LORD CLYDE-LORD LYNDHURST. or of doing without sleep for a long time and then making up the arrears. It was known that in a drawing-room, in the midst of a lively conversation which he would begin with a lady, he would softly slumber, or seem to slumber while his fair companion went on talking, and would wake up at the right moment to reply or to resume the discussion. There was a joke, probably well founded, that at a conversazione he was talking learnedly about a Hindoo poem written five hundred years before the Christian era, when suddenly somebody gave a turn to the conversation, which led him to discourse with equal knowledge and fluency on the philosophical method of cooking a beaf-steak. But we can scarcely pass the subject of veterans without referring to the third Campbell, the veteran warrior who had, at nearly seventy years of age, completed the great work of the suppression of the rebellion in India, and at last had received the recognition of his services there and in the Crimea, by receiving a peerage with the title of Baron Clyde. Sir Colin Campbell was born in Glasgow in 1792, and obtained such learning as he possessed at the High School. He entered the army as an ensign in the 9th Regiment of foot, when he was sixteen, his commission having been procured for him by his uncle, Colonel Campbell. The same year he was at Vimiera with Wellesley, and was afterwards at Corunna with Sir John Moore. His career begun with hard fighting, and it continued through the Peninsular war, and yet he only obtained the rank of captain, for there was no family influence to back him, and he gained every step by active service, such as the leading of a storming party at St. Sebastian, where he was severely wounded, and only recovered in time to take part in another engagement, in which he was again disabled by a musket shot. In 1814 he was sent to America with his regiment the 60th Rifles. And in 1815, when the peace was declared, he found leisure to study the theory of his profession, and made such proficiency that he rose to a command as brigadier-major, in which capacity VOL. III 305 he went to Demerara, with the thankless duty of quelling the negro insurrection. By 1825, and again in 1832, he was able to purchase his majority, so that in the latter year he was lieutenant-colonel of the 98th, with which he went to China, and was rewarded for his brilliant services by promotion to a full colonelcy. His next campaign was in India in 1848, when Lord Gough made him brigadier, and he retrieved the losses of the battle of Chillianwallah (where he was wounded), with the victory of Goojerat, which closed the Sikh wars, and brought him the honours of a K.C.B. Though he went through the Scinde campaign with Sir Charles Napier, his military rank of brigadier was local only, and on his return in 1853 he was still only a colonel, until he went out to the Crimea in 1854 as brigadier-general. We have already seen what were his services during that terrible time, and it can scarcely be wondered at that, upon the appointment of General Codrington to the command, after the death of General Simpson, Sir Colin should have felt himself slighted at having been superseded by a junior officer. He returned to England, but being requested to resume active service, had prepared to take command of a large corps of British and Turkish soldiers, to land at Theodosia, ascend the river and take the Russian entrenchments in the rear, when the war was brought to an end, and he returned home to receive a wellearned reward, not only in an addition to his title by being made a G.C.B., but in the enthusiastic regard of the country, and the public presentation of a sword of honour by six thousand of his fellow-citizens in Glasgow. After his brilliant services in the Indian mutiny he was able to rest on his laurels, and to receive from the queen and the nation those further distinctions which had been so arduously earned. Lord Lyndhurst was in his eighty-eighth year, and it was he who with amazing force and intensity advocated those additions to the national defences, which had been advised by Prince Albert and the Queen after their visit to 62 Cherbourg had shown them the French fortifications: Lord Palmerston was completely of the same opinion. In a strong speech in the House of Lords, Lord Lyndhurst had said: "If I am asked whether I cannot place reliance in the Emperor Napoleon, I reply with confidence that I cannot, because he is in a position in which he cannot place reliance on himself. He is in a situation in which he must be governed by circumstances, and I will not consent that the safety of this country should be placed in such contingencies. Selfreliance is the best road to distinction in private life. It is equally essential to the grandeur and character of a nation. . . . The question of the money expense sinks into insignificance. It is the price we must pay for our insurance, and it is a moderate price for so important an insurance. I know there are persons who will say 'Let us run the risk!' Be it so. But, my lords, if the calamity should come-if the conflagration should take place what words can describe the extent of the calamity, or what imagination can paint the overwhelming ruin that would fall upon us!" Lord Palmerston did not quite take this view. He had or seemed to have an invincible faith in England and in English pluck and mettle, but he was in favour of armaments for all that. He held that a frank avowal that we were prepared for war, if war should be necessary, was the best way of preserving peace. It was the friendship of the prizering; the shaking hands with an eye to a setto, as much as to say, "Nothing could exceed my pleasure in our amicable relations; but if you want anything-come on!" It is scarcely to be wondered at that people should have been asking how Mr. Gladstone came to accept office as chancellor of the exchequer. He had held an appointment, though an honorary and non-political one, under the Derby administration (for it should be noted that he had refused to accept any salary for his services as commissioner extraordinary at Corfu), but his sympathies were certainly not with the Conservatives,and his Liberal opinions had even gone far beyond those of many who sat with Lord Palmerston. At this time Mr. Gladstone may be said to have belonged to no party and to neither side. The “Peelites,” no longer had any existence. The small group who had been called by that name had dispersed. Cardwell had long ago thrown in his lot with the Palmerston ministry, and was now secretary for Ireland. Sidney Herbert had followed, and Graham had given a final blow to the Conservatives in the last debate, and was all on the Liberal side. Before the dissolution following that defeat, Gladstone had sat solitary among the Conservative party. His political convictions were many of them with the other side; but not some of his deepest moral or religious convictions. It happened to him then, as it had happened before and has happened since, that he came to a decision through a mental conflict from which men of less sensitive (some have said fantastic) feelings-or less habitual self-dissection and investigation of motives— would not have suffered. He accepted the office of chancellor of the exchequer amidst the murmurs of the extreme Radicals and the satisfaction of the Whigs, but it was understood that if he continued to hold office there must be a good many open questions, and that he was likely to oppose the demand for increased armaments, and yet to be more in sympathy with the aspirations of the Italians for freedom than with the policy of conciliating Austria. The probability of a war in Italy between Austria and Sardinia, or rather between the Austrians and the French, who were ready to stand before the Sardinians in the name of Italian freedom, had been the burning question at the beginning of the year 1859, and now by the end of June it had been emphatically answered. Austrian rule in Italy had become unendurable. It did not need the vivid utterances of Mazzini, or the desperate protests of Italian conspirators-to convince the world of this. All lovers of liberty regarded with indignation the conditions under which the Italians of the Duchies were governed; and in England sympathy with Mazzini and those who cried out for a united Italy and the overthrow of the usurper, had reached to a great height. CAVOUR-MAZZINI-GARIBALDI. 307 But it had not reached to the height of in- | territory according to circumstances, and tervention. Such representations as had been abandoning the betrayed Venetian provinces, made when Mr. Gladstone exposed the revolt- as well as a portion of Lombardy, to Austria." ing cruelties of the Neapolitan prisons might have been repeated, and perhaps with as much or as little effect; but to go further would have been virtually to declare war against Austria, while to espouse the cause of the "national party," who, under the direction of Mazzini, were endeavouring to effect the liberation of Italy by a series of insurrections, would have been to oppose the only firm Italian government in existence-that of Piedmont, under our former ally. Victor Emmanuel had in fact continued sentence of death against the republican agitator; while Cavour, in order to counteract the "fatal influence" of the fervid patriot not only in Italy but in Piedmont itself, became the prime mover of the "national society" which assumed to have for its object war with Austria. The policy of Cavour was to wait a little longer. The moderate party in Italy was also ready to look for some future advantage and to delay action. Mazzini was for immediate effort. What Cavour wanted was a monarchical Italy under Victor Emmanuel, and Mazzini suspected that he was ready to pay a price for it when the time came. That price the republican averred was the cession of Savoy and Nice to France for becoming an ally of Italy. He had written months before the event that Napoleon sought "in Nizza and Savoy the price for Lombardy, the throne of Naples for Murat, and of the centre for his cousin," and that Cavour had agreed to it. "If Austria resist to the utmost the whole design will be completed. If after the first defeats she should offer to abandon Lombardy in order to have Venetia secured to her, they will accept, and only the conditions concerning the aggrandisement of the house of Savoy will be fulfilled; the rest of uprisen Italy will be abandoned to the vengeance of her masters." He also pointed out the probability of what he said would be a "sudden ruinous peace, fatal to the insurgents, before the war is half over. .. Louis Napoleon, fearing the action of the peoples, should the war be prolonged, will compel the Sardinian monarchy to desist, conceding to it a certain portion of This was a close representation of much that afterwards took place, and also of the whole of what would probably have been the result but for an uncomputed factor. That factor was Garibaldi. Mazzini and Garibaldi, equally pure in intention, both ready to sacrifice everything to a noble patriotism, were never at one. Mazzini was a visionary statesman with exalted ideas of what a republic should be. He exhausted himself and the very cause which he had at heart in the endeavour to attain national liberty by arousing public spirit to insurrection by means of a sentiment, and then uniting in one great effort. Garibaldi was a warrior, believing that when there was a good hope for insurrection in the name of liberty,-and not before, -men needed only leaders who, with sword in hand, would help to fire them with immediate enthusiasm, and take them onward to battle. Mazzini would have had Garibaldi obey orders, and either fight, or stop fighting, on a sentimental principle of pure republicanism. Garibaldi refused to yield obedience against his own opinions, and cared less for subtle distinctions as to what kind of republic should alone claim the devotion of the nation, than for the actual achievement of national liberty and the destruction of the foreign yoke. Cavour-that rather commonplace-looking, stoutish, easygoing Italian, in spectacles, which gave him a still more ordinary appearance, and with a manner that, to superficial observers, suggested anything but subtle diplomacy worthy of the old Italian traditions-could outplot them both. He perhaps was not the equal of Mazzini for real insight, but he was far beneath him in scrupulousness, and this, added to the possession of power, gave him an advantage, which he used continually to check the effects of the fervid and unselfish appeals which so often seemed to be stirring a people to enthusiastic action, but which always fell short of achieving more than a partial outbreak. This is not the place to analyse or comment upon the character of Cavour. He succeeded in raising an Italian |