sensible things, can not be submitted to the investigations of the physicist and anatomist." In the mean time, let the eager philosophic sceptic carefully consider his logic, lest, if the oracle announce correlation of forces as demonstrable, the atheistic herald even then should run upon a fool's errand. The question of forces, their conservation and correlation and analysis, falls far within the comprehensive question involved in this discussion,—the question of a God and of faith in God.

These are but a few of the many theories proposed to account for and explain the system of things. In these manifold and diverse theories, old and new, and old renewed, there is involved not only an admission of the importance and difficulty of answering these great questions of the soul, but also the admission of inherent weakness in the theories themselves. They are mere hypotheses. Even the very positive Westminster Review (Oct., 1872) says of Darwin's theory: "The case of man's descent does not yet admit of proof. The same may be said of the origin of any other species, of Darwin's hypothesis in general, and of the hypothesis of special creations which it denies."

La Place, while he would dispense with the theism of Newton-La Place, bold among the boldest scientific investigators, offers his " Exposition du

66

Systême du Monde " as an hypothesis, and as such presents it with becoming diffidence: "Je presente avec la défiance que doit inspirer tout ce qui n'est point un resultat de l'observation, ou du calcul." But not only are these theories of "exact" science mere hypotheses concerning the questions at issue; they are made, it should be remembered, with the provisional admission that "science can not find a first cause.' "'* Whatever science may answer to the soul's irrepressible and comprehensive challenge, it refers to method only, not to origin. Transcending, as well as comprehending, the field of its investigations are evermore the questions, Whence? and Why? The positive philosophy affirms truly, and must perpetually affirm: "Science can not find a first cause." Science evermore traces, and can only trace, the manifestations of the first cause. Whatever it be-material or spiritual-science studiously traces the manifestations of the first cause in the order or law which it discovers, and which it seeks to generalize. Retracing specific to more general laws, it classifies evermore in higher and still higher generalizations, steadily extending its knowledge as it reaches a larger unit. This it makes the point of a new departure, forever asking, What

* Comte.

is? and the higher question, How? or in what order, or by what law it is.

And here, at length, we reach the comprehensive admission that science seeks to trace all effects to unity—that philosophy would unify its knowledge by retracing all phenomena to one common origin. Each particular science seeks this unity for itself, and "universal science seeks after absolute unity." To this ultimate result all its processes tend. To seek this unification it is authorized; nay, it is compelled. It is claimed, on the one hand, that this final unification may consist in matter, and not in mind; that matter exists by a reason in itself; and that matter is the beginning, the originator. But how do we get a notion of any beginning? Is it not by the power (the energy) of our own minds putting forth new activities, producing effects, originating phenomena? What, we ask, is matter, that it should be the originator, the beginning? Does scepticism reply, "It is force"? Again we ask, Is force an abstraction, independent and unrelated? Does not force itself originate in mind?

These and similar questions confront the theory of materialistic unity.

On the other hand, it is claimed that multiplicity in the universe may be reduced to pantheistic unity; that there is not only theism, but pantheism. God

is all, and all is God. But, as no one else will believe that the pantheist is God, and as each knows for himself that he is not God, the excess of pantheistic admission is apparent.

The fault is not in the attempt at unification; for this is unavoidable. Atheist, pantheist, and theist, materialist and spiritualist, are alike compelled to it by the very law of thought. The admission is inevitable. The fault lies in the principle and the process of unifying. Is the principle right? Is the process broad enough? Here is the point of divergence. Which is the true course? Which is the false? These questions remain to be considered.

CHAPTER VI.

IN

MODERN THOUGHT.

N the strife of theories, both science and faith should be saved from confusion. Carefully, at least, if not repeatedly, should we take our bearings, that we may better detect the drift of modern thought, and distinguish the course of false thinking from that of the true.

At the outset, it is obvious to remark, but it is important to remember, that thought has its laws as fixed as those of material nature-perhaps comprehending the laws of nature and confirming the laws of faith.

The primary law of thought is the recognition of existence; the existence of the thinker, and then of the act of thinking as involving content. This is illustrated by the proposition cogito, expressing the simplest judgment. Whatever may be thought of Descartes' familiar enthymeme, cogito ergo sum, to which we do not refer, the proposition cogito (I think), illustrates this primary law which thought implicitly follows in the simplest judgment, I am think