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objected that poverty is not a barrier to a man's being educated, and that there have been numerous instances of poor men becoming intelligent and intellectual. This we do not deny. Mr. G. Combe says, in substance, that persons with large brainal development, indicating great mental power, would by the force of their intellects educate themselves under any circumstances;* and J. Forster, speaking of self-educators, observes that the energetic efforts made by such give a vigour and a force to their minds, which is seen in all their intellectual labours.† It is obvious that these statements apply to a comparatively small number only taking the poorer classes in the aggregate, the existing state of things, as regards education, amply confirms the principle we have laid down."

An important inquiry now presents itself, namely, the influence of circumstances upon moral character. Every society exerts an influence peculiar to itself. The primary object of many organizations is the intellectual benefit of their members: not unfrequently moral and intellectual improvement are aimed at jointly. A powerful moral influence is exerted upon youth by companions; but the place where the seeds of character are sown is pre-eminently home. Whatever appearances may be assumed in public, here parents discover their real qualities. Here virtue is inculcated by precept, and recommended by example, or thoughts of truth and right are banished. Here the opening mind is watched, and as it manifests either good or bad inclinations, receives check or encouragement; or, on the other hand, there is positive indifference as to the principles which children imbibe, whilst the daily examples that are before them of passion and profligacy infuse a deadly poison into their moral nature, and thus prepare them for a career of crime. Is it not morally certain that impressions produced in youth lay the foundation of a character that will last through life? And if so, what are we in this most important respect but the creatures of circumstances? We grant that character is sometimes modified, and that new elements are added to it, after the parental roof has been left, as admirably described by J. Forster; but in the overwhelming majority of mankind, we believe the moral principles taught in the early stages of life are never eradicated. When an entire change of moral character does take place, the causes that have combined to produce it may be easily traced; and being independent of the will of the person who experiences such change, our position is still further strengthened.

Viewing moral character as affected by education, we might refer to the opinions of numerous able writers, who have contended that crime would diminish in the same proportion as the *G. Combe's "Phrenology."

"Essay on Popular Ignorance."

See "Essay on a Man Writing Memoirs of himself."

people were better educated (though we incline to think that too much has been made of ignorance as a source of crime, and too little account taken of poverty). Whatever measure of truth we concede to their representations, we are shut up to this conclusion, that by reason of circumstances not under their control, some of the least fortunate of our species have grown up in ignorance of moral distinctions, and in consequence are easily tempted to commit crime. Appalling as this may seem, we see no way of avoiding the inference.

Our next proposition is, that man is the creature of circumstances in respect to his opinions.

And first, as to his opinions of his fellow men. We cannot think of people according to our wishes. We may feel a kind of attachment for those of whom we cannot think highly intellectually. The will has nothing to do with opinion, except, indeed, it be said that the judgment never acts without the will at the same time choosing to judge. We observe that opinion primarily belongs to the judgment, and that it cannot be predicated of the will. The judgments we form depend upon the evidence presented to our consciousness, and we feel ourselves under the necessity of judging accordingly. We are often desirous of thinking otherwise than as we do concerning persons whose moral dispositions are excellent, but who give unmistakable proofs of mental weakness. It may be said that the affections and passions sometimes warp the judgment, and this we readily concede. We can conceive of many circumstances in which jealousies, envyings, and suspicions carry on their insidious operations, and bias the mind, causing it to regard testimony through a perverted medium. Probably this takes place chiefly amongst those competing for distinction, either at the bar, in the senate, or in spheres more humble. It is perhaps owing to this that great men are underrated by their contemporaries, who feel mortified when their own powers are eclipsed. A case in point is that of Edmund Burke, who was coughed down by the aristocrats in parliament, and who, as Goldsmith says, "thought of dining, whilst the orator went on refining." But, notwithstanding these exceptions, the broad principle is undeniable. A man having to do with the world, and of a reflective turn of mind, will find himself passing judgment upon those with whom he transacts business every hour in the day. The serious looks and demeanour of one, the lightness and frivolity of another, and the unmeaning, senseless talk of a third, impress him, that the first does not speak until he has thought, that the next has a mind of but little solidity, and that the last has no brains at all: and these operations proceed upon the principle already stated.

What has been advanced prepares us for considering man the creature of circumstances in respect of his opinions in general. We believe, in all seriousness, that when a truly earnest mind

addresses itself to the examination of a theory in any department of human inquiry, it can no more affirm beforehand what the conclusions will be at which it will arrive, than a jury can pronounce its verdict in a case previously to hearing the evidence. How many readers of this work have had an entire revolution effected in their opinions on subjects discussed in its pages, by arguments of which they had not before heard, but the force of which their judgments were unable to withstand! Previously to inquiry it is impossible to tell which way the judgment may incline; it is the preponderance of fact and argument this way or that, which causes the mind to decide, as in using a pair of scales, that side which contains the greatest weight necessarily goes down. We are aware, that on many subjects a great variety of motives may influence the mind, and hinder it from forming a just judgment. Perhaps the questions that are most likely to be judged of according to strict reason are those that are purely scientific and literary, affording, as they do, but little scope for the display of passion, inasmuch as those sensitive parts of our nature, so soon touched by opposing arguments in moral and religious inquiries, are not much acted upon in these departments. But whether the mind reaches conclusions in accordance with evidence, or is biased by early education, self-love, or selfinterest, will, we apprehend, make no difference to our argument. Some minds are, if we may so speak, of a philosophical construction; they do not inquire if principles that are placed before the world will agree with what they were taught in youth, but if they are established by adequate proofs. Another class adheres tenaciously to long cherished views, and will not be moved by reasoning, however cogent. A third is of such mental construction as that, when reason and interest clash, the former is overpowered, and instead of leading, is led. Now these several qualities are partly natural and partly acquired if we consider them as the joint result of nature and education, as both are determined by events not controlled by man in judging rationally or otherwise, we are acting out a character that has been formed by influences external to ourselves.

With reference to politics, although, in a free country like this, where every measure of public concern is criticised by the press, most men have their polítical opinions, it is manifest there are but few who have either time or disposition for profound inquiries touching the rise of our institutions, or the science of government. So true is it of the multitude that they are the creatures of circumstances in regard to their sentiments on national affairs, that (as a great authority has lately declared) if we knew the papers they read, we might pronounce with certainty as to the political party that has their sympathies. The public acts of our statesmen likewise supply an illustration. would not be easy to fix upon another order of educated men whose conduct is less traceable to the operation of fixed prin

It

ciples. To conceive of it aright, several things must be taken into account, as the trammels of party, the wishes of the sovereign, but, more than all, the demands of public opinion. When Mr. Fox (that idol of the Whig party, as he had been called) was in opposition, he exerted his eloquence against the slave trade; when he found himself a minister, his zeal abated.* But our proposition derives the most striking confirmation from the career of the late Sir Robert Peel, two of whose most remarkable measures were, the removal of the Catholic disabilities, and the repeal of the corn laws; neither being a natural sequence of his own views, but extorted from him by the irresistible force of circumstances.

With respect to opinion in religious matters, no demonstration is necessary to prove that a man who is a Christian in England would, if born in Turkey of Mahomedan parents, have been a Mahomedan, if of Chinese parents, a Pagan. But to confine our views to England. The children of Episcopalians adhere to the Establishment, and think it right; those of Independents regard the system, in the midst of which they have been reared, as most in accordance with scripture; so of the Baptists, Unitarians, and other sects.

There is another argument which, as it appears to us, may be legitimately used in support of the affirmative of the present question, we refer to the mode of operation of the mind in the acts of choosing and refusing. Mind is acted upon by motives, and the will always is in the direction of the strongest motive; so that, in preferring one thing before another thing, or one course of action before another course of action, the will is determined by the most powerful motives presented to it, and consequently a man is in respect of such determination the creature of circumstances.

In bringing our remarks to a conclusion, we beg to be distinctly understood, that we do not deny man's responsibility. If asked to reconcile the belief of that doctrine with the views here set forth, we reply, we decline making the attempt. That both are true, we are firmly convinced; that man will ever see their agreement in the present world we think unlikely. We however honestly declare, that our sentiments incline us to regard the all-wise Disposer of events in a very different manner from that in which he is viewed by many good men. We think him more just than their theological notions make him. Where they would represent him as ready to pour forth the vials of his indignation, we should rather conceive of him as bending over his creatures with pity. Various are the talents with which he has endowed us, and the privileges with which, in his providence, he has favoured us; and we do not in the least doubt, that in finally dealing with men, these circumstances will be taken into account, and justice be done.

*See Brougham's "Statesmen."

ALPHA.

IS THE CHARACTER OF QUEEN ELIZABETH, ETC. 117

History.

IS THE CHARACTER OF QUEEN ELIZABETH
WORTHY OF ADMIRATION?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.-II.

THAT the reign of Elizabeth was, in many respects, one of the most glorious and most brilliant recorded in the annals of our country, no one will deny; but the prudence and wisdom of the sovereign should not blind us to her tyranny and hypocrisy, nor should the talents and learning of the woman be suffered so to dazzle us, as to hide from view her vanity, her pride, and her heartlessness. Much as we may admire the skilful policy which baffled the designs of the formidable league which at one period threatened to overwhelm our country with utter ruin, and the prudent encouragement accorded to commerce and adventure which in a few years raised England to a proud pre-eminence among the nations, there is yet such a dark side to the brilliant picture so often drawn of her prosperous reign, that all the palliations and excuses urged in her behalf are quite insufficient to vindicate her memory from the odium cast upon it by many

of her actions.

Among the most prominent of the bad traits of her character, both in her public and private capacities, were habitual hypocrisy and dissimulation. Passing over her feigned observance of the Romish ritual during the reign of her bigoted sister, as her duplicity in this respect doubtless resulted from a praiseworthy feeling of humility, and a sense of her unworthiness to become a martyr for so glorious a cause as the Protestant faith, her conduct with respect to ecclesiastical affairs after her accession to the throne was characterized by such dissimulation, that after alternately raising the hopes of both Romanists and Reformers, she at length disappointed both, by rigourously enforcing submission to a system to which the whole of the former party, and a considerable section of the latter, could not conscientiously give their adhesion. And at a later period, although entertaining as exalted notions of the royal prerogative as any of the infatuated house of Stuart, and repressing with an iron hand the slightest symptoms of freedom of thought or speech among her own subjects, Elizabeth nevertheless, for reasons of state policy, secretly encouraged and aided the subjects of foreign powers in rebellion against their sovereigns. In Scotland, in France, and the Netherlands, under pretence of supporting the

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