which is meant of a general outward behaviour, and not of the private and subtile motions and labours of the countenance and gesture; which as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is "animi janua." None more close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of Gallus, "Etenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat." So again noting the differing cha well of the hawk, that can soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the prey: in substance, because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth, that nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise in the globe of crystal, or form;" that is, that there be not any thing in being and action, which should not be drawn and collected into contemplation and doc-racter and manner of his commending Germanicus trine. Neither doth learning admire or esteem of this architecture of fortune, otherwise than as of an inferior work: for no man's fortune can be an end worthy of his being; and many times the worthiest men do abandon their fortune willingly for better respects: but nevertheless fortune, as an organ of virtue and merit, deserveth the consideration. First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most summary towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that window which Momus did require who seeing in the frame of men's heart such angles and recesses, found fault that there was not a window to look into them; that is, to procure good informations of particulars touching persons, their natures, their desires and ends, their customs and fashions, their helps and advantages, and whereby they chiefly stand: so again their weakness and disadvantages, and where they lie most open and obnoxious; their friends, factions, and dependencies; and again their opposites, enviers, competitors, their moods and times, "Sola viri molles aditus et tempora noras;" their principles, rules, and observations, and the like: and this not only of persons, but of actions; what are on foot from time to time, and how they are conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they import, and the like. For the knowledge of present actions is not only material in itself, but without it also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous; for men change with the actions; and whilst they are in pursuit they are one, and when they return to their nature they are another. These informations of particulars, touching persons and actions, are as the minor propositions in every active syllogism: for no excellency of observations, which are as the major propositions, can suffice to ground a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors. That this knowledge is possible, Solomon is our surety; who saith, "Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda; sed vir prudens exhauriet illud." And although the knowledge itself falleth not under precept, because it is of individuals, yet the instructions for the obtaining of it may. We will begin therefore with this precept, according to the ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief and distrust; that more trust be given to countenances and deeds than to words; and in words, rather to sudden passages and surprised words. Neither let that be feared which is said, "Fronti, nulla fides:" and Drusus in the senate, he saith, touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech of Germanicus, thus; "Magis in speciem adornatis verbis, quam ut penitus sentire videretur:" but of Drusus thus; "Paucioribus, sed intentior, et fida oratione:" and in another place, speaking of his character of speech, when he did any thing that was gracious and popular, he saith, that in other things he was "velut eluctantium verborum;" but then again, "solutius vero loquebatur quando subveniret." So that there is no such artificer of dissimulation, nor no such commanded countenance, “vultus jussus," that can sever from a feigned tale some of these fashions, either a more slight and careless fashion, or more set and formal, or more tedious and wandering, or coming from a man more drily and hardly. Neither are deeds such assured pledges, as that they may be trusted without a judicious consideration of their magnitude and nature: "Fraus sibi in parvis fidem præstruit, ut majore emolumento fallat:" and the Italian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and sold, when he is better used than he was wont to be, without manifest cause. For small favours, they do but lull men asleep, both as to caution and as to industry; and are, as Demosthenes calleth them, "Alimenta socordiæ." So again we see how false the nature of some deeds are, in that particular which Mutianus practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and unfaithful reconcilement which was made between them; whereupon Mutianus advanced many of the friends of Antonius: "simul amicis ejus præfecturas et tribunatus largitur." wherein, under pretence to strengthen him, he did desolate him, and won from him his dependences. As for words, though they be like waters to physicians, full of flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised, especially with the advantage of passion and affection. For so we see Tiberius, upon a stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a step forth of his dissimulation, when he said, "You are hurt, because you do not reign;" of which Tacitus saith, "Audita hæc raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuere; correptamque Græco versu admonuit, ideo lædi, quia non regnaret." And therefore the poet doth elegantly call passions, tortures, that urge men to confess their secrets: "Vino tortas et ira.' And experience showeth, there are few men so true to themselves and so settled, but that sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery, some times upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of telligenced in every several kind. The second mind and weakness, they open themselves; especially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation, according to the proverb of Spain, "Di mentira, y sacaras verdad." (Tell a lie and find the truth.) is, to keep a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and secrecy; in most things liberty: secrecy where it importeth; for liberty of speech inviteth and provoketh liberty to be used again, and so bringeth much to a man's knowledge; and secrecy, on the other side, induceth trust and inwardness. The last is, the reducing of a man's self to this watchful and serene habit, as to make account and purpose, in every conference and action, as well to observe as to act. For as Epictetus would have a philosopher in every particular action to say to himself, "Et hoc volo, et etiam As for the knowing of men, which is at second hand from reports; men's weaknesses and faults are best known from their enemies, their virtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and times from their servants, their conceits and opinions from their familiar friends, with whom they discourse most. General fame is light, and the opinions conceived by superiors or equals are de-institutum servare;" so a politic man in every ceitful: for to such, men are more masked: "Verior fama e domesticis emanat." thing should say to himself, "Et hoc volo, ac etiam aliquid addiscere." I have stayed the longer upon this precept of obtaining good information, because it is a main part by itself, which answereth to all the rest. But, above all things, caution must be taken that men have a good stay and hold of themselves, and that this much knowledge do not draw on much meddling: for nothing is more unfortunate than light and rash intermed But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is by their natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best interpreted by their natures, and the wisest by their ends. For it was both pleasantly and wisely said, though I think very untruly, by a nuncio of the pope, returning from a certain nation where he served as lieger; whose opinion being asked touching the appoint-dling in many matters. So that this variety of ment of one to go in his place, he wished that in any case they did not send one that was too wise; because no very wise man would ever imagine what they in that country were like to do. And certainly it is an error frequent for men to shoot over, and to suppose deeper ends, and more compass-reaches than are: the Italian proverb being elegant, and for the most part true : "Di danari, di senno, e di fede, C'e ne manco che non credi." (There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less good faith than men do account upon.) But princes, upon a far other reason, are best interpreted by their natures, and private persons by their ends; for princes being at the top of human desires, they have for the most part no particular ends whereto they aspire, by distance from which a man might take measure and scale of the rest of their actions and desires; which is one of the causes that maketh their hearts more inscrutable. Neither is it sufficient to inform ourselves in men's ends and natures, of the variety of them only, but also of the predominancy, what humour reigneth most, and what end is principally sought. For so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself outstripped by Petronius Turpilianus in Nero's humours of pleasures, "metus cjus rimatur" (he wrought upon Nero's fears,) whereby he broke the other's neck. knowledge tendeth in conclusion but only to this, to make a better and freer choice of those actions which may concern us, and to conduct them with the less error and the more dexterity. The second precept concerning this knowledge is, for men to take good information touching their own person, and well to understand themselves: knowing that, as St. James saith, though men look oft in a glass, yet they do suddenly forget themselves; wherein as the divine glass is the word of God, so the politic glass is the state of the world, or times wherein we live, in the which we are to behold ourselves. For men ought to take an impartial view of their own abilities and virtues; and again of their wants and impediments; accounting these with the most, and those other with the least; and from this view and examination to frame the considerations following. First, to consider how the constitution of their nature sorteth with the general state of the times; which if they find agreeable and fit, then in all things to give themselves more scope and liberty; but if differing and dissonant, then in the whole course of their life to be more close, retired, and reserved: as we see in Tiberius, who was never seen at a play, and came not into the senate in twelve of his last years; whereas Augustus Cæsar lived ever in men's eyes, which Tacitus ob But to all this part of inquiry the most compen-serveth, "Alia Tiberio morum via." dious way resteth in three things: the first, to Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth have general acquaintance and inwardness with with professions and courses of life, and accordthose which have general acquaintance and look ingly to make election, if they be free; and, if most into the world; and especially according to engaged, to make the departure at the first opporthe diversity of business, and the diversity of per-tunity: as we see was done by Duke Valentine, sons to have privacy and conversation with some that was designed by his father to a sacerdotal one friend, at least, which is perfect and well in-profession, but quitted it soon after in regard of VOL. I.-30 U 2 his parts and inclination; being such, neverthe-of a few. But if it be carried with decency and less, as a man cannot tell well whether they were government, as with a natural, pleasant, and inworse for a prince or for a priest. Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom they are like to have competitors and concurrents; and to take that course wherein there is most solitude, and themselves like to be most eminent: as Julius Cæsar did, who at first was an orator or pleader; but when he saw the excellency of Cicero, Hortensius, Catulus, and others, for eloquence, and saw there was no man of reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon whom the state was forced to rely, he forsook his course begun toward a civil and popular greatness, and transferred his designs to a martial greatness. Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and dependences, to proceed according to the composition of their own nature: as we may see in Casar; all whose friends and followers were men active and effectual, but not solemn, or of reputation. genious fashion; or at times when it is mixed But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue, as they are not perchance unnecessary, so it is at least necessary that virtue be not disvalned and embased under the just price; which is done in three manners: by offering and obtruding a man's self; wherein men think he is rewarded, when he is accepted; by doing too much, which will not give that which is well done leave to settle, and in the end induceth satiety; and by finding too soon the fruit of a man's virtue, in commendation, applause, honour, favour; wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let him hear what is truly said; "Cave ne insuetus rebus majoribus videaris, si hæc te res parva sicuti magna delectat." Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide themselves by examples, in thinking they can do as they see others do; whereas perhaps their natures and carriages are far differing. In which error it seemeth Pompey was, of whom Cicero saith, that he was wont often to say, "Sylla potuit, ego non potero?" Wherein he was much abused, the natures and proceedings of himself and his example being the unlikest in the world; the one being fierce, violent, and pressing the fact; the other solemn, and full of majesty and circum-portance than the valuing of good parts; which stance, and therefore the less effectual. But this precept touching the politic knowledge of ourselves, hath many other branches, whereupon we cannot insist. But the covering of defects is of no less im may be done likewise in three manners, by caution, by colour, and by confidence. Caution is when men do ingeniously and discreetly avoid to be put into those things for which they are not Next to the well understanding and discerning proper: whereas, contrariwise, bold and unquiet of a man's self, there followeth the well opening spirits will thrust themselves into matters without and revealing a man's self; wherein we see no-difference, and so publish and proclaim all their thing more usual than for the more able men to wants. Colour is, when men make a way for make the less show. For there is a great advan-themselves, to have a construction made of their tage in the well setting forth of a man's virtues, faults and wants, as proceeding from a better fortunes, merits; and again, in the artificial cover-cause, or intended for some other purpose: for of ing of a man's weaknesses, defects, disgraces; the one it is well said, "Sæpe latet vitium proxistaying upon the one, sliding from the other; mitate boni," and therefore whatsoever want a cherishing the one by circumstances, gracing the man hath, he must see that he pretend the virtue other by exposition, and the like: wherein we see that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he must afwhat Tacitus saith of Mutianus, who was the fect gravity; if a coward, mildness; and so the greatest politician of his time, "Omnium quæ rest: for the second, a man must frame some prodixerat feceratque arte quâdam ostentator:" which bable cause why he should not do his best, and requireth indeed some art, lest it turn tedious and why he should dissemble his abilities; and for arrogant; but yet so as ostentation, though it be that purpose must use to dissemble those abilities to the first degree of vanity, seemeth to me rather which are notorious in him, to give colour that his a vice in manners than in policy: for as it is said, true wants are but industries and dissimulations. “Audacter, calumniare, semper aliquid hæret:" For confidence, it is the last but surest remedy: so, except it be in a ridiculous degree of deform-namely, to depress and seem to despise whatsoity, "Audacter te vendita, semper aliquid hæret." ever a man cannot attain; observing the good For it will stick with the more ignorant and inferior sort of men, though men of wisdom and rank do smile at it, and despise it; and yet the authority won with many doth countervail the disdain principle of the merchants, who endeavour to raise the price of their own commodities, and to beat down the price of others. But there is a confidence that passeth this other; which is, to face out a man's own defects, in seeming to con- | ceive that he is best in those things wherein he is failing; and, to help that again, to seem on the other side that he hath least opinion of himself in those things wherein he is best: like as we shall see it commonly in poets, that if they show their verses, and you except to any, they will say, that that line cost them more labour than any of the rest; and presently will seem to disable and suspect rather some other line, which they know well enough to be the best in the number. But above all, in this righting and helping of a man's self in his own carriage, he must take heed he show not himself dismantled, and exposed to scorn and injury, by too much dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature; but show some sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge: which kind of fortified carriage, with a ready rescuing of a man's self from scorns, is sometimes of necessity imposed upon men by somewhat in their person or fortune; but it ever succeedeth with good felicity. Another precept of this knowledge is, by all ́possible endeavour to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion; for nothing hindereth men's fortunes so much as this; "Idem manebat, neque idem decebat," men are where they were, when occasions turn: and therefore to Cato, whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, he addeth, that he had "versatile ingenium." And thereof it cometh that these grave solemn wits, which must be like themselves, and cannot make departures, have more dignity than felicity. But in some it is nature to be somewhat viscous and inwrapped, and not easy to turn; in some it is a conceit, that is almost a nature, which is, that men can hardly make themselves believe that they ought to change their course, when they have found good by it in former experience. For Machiavel noted wisely, how Fabius Maximus would have been temporizing still, according to his old bias, when the nature of the war was altered and required hot pursuit. In some other it is want of point and penetration in their judgment, that they do not discern when things have a period, but come in too late after the occasion; as Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country fellows, when they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow, then they remove their weapon to that ward, and not before. In some other it is a loathness to leese labours passed, and a conceit that they can bring about occasions to their ply; and yet in the end, when they see no other remedy, then they come to it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave for the third part of Sibylla's books the treble price, when he might at first have had all three for the simple. But from whatsoever root or cause this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most prejudicial; and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune. Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with that we last spake of, but with difference, is that which is well expressed, “Fatis accede Deisque," that men do not only turn with the occasions, but also run with the occasions, and not strain their credit or strength to over hard or extreme points; but choose in their actions that which is most passable: for this will preserve men from foil, not occupy them too much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please the most, and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they undertake; which cannot but mightily increase reputation. Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy with the former two, but not as I understand it; and it is that which Demosthenes uttereth in high terms; "Et quemadmodum receptum est, ut exercitum ducat imperator, sic et a cordatis viris res ipsæ ducendæ; ut quæ ipsis videntur, ea gerantur, et non ipsi eventus tantum persequi cogantur." For, if we observe, we shall find two different kinds of sufficiency in managing of business: some can make use of occasions aptly and dexterously, but plot little; some can urge and pursue their own plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take in; either of which is very imperfect without the other. Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity in the declaring, or not declaring a man's self: for although depth of secrecy, and making way, "qualis est via navis in mari," (which the French call sourdes menées, when men set things in work without opening themselves at all,) be sometimes both prosperous and admirable; yet many times "Dissimulatio errores parit, qui dissimulatorem ipsum illaqueant;" and therefore, we see the greatest politicians have in a natural and free manner professed their desires, rather than been reserved and disguised in them; for so we see that Lucius Sylla made a kind of profession, "that he wished all men happy or unhappy, as they stood his friends or enemies." So Cæsar, when he went first into Gaul, made no scruples to profess," that he had rather be first in a village than second at Rome." So again, as soon as he had begun the war we see what Cicero saith of him, "Alter (meaning of Cæsar) non recusat, sed quodammodo postulat, ut, ut est, sic appelletur tyrannus." So we may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Cæsar in his very entrance into affairs, when he was a darling of the senate, yet in his harangues to the people would swear, "Ita parentis honores consequi liceat," which was no less than the tyranny; save that, to help it, he would stretch forth his hand towards a statue of Caesar's that was erected in the place: whereat many men laughed, and wondered, and said, Is it possible? or, Did you ever hear the like to this? and yet thought he meant no hurt; he did it so handsomely and ingenuously. And all these were prosperous: whereas Pompey, who tended to the same end, but in a more dark | I may condemn with like reason as Machiavel and dissembling manner, as Tacitus saith of him, doth that other, that moneys were the sinews of "Occultior, non melior," wherein Sallust concur- the wars; whereas, saith he, the true sinews of reth, "ore probo, animo inverecundo," made it his the wars are the sinews of men's arms, that is, a design, by infinite secret engines to cast the state valiant, populous, and military nation: and he into an absolute anarchy and confusion, that the voucheth aptly the authority of Solon, who, when state might cast itself into his arms for necessity | Crœsus showed him his treasury of gold, said to and protection, and so the sovereign power be put him, that if another came that had better iron, he upon him, and he never seen in it: and when he had would be master of his gold. In like manner it brought it, as he thought, to that point, when he was may be truly affirmed, that it is not moneys that chosen consul alone, as never any was, yet he could are the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and make no great matter of it, because men understood steel of men's minds, wit, courage, audacity, rehim not; but was fain, in the end, to go the beaten solution, temper, industry, and the like. In the track of getting arms into his hands, by colour of third place I set down reputation, because of the the doubt of Cæsar's designs: so tedious, casual, peremptory tides and currents it hath; which, if and unfortunate are these deep dissimulations: they be not taken in their due time, are seldom whereof, it seemeth, Tacitus made his judgment, recovered, it being extreme hard to play an afterthat they were a cunning of an inferior form in re-game of reputation. And lastly, I place honour, gard of true policy; attributing the one to Augus- which is more easily won by any of the other tus, the other to Tiberius; where, speaking of three, much more by all, than any of them can be Livia, he saith, “ Et cum artibus mariti simula- purchased by honour. To conclude this precept, tione filii bene composita:" for surely the con- as there is order and priority in matter, so is there tinual habit of dissimulation is but a weak and in time, the preposterous placing whereof is one sluggish cunning, and not greatly politic. of the commonest errors; while men fly to their ends when they should intend their beginnings, and do not take things in order of time as they come on, but marshal them according to greatness, and not according to instance; not observing the good precept, "Quod nune instat agamus." Another precept of this architecture of fortune is, to accustom our minds to judge of the proportion or value of things, as they conduce and are material to our particular ends; and that to do substantially, and not superficially. For we shall find the logical part, as I may term it, of some men's minds good, but the mathematical part erroneous; that is, they can well judge of consequences, but not of proportions and comparasons, preferring things of show and sense before things of substance and effect. So some fall in love with access to princes, others with popular fame and applause, supposing they are things of great purchase: when in many cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and impediment. Another precept of this knowledge is, not to embrace any matters which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but to have that sounding in a man's ears, "Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus:" and that is the cause why those which take their course of rising by professions of burden, as lawyers, orators, painful divines, and the like, are not commonly so politic for their own fortunes, otherwise than in their ordinary way, because they want time to learn particulars, to wait occasions, and to devise plots. Another precept of this knowledge is, to imi So some measure things according to the labour and difficulty, or assiduity, which are spent about them; and think, if they be ever moving, that|tate_nature, which doth nothing in vain; which they must needs advance and proceed: as Cæsar saith in a despising manner of Cato the Second, when he describeth how laborious and indefatigable he was to no great purpose; "Hæc omnia magno studio agebat." So in most things men are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest means to be best, when it should be the fittest. As for the true marshalling of men's pursuits towards their fortune, as they are more or less material, I hold them to stand thus: first the amendment of their own minds; for the remove of the impediments of the mind will sooner clear the passages of fortune than the obtaining fortune will remove the impediments of the mind. In the second place I set down wealth and means, which I know most men would have placed first; because of the general use which it beareth to wards all variety of occasions: but that opinion, surely a man may do if he do well interlace his business, and bend not his mind too much upon that which he principally intendeth. For a man ought in every particular action so to carry the motions of his mind, and so to have one thing under another, as if he cannot have that he seeketh in the best degree, yet to have it in a second, or so in a third; and if he can have no part of that which he purposed, yet to turn the use of it t> somewhat else; and if he cannot make any thing of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of somewhat in time to come; and if he can contrive no effect or substance from it, yet to win some good opinion by it, or the like. So that he should exact account of himself of every action, to reap somewhat, and not to stand amazed and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is more impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one; for he that doth so leeseth infinite occa |