Изображения страниц
PDF
EPUB

BRITISH RULE IN INDIA, DISRAELI'S IMPERIAL POLICY.

265

experience in India had tended to demoralize | gagement not to tamper with their religion."

It is not difficult to see that these remarks were levelled against the policy of Lord Dalhousie, and they were made also to tell against that of Lord Canning. The forcible destruction of native authority in India, the disturbance of the settlement of property, and the tampering with the religion of the people, were, said he, the causes to which directly, or indirectly, all our difficulties were to be traced.

the nation, because of the feelings of fury and revenge which accompanied and succeeded the dreadful conflict. Numbers of people not only would have excused cruelty, but seriously spoke of torturing the wretches who were caught red-handed in the mutiny. Happily there were those who saw with deep distress that the encouragement of such language and the perpetuation of a craving for vindictive punishment would assimilate the people in But his opponents might have answered, the England to the Sepoys against whom they suppression of those robber chiefs who, by were demanding vengeance. Mr. Disraeli, their tyrannical exactions, kept the population who held very pronounced opinions against of the country in a state of misery, and prethe policy of Lord Canning, was among those vented any regular form of government, the who protested against the wild cry for torture introduction of a system of land laws, and of and revenge, the raising on our altars the succession designed to put an end to the constatue of Moloch instead of the image of dition of slavery in which the wretched ryots Christ. He reminded his hearers that the and the agricultural labourers among the counsels of cruelty would make Nana Sahib | Hindoos had been reduced,-and the abolition himself the model of a British officer. of the suttee, of dacoitry, and of the barbarous inflictions of a debasing superstition which had become indistinguishable from public crimes,-were the cause of the difficulties of a government which could not have continued to exist unless these things had been firmly and emphatically dealt with. The truth seems to have been that, as Disraeli afterwards indicated, there was not a sufficient impression of imperial good faith among the Hindoos. There was enough of high-handed interference: too much of a half-missionary and half-military method of converting the natives; and by no means enough regard to implied contracts with the dethroned princes, and with those who could prove, even without undue recourse to the Hindoo law of inheritance of landed property, that they were entitled to considerable indemnities or to large pensions which had either been withheld, reduced, or converted into small annuities. It would perhaps have been exceedingly difficult for Disraeli to point out how the government of India could have been upheld had the policy of non-intervention and of entire unintrusion been adopted, but he had a course to recommend. It was this: "You ought at once, whether you receive news of success or of defeat, to tell the people of India that the relations between them and their real ruler

Mr. Disraeli, in the debate on the mutiny on the 27th of July, first intimated a policy which may be said to have foreshadowed the "imperial" line of procedure of which he afterwards made so prominent a feature in relation to our government in India. He had urgently demanded further information on Indian affairs, and had denounced the policy which had been pursued. Our empire in India was, he said, founded on the principle of Divide et impera; but that principle was put into operation by no machiavellian devices, but by availing ourselves of the natural circumstances of the country. There were in India so many independent states, so many princes of different races, so many religions, and even so many languages, that if you honestly performed your engagements, it was totally impossible for a fatal combination to be formed against you. "Why did the Mohammedans and Mahrattas fail in India? The two principal causes of the downfall of those dynasties were: first, that they persecuted the people whom they had conquered on account of their religion; and secondly, that when their treasuries became empty they confiscated the land of the chief proprietors. England, on the contrary, always came in with a guarantee of their lands, and a solemn en

and sovereign Queen Victoria shall be drawn nearer. You must act on the opinion of India on that subject immediately, and you can only act upon the opinions of Eastern natives through their imaginations. You ought to have a royal commission sent by the queen from this country to India immediately to inquire into the grievances of the various classes of that population. You ought to issue a royal proclamation to the people of India declaring that the Queen of England is not a sovereign who will countenance the violation of treaties-that the Queen of England is not a sovereign who will disturb the settlement of property-that the Queen of England is a sovereign who will respect their laws, their usages, their customs, and above all their religion. Do this, and do it not in a corner, but in a mode and manner which will attract universal attention and excite the general hope of Hindostan, and you will do as much as all your fleets and armies can achieve."

Disraeli had some notion,-which he afterwards developed into the proposition that England's empire was oriental that we could establish an imperial rule in India on a basis of condescending conciliation, but it would have been difficult to point out how this was to be accomplished, unless the way were to be paved for it by administrative changes similar to those which had already been effected and which he opposed and condemned.

Cobden, on the other hand, was of opinion that we should never really govern India in any true or constitutional sense-that we had "attempted an impossibility in giving ourselves to the task of governing one hundred millions of Asiatics." His reasons for this belief were characteristic. "If the plan were practicable at the great cost and risk that we now see to be inseparable from it," he wrote to Mr. Ashworth, "what advantage can it confer on ourselves? We all know the motive which took the East India Company to Asia-monopoly; not merely as towards foreigners, but against the rest of their own countrymen. But now that the trade of Hindostan is thrown open to all the world on equal terms, what exclusive advantage can we derive, to compensate for all the trouble, cost, and risk

of ruling over such a people?—a people which has shown itself, after a century of contact with us, to be capable of crimes which would revolt any savage tribe of whom we read in Dr. Livingstone's narrative, and which had never seen a Christian or European till he penetrated among them. . . . I can't even co-operate with those who seek to 'reform' India, for I have no faith in the power of England to govern that country at all permanently, and though I should like to see the Company abolished-because that is a screen between the English nation and a full sight of its awful responsibilities-yet I do not believe in the possibility of the crown governing India under the control of parliament. the House of Commons were to renounce all responsibility for domestic legislation, and give itself exclusively to the task of governing one hundred millions of Asiatics, it would fail. Hindostan must be ruled by those who live on that side of the globe. Its people will prefer to be ruled badly-according to our notions

If

by its own colour, kith, and kin, than to submit to the humiliation of being better governed by a succession of transient intruders from the antipodes." These opinions, however, as Cobden acknowledged, were not adapted for the practical work of the day. "What is to be done now? Put down the military revolt in justice to the peaceable population, who are at the mercy of the armed mutineers. It is our duty to do so. We can do it, and I have no doubt it will be done. But then comes our difficulty. With the experience of the present year we can never trust a native force with arms again with the feelings of security which we formerly indulged. . . Yet we cannot possibly administer the affairs of that country without a native force, and we are now actually raising an army of Sikhs, the most warlike of our subjects in all Asia, whom we disarmed when we took possession of the country, and of whom Lord Dalhousie said in a letter not ten years ago, that every man was against us.” Speaking of the horrible massacres and the fiendish ferocity of the Sepoys, Cobden said in a letter to Mr. Bright, "It is clear that they (the mutineers) cannot have been inspired

COBDEN ON INDIAN GOVERNMENT-KLAPKA.

267

that even the humiliation to which the native Hindoos were subjected might have been borne if the English with whom they came in contact had displayed exalted virtues and high intellectual powers. This, of course, was easy to say, but as a matter of possible government it would have been difficult to procure a large number of men of such qualities to fill the offices of subalterns in India or to enter the civil service there.

with either love or respect by what they have | civil and military officers. Cobden declared seen of the English. There must be a fierce spirit of resentment, not unmixed with contempt for the ruling class, pervading the native mind. From the moment that I had satisfied myself that a feeling of alienation was constantly increasing with both the natives and the English (we had some striking evidence to this effect before our committee in 1853), I made up my mind that it must end in trouble sooner or later. It is impossible that a people can permanently be used for their own obvious and conscious degradation. The entire system of our Indian rule is that the natives will be the willing instruments of their own humiliation. Nay, so confident are we in this faith, that we offer them the light of Christianity and a free press, and still believe that they will not have wit enough to measure their rights by our own standard." It may be mentioned that as a matter of policy, and necessary policy, Lord Canning had placed restrictions on the press in India when he found it was used for spreading sedition, and he had also refused to countenance the formation of armed volunteer corps, since he mistrusted either the intention of those who had stimulated the movement, or the use that might be made of such a distribution of arms at the very time when it was becoming necessary to deprive the natives of their weapons and to disband their regiments. In these proceedings he was blamed, almost at the same time that he was also accused of undue leniency and "clemency," because he refused to become a party to the panic which would have resulted in punishing the atrocities of the Sepoys with atrocious reprisals. Doubtless Lord Canning, like his predecessor, had masterful and imperious views of the government of India; but Mr. Disraeli would have been puzzled to point out how to rule otherwise, and Mr. Cobden himself would have admitted that if we could rule at all, it must be by strong and definite government, though not by degrading and oppressing the hundred million of Asiatics. The position which was assumed by Lord Dalhousie and his successor did not necessarily involve the temper displayed by many of the subordinate

Exalted virtues and high intellectual powers are not common commodities, or they would of course cease to be conspicuous, and those who possessed them were scarcely less wanted in England than in India. But Cobden was not beside the mark when he spoke of a low morale and an absence of mental energy having been the most conspicuous faults of the British officers, so that the business of the regiments had now fallen into the hands of the natives. He saw too, what Klapka, the Hungarian general saw, and spoke of with anxious deprecation, that from the wholesale and indiscriminate slaughter and execution of the Sepoys, of whom 100,000 were said to be in the mutiny, there was a danger that the assassinations and massacres on one side, and the retributive carnage on the other, would perpetuate and deepen the feeling of alienation and promote a horrible ferocity and bloodthirst on both sides. Klapka pointed out that large numbers of the Sepoy soldiers had probably joined in the mutiny without any personal sympathy with it, but only from the habit of following their own officers and acting on their orders en masse. Cobden said, "Had it been a mutiny of a company or a regiment, it would have been of doubtful policy to hang or blow from the guns all the privates concerned. But when an entire army of 100,000 men have planted the standard of revolt it is no longer a mutiny, but a rebellion and civil war. To attempt to hang all that fall into our power can only lead to reprisals and wholesale carnage on both sides."

We may not unprofitably note these various opinions, since they at all events illustrate the declaration that the government of India must practically be carried on in that country itself.

This declaration was common to critics on both sides, and their respective objections at least went to show that it was well founded.

But whatever may have been the force and importance of these representations—and that they deserved deep attention was attested by the events preceding and following the mutiny, as well as by the ferocious counsel of people here who would have slain, tortured, and if possible have exterminated the rebellious Sepoys the mutiny had been suppressed. The recapture of Delhi was practically the end of

the insurrection.

The King of Delhi-the miserable survivor of the house of which he had been the chief, and the last of the line of Great Moguls-was tried and sentenced to exile, or to what in a less distinguished criminal would have been transportation. But transportation was at an end. The colonists at the Cape of Good Hope would not receive even an ex-sovereign who had become a convict, and he was subsequently taken to Rangoon. Nana Sahib-the archfiend of the massacre-had disappeared, nobody knew how or whither. It was years afterwards that a rumour came from India of the capture of the chief of Bithoor, but it was a case of mistaken identity. The fate of the monster of Cawnpore was never discovered. His lieutenant, Tantia Topee, held out for some time, but after having been repeatedly defeated, was taken prisoner, tried, and hanged. One of the boldest, most successful—or rather least unsuccessful-and most enduring of the rebel leaders was the Rhanee of Jhansi, whose territory had been annexed by Lord Dalhousie, and who, regarding the insurrection as a national rebellion, took the field with Nana Sahib. For months after the fall of Delhi she carried on her opposition, leading her troops and taking part in the fighting in the uniform of a cavalry officer. She opposed her squadrons to the forces of Sir Hugh Rose, and struggled for the possession of Gwalior, and was killed on the field after leading repeated charges. Her body was afterwards found, scarred with wounds. "The best man upon the side of the enemy," said Sir Hugh Rose, 66 was the woman found dead-the Rhanee of Jhansi."

The mutiny had lasted just twelve months before the capital of Oudh was recovered, and after repeated battles the country was restored to something like order, and the rebellion was finally put down. It was in the month of June, 1858, that Sir H. Rose issued a general order in which he said: "Soldiers, you have marched more than a thousand miles, and taken more than a hundred guns. You have forced your way through mountain passes and intricate jungles, and over rivers; you have captured the strongest forts, and beat the enemy, no matter what the odds, wherever you met them; you have restored extensive districts to the government, and peace and order now reign where before, for twelve months, were tyranny and rebellion; you have done all this and you have never had a check. I thank you with all sincerity for your bravery, your devotion, and your discipline. When you first marched I told you that you, as British soldiers, had more than enough of courage for the work which was before you, but that courage without discipline was of no avail; and I exhorted you to let discipline be your watchword. You have attended to my orders. In hardships, in temptations, and in dangers you have obeyed your general, and you have never left your ranks. You have fought against the strong and you have protected the rights of the weak and defenceless, of foes as well as friends; I have seen you in the ardour of combat preserve and place children out of harm's way. This is the discipline of Christian soldiers, and this it is that has brought you triumphant from the shores of Western India to the waters of the Jumna, and establishes without doubt that you will find no place to equal the glory of your arms." A telling though rather inflated declaration this, and one which serves to indicate what had been the course and the effect of the struggle. It was not till the 20th of December, 1858, that Sir Colin Campbell, who had been elevated to the peerage under the title of Lord Clyde, announced to the governorgeneral: "The campaign is at an end, there being no longer even the vestige of rebellion in the province of Oudh. . . . The last remnant of the mutineers and insurgents have

LORD LAWRENCE.

been hopelessly driven across the mountains which form the barrier between the kingdom of Nepaul and her majesty's empire of Hindostan."

The relief to public anxiety was very great, and honours were not grudged to men who had been prominent in suppressing the revolt, as well as to those who by their sagacity of administration had prevented it from reaching still further, to proportions that might have justified Mr. Cobden's predictions. Foremost among the latter was Sir John Lawrence, who as a boy had carried off the chief prizes at Haileybury College, and in 1827 had entered the civil service of the East India Company. His experiences in the North-west Provinces had taught him what was the condition of the peasantry of India, and had enabled him satisfactorily to complete the settlement of the province of the Punjaub. He had been with Sir Henry Hardinge as a political officer during the Sikh war, and had afterwards been appointed commissioner of the ceded territory within the Sutlej, where his administrative abilities were so remarkable that he not only preserved tranquillity but recruited a brigade of troops from among the peasants, who, when the second Sikh war broke out, remained firm and opposed their own countrymen.

We have seen that he became commissioner of the Punjaub after its annexation. There he had protected the more peaceful inhabitants from the dominant military power of the Sikhs, had checked the exactions of the disbanded soldiery, who tried to carry out the old system of exacting pay from the Mohammedans. All was tyranny and oppression, and Lawrence stood between the tyrants and their victims. He abolished the barbarous Sikh laws, and introduced the "Indian criminal code." The country was surveyed for revenue purposes, and the land settled by what was believed by him to be an equitable adjustment. A local protective police force was organized, some of the old disbanded soldiers being enlisted in its ranks; and a Punjaub irregular force was instituted, comprising five regiments of cavalry, four of Sikh and six of Punjaub infantry, a corps of guides, and five batteries of artil

269

lery, all practically under the immediate orders of the Board of Administration. Lawrence, who possessed a strong constitution and an indomitable energy, visited every part of the territory, which covered an area of above 50,000 square miles. The border tribes, who under the Sikh rulers would descend from the mountains and ravage the land between the Suliman range and the Indus, were permitted to trade with us, but their incursions were prevented and repelled by force. The head men were invited to conferences with the chief commissioner, and invited to settle on our districts. The border-land became peaceful, and the highway of the frontier was subsequently safe. The disarmament of the Punjaub was carried out successfully, notwithstanding the lawless condition of its inhabitants.

On the outbreak of the mutiny all eyes turned to the Punjaub. It would have been a matter for small surprise had the Sikhs taken advantage of the mutiny to rise against us. The crisis called forth the magnificent administrative abilities of Sir John Lawrence. He knew his subordinates were, like himself, men of iron, and he trusted them. Right loyally did they stand by their chief. The Sikhs likewise knew and trusted him. Chieftain after chieftain personally tendered his allegiance and offered the use of his own contingent. The offers were accepted, and names which now have become familiar as furnishing detachments during the Afghan war then first came into note as swarming down to our aid at Delhi. The Punjaub irregular force was doubled; its gallant commander, Neville Chamberlain, hurried down to the army in the field; and Lawrence set his whole energies to work to draw from the military population of the Punjaub an army which should subdue the faithless Sepoys from Oudh. He proved himself a true general, for he detected generalship in others, and he shunned no responsibility. Reference to higher authority was impossible, and though he had no more authority to grant commissions than he had to create bishoprics, he deemed the emergency so great as to admit of any stretch of authority. Major Nicholson, the district officer of Bunnoo, was made a

« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »