an active and free will endowed subject, and who can predict with certainty what views and courses he will take under any given influences. Is it too much to suppose that the determinations of the free will and intellect endowed mind of man may offer a problem even to Divine wisdom? It is revealed to us that "man was created in the image of God;" and on the occasion of his " "fall," ," "the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil;" and we know that God addresses us in his word in the language of persuasion and reason, promise and threatening; but to what end, we ask, if more cogent and direct appliances were available? What, too, means the great work of redemption, furnishing us, as it does, with the means for "working out own salvation" by the voluntary and intelligent acceptance, on our part, of those "means of grace,' if more obvious and certain measures would effect the same result? Do not most of us know of instances where decidedly good influences have been averted, and rare opportunities abused, by perverse specimens of humanity? and conversely, are there not instances of men who have achieved an honorable repute, despite obstacles and adverse circumstances? But to accept the analogy, so far as it holds,-what does it prove to support "Vinculum's" assertion? The changes that can be induced on the "wild crab," or any other member of the wild vegetable tribes, are limited in extent and to well-ascertained directions. A "wild crab," passive though it be under the operations of human reason, cannot be "moulded into any shape;” much less, then, the free will endowed mind of man.

Apropos of "the appliances of "education" to the minds of our children and pauper population," the question, "Would education eradicate crime?" has been fully discussed in these pages, and has helped us to form a negative conclusion on that point. The arguments there adduced will hold good on the present occasion, to the extent the present question is affected by conclusions on that subject. If education, the most pointed of all the "circumstances" incident to man, cannot certainly effect its main design, much less can such dominancy over man be claimed for any other "circumstances." "Vinculum" may have proved that children are more the "creatures of circumstances than men ; but results, as exemplified in any and every family, are not of that frequent and uniform character necessary to constitute the "circumstances" of the parental relation a law, conforming its subjects to a set "pattern." Even children exercise a degree of volition and judgment which modifies the action of rarental influences and family circumstances; and this power continually increases as they advance in years, and in concomitant strength of will and judgment, so that the obedience that was rendered mainly from mere natural affection and a sense of dependence, is, at length, given from a principle of duty and

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intelligent affection; so that we give credit for moral goodness, which implies a free and intelligent source of action, as contradistinguished from the doings of "a creature of circumstances." Thus, we may admit that family characteristics and the attributes of race are something definite and real," without committing ourselves to the conclusion that "man, in the individual," is the "resultant" of "distinct (i. e., extrinsic) moral and physical forces." We quite concur in the statement that " every individual is affected by the circumstances of locality, association, and habit which he has himself voluntarily incurred, or to which he has been accidentally exposed." This is the modicum of truth in "Vinculum's" argument; but the pervading defect in his reasoning is a march of discrimination between causes principal and causes instrumental-between active causes and causes passive or reactive. Yet in this distinction, we conceive, lies the gist of the question at issue. If it is true that circumstances influence man, it is equally true that man modifies or creates, adopts or rejects, circumstances at his will; and in deciding whether "man is the creature of circumstances," or whether circumstances constitute the pabulum of man's activities, we have to determine which is the principal or active, and which the instrumental or passive, agent in producing results in man's regard. The question fairly before the mind, the judgment cannot well err in its decision. Man's will and intellect, going forth into action, encounter “circumstances," which reach in various ways. They may occur as opportunities or obstacles, adjuncts or temptations, incitements or determents; and according as he uses or abuses, overcomes or succumbs,acts or remains supine, will be the results to his individual character and destiny-results clearly attributable to his free determination as the cause principal. Perhaps we have now sufficiently answered "Vinculum's" arguments respecting "man in the individual;" so we will pass on to test his hypothesis respecting man in the aggregate," as being the "resultant of grand political and social laws." What laws are here meant ? Laws are for the most part of a prohibitory and conformative character, and so negative in the matter of producing positive results or "resultants;" they may conform the conduct, and even conduce to enlighten the intellect, but they are powerless to reform the heart or will of man. Such a proposition, as the one we have under notice, should have been supported by facts and illustrated by examples. We will endeavour to supply the defect. The Jewish nation was blessed with "political and social laws," expressedly framed for and adapted to it by the Divine Being himself. We know its history and final consummation. Can we say of that community that it was a "resultant" of its truly grand political and social laws"? Such an assertion would reflect on the Divine Lawgiver. But if not, why not? What answer have we but this,-that they were not the "creatures of

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circumstances"-of laws the most cogent we can conceive of for producing a given "political and social" "resultant"? We are told by "Vinculum," that "the irregularity of coast-line, the luxuriance of vegetable productions, or the beneficence of climate, render one nation prosperous and civilized, and by their absence retard the development of another, and keep it in a state of semi-barbarism." But what sort of a commentary do the respective histories and present circumstances of Holland and Turkey furnish to his text! A contemporary periodical,* speaking of the former country, says, "The nation in Europe, by far the thriftiest and most frugal, has in a great measure created its own country. By running out into the shallow sea dykes and embankments, and then pumping off the brine, the Hollanders have reclaimed a vast surface from the watery waste; and now, on spots where fishes used to be caught, and where ships rode at anchor, cattle graze, gardens blossom, and people go out and in among the thriving villages." Turkey, on the other hand, is second to none in geographical position, climatical advantages, and in vegetable and mineral riches; yet her resources remain undeveloped, and the great bulk of her inhabitants are little, if any, removed from a state of "semi-barbarism." Surely, "Vinculum" must have written in the spirit of the merest theorist, when he thus tempts the apposition of facts altogether condemnatory of his propositions. We wonder if the modicum of truth in Homo est, quod est propter stomachum, which "Vinculum" appears to confess to, had anything to do with the matter; the symptoms he so feelingly describes might account for such crudity. We are to be libelled as "not merely the creatures' but the 'slaves' of circumstances," because objects and events transcribe themselves on the tablet of the memory, and produce "ideas"! Parallelizing this mode of expression, we might proceed to characterize the eye as the slave of light-the lungs, of breath-the heart, of blood-or the soul, of affection! and we might go on to enumerate other equally felicitous and astute propositions ad infinitum. Apropos of Sydney Smith, and his remarks. It might answer the purpose of the "witty philosopher" to represent the order and relation of things to men, and men to things, in an inverted aspect. Such inversion is frequently made the vehicle for evolving wit; and wit is never better employed than in holding up to ridicule this inversion of true order, when it has place in the depraved or supine human subject. But propositions of this order are not those which judgment would choose to construct its philosophy withal; "Wit is not wisdom." It is propounded by "Vinculum," as "by no means an unworthy subject for consideration, whether that ungenial element, which more or less pervades the national (English) character, may not fairly be

* "Excelsior," No. 25, Art. I.

attributed to the variability of our climate." The drift of the suggestion renders a notice of it desirable. What if the reverse of the proposition be true? It is, at least, as susceptible of proof. Scripture tells us of lands rendered barren for "the wickedness of them that dwell therein;" and of nations which, at the time prophecies were uttered against them, "flowed with milk and honey," and were the seats of wealth, power, civilization, and luxury, but which became, as predicted, howling wildernesses." We opine a connection, as of cause and effect, between their sin and their visitation. We have heard of, and believe in, the spiritual nature of the occult causes of epidemics and diseases of all sorts; and it is by no means an unworthy subject for consideration, whether what occur to us as accidents, of every description, are not, under the permission of Providence, conduced and induced by spiritual agencies? whether all objectivities are not the natural exponents of spiritual realities? whether all evil and deleterious qualities are not referable to the common origin of evil, and result from the perverse use man has made of his free will, in averting himself from God, and perverting the good qualities and influences freely imparted to him, to selfish, proud, covetous, and sensual determinations? In short, it is a question, which we regard affirmatively, whether "man in the aggregate" has not a special influence on circumstances" in the aggregate; and, in his fallen state, the remote but fundamental cause of all evil and deleterious qualities and influences in the ground we tread on, the air we breathe, in plants and animals, and in events, while circumstances in themselves harmless, or calculated to be beneficial, may become harmful, in a relative sense, as affecting the individual? "There is nothing good or ill, but thinking makes it so," says Shakspeare; so true is it that the aspect of circumstances is altogether relative to the state of the individual affected by them. We conclude, in the hope that we have adduced considerations that will uphold the dignity of man against those who would degrade him, by their reasonings, to a "creature of circumstances." The general subject is one that induces strong reflection on the influence man has on his own character and consequent destiny. May some of our observations be found conducive to those actions which are the genuine fruit of noble aspirations and true principles, and without which such aspirations and principles are mere barren abstractions, effective only for the condemnation of those who "knew their Lord's will, and did it not." PERSONA.

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CONTEMPT.-The basest and meanest of all human beings are generally the most forward to despise others. So that the most contemptible are generally the most contemptuous.-Fielding. VIRTUE is the only nobility.-Seneca.

History.

IS THE CHARACTER OF QUEEN ELIZABETH
WORTHY OF ADMIRATION?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.-III.

THOSE who would defend the character of any great historical personage are placed in a position of no slight difficulty. "Without spot, and blameless," is an epitaph unbecoming any stone which covers the dust of humanity; and yet if the advocate admit great failings, his candor is not unapt to prejudice his hearers or readers against the cause he supports. Eulogy and invective," says Macaulay, "may be had for asking."

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In duly weighing the character of Elizabeth, let us first ask ourselves the question, Do we not find in the page of history evidences of a transition era of convulsion, violence, and persecution,—a whirlpool of passion, into which the greatest and best are drawn? Can we be surprised that the central figure of these troubled groups failed to come out calm and spotless? He who knew the human heart bade us pray that we might not be led into temptation; surely, then, as we utter the prayer for our selves, it behoves us to be very guarded in condemning those who were so sorely tried, and whose greatest failings are directly traceable to the prevalent influences and ideas of the age in which they lived.

Persecution for religion's sake is in these days classed among the most odious of human crimes. The last vestiges of such a spirit have been expunged from our own code, and its slightest movements in other lands are watched with a jealous eye, and met by remonstrance or direct interference. Most deeply do we glory in the pre-eminence of England in her religious freedom, and earnestly do we long for the extension of that freedom to every nation under heaven. But in the present debate, we feel that there is considerable danger of our readers being unduly prejudiced by the fact, which no candid admirer of Elizabeth can deny, that she was, to some extent, a persecutor. We had hoped that the candor of "Threlkeld" would have been copied by his coadjutors, and that, like him, they would have admitted that Elizabeth is scarcely to be blamed for her bigotry and intolerance;" but we regret to find that B. J. only quotes those words to differ from them, and to open the way for an attack upon Elizabeth's character on these specific grounds. Surely our readers will not endorse so prejudiced and unfair a

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