by law,unless the judge thereof shall so direct by writing under his hand, and filed with the clerk of said court." The act thus practically abolishing grand juries was passed February 12, 1859. The system is not at all in vogue here now. C. H. G.

Grand Rapids, Mich.

Query 63. [14 Cent. L. J. 499.] A sued B and obtained judgment. Before issuing execution B assigned all his property to C. Can I obtain order from judge setting aside assignment on the ground of being made with a fraudulent intent, or how am I to go about it? Troy, N. Y. S. T.

Answer No. 1. From the query it is hard to tell whom S T represents, but we suppose he is A's attorney, and therefore answer, that no court would make any such order as S T mentions; and if it would the order could in no way affect the assignee, C, who is no party to the suit between A and B. One of two courses is open to A. He may either bring suit in equity against B and C to set aside the fraudulent conveyance, or have his execution levied on the property conveyed to C, and run the risk of being sued by C. No authorities are cited because the propositions stated are elementary. M. N. SALE.

St. Louis, Mo.

Answer No. 2. A does not require to set aside assignment to C. If he can prove fraudulent intent on the part of B, and that C knew of such intent, or if he can prove that C was not a bona fide creditor or purchaser, then he can proceed and levy on the property assigned or conveyed, as such assignment or conveyance is utterly void, and the legal title is still in B. The sheriff will probably require an indemnity bond. See Freeman on Executions, sec. 136; Brown v. Snell, 46 Me. 490; Booth v. Bunce, 33 N. Y. 139; Russell v. Wynne, 37 N. Y. 591; 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 384; 11 Mo. 540, and 50 Mo. 90.

handsomely printed upon good paper, and contains more than a thousand pages bound in a volume not larger than the usual law book size.

DIGEST OF FIRE INSURANCE DECISIONS, in the Courts of Great Britain and North America. By H. A. Littleton and J. S. Blatchley, with Additional Notes to the Second Edition by Stephen G. Clarke, Third edition, revised and enlarged. By Clement Bates. New York, 1873: Baker, Voorhis & Co.

DIGEST OF FIRE INSURANCE DECISIONS, in the Courts of the United States, Great Britain and Canada. Being a Supplement, or Continuation of the Third and Last Edition of Littleton and Blatchley, Clarke and Bates Digest, from 1872 to 1882. By George A. Clement. New York, 1822: Baker, Voorhis and Co.

These two volumes, which are uniform in style, present the reader a digest of the cases upon the subject of fire insurance from the earliest period down to 1882. The work is carefully and precisely done. There is no waste of space, and yet the references are not so much abbreviated as to become unintelligible. While the method of arrangement is not altogether unobjectionable (its chief defect being a lack of sub-heads), still it is as good as the plan pursued in the great majority of digests. Altogether the work will be found useful.

RECENT LEGAL LITERATURE.

A

and

STOCK BROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES. Treatise on the Law of Stock Brokers Stock Exchanges. By John R. Dos Passos. New York, 1882: Harper & Brothers.

A business like that conducted upon the floors in the environs of the modern stock exchange is in itself so peculiar and so much the creature of custom and usage, differing so radically from the ordinary transactions of life, that some degree of special training and examination of its methods is necessary before even the most rudimentary of its transactions can be understood by an ordinary practitioner with no special knowledge beyond an acquaintance with the law of contracts and the principles of commercial law. To such a person the volume before us will be found a mine of knowledge. The usages, history and methods of dealing of stock exchanges occupy a very large portion of the work, though the strictly legal features of it are by no means slighted, and consequently the book will be found exceedingly readable by the general, as well as by the professional reader. The style is luminous and facile, and altogether the work, in addition to being a very useful is a very agreeable one. The book is

NOTES.

A Kentucky negro who was sentenced to the penitentiary for three years for stealing copper worth $25, when asked by the judge if he had anything to say, remarked that he had not, but only regretted that he hadn't stole a drove of cattle instead of that piece of copper. The joke lay in the fact that a man had just been sentenced for one year for stealing eighteen head of cattle.

-A contemporary dilates upon the fact that so many successful men in all professions are young, and refers to the fact that many of our judges jump off the bench, mount a hack at Westmister Hall, and subsequently play lawn tennis until it is time to dress for dinner. The writer is ill informed. Judges on their appointment, however young in years they may be, become old in their habits. Mr. Justice Chitty, on being made a judge, ostentatiously abandoned lawn tennis. Mr. Justice North abandoned his morning meerschaum down Oxford Street. They necessarily shrink into themselves. They hold little intercourse with the bar, and notwithstanding their youth the habits of age are forced upon them. On this ground we doubt the happiness of being made a judge in the days of one's youth.-Law Times.

ST. LOUIS, JULY 14, 1882.

CURRENT TOPICS.

The plethora which exists in the docket of our Supreme Court (which the Constitutional Amendment that is to be submitted to the voters in November is designed to remedy) is simply a counterpart to the condition of affairs that exists in many other States; and in nearly all of them there is active discussion of proposed remedies. It may not be uninteresting then to our subscribers, without as well as within the State, to call attention' to the cardinal provisions of the proposed Amendment, and to the views contained in a report of Judiciary Committee of the St. Louis Bar Association in response to the question, referred to them by resolution, at a recent meeting: "What, if any, action should be taken by the association concerning the proposed amendment to the Constitution of Missouri in regard to the changes in the Supreme Court of the State?"

For the benefit of those not familiar with the judicial system of Missouri, it is needful to premise that the St. Louis Court of Appeals has at present jurisdiction, within a limited territory, of appeals and writs of error in both civil and criminal cases, and that from it, except in cases within certain pecuniary limits and in certain classes of cases, appeal lies to the Supreme Court. Without the territory which is included in the jurisdiction of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, the appeal lies directly from the circuit to the Supreme Court.

The most noteworthy provisious of the proposed amendment are: 1. The increase of the number of judges of the Supreme Court from five to six; 2. Their separation into two divisions with criminal and civil jurisdiction respectively; the criminal side to hear in addition to appeals and writs of error in criminal cases, all cases for damages in torts, and applications for writs; of habeas corpus, and quo warranto, mandamus, certiorari and other remedial writs; and two judges of either side to constitute a quorum; 3, that the Chief Justice shall have a superintending 'urisdiction to or

Vol. 15-No. 2.

him that the criminal side of the court has within twenty days rendered a decision contrary to some decision of the civil side; 4, the restriction of the jurisdiction of the St. Louis Court of Appeals to the 8th Judicial Circuit, and the relieving it of any criminal jurisdiction, and the provision that its civil jurisdiction shall be final; 5, the provision. that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall have a superintending jurisdiction over the St. Louis Court of Appeals, to issue a certiorari (whenever it is "made to appear" to him that the St. Louis Court of Appeals has decided a cause contrary to any decision of the Supreme Court, within two months), "to transfer the cause from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court for re-hearing, and that on such rehearing, all the judges, both of the Supreme Court aud Court of Appeals, or a majority of them, shall sit, the Chief Justice, if present, presiding, and the decision of this tribunal shall be binding authority upon both courts.

Such is the outline of the constitutional amendment to be submitted to the voters in November, and it is entitled to the careful and dispassionate consideration of every voter, and most of all to that of the bar, who are best able to form an intelligent opinion of its merits and demerits, and whose views are likely to have great weight with their neighbors and friends.

The report of the committee above referred to (which is an unusually able and well-reasoned document, and which, much to our regret, we are unable to publish in full, on account of our limited space), contains the recommendation that the proposed amendment be rejected by the people, and assigns the following reasons: 1. The division of the Supreme Court into two benches of three judges each, two of whom constitute a quorum, makes the decision of these two practically final in many cases. Such administration of justice is not contemplated by the Constitution. 2. The objection to such a division is not overcome by the provision in the second section, for a rehearing in certain cases because: a. It relates only to cases decided by the Criminal side of the court, and leaves the de

cisions made by the civil side of the court absolutely final. The superiority of grade thus bestowed upon members of the civil side would of necessity lead to jealosies and friction. b. The right to rehearing being restricted to cases in which the decision of the criminal side conflicts with some decis ion of the old court, or of the civil side, it follows that upon a question entirely new, a decision of the two or three judges constituting that side of the court is absolutely final, no matter how glaringly erroneous, c. The whole time of the chief justice would be of necessity occupied in hearing applications for rehearing, and thus the civil side of the court be reduced to two members; or the chief justice must refuse all such applications, where the right to a rehearing was not apparent at first sight, and thus the object of the provision be defeated. e. The vesting of the power to grant a rehearing in the chief justice alone is objectionable, because it makes the fate of a cause depend upon the judgment of one man. e. In cases in which a rehearing is granted the cause is reviewed virtually by three appellate courts, (1) the criminal side of the court or the St. Louis Louis Court of Appeals, as the case may be; (2) the Chief Justice on application for rehearing; and (3) the court in banc. 3. The granting of final appellate jurisdiction to the St. Louis Court of Appeals of causes arising in the Eighth Judicial Circuit is dangerous and radically wrong. "Your committee is fully impressed with, and gives due weight to, the acknowledged integrity, industry, learning and wisdom of the present judges of the St. Louis Court of Appeals. But we assert that no tribunal of final appellate jurisdiction over the litigation of a municipal community, such as the City of St. Louis should be composed exclusively of judges who are citizens of that community." 4. The provisions for the rehearing of causes decided by the St. Louis Court of Appeals would be ineffectual for the reasons stated above; and the final jurisdiction of the St. Louis Court of Appeals would result in the growth and establishment of a system of judicature and decision essentially differing from that of the balance of the State. The report concludes as follows:

"The tendency of thinking men is toward the creation of intermediate appellate tribu

nals (with, perhaps, such limited final jurisdiction as is now beneficially exercised by the St. Louis Court of Appeals) as the best method for the relief of courts of last resort, and we believe that this plan will speedily and finally find favor in Missouri.

"But if it be deemed indispensable to adopt a measure of immediate relief, it would be far safer to create at once, by simple legislative enactment, an advisory commission to hear and prepare decisions which may be assigned to it by the Supreme Court, which decisions the court may at its option adopt and promulgate or reject. Such a commission could be abolished as soon as the necessity for its existence may cease.

"In conclusion, it is proper to state that Mr. Finkelnburg, being absent from the State, has not participated in the deliberations of the committee. Messrs. Madill, Slayback and Vastine authorize me to make this report, which is respectfully submitted.

"JAMES TAUSSIG, Chairman."

The views expressed by this committee, and the reasoning by which they have reached the results indicated above, appear to us to be singuarly conclusive, and worthy of the most careful attention. It is a singular and striking fact, and one of great weight against the amendment, that the result of their deliberations at this time, when a period sufficiently long for mature reflection has elapsed, should be in such perfect accord with the arguments contained in a letter from Jay L. Torrey, Esq., printed in these columns more than a year ago, soon after the passage of the resolution by the Legislature submitting the Amendment. See 12 Cent. L. J., 310. And it is no mean compliment to our correspondent's insight and sagacity that the views presented by him at that early date should be sustained by the conclusions reached by so able a body as the committee in question, after the lapse of time for mature deliberation.

The

PARENT AND CHILD.

parental relation must be considered

truth that a father is entitled to the fruits of his child's labor, but it is equally true that this is a right that results directly from the

ship. It springs from social law, and ex necessitate imposes a duty upon those who hold it. From this duty a right is derived in favor of a parent; and that is the right to have the custody and control of its minor child. Municipal law will not disturb parents in this right where the exercise of it is not abused.2 "It is perfectly true as a general proposition," says Judge Ware in the case of The Etna, "that a father has the right to the custody and control of the person of his child, but no one will contend that a father under the common law, stands in the relation of a sovereign to his child." The right to control is a limited one, but it implies the power to command, ex proprio vigore.

It is said by most of the cases that parents are obliged to support their minor children. But, independent of statutes, this can not be sustained; for they are only indemnifying their nature in favor of municipalities, and do not extend to individuals.3 With this exception, it must follow from the nature of the parental relation, that the obligation is only a moral one, and, unless it is founded upon a prior legal liability, it has no binding force from a legal point of view. Moreover, the right to control the child puts it out of its power to give consent to contract between the father and it; and as between it and a third person, we shall show that the power of the child to bind its parent upon a contract, is one of agency common to all cases. Parents are not obliged to support their minor children only so far as statute law imposes it.4

But the books all agree that, while minor children live with and are supported by their parents, or by one standing in loco parentis, their services belong to those holding the parental relation.5 "So, also, it is a general

1 The Etna, Ware, 474; United States v. Bainbridge, 1 Mason, 78, Hammond v. Corbett, 50 N. H. 501. 2 The Etna, supra.

3 Farmington v. Jones, 36 N. H. 271.

4 Kelley v. Davis, 49 N. H. 187; Raymond v. Loyl, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 483; Gordon v. Potter, 17 Vt. 348.

5 Monoghan v. School District, 38 Wis. 100; Coffin v. Shaw, 3 Ware, 82; Galbraith v. Green, S. & R. (Pa.) 207; Shute v. Dorr, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 203; Benson v. Remington, 2 Mass. 113; Angel v. McLellan, 16 Mass. 23; United States v. Bainbridge and The Etna,

viding for the well being of his child," says Ware, Judge, in the case of The Etna.6 Support and services are dependent upon each other. If the one is withheld, the other is withdrawn; and if the latter is wilfully refused, the former may be denied, as between a parent and third persons, to recover for necessaries furnished to the child. Probably all that is meant by the courts when they say that parents are obliged to support their minor children is, that as between them and a city or town, they are liable, if able to support. Notice that support is being given is required by the statute to affect a defendant with knowledge, from which a promise might be inferred. The difficulty in most cases is, that there is no promise to pay debts contracted by a minor child; and, as the statutes are intended only for the indemnity of the public against paupers, and not for the reimbursement of an individual who may have relieved the sufferings and distress of needy persons, a promise can not be inferred, even though notice be given by one who has provided the support, because there is no legal obligation to found a promise on; and without it a request is necessary. If a child wilfully leaves its father's house, its act is a refusal of services; and if a father drives his child from his house, his act is a renunciation of his right to the child, and it is transferred to the latter by that act. There can be no difference in principle if he should abandon it.9 But it has been held that where a man had deserted his family, his wife was impliedly authorized to act as his agent to procure necessaries for it.10 Enlarging the parental to a contractual relation, going a step farther, the following proposition is sustained by the authorities: Parents are not liable upon any contracts made by their minor chil

8

supra; Hollingsworth v. Swedenborg, 49 Ind. 378; Gifford v. Kollock, 3 Ware, 45; Nightingale v. Withington, supra.

6 Supra.

7 Farmington v. Jones, supra.

8 United States v. Bainbridge, supra.

9 The Etna, supra; Nightingale v. Withington, supra: Bageley v. Forder, 3 Q. B. 559, Cockburn, C. J., dissentient.

10 Walker v. Laighton, 31 N. H. 111; Rumney v. Keyes, 7 N. H. 571.

The four American cases-Gordon v. Potter, Weeks v. Morrow, Raymond v. Loyl and Kelley v. Davis-best exemplify the rule. The former was decided in 1840. In that case an action was brought to recover the price of cloth and trimmings sold to the defendant's minor son. Defendant told his son in the spring that he could work out, and defendant would get him some clothes in the autumn. Defendant did not refuse to get the clothes, but neglected to get them; and he knew of the purchase. He also gave his son one dollar and part of his son's earnings to pay for making up the clothes. Defendant had judgment. Kelly v. Davis was assumpsit for goods sold to defendant's minor son while he was employed by a third person. Some of the articles were, and some were not, necessaries. Defendant knew where his son was. It was held that he was not liable. In Raymond v. Loyl, defendant's son worked for the plaintiff, who provided clothes for him when in a destitute condition. Defendant did not give her consent to the arrangement, and had judgment on the ground of no contract made by her. Weeks v. Morrow, was a case where defendants son left home without the knowledge or consent of his father, who was sued for board furnished to the son. Held, that there was no contract to pay for it by the defendant. Previous to these judgments, the doctrine of Van Valkingberg v. Watson 12 had been followed by some courts. It is, that evidence of a palpable omission to provide support is sufficient to show a binding obligation upon a parent. But this rule goes no further than a moral obligation, a promise founded upon which would be a nudum pactum. Under the true rule, there is nothing peculiar about the relation of parent and child; they stand upon the same footing with

11 Raymond v. Loyl, 10 Barb. 483; Weeks v. Merrow, 40 Me. 151; Kelley v. Davis, supra; Owen v. White, 5 Stew. & Port. (Ala.) 435; Ang 1 v. McLellan, 16 Mass. 28; Wilson v. Wilson, 52 Iowa, 44; Clark v. Gotts, 1 Ill. App. 455; Bailey v. King, 41 Conn. 365; Kernodle v. Caldwell, 46 Ind. 153; Rogers v. Turner, 59 Mo. 116; Harper v. Lemon, 38 Ga. 227; Clark v. Clark, 46 Conn. 586; Byers v. Thompson, 66 Ill. 421; Mortimer v. Wright, 6 Mees. & W. Bainbridge v. Pickering, 2 W. Bl. 1325; Gordon v. Potter, 17 Vt. 348; Shelton v. Springett, 11 C. B. 452; 2 Kent (11th ed.), 190, note 3.

12 13 Johns., 480. See, also, Pidgin v. Cram, 8 N. H. 350; In the matter of Ryder, 11 Paige, 185.

amount of proof necessary in an ordinary case to make out a contract, is required in a case where the parental relation is made an element. An agency can not be inferred from the parental relation.

A minor son, while in college, purchased some articles for his use. His father was sued for the price of them. But evidence that they were purchased under such circumstances did not imply consent of the father. 13 It is a question for the jury to say whether or not the circumstances in any given case imply a promise from the parent to pay for articles purchased by the child. 14 Where a son had left home and had purchased articles for his own use, his father was held liable for the price in an action to recover it, on the ground that he had paid the seller for articles purchased from him by the son previously, and that the agency continued until notice of its revocation. 15

A fortiori one holding the relation of stepfather can not be holden for the debts of his step-child. 16 But if one stands in loco parentis-receives the child of his wife by a former husband into his family and treats it as he would his own-the relation is established.17 The court in Freto v. Brown, says that while a child lives in the family of, and is supported by its "father-in-law," it must be considered a servant as to strangers, who can not question his right to its earnings. But the relation is not binding upon the child. The relation of parent and child is prima facie established if its parents are recognized as husband and wife. 18

It is said by most of the cases on the question of the rights of a mother, that she is not entitled to the services of her minor child after the death of its father, even though she provides support for it.19 But

13 Owen v. White, 5 Stew. & Port. 435,

14 Kelley v. Davis, supra; Ayer v. Ayer, 41 Vt. 55. 15 Murphy v. Ottenheimer, 84 Ill. 39. See, also, Harper v. Lemon, 38 Ga. 227; Fowlkes v. Baker, 29 Tex. 135; Platts v. Rosebury, 4 Dutch. (N. J.) 146. 16 Freto v. Brown, 4 Mass. 675; Tubb v. Harrison, 4 T. R. 118; Trescott v. Dennysville, 30 Me. 470.

17 Mulhern v. MeDavitt, 16 Gray, 404; Mowbry v. Mowbry. 64 Ill. 383; Williams v. Hutchinson, 3 Comst. 312; Gorman v. State, 42 Tex. 221; St. Ferdinand, etc. v. Bobb, 52 Mo. 357.

18 Dalton v. Bethlehem, 20 N. H. 505; Illinois, etc. Co. v. Bonner, 75 Ill. 315.

19 Pray v. Gorham, 31 Me. 240; E. B. v. E. C. B.. 26 Barb. 300; South v. Deniston, 2 Watts, 474; Com