rerum natura, had been at last positively settled. Our periodicals occasionally present some curious. illustrations of this haste to believe in anything that calls itself science. Lucretius, for example, is praised for his wonderful forecasting "genius in having anticipated one of the most brilliant of modern discoveries." The reference is to what he says about atoms, as though it were any more, or any less, hypothetical in the brilliant Latin poet, than as it now appears even in some of our scientific text books. The hypothesis of Dalton, and of our latest scientists, may have more of what may be called a scientific look; but atoms are still a sheer imagination. No eye has ever seen an atom; no microscope has ever brought one into visibility. They belong to the " unseen world," not of spirit but of sense. They lie as far below all sense vision, with its highest instrumental aids, as they did in the old days of Democritus. Lucretius had a most ingenious mode of getting the atoms at work, in his hypothesis of an infinitesimal deviation from the perpendicular, or the original direction of their motion. would be enough, in time, to set them all impinging, and therefore, in a still longer time, of running through all possible collisions and cohesions until they had produced this present "aspectable world,” as he styles it. It had as much" established science"

This

in it as any modern hypothesis built on similar premises. So was it with the older atomism of Democritus. Given an eternity to work in, what would they not accomplish? Infinite incongruities falling at last into congruities; or after infinite misses making, at last, some lucky hits, so as to get in some kind of position, and so on, and so on, until, after another immeasurable time, some kind of embryo world would begin to appear. Tremendous leaps did these old world-builders make, but not more tremendous than are now made by the modern cosmologists. The maxim of these older men seems to have been ἀρχὴ ἡμισυ έργου, “ the beginning is the half of the work." Get the atoms in motion, get them deviating from the perpendicular," let them begin to impinge upon one another, making their congruities and their natural selections, and the business might be regarded as virtually done. The world,-with all its freight of life organic, vegetable, animal, with all its load of sin and death and corruption, with all its forces, with all its mind and consciousness, would come at last, as it would all, in like manner, at last disappear. Only give it time enough, and, in a similar process, all things would come out of the nebula, that favorite hypothesis of modern times. We are not exaggerating the features of resemblance. Any one who will turn to Aristotle's Physica, Lib. III,

66

Chap. viii.,* will see how old is the doctrine of "natural selections," and "survival of the fittest," out of which Darwin would make all species.

The unscientific mind, it is said, is not competent to deal with these matters. The objection involves an egregious fallacy. It is a fact, and the scientific men who make this plea should be plainly told it, and made to confess it, that there is a region accessible to the common cultivated mind, and especially to such a thinker as the author of this book, where the Darwins, Tyndalls, and Huxleys-giving them all due credit for the great eminence they have attained, and the great value of their science, so far as they have established it—are simply on a par with other men of intelligence. By the thoughtful man this science-transcending region is soon reached. A few steps, and we are where the great philosophers of old, and the great schoolmen of later times, (defective as may have been their science) showed an acuteness in discussing these questions of primordial

* The passage is quoted and well translated by Mivart in his book on the Genesis of Species, page 306. It is thus Aristotle states the opinion of the old atheists whom he refutes: "For when the very same combinations happened to be produced which the law of final causes would have called into being, those which proved to be advantageous to the organism were preserved, while those that were not so, perished like the minotaurs and sphinxes of Empedocles."

The illustrations are crude, but there is as much "established science" in the ancient as in the modern Darwinism.

causation, and a power of thought, of which the keenest thinkers of this or any other age might well be proud. Inductive science, the highest range of sense-knowledge, gives no advantage here, except as all culture quickens the mental powers, and extends the sphere of philosophic insight. It is not presumptuous, therefore, in men like Dr. Welch to enter upon discussions like these, and the same might be said of Professor Martin, Mr. Bowne, and others in our own land who have boldly analyzed the boastful pretentions of what calls itself "modern thought."

We are tempted to say more of this little book, but the Introduction ought to bear a due proportion to the modest volume it announces to the public. Our thanks are due to the publishing house of Putnam's Sons for the service they have rendered to the cause of religion and revelation by adding this to the valuable course of similar healthful works they have lately given to the world.

TAYLER LEWIS.

SCHENECTADY, February 3, 1876.

FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT.

THE

CHAPTER I.

THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES.

HE theory of force is as old as the process of speculation. But the theory of forces as applied to the great questions of physics and philosophy is of modern origin.

Let us examine this modern theory: first, in the light of its own definitions, its consequences, and its confessions; and, secondly, in the light of consciousness, reason, and revelation.

This theory proposes not only to explain the phenomena of nature, but to solve the problem of being to tell what is, and how it is--what is primitive and what derivative-where the process of derivation began, and how; and how it proceeds, including within its range, not only matter and mind, but problems of life, and liberty, and morality, and religion.