlett, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 774; Palmer v. Locke, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 388; Sedgwick v. Hargrave, 2 Ves. Sr. 49; Parkin v. Thorald, 16 Beav. 67; also Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head, 67; McClure v. Harris, 7 Heisk. 378; Smith v. E-tes, 72 Mo. 310; Dominick v. Michael, 4 Sandf. 374; O'Reilly v. King, 2 Rob. (N. Y.) 587; Kelso v. Lorillard, 85 N. Y. 177; Ludlow v. O'Neil, 29 Ohio St. 181; Jackson v. Ligon, 3 Leigh, 161.

Where the lands are in this State, although the defendant is a non-resident, specific performance may be decreed. Telfair v. Telfair, 2 Desauss. 271; Matteson v. Scofield, 27 Wis. 671.

The validity of a mortgage on lands is to be determined by the lex rei sitae, although both of the parties thereto may be non-residents. Goddard v. Sawyer, 9 Allen, 78; Hosford v. Nichols, 1 Paige, 220; Lyon v.McIlvaine, 24 Iowa.9; Thayer v. Marsh, 11 Hun, 591. See 1 Jones on Mort., secs. 656 663.

Where a creditor resides or is found in this State, with deeds in his possession for lands in New York, deposited in that State (where such deposit constitutes an equitable mortgage), he will not be compelled to surrender them until the debt is paid. Griffin v. Griffin, 3 C. E. Gr. 104; Varden

Seth Sam v. Luckpathy Roujee Lallah. 9 Moo. Ind. App. 303.

A mortgage to A, "his executors, administrators and assigns," conveys only a life estate. Clearwater v. Rose, 1 Blackf. 136.

A mortgage executed in New York, where the mortgagee resided, on lands in Massachusetts, to him, "his successors and assigns forever," conveys only a life estate. Sedgwick v. Laflin, 10 Allen, 430.

A mortgage of lands in New Jersey, drawn in New York, to executors, "their successors and assigns," containing the usual clause, conveying all the mortgagor's estate, right, title and interest, and recorded in full, is notice to a subsequent encumbrancer that such mortgage was intended to convey the fee. Bunker v. Anderson, 5 Stew.

Eq. 35.

Such a mortgage may be reformed. Wilson v. King, 12 C. E. Green. 374. See Wheeler v. Kirtland, 8 C. E. Green, 13; 9 C. E. Green, 532; Fish v. New York Co., 2 Stew. Eq. 16, 610; even against a third person who acquires rights with notice. Gale v. Morris, 2 Stew. Eq. 222; 3 Id. 285. By the law of Ohio, a married woman over eighteen years old may contract. A mortgage on lands in Ohio, executed by a non-resident married woman over eighteen, but under twenty-one, was held good, although by the law of her domicil she was incapable of contracting. Sell v. Miller, 11 Ohio St. 331. See Thompson v. Ketchum, 8 Johns. 189.

A mortgage on lands in Kentucky, executed during the war by a citizen of Tennessee to a citizen of Kentucky, is void. Hyatt v. James, 2 Bush. 463.

A mortgage on lands in Wisconsin was given to a bank in New York by its corporate name, Held good, although the statutes of New York provide that all conveyances of real estate should be made to the president. An assignment of such mortgage by "R. R. K., President of the Farmers' Bank of Saratoga County, New York," duly executed and acknowledged by him as president, with the corporate seal attached, was also held good. Kennedy v. Knight, 21 Wis. 340.

A court of the State of New York, where a mortgage on lands in Colorado was executed, giving a power of sale in New York in case of default, will not enjoin such sale after default, on a mere allegation that such power is void, no statute of Colorado being shown which prohibits such sale. Central Gold Mining Co. v. Platt, 3 Daly, 263. JOHN H. STEWART.

witness to the privilege of silence the court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called upon to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer; but, if the fact of the witness being in danger be once made to appear, great latitude should be allowed him in judging for himself of the effect of any particular question.

Ledru Rollin Reynolds was adjudicated a bankrupt on a petition filed in the London Bankruptcy Court on the 23d September, 1881. On the 4th of December, 1880, he had executed a post nuptial settlement in favor of his wife and others, of which settlement his brother, George Kossuth Mazzini Reynolds, was one of the trustees. On the 24th of January, 1882. G. K. M. Reynolds was examined on oath before Mr. Registrar Hazlitt, by counsel for the trustee in the bankruptcy, touching his knowledge of the bankrupt's property, and particularly with regard to the circumstances under which the settlement had been executed, and the property comprised in it. Various questions were put to the witness, the greater number of which the witness, by the advice of his counsel, declined to answer on the ground that his answers might tend to criminate him. It was obvious that answers to some of the questions could not possibly have such a tendency.

The Registrar expressed an opinion that some of the questions were legal and proper questions; but, as the witness persisted in his refusal, a formal order was made by the registrar, which, after stating that the questions referred to in the transcript of the shorthand notes of the examination had been put, that the witness had refused to answer them on the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate him, and that it appeared to the registrar that some of the questions were legal and proper questions and that the witness was bound to answer them, referred the further examination to the chief judge, with a view of rendering a special application to his lordship for the committal of the witness to answer the questions unnecessary, and directed the witness to attend before the chief judge on a certain day for such further examination.

The 20th of February was the day appointed for hearing the reference from the registrar, and on that day the chief judge, after reading the transcript and hearing counsel for the trustee and the witness, ordered that the witness "do answer all lawful questions put to him, and that the examination be referred back to the registrar for that purpose," and that the witness should attend the examination at his own expense, and pay the costs of the application.

The witness appealed.

Horton Smith, Q. C., and Montagu Williams (Terrell with them) for the appellant.-The witness had a reasonable ground for taking the objection to the questions, for under sec. 11 of the Debtor's Act, 1869, the bankrupt himself might have been guilty of a misdemeanor by reason of

the acts committed by him in connection with the settlement; and, in case of its being proved that the witness was a party to the settlement, he might himself be liable to an indictment. One question asked was, whether the witness had ever signed his name as George Edwards. It is possible that an answer to that might result in a charge of forgery being preferred against the witness. But the principal object of the examination was to make out that there had been a conspiracy between the two brothers. The advisers of the trustee say. The whole settlement is a sham. You knew of it. and aided and assisted in it." If that is true and can be proved, what was done amounted to an indictable conspiracy. Rex v. Edwards, 8 Mod. 320; Rex v. Delavel, 3 Bur. 1434.

Another question is, who is to be the judge whether the question put ought to be answered? According to some dicta, the witness himself is the sole judge; according to other dicta, he must show some reasonable ground for believing that his answer will tend to eriminate him. If the witness claims protection, and there appears reasonable ground that the answer woul! tend to eriminate him, he is not compellable to answer. Reg. v. Garbett, 1 Den. C. C. 236; 2 C. & K. 474.

Whether the claim of privilege is reasonably well founded or not, is a question for the witness, not for the judge. Fisher v. Ronalds. 20 L. T. Rep. O. S. 100; 12 C. B. 762.

In that case Jervis, C. J.. says: "We must therefore allow the witness to judge for himself, or he would be made to criminate himself." Maule, J., expressed a similar opinion during the argument. Lord Truro, L. C., says: "A defendant, in order to entitle himself to protection, is not bound to show to what extent the discovery sought might affect him, for to do that he might oftentimes of necessity deprive himself of the beneit he is seeking; but it will satisfy the rule if he states circumstances consistent on the face of them with the existence of the peril alleged, and which also render it extremely probable.” Short v. Mercier, 16 L. T. Rep. O. S. 453; 3 Mac. & G. 205, 217.

The law as stated by Maule, J., in Fisher v. Reynolds was afterwards approved by Pollock, C. B. Adams v. Lloyd, 31 L. T. Rep. O. S. 219; 3 H. & N. 351, 361.

In 1855, according to Parke, B., the rule was still unsettled. Osborn v. London Dock Company. 24 L. T. Rep. O. S. 272; 10 Ex. 698, 700.

In another case Stewart, V. C., although he did not agree with the rule taken by Maule, J., admitted that there might be cases in which the witness was the sole judge. Sidebottom v. Adkins, 29 L. T. Rep. O. S. 310.

If the judge has any duty at all, it is only to satisfy himself whether the objection is genuine. Ex parte Sebolfield; Re Firth, 37 L. T. Rep. N. S. 281: L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 230.

They also referred to Ex parte Fernandez, 4 L. T. Rep. N. S. 324; 10 C. B. N. S. 3; Reg. v. Boyes, 5 L. T. Rep. N. S. 147; 1 B. & S. 311.