well observed; for it concerneth the regimen and government of every man over himself, and not over others. And as in architecture the direction of framing the posts, beams, and other parts of building, is not the same with the manner of joining them and erecting the building; and in

for the opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the general consent even of the Epicures themselves, that virtue beareth a great part in felicity; and if so, certain it is, that virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations than in compassing desires. The sophist's opinion is much favoured by the assertion we last spake of, that good of advance-mechanicals, the direction how to frame an inment is greater than good of simple preservation; because every obtaining a desire hath a show of advancement, as motion, though in a circle, hath a show of progression.

But the second question, decided the true way, maketh the former superfluous. For can it be doubted, but that there are some who take more pleasure in enjoying pleasures than some other, and yet nevertheless are less troubled with the loss or leaving of them? so as this same, "Non uti ut non appetas, non appetere ut non metuas, sunt animi pusilli et diffidentis." And it seemeth to me, that most of the doctrines of the philosophers are more fearful and cautionary than the nature of things requireth. So have they increased the fear of death in offering to cure it: for when they would have a man's whole life to be but a discipline or preparation to die, they must needs make man think that it is a terrible enemy, against whom there is no end of preparing. Better saith the poet:

"Qui finem vitæ extremum inter munera ponat Naturæ."

So have they sought to make men's minds too uniform and harmonical, by not breaking them sufficiently to contrary motions: the reason whereof I suppose to be, because they themselves were men dedicated to a private, free, and unapplied course of life. For as we see, upon the lute or like instrument, a ground, though it be sweet and have show of many changes, yet breaketh not the hand to such strange and hard stops and passages, as a set song or voluntary; much after the same manner was the diversity between a philosophical and a civil life. And therefore men are to imitate the wisdom of jewellers; who, if there be a grain, or a cloud, or an ice which may be ground forth without taking too much of the stone, they help it; but if it should lessen and abate the stone too much, they will not meddle with it: so ought men so to procure serenity as they destroy not magnanimity.

strument or engine, is not the same with the manner of setting it on work and employing it, (and yet nevertheless in expressing of the one you incidently express the aptness towards the other;) so the doctrine of conjugation of men in society differeth from that of their conformity thereunto.

This part of duty is subdivided into two parts; the common duty of every man, as a man or member of a state; the other, the respective or special duty of every man, in his profession, vocation, and place. The first of these is extant and well laboured, as hath been said. The second likewise I may report rather dispersed than deficient; which manner of dispersed writing in this kind of argument I acknowledge to be best: for who can take upon him to write of the proper duty, virtue, challenge, and right of every several vocation, profession and place? For although sometimes a looker on may see more than a gamester, and there be a proverb more arrogant than sound, "That the vale best discovereth the hill;" yet there is small doubt but that men can write best, and most really and materially, in their own professions; and that the writing of speculative men of active matter, for the most part, doth seem to men of experience, as Phormio's argument of the wars seemed to Hannibal, to be but dreams and dotage. Only there is one vice which accompanieth them that write in their own professions, that they magnify them in excess. But generally it were to be wished, as that which would make learning indeed solid and fruitful, that active men would or could become writers.

In which kind I cannot but mention, "honoris causa," your majesty's excellent book touching the duty of a king: a work richly compounded of divinity, morality, and policy, with great aspersion of all other arts; and being, in mine opinion, one of the most sound and healthful writings that I have read; not distempered in the heat of invention, nor in the coolness of negliHaving, therefore, deduced the good of man gence; not sick of business, as those are who which is private and particular, as far as seemeth lose themselves in their order; nor of convulsions, fit; we will now return to that good of man which as those which cramp in matters impertinent; respecteth and beholdeth society, which we may not savouring of perfumes and paintings, as those term Duty; because the term of Duty is more do who seek to please the reader more than nature proper to a mind well framed and disposed to-beareth; and chiefly well disposed in the spirits wards others, as the term of virtue is applied to a thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt for acmind well formed and composed in itself: though neither can a man understand virtue without some relation to society, nor duty without an inward disposition. This part may seem at first to pertain to science civil and politic: but not if it be

tion; and far removed from that natural infirmity, whereunto I noted those that write in their own professions to be subject, which is, that they exalt it above measure: for your majesty hath truly described, not a king of Assyria or Persia in their

Unto this part, touching respective duty, doth also appertain the duties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant: so likewise the laws of friendship and gratitude, the civil bond of companies, colleges, and politic bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other proportionate duties; not as they are parts of government and society, but as to the framing of the mind of particular persons.

"Infelix, utcumque ferent ea fata minores."

extern glory, but a Moses or a David, pastors of | envy and sting, and the rest; that is, all forms their people. Neither can I ever leese out of my and natures of evil: for without this, virtue lieth remembrance, what I heard your majesty in the open and unfenced. Nay, an honest man can do same sacred spirit of government deliver in a no good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim great cause of judicature, which was, "That them, without the help of the knowledge of evil. kings ruled by their laws, as God did by the laws For men of corrupted minds presuppose that hoof nature; and ought as rarely to put in use their nesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, and supreme prerogative as God doth his power of believing of preachers, schoolmasters, and men's working miracles." And yet notwithstanding, in exterior language: so as, except you can make your book of a free monarchy, you do well give them perceive that you know the utmost reaches men to understand, that you know the plenitude of their own corrupt opinions, they despise all of the power and right of a king, as well as the morality; "Non recipit stultus verba prudentiæ, circle of his office and duty. Thus have I pre- nisi ea dexeris quæ versantur in corde ejus." sumed to allege this excellent writing of your majesty, as a prime or eminent example of tractates concerning special and respective duties: wherein I should have said as much, if it had been written a thousand years since: neither am I moved with certain courtly decencies, which esteem it flattery to praise in presence: no, it is flattery to praise in absence; that is, when either the virtue is absent, or the occasion is absent; and so the praise is not natural, but forced, either The knowledge concerning good respecting soin truth or in time. But let Cicero be read in his ciety doth handle it also, not simply alone, but oration pro Marcello, which is nothing but an ex- comparatively; whereunto belongeth the weighcellent table of Cæsar's virtue, and made to his ing of duties between person and person, case face; besides the example of many other excel- and case, particular and public: as we see in the lent persons, wiser a great deal than such ob-proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own servers; and we will never doubt, upon a full sons, which was so much extolled; yet what was occasion, to give just praises to present or absent. said? But to return: there belongeth further to the handling of this part, touching the duties of professions and vocations, a relative or opposite, touching the frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of every profession, which hath been likewise handled: but how? rather in a satire and cynically, than seriously and wisely: for men have rather sought by wit to deride and traduce much of that which is good in professions, than with judgment to discover and sever that which is corrupt. For, as Solomon saith, he that cometh to seek after knowledge with a mind to scorn and censure, shall be sure to find matter for his humour, but no matter for his instruction: "Quærenti derisori scientiam ipsa se abscondit; sed studioso fit obviam." But the managing of this argument with integrity and truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be planted. For, as the fable goeth of the basilisk, that if he see you first, you die for it; but if you see him first, he dieth: so is it with deceits and evil arts; which, if they be first espied, they leese their life; but if they prevent, they endanger. So that we are much beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought to do. For it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the serpent; his baseness and going upon his belly, his volubility and lubricity, his

So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides. Again, we see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose opinions they meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made their associates, and cast forth the question touching the killing of a tyrant being an usurper, they were divided in opinion; some holding that servitude was the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was better than a civil war: and a number of the like cases there are of comparative duty; amongst which that of all others is the most frequent, where the question is of a great deal of good to ensue of a small injustice, which Jason of Thessalia determined against the truth: Aliqua sunt injuste facienda, ut multa juste fieri possint." But the reply is good, "Auctorem præsentis justitiæ habes, sponsorem futuræ non habes." Men must pursue things which are just in present, and leave the future to the divine Providence. So then we pass on from this general part touching the exemplar and description of good.

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Now therefore that we have spoken of this fruit of life, it remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto; without which part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair image, or statua, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without life or motion: whereunto Aristotle him self subscribeth in these words: "Necesse est scilicet de virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ex quibus gignatur. Inutile enim fere fuerit virtutem qui

"Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo;"

and so likewise,

"Vincenda est omnis natura ferendo."

dem nosse, acquirendæ autem ejus modos et vias | In these things, therefore, it is left unto us to proignorare: non enim de virtute tantum, qua specie ceed by application. sit, quærendum est, sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat; utrumque enim volumus, et rem ipsam nosse, et ejus compotes fieri; hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomo-But when that we speak of suffering, we do not do." In such full words and with such iteration speak of a dull and neglected suffering, but of a doth he inculcate this part. So saith Cicero in wise and industrious suffering, which draweth great commendation of Cato the Second, that he and contriveth use and advantage out of that which had applied himself to philosophy, "non ita dis- seemeth adverse and contrary; which is that proputandi causâ, sed ita vivendi." And although perly which we call accommodating or applying. the neglect of our times, wherein few men do hold Now the wisdom of application resteth principally any consultations touching the reformation of in the exact and distinct knowledge of the precetheir life, (as Seneca excellently saith,) "De par-dent state or disposition, unto which we do apply: tibus vitæ quisque deliberat, de summâ nemo,' ," for we cannot fit a garment, except we first take may make this part seem superfluous; yet I must measure of the body. conclude with that aphorism of Hippocrates, "Qui So then the first article of this knowledge is, gravi morbo correpti dolores non sentiunt, iis mens to set down sound and true distributions and deægrotat;" they need medicine, not only to assauge scriptions of the several characters and tempers of the disease, but to awake the sense. And if it be men's natures and dispositions; especially having said, that the cure of men's minds belongeth to regard to those differences which are most radical, sacred divinity, it is most true: but yet moral in being the fountains and causes of the rest, or philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise most frequent in concurrence or commixture; servant and humble handmaid. For as the psalm wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in saith, that the eyes of the handmaid look per-passage, the better to describe the mediocrities of petually towards the mistress, and yet no doubt virtues, that can satisfy this intention. For if it many things are left to the discretion of the hand-deserve to be considered, "That there are minds maid, to discern of the mistress's will; so ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself, within due limits, many sound and profitable directions.

This part therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry: the rather, because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and action is often conversant; and such wherein the common talk of men, (which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass,) is wiser than their books. It is reasonable therefore that we propound it in the more particularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may acquit ourselves for reporting it deficient, which seemeth almost incredible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves that have written. We will therefore enumerate some heads or points thereof, that it may appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant.

First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical, we ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not; for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of application only. The husbandman cannot command, neither the nature of the earth, nor the seasons of the weather; no more can the physician the constitution of the patient, nor the variety of the accidents; so in the culture and cure of the mind of man, two things are without our command; points of nature, and points of fortune: for to the basis of the one, and the condition of the other our work is limited and tied. |

which are proportioned to great matters, and others to small," (which Aristotle handleth, or ought to have handled, by the name of magnanimity ;) doth it not deserve as well to be considered, "That there are minds proportioned to intend many matters, and others to few ?" So that some can divide themselves; others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in few things at once: and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as well as pusillanimity. And again, "That some minds are proportioned to that which may be despatched at once, or within a short return of time; others to that which begins a far off and is to be won with length of pursuit ;"

"Jam tum tenditque fovetque." So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is commonly also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further deserved it to be considered by Aristotle; "that there is a disposition in conversation, (supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or concern a man's self,) to soothe and please; and a disposition contrary to contradict and cross:" and deserveth it not much better to be considered, "that there is a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but in matter of more serious nature, (and supposing it still in things merely indifferent,) to take pleasure in the good of another; and a disposition contrariwise, to take distaste at the good of another? which is that properly which we call good-nature or ill-nature, benignity or malignity and therefore I cannot sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge, touching the several characters of natures and dispositions, should be omitted both in morality

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knowledge of the diversity of complexions and constitutions doth to the physician; except we mean to follow the indiscretion of empirics, which minister the same medicines to all patients. touching the affections; for as in medicining of Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry the body, it is in order first to know the divers complexions and constitutions; secondly, the diseases; and lastly, the cures: so in medicining of the mind, after knowledge of the divers char

and policy; considering it is of so great ministry grounds and moulds doth to agriculture, and the and suppeditation to them both. A man shall find in the traditions of astrology some pretty and apt divisions of men's natures, according to the predominances of the planets; lovers of quiet, lovers of action, lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers of arts, lovers of change, and so forth. A man shall find in the wisest sort of these relations which the Italians make touching conclaves, the natures of the several cardinals handsomely and livelily painted forth: a man shall meet with, in every day's con-acters of men's natures, it followeth, in order, to ference, the denominations of sensitive, dry, formal, real, humorous, certain,huomo di prima impressione, huomo di ultima impressione," and the like: and yet nevertheless this kind of observations wandereth in words, but is not fixed in inquiry. For the distinctions are found, many of them, but we conclude no precepts upon them: wherein our fault is the greater: because both history, poesy, and daily experience are as goodly fields where these observations grow; whereof we make a few posies to hold in our hands, but no man bringeth them to the confectionary, that receipts might be made of them for the use of life.

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know the diseases and infirmities of the mind, which are no other than the perturbations and distempers of the affections. For as the ancient politicians in popular states were wont to compare the people to the sea, and the orators to the winds; because as the sea would of itself be calm and quiet, if the winds did not move and trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and tractable, if the seditious orators did not set them in working and agitation: so it may be fitly said, that the mind in the nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again I Of much like kind are those impressions of written divers volumes of Ethics, and never find strange, as before, that Aristotle should have nature, which are imposed upon the mind by the handled the affections, which is the principal sex, by the age, by the region, by health and subject thereof; and yet, in his Rhetorics, where sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, they are considered but collaterally, and in a sewhich are inherent and not external; and again, cond degree, as they may be moved by speech, those which are caused by external fortune; as he findeth place for them, and handleth them sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, well for the quantity; but where their true place magistracy, privateness, prosperity, adversity, is, he pretermitteth them. For it is not his disconstant fortune, variable fortune, rising "per putations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy saltum," per gradus," and the like. And there- this inquiry, no more than he that should genefore we see that Plautus maketh it a wonder to rally handle the nature of light, can be said to see an old man beneficent, "benignitas hujus ut handle the nature of colours; for pleasure and adolescentuli est." St. Paul concludeth, that pain are to the particular affections as light is to severity of discipline was to be used to the Cre-particular colours. Better travails, I suppose, tans, "Increpa eos durè," upon the disposition had the Stoics taken in this argument, as far as I of their country, "Cretenses semper mendaces, malæ bestiæ, ventres pigri." Sallust noteth, that it is usual with kings to desire contradictories: "Sed plerumque regiæ voluntates, ut vehementes sunt, sic mobiles, sæpeque ipsæ sibi adversæ." Tacitus observeth how rarely raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition: "Solus Vespasianus mutatus in melius." Pindarus maketh an observation, that great and sudden fortune for the most part defeateth men, “Qui magnam felicitatem concoquere non possunt." So the Psalm showeth it is more easy to keep a measure in the enjoying of fortune, than in the increase of fortune: "Divitiæ si affluant, nolite cor apponere." observations, and the like, I deny not but are These touched a little by Aristotle, as in passage, in his Rhetorics, and are handled in some scattered discourses: but they were never incorporated into moral philosophy, to which they do essentially appertain; as the knowledge of the diversity of VOL. I.-29

can gather by that which we have at second hand. But yet, it is like, it was after their manner rather in subtilty of definitions. (which in a subject of this nature are but curiosities,) than in active and ample descriptions and observations. So likewise I find some particular writings of an elegant nature, touching some of the affections; as of anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of tenderness of countenance, and other.

best doctors of this knowledge: where we may But the poets and writers of histories are the find painted forth with great life, how affections are kindled and incited; and how pacified and further degree; how they disclose themselves; refrained; and how again contained from act and how they work; how they vary; how they gather and fortify; how they are inwrapped one within another; and how they do fight and encounter one with another; and other the like particularities: amongst the which this last is of special use in

moral and civil matters; how, I say, to set affection against affection, and to master one by another; even as we use to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird, which otherwise perhaps we could not so easily recover: upon which foundation is erected that excellent use of "præmium" and "pœna," whereby civil states consist; employing the predominant affections of fear and hope, for the suppressing and bridling the rest. For as in the government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so it is in the government within.

so an insatisfaction on the end: if too weak, of the other side, you may not look to perform and overcome any great task.

Another precept is, to practise all things chiefly at two several times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other when it is worst disposed; that by the one you may gain a great step, by the other you may work out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make the middle times the more easy and pleasant.

Another precept is that which Aristotle mentioneth by the way, which is, to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by

stream, or making a wand straight by bending him contrary to his natural crookedness.

Now come we to those points which are within our own command, and have force and operation | nature inclined: like unto the rowing against the upon the mind, to affect the will and appetite, and to alter manners: wherein they ought to have handled custom, exercise, habit, education, exam- Another precept is, that the mind is brought to ple, imitation, emulation, company, friends, praise, any thing better, and with more sweetness and reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies: happiness, if that whereunto you pretend be not these as they have determinate use in moralities, first in the intention, but "tanquam aliud agendo," from these the mind suffereth; and of these are because of the natural hatred of the mind against such receipts and regimens compounded and de- necessity and constraint. Many other axioms scribed, as may seem to recover or preserve the there are touching the managing of exercise and health and good estate of the mind, as far as per-custom; which, being so conducted, doth prove intaineth to human medicine: of which number we deed another nature; but being governed by change, will insist upon some one or two, as an example doth commonly prove but an ape of nature, and of the rest, because it were too long to prosecute bringeth forth that which is lame and counterfeit. all; and therefore we do resume custom and ha- So if we should handle books and studies, and bit to speak of. what influence and operation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts of great caution and direction appertaining thereunto? Did not one of the fathers in great indignation call poesy vinum dæmonum," because it increaseth temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions? Is not the opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith, "That young men

The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent opinion, that of those things which consist by nature, nothing can be changed by custom; using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up, it will not learn to ascend; and that by often seeing or hearing, we do not learn to see or hear the better. For though this principle be true in things wherein nature is pe-are no fit auditors of moral philosophy, because remptory, (the reason whereof we cannot now stand to discuss,) yet it is otherwise in things wherein nature admitteth a latitude. For he might see that a strait glove will come more easily on with use; and that a wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew; and that by use of the voice we speak louder and stronger; and that by use of enduring heat and cold, we endure it the better, and the like: which latter sort have a nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he handleth, than those instances which he allegeth. But allowing his conclusion, that virtues and vices consist in habit, he ought so much the more to have taught the manner of superinducing that habit: for there be many precepts of the wise or dering the exercises of the mind, as there is of ordering the exercises of the body; whereof we will recite a few.

The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first either too high a strain, or too weak: for if too high, in a diffident nature you discourage; in a confident nature you breed an opinion of facility, and so a sloth; and in all natures you breed a further expectation than can hold out, and

they are not settled from the boiling heat of their affections, nor attempered with time and experience?" And doth it not thereof come, that those excellent books and discourses of the ancient writers, (whereby they have persuaded unto virtue most effectually, by representing her in state and majesty, and popular opinions against virtue in their parasites' coats, fit to be scorned and derided,) are of so little effect towards honesty of life, because they are not read and revolved by men in their mature and settled years, but confined almost to boys and beginners? But is it not true also, that much less young men are fit auditors of matters of policy, till they have been throroughly seasoned in religion and morality; lest their judgments be corrupted, and made apt to think that there are no true differences of things, but according to utility and fortune, as the verse describes it,

"Prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur:

and again,

"Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit, hic diadema:" which the poets do speak satirically, and in indignation on virtue's behalf; but books of policy