immortality of each individual human soul, and a consequent state of future rewards and punishments. Whatever Lord Brougham may urge on this subject, and all that he has urged is only the hash-up of his predecessors' nonsense, with the exceptions of his mistakes, which are nearly all his own,-the Bishop's paradox, as it has been called, will stand like the Peak of Teneriffe,

"That hurls defiance to the winds and waves."

To show, then, how little chance a scholar of Lord Brougham's calibre has of battering down a pyramid of learning with the squibs and crackers of his superficial reading, we will, with Dr. Turton's aid, examine the passages which his Lordship has quoted to prove that Plato and Aristotle agree in the immateriality of the human soul, on which alone, says his Lordship, depends the certainty of its immortality; a position which, if it be made out satisfactorily, would do away with revealed religion, and if not made out, with religion altogether.

Plato, says his Lordship, speaks of the ovoía ȧowμaros kai vontý→ a bodiless or incorporeal and intelligent being.

Now, in the first place, we very much suspect that these words are not to be found in Plato at all; but that Cudworth, from whom his Lordship got the quotation, put them down in the place of vonta ärra kaì ảowμara tiền (Sophist. p. 246, B.) Secondly, if they are in Plato, it will be found that they allude to quite a different subject, as remarked by Mosheim; whose words are"Hæc ȧowμara Platonis nihil sunt quam æterna, quæ putabat esse rerum omnium exempla et species seu idéac, quæ, quod omnes intelligunt, multum distant a naturis, quas nos spiritus vocamus, et corpore secretas esse ducimus, sive Platonem eas extra Deum vel in animo Dei posuisse censeamus."* Lastly, had Plato meant by vonrn intelligent, he would have written, says Dr. Turton, VonTun, although it is true that Olympiodorus, quoted by Wyttenbach on Phædon. p. 204. takes vonros in an active sense, and refers to the Timæus and to Aristotle for a similar use of the word; which, says Wyttenbach, is contrary to the genius of the language, and the interpretation of Proclus in Tim. i. p. 90, who there explains τῶν νοητῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων, as Cicero has translated it, "Sempiternarum rerum et sub intelligentiam cadentium." Correctly, therefore, does Hesychius observe (in Noɛpov) that voɛpov μέν ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν· νοητὸν δὲ τὸ νοούμενον—λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἐναλλαξ

* So Philo Judæus says that God created the world after certain preconceived forms in his own mind-oἷα δημιουργὸς ἀγαθὸς—ἑκάστῃ τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἰδεῶν τὰς σωματικὰς ἐξομοιῶν οὐσίας.

Or voɛpá, as shown by the passages quoted in H. Steph. Thes. L. Gr., who says that voɛpòv expresses the active, and roŋròv the passive meaning, as seen in Synes. Epist. 154: ò eos, os ToiÇ TE VOEρois Tou νοεῖν καὶ τοῖς νοητοῖς αἴτιος τοῦ νοεῖσθαι.

καταχρηστικώς. But as Mosheim has made the very same mistake with his Lordship, we will let the error pass, as a proof that great geniuses will sometimes clash.

Lord Brougham's next quotation is from Plato (Politic. p. 268. Α.): τὰ ἀσώματα κάλλιστα ὄντα καὶ μέγιστα λόγῳ μόνον, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδένι σαφῶς δείκνυται. But these words have nothing to do with the immateriality of the soul. They merely assert that "incorporeal things... are made manifest to us by reason alone;" just as corporeal are by the senses. (Compare Phædon. p. 79. A.) In the Cratylus too, says this doughty opponent of Warburton, Plato derives oua from oweoba, and represents the body as a prison of the soul—εἰκόνα δεσμωτηρίου εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτὸ ἕως ἦν τὰ opeiλóμeva τò owμa. Of this passage, where a verb has dropped out necessary to complete the sense, his Lordship has done wisely not to attempt a translation; which would have been very easy, had he transcribed the passage from the original, and not taken it second-hand from some careless or dishonest writer; who should have quoted (§ 38. p. 400 D.) Τούτου δὲ περίβολον ἔχειν, ἵνα σώζηται, δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ὥσπερ αὐτὸ ὀνομάζεται, ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν παράγειν οὐδὲ γράμμα—for then his Lordship would have seen that the passage was nothing to the purpose.

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Aristotle, too," says his Lordship, "speaks of a being separable and separated from things perceivable by the sense,' οὐσία χωριστὴ καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν. These, however, are not the words of Aristotle, but of Cudworth himself, as remarked by Mosheim, who refers to Metaphysic. xiv. 7. But there Aristotle says not a word about the human soul, but merely asserts that there is οὐσία τις αΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν.

"Nevertheless, these philosophers," says his Lordship, "fre"quently speak of the soul as being always, and as it were necessarily, connected with matter of some kind or other, as in Plato, Leig. x. § 12. p. 903 D. ἀεὶ ψυχὴ συντεταγμένη σώματι, τότε « μὲν ἄλλῳ, τότε δὲ ἄλλῳ, μεταβάλλει παντοίας μεταβολάς. 'The soul "is always annexed to a body.' But the sense is rather-' A "soul-for the allusion is there to the transmigration of one "soul through many bodies; a doctrine that Plato, as a Pythagorean, necessarily adopted, but Aristotle, as opposed to Plato, "as necessarily rejected." His Lordship however quotes from the Peripatetic, (De Generat. Animal. ii. 4,) yàp yuxǹ ovola owμatós Tivós ÉσT" the soul is the substance of some body." Now, had our Aristotelian, like Sidrophel, "read every text and gloss over," he would have seen, as remarked by Dr. Turton, that Aristotle was speaking, not of the soul, but the vivifying

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From this double meaning of ux, we can at once perceive that the metaphysical ux, soul, was derived from the physical uxos, cold.

principle, as shown by the whole passage-"Eore dè tò μèv owμa èk τοῦ θήλεος, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἄρρενος· ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ οὐσία σώματός τινος OTIV and had our Grecian known any thing of the language, he would have seen that xì ovσía owμaros is a combination of words perfectly unintelligible; and, lastly, had our zoologist been an Athenian, as well as an Edinburgh, critic, he would have seen that Aristotle wroteἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ οὐσία σώματος γονῆς ἐστι : as is evident from Π. 3., τὸ δὲ τῆς γονῆς σῶμα, ἐν ᾧ συνυπάρχεται τὸ σπέρμα τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχῆς κ. τ. λ. where ἀρχῆς is explained by Π. 4. ὕλην μὲν οὖν παρέχει τὸ θῆλυ, τῆν δὲ ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως τὸ ἄρρεν. His Lordship might however have quoted more to his purpose (De Anima, ii. 1. p. 630. Β.) ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος—were it not that the passage is suspicious on account of the unintelligible is eldos. But he should not have quoted De Anim. ii. 2. kaì dià touto kadŵç ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οἷς δοκεῖ μήτε ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι μήτε σῶμά τι ψυχή. σῶμα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐστι, σώματος δέ τι. For there, as remarked by Dr. Turton, xǹ means the vivifying principle, and not soul or intellect, which Aristotle says—ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι appears to be a production different from soul."

With regard to the next passage quoted from Plutarch (Quæst. Platon. T. ii. p. 1002), which Lord Brougham has misunderstood, and consequently misrepresented, we willingly refer to Dr. Turton, who has said all that is requisite; and shown, moreover, that the error of his Lordship is to be traced to his neglecting to look at his brief, and not perceiving that two members of the same family, whom he supposed were living together like man and wife, were regularly separated.

From a similar neglect of the text-books, his Lordship has been led to believe that Plutarch, in Quæst. Platon. ii. p. 1001, is speaking of the human soul, when he is speaking of the soul of the world, "which having received a share of intellect, reason, and harmonious arrangement, becomes not only the handywork of God, but also a portion; nor does it exist apart from him, but under him and from him.*

For as matter, through its connexion with the warm vivifying principle, is not cold, so the mind, whose properties are opposed to those of matter, would be properly called cold, i. e. vx-n. Thus when we speak of a cool head and a warm heart, we designate respectively two persons, one of whom is influenced by reflection, a property of the cold mind, and the other by passion, a property of the warm body. The preceding derivation of tux-n, soul, from tux-os cold, will enable us to perceive that soul is only a corruption of goul, (which in old English means the spirit of a dead person,) and that goul has the same affinity to cold, that ʊx has to ψύχος.

* In the original we read—ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ, νοῦ μετασχοῦσα καὶ λογισμοῦ καὶ ἁρμονίας, οὐκ ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρος, οὐδ ̓ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ

Lastly, with regard to the passage from Epictetus-ovvapeic τῷ Θεῷ ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια, ουσία καὶ ἀποσπάσματα-even a less Grecian than his Lordship would have discovered "something rotten in the state" of the text, and would have corrected ovoa, as found in Epictet. Dissert. i. 14. αἱ ψυχαὶ μὲν οὕτως εἰσὶν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς τῷ Θεῷ, ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι καὶ ἀποσπάσματα-where Upton quotes from Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 13, "Humanus autem animus discerptus ex mente divina,”—and De Senect. 21, from whence the doctrine appears to have been a Pythagorean one.

So much for the first act of his Lordship's classical farce; and we now come to the second, where, in the Equity court of the new Divinity Professor, who, unlike Minos the lawgiver, we presume, of Jedburgh

"Audit, castigatque dolos, subigitque fateri❞—

it will be seen that his Lordship can with greater ease put on the lion's skin, than enact, like Bottom, the lion's self.

Of the tricks played upon his reading public by Lord Brougham, who in his recent practice of an Equity draftsman has learned to make a conveyance from the extensive premises of Cudworth to his own little grounds, we will say nothing. An Encyclopedist is, "like the air, a chartered libertine;" and he may say of himself, "Where the bee sucks, there lurk I."* But while his Lordship was dipping his pen into Cudworth's ink-bottle, how came he to neglect that of Mosheim, which was standing close by? For had he not confined himself too closely to the original, he would have escaped the misfortune of quoting, as the words of Epicurus, the words of Cudworth merely; who, by a slip of the memory, while his Lordship's is only a slip of the pen, forgot that the words of Epicurus, as quoted by Diogenes Laertius, x.123. p. 655. are-Πρῶτον μὲν τὸν Θεὸν ζῶον ἄφθαρτον καὶ μakápiov voμizwv; and, again, where Cudworth is speaking of the world existing μηδένος διατάττοντος ἢ διαταξαμένου, τὴν πᾶσαν ἔχοντος μακαριότητα μετ' ἀφθαρσίας — Mosheim observes that the Greek words are from no ancient author, but Cudworth's own; from

ἀλλ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γέγονεν. But, in the first place, ἀπ ̓ αὐτοῦ and ἐξ αὐτοῦ savour too much of a tautology; and, secondly, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ cannot thus follow ὑπ ̓ αὐτοῦ, although ὑπ' αὐτοῦ may follow ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ; while the expression ὑπ' αὐτοῦ—γέγονεν is sufficiently explained by Plutarch, ii. p. 1014, ὕλην—ὑποκειμένην ἀεὶ τῷ δημιουργῷ; and Philo Jud. p. 2. C. Μωσῆς δὲ-ἔγνω δὴ ὅτι ἀναγκαιότατόν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν τὸ μὲν εἶναι δραστήριον αἴτιον, τὸ δὲ παθητόν· καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν δραστήριον ὁ τῶν ὅλαν Νοῦς ἐστιν—τὸ δὲ παθητὸν ἄψυχον καὶ ἀκίνητον ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, κινηθὲν δὲ καὶ σχηματισθὲν καὶ ψυχωθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ Νοῦ—μετέβαλεν εἰς τὸ τελειότατον ἔργον.

* Unlike the bee, however, his Lordship, in collecting the pollen for his honey, has contrived to get only what will make wax for his legs to get hampered in.

immortality of each individual human soul, and a consequent state of future rewards and punishments. Whatever Lord Brougham may urge on this subject, and all that he has urged is only the hash-up of his predecessors' nonsense, with the exceptions of his mistakes, which are nearly all his own,-the Bishop's paradox, as it has been called, will stand like the Peak of Teneriffe,

"That hurls defiance to the winds and waves."

To show, then, how little chance a scholar of Lord Brougham's calibre has of battering down a pyramid of learning with the squibs and crackers of his superficial reading, we will, with Dr. Turton's aid, examine the passages which his Lordship has quoted to prove that Plato and Aristotle agree in the immateriality of the human soul, on which alone, says his Lordship, depends the certainty of its immortality; a position which, if it be made out satisfactorily, would do away with revealed religion, and if not made out, with religion altogether.

Plato, says his Lordship, speaks of the ovoía árúμatos kai vontha bodiless or incorporeal and intelligent being.

Now, in the first place, we very much suspect that these words are not to be found in Plato at all; but that Cudworth, from whom his Lordship got the quotation, put them down in the place of vonrà arra kai ȧowμara eion (Sophist. p. 246, B.) Secondly, if they are in Plato, it will be found that they allude to quite a different subject, as remarked by Mosheim; whose words are "Hæc ȧowμara Platonis nihil sunt quam æterna, quæ putabat esse rerum omnium exempla et species seu idéas, quæ, quod omnes intelligunt, multum distant a naturis, quas nos spiritus vocamus, et corpore secretas esse ducimus, sive Platonem eas extra Deum vel in animo Dei posuisse censeamus."* Lastly, had Plato meant by vonn intelligent, he would have written, says Dr. Turton, VonTun, although it is true that Olympiodorus, quoted by Wyttenbach on Phædon. p. 204. takes vonros in an active sense, and refers to the Timæus and to Aristotle for a similar use of the word; which, says Wyttenbach, is contrary to the genius of the language, and the interpretation of Proclus in Tim. i. p. 90, who there explains τῶν νοητῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων, as Cicero has translated it," Sempiternarum rerum et sub intelligentiam cadentium." Correctly, therefore, does Hesychius observe (in Noepòv) that voɛpov μέν ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν· νοητὸν δὲ τὸ νοούμενον—λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἐναλλαξ

* So Philo Judæus says that God created the world after certain preconceived forms in his own mind-oἷα δημιουργὸς ἀγαθὸς ἑκάστῃ τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἰδεῶν τὰς σωματικὰς ἐξομοιῶν οὐσίας.

Or voɛpá, as shown by the passages quoted in H. Steph. Thes. L. Gr., who says that voɛpòv expresses the active, and roŋròv the passive meaning, as seen in Synes. Epist. 154: ὁ Θεὸς, ὃς τοῖς τε νοεροῖς τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ τοῖς νοητοῖς αἴτιος τοῦ νοεῖσθαι.