from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead" (Rom. i: 20). The latter view ends in nescience, perplexing and disheartening. Within its distant but darkened range science, material science, pursues its weary way in the tread-mill of experiment amid material forces; seeking for life which can never be phenomenal, but ever and forever evades our physical senses; seeking at nerve-centers to detect and dissect mind itself, which ever and forever eludes the search, replying evermore to the deluded seeker, that while it acts in time it is not confined to space; seeking in every nook and corner of the material universe for the great First Cause, if haply it may feel after him and find him, but with the eye of intuitive reason closed, failing to see him, though he be not far from every one of us; terminating its unsuccessful search in utter nescience and despair. Nothing but perfect demonstration can ever establish such a result.or authorize such a conclusion. And in the very nature of the case, demonstration of this negative conclusion is impossible. "All that induction can do, as scientific, is to observe phenomena and sequences in nature, and put them into convenient generalizations."

This modern theory of evolution is not only

unsatisfactory and invalid; it is wholly uncalled for, and, therefore, even the presumption is against it. We are not, needlessly, to multiply hypotheses. The old dictum of Occam remains valid: Entia non multiplicanda sunt praeter necessitatem.

Let Occam's razor be applied to this needless hypothesis of evolution. This presumption is strengthened by the presence and prevalence of an older theory, and a better—an evolution at once comprehensive and satisfactory, comprehending all the facts of material science and satisfying all the spiritual demands of the soul.

The real issue, then, is between the false and the true theory of evolution-between atheism and theism-chance and God. The true view is not only sublime, but is full of sympathy and support and guidance—almighty support and guidance for the material universe-almighty guidance and support and sympathy for man. Whatever changes may occur in material nature-and what finite mind can forecast the possibility?—whatever changes may occur, yet, by the wise behest of Almighty God, order-divine and benign order-shall evermore be preserved; and man may evermore trust in God and not be afraid; and, in the light of His divine presence and the strength of His divine aid, go on to

improve and enjoy the life which now is and the life which is to come.

The false view, though but a step removed from the sublime, is-it must be confessed-utterly devoid of sympathy, of support, of guidance and rational government. By it we are plunged into the frightful abyss of nescience. If force be impersonal, what are its powers and possibilities whether it be mechanical necessity, or capricious chance, or blind fate; whether it be malicious or merciful, as a friend, a fury, a fiend, or a phantasm—is unknown. This were a conclusion horrible enough, were we permitted by this modern theory of evolution to hope in a God behind the unknown force, and superior to it, who might rescue us from the frightful abyss. But to be denied even this hope, and to be left to sink at last in the fathomless vortex of atheism, at the mercy of a blind but tremendous and pitiless force, forever unknown and unknowable -this is the depth of woe, the climax of horror.

And to this we are driven by the modern theory of evolution, based upon the modern theory of forces.

CHAPTER II.

FAITH AND POSITIVISM.

SHALL faith be ruled out? This is not exclu

sively a question between philosophy and theology, but it is also a question of philosophy with philosophy. It has of late been fashionable in certain quarters to satirize Christian faith as folly, to admit nothing but "positive knowledge," to sneer at belief as irrational.

One class of these pretentious foes to faith, who Occupy the realm of sense, assume the modest appellation of philosophers, yet magisterially limit all knowledge to this realm. What appears to sense they know. The phenomenal is the real-the only real. Just what it is, they are not able to say; but that it is, they know. The senses are the media of communication, and the senses are the source of knowledge-the source of all knowledge.

Another class, in the same field of the sense, despising the appearance of modesty, reject the name philosopher; affirm the paradox that "there are more false facts than false theories" (Lewes' Biograph

ical History of Philosophy, etc.); and resolutely press their theory to its legitimate conclusion, "that a valid philosophy is impossible," "that science is radically opposed to and excludes all philosophy and theology." As said the sophists, so say they, that nothing is truly known; and the logical result is utter skepticism. "The ancient researches," says Lewes, "ended in skepticism, common-sense, and skepticism again. The modern researches ended in idealism, skepticism, common-sense, and skepticism."

The question, then, whether faith is entitled to any place and prerogative, concerns not theology alone, but philosophy as well; even science itself is not unconcerned.

The entire range of this discussion includes two fields: one, the philosophic and finite; the other, the religious and infinite; the former regarding matter, mind, and morals; the latter regarding God, immortality, and religion, especially the Christian religion. After a brief survey of the ground, and a due limitation of terms, we shall follow two lines of argument, the indirect and the direct; by the first to vindicate a place for faith by the admissions (positive or implied,) of objectors themselves; by the second, to establish a place for faith on positive and reliable grounds. The higher domain of faith, the religious and infinite, will then challenge our inspection.