have generally been sustained by the courts. (Abeel v. Clark,

84 Cal., 226; 24 Pac., 383. Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn., 183; 32 Atl., 348; 29 L. R. A., 251. Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind., 121; 56 N. E., 89; 80 Am. Stat. Rep., 195; 50 L. R. A., 64. Morris v. City of Columbus, 102 Ga., 792; 30 S. E., 850; 42 L. R. A., 175; 66 Am. Stat. Rep., 243. State v. Hay, 126 N. C., 999; 35 S. E., 459; 49 L. R. A., 588; 78 Am. Stat. Rep., 691. Hazen v. Strong, 2 Vt., 427. In re Rebenack, 62 Mo., App. 8. Duffield v. Williamsport School District, 162 Pa., 476; 29 Atl., 742; 25 L. R. A., 152. Cooley's Cons. Lim. (7th ed.), 880. Prentice on Police Powers, 39, 132. 1 Dillon's Mun. Corp., sec. 355. Parker & Worthington's Public Health and Safety, sec. 123.)

A common belief, like common knowledge, does not require evidence to establish its existence, but may be acted upon without proof by the legislature and the courts. While the power to take judicial notice is to be exercised with caution, and due care taken to see that the subject comes within the limits of common knowledge, still, when according to the memory and conscience of the judge, instructed by recourse to such sources of information as he deems trustworthy, the matter is clearly within those limits, the power may be exercised by treating the fact as proved without allegation or proof. (Jones v. U. S., 137 U. S. 202, 216, 11 Sup. Ct. 80, 34 L. Ed. 691; Hunter v. N. Y., O. and W. R. R. Co., 116 N. Y. 615, 623, 23 N. E. 9, 6 L. R. A. 246; Porter v. Waring, 69 N. Y., 250, 253; Geist v. Detroit City R. R. Co., 91 Mich. 446, 51 N. W. 1112; Greenleaf's Ev. (14th Ed.) sec. 5; 1 Wharton's Ev. (3d) Ed.) sec. 282; 1 Starkie's Ev. 211; 17 Am. and Eng. Encyc. (2d Ed.) 894.) Common belief, in order to become such common knowledge as to be judicially noticed by us, must be common in this State, although in a matter pertaining to science it may be strengthened somewhat by the general acceptance of mankind. As was said by Mr. Justice Swayne in Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37, 42, 23 L. Ed. 200: "Courts will take notice of whatever is generally known within the limits of their jurisdiction, and, if the judge's memory is at fault, he may refresh it by resorting to any means for that purpose which he deems safe and proper. This extends to such matters of science as are involved in the cases brought before him." See, also, People v. Lochner, 177 N. Y. 169, 69 N. E. 373.

The fact that the belief is not universal is not controlling, for there is scarcely any belief that is accepted by every one. The possibility that the belief may be wrong, and that science may yet show it to be wrong, is not conclusive; for the legislature has the right to pass laws which, according to the common belief of the people, are adapted to prevent the spread of contagious diseases.

In a free country, where the government is by the people through their chosen representatives, practical legislation admits of no other standard of action; for what the people believe is for the common welfare must be accepted as tending to promote the common welfare, whether it does in fact or not. Any other basis would conflict with the spirit of the constitution, and would sanction measures opposed to a republican form of government. While we do not decide and can not decide that vaccination is a preventive of smallpox, we take judicial notice of the fact that this is the common belief of the people of the State, and with this fact as a foundation we hold that the statute in question is a health law, enacted in a reasonable and proper exercise of the police power. It operates impartially upon all children in the public schools, and is designed not only for their protection but for the protection of all the people of the State. The relator's son is excluded from school only until he complies with the law passed to protect the health of all, himself and his family included. No right conferred or secured by the constitution was violated by that law, or by the action of the school authorities based thereon. In view of the opinions below, we regard further discussion as unnecessary, and we affirm the order appealed from, with costs.

IV. PROVISION FOR PHYSICAL WELFARE

An effective illustration of the enlargement of the scope of public education so as to include opportunity and provision for the physical welfare of school children is to be found in the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Washington.

[State ex rel. School District No. 56, Chelan County v. Superior Court of Chelan County et al., 124 Pac. 484. (Supreme Court of Washington, June 25, 1912.)]

FULLERTON, J. In this proceeding, school district No. 56, Chelan county, seeks to appropriate, as additional grounds to its existing school site, 2 acres of land out of a tract containing 18 acres now the property of the respondents J. N. Dotson and Jennie N. Dotson. The records show that the school district named comprises the town of Cashmere, in Chelan county, together with certain outlying territory; that it now owns a school site consisting of two acres, situated in the town of Cashmere, on which it has erected two school buildings, one 70 by 75 feet in size and

another 50 by 102, which buildings it is conceded are ample to accommodate the present attendance at the school and the anticipated increase in attendance for some time in the future. The additional grounds sought to be acquired abut upon the existing site and form therewith a single tract or parcel of land. The testimony of the school officers was to the effect that the present grounds were adequate for the purposes of the school in the sense that they afforded sufficient room for ingress and egress to and from the school buildings and sufficient room for the necessary auxiliary and outbuildings, but that they were inadequate in the sense that they afforded no room for the pupils attending the school to exercise; the superintendent of the school testifying that it had been found almost impossible, without forbidding all forms of play and exercise, to keep the pupils from trespassing on the adjoining property, and that much complaint had been made to him by adjoining property hoiders of such trespassing, and that the additional ground sought was desired at the present time to afford additional playgrounds for the pupils of the school, that they might have grounds upon which the common athletic games current among schools of its class could be played. The preliminary proceedings for the acquisition of the lands had by the school board seemed to have been in compliance with the statutes save in one particular. At the special meeting of the voters of the district called to determine whether the board of directors should be authorized to acquire the additional tract for school purposes, the vote was taken by calling on the voters present to stand up and be counted, instead of by ballot, as the statute directs. On the hearing in the court below, at the conclusion of the petitioner's case, the respondents moved for a dismissal of the proceedings on the grounds: First, that the petitioner had not shown a compliance with the law with reference to the selection of the land sought to be taken; second, that the act under which the petitioner is proceeding is invalid and void; and, third, it is seeking to take the land for a purpose not authorized by law. The motion was granted, and the petitioner brought the proceeding to this court by a writ of review.

(1) The contentions of the respondents are the same in this court as they were in the court below, and we shall notice them in the order in which they are stated in the motion. By the Code of Public Instruction it is provided (Laws 1909, p. 349) that any board of directors may at its discretion call a special meeting of the voters of the district to determine whether the district shall purchase any schoolhouse site or sites or additional grounds to an existing site, at all of which such meetings the "voting shall be by ballot, the ballots to be of white paper of uniform size and

quality." As we have elsewhere stated, the voting at the special meeting in which it was determined to purchase the school site in question here was not by ballot, but by standing vote, and it is this fact that is thought to render the preliminary proceedings void. There is here no contention that the election complained of did not express the popular will of the electors, and we hold it valid.

(4) Finally, it is urged that the use for which the land is sought to be taken is not a public use. It is contended that the land is sought rather as a playground for the pupils attending the school than for strictly school purposes. The testimony of the superintendent of the school from which we have hereinbefore cited undoubtedly lends color to this contention, but nevertheless we think the use for which the land is sought to be taken is a public use. The physical development of a child is as essential to his wellbeing as is his mental development, and physical development cannot be had without suitable places for recreation and exercise. To acquire such grounds is therefore within the province of the public schools.

The order of dismissal entered by the superior court is reversed, and the cause reinstated, with instruction to proceed with the hearing thereof in accordance with the statutes.

CHAPTER XXI

TEXTBOOKS AND SUPPLIES

FROM among the large amount which has been written on the question of textbooks we reproduce four editorial articles and all of the argument of the report of a recent legislative investigating committee. The first really sums up the whole question in a clear and forceful manner, stating as it does the problem of publication, supply, and adoption in almost all of its phases. The second and third deal particularly with the question of state publication, and the fourth with the tendency of many of our American states to enact foolish laws on the subject. The legislative report, which closes this chapter, deals chiefly with the question of the cost of textbooks.

I. THE CALIFORNIA TEXTBOOK SYSTEM

[An article printed as an editorial in the Sierra Educational News, the official organ of the California Teachers' Association, in the issues for October and November, 1911.]

At the last session of the Legislature, the Senate appointed a committee of five of its members to investigate the general question of textbooks for our elementary schools. This committee has made a promising beginning. Its recent hearings in San Francisco have fully sustained the charges made by the State Board of Control that for years there has been shameful mismanagement of the State Printing Office. It was shown that if a business-like administration of that office could be secured, the price of our textbooks would be materially reduced.

INTEREST IN THE TEXTBOOK INVESTIGATION

The investigation has attracted wide attention. The people of California are vitally interested in the question of textbooks,