cles. de Const. n. 19 et 20. where amongst other things he saith, that the pope when he hath cause, can change the usual form of baptism, and make it lawful to baptize in the name of the Trinity, which he reports out of Innocentius, 'cap. 1. de Baptis, in fine, num. 1.' Yea, the same Felinus is bold to affirm'in cap. 1. de Const. n. 23.' that the pope with one word can create a priest, without any other solemnity, say. ing, Be thou a priest; which he reports out of Innocentius 'in cap. 1. Sacra Unct.' The same Felinus adds further, that the pope with his word alone can make a bishop; and he cites Angelus in lib. 2. cap. de Crim. Sacrilegii ; et in lib. 1. cap. de Sententiam passis.' The same is held by Decius concil. 112, n. 3. in fine: et in dict. cap. Quæ in Eccles. n. 25. et seq. alias n. 44 et 45. in Novis. Allegantur etiam alii Juristæ in cap. 2. de translat. Episcopi; et in lib. Manumissiones. ff. de just. et jure; et in lib. 2. cap. de Servit.'" &c.

Here is a rare way of probation: for these allegations are not only a testimonial that these Catholic authors are of that opinion; but it is intended to represent, that this opinion is not against the Catholic faith; that popes and great lawyers are of it; and therefore that it is safe, and it may be followed, or be let alone; but yet this is sufficient to determine the doubting conscience of a subject, or be propounded to him as that on which he may with security and indemnity rely. The thing is affirmed by Felinus, and for this he quotes Innocentius: and the same is the opinion of Decius, and for this opinion divers other lawyers are alleged. Now when this or the like happens to be in a question of so great concernment as this, it is such a dry story, such an improbable proof, so unsatisfying an answer to the conscience, that the great determination of all those questions and practices,-which can depend upon so universal an article as this, and a warranty to do actions which, their adversaries say, are abhorrent from the law of nature and common honesty, shall, in their final resort, rest upon the saying of one or two persons, who, having boldly spoken a foolish thing, have passed without condemnation by those superiors, for whose interest they have been bold to tell so great a lie.

In conclusion, the effect of these uncertain principles and unsteady conduct of questions is this; that though by violence and force they have constrained and thrust ther

churches into a union of faith, like beasts into a pound, yet they have made their cases of conscience and the actions of their lives unstable as the face of the waters, and immeasurable as the dimensions of the moon; by which means their confessors shall be enabled to answer according to every man's humour, and no man shall depart sad from their penitential chairs, and themselves shall take or give leave to any thing; concerning which I refer the reader to the books and letters written by their parties of Port-Royal, and to their own weak answers and vindications.

If I were willing, by accusing others, to get reputation to my own, or the undertakings of any of our persuasion or communion, I could give very many instances of their injustice and partialities in determining matters and questions of justice, which concern the church and their ecclesiastical persons; as if what was just amongst the reprobates of the laity were hard measure if done to an ecclesiastic, and that there were two sorts of justice, the one for seculars and the other for churchmen; of which their own books' give but too many instances. I could also remark that the monks and friars are iniquiores in matrimonium,' and make inquiries into matrimonial causes with an impure curiosity, and make answers sometimes with spite and envy, sometimes with licentiousness; that their distinction of sins mortal and venial hath intricated and confounded almost all the certainty and answers of moral theology; but nothing of this is fitted to my intention, which is only to make it evident that it was necessary that cases of conscience should be written over anew, and established upon better principles, and proceed in more sober and satisfying methods: nothing being more requisite than that we should all be instructed, aud thoroughly prepared to every good work;" that we should "have a conscience void of offence both towards God and towards man;" that we should be able to separate the vile from the precious," and know what to choose and what to avoid; that we may have our senses exercised to discern between good and evil,” that he may not " call good evil, or evil good." For since obedience is the love of God, and to do well is the life of religion, and the end of faith is the

r Vide Summas Cas. Consc. in verbis, Immunitas. Ecclesia, Hospitale. Privilegium. Clericus. Monasterium, &c.

death of sin and the life of righteousness; nothing is more necessary than that we be rightly informed in all moral notices; because in these things an error leads on to evil actions, to the choice of sin, and the express displeasure of God; otherwise than it happens in speculation and ineffective notices and school-questions.

And indeed upon this consideration I was always confident, that though the questions of the school were nice and subtile, difficult and very often good for nothing; yet that in moral theology I should have found so perfect an accord, so easy determination of questions, that it would have been harder to find out questions than answers; and the great difficulty in books of this subject would be to put the great number of inquiries into order and method. I was not deceived in the ground and reason of my conjecture; because I knew that" in promtu et facili est æternitas;" God had made the way to heaven plain and simple; and what was necessary did lie open, and the lines of duty were to be read by every eye, or heard and learned by all understandings; and therefore it is certain that all practical truths are to be found out without much contention and dispute, because justice and obedience to God in all moral conversation are natural to us, just as logic and discourse are. But when I came to look a little nearer, I found that men were willing enough to be tied up to believe the inactive propositions of the doctors, but would keep a liberty of pleasing themselves in matters of life and conversation: in the former they would easily be governed by leading men; but in the latter they would not obey God himself, and without great regret would not be confined to strictness and severity in their cases of conscience. Some would; but many would not. They that would, gave laws unto themselves, and they could easily be governed; but they that would not, were ready to trample upon their yoke, if it were not made gentle and easy for their neck. But this was the least part of the evil.

For besides this, moral theology was made a trade for the house, and an art of the schools: and as nothing is more easy than natural logic, and yet nothing harder than sophistical, so it is in moral theology; what God had made plain, men have intricated; and the easy commandment is wrapped up in uneasy learning; and by the new methods, a simple

VOL. XI.

2 A

and uncrafty man cannot be wise unto salvation;' which is but small comfort to him that stands in the place of the idiot and unlearned. Sometimes a severe commandment is expounded by the sense of ease and liberty, and the liberty is established in rule; but because the rule is not true in some hundreds of cases, a conscientious man does not know how to make use of it: and if the commandment be kept close to the sense of strictness and severity, there are so many outlets and escapes found out, that few men think themselves obliged. Thus in the rule, "Spoliatur ante omnia restituendum," which is an excellent measure of conscience in many cases, and certainly can have no direct abatement in the duty, and the party obliged can only be relieved by equity in the manner of doing it; yet of this plain and easy rule, Gabrielius brings no less than threescore and ten limitations and to make all questions of that nature and the rule of conscience infinite and indeterminable, Menochius hath seven hundred ninety and eight questions concerning 'possession;'-and "who is sufficient for these things?"There is a rule amongst the lawyers which very much relates to the conscience of those men, who are engaged in suits and sentences of law in all countries which are ruled by the civil law: "In quolibet actu requiritur citatio." Of this rule Porcius brings a hundred and sixteen ampliations, and a hundred and four-and-twenty limitations.-Maranta enumerates forty cases, in which a negative ought to be proved: and Socinus sets down eight hundred and two 'fallencies' (that is the word of the law), concerning the contestation of suits and actions at law. Many more might be reckoned even in the interpreters of the civil law, and in the measures we derive from thence. But if any man thinks it better in the canon law, which is supposed to be as great a rule of our conscience in the matter of religion as the other is of justice; I shall only say, that the very title of the canon law was 'Concordantia Discordantiarum,' a tying of contradictions together in one string: and when you begin to look into the interpreters of the Decretum,' which is the best part of the canon law, Simoncellus tells that the word 'decretum' hath five-and-twenty significations. So that there is a wood before your doors, and a labyrinth within the wood, and locks

• Tract. de Decretis.

and bars to every door within that labyrinth; and after all we are like to meet with unskilful guides; and yet of all things in the world, in these things an error is the most intolerable.

But thus the enemy of mankind hath prevailed upon us, while we were earnest in disputations about things less concerning: then he was watchful and busy to interweave evil and uncertain principles into our moral institutions, to entangle what was plain, to divide what was simple, to make an art of what was written in the tables of our hearts with the finger of God. When a gentleman was commending Dr. Fisher's (bishop of Rochester) great pains in the confutations of Luther's books, the wise prelate said heartily, that he wished he had spent all that time in prayer and meditation which he threw away upon such useless wranglings. For that was the wisdom of the ancients: "Antiqua sapientia nihil aliud quam facienda et vitanda præcepit: et tunc meliores erant viri. Postquam docti prodierunt, boni desunt. Simplex enim illa et aperta virtus in obscuram et solertem scientiam versa est; docemurque disputare non vivere: "Our forefathers taught their children what to do and what to avoid; and then men were better. But when men did strive to become learned, they did not care so much to become good; then they were taught to dispute rather than to live." To this purpose I understand that excellent saying of Solomon ; "Of making many books there is no end, and much study is a weariness of the flesh. Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter. Fear God and keep his commandments; for this is the whole duty of man":"-meaning, that books which serve to any other purpose, are a laborious vanity, consumptive of our time and health to no purpose: nothing else being to any purpose but such things which teach us to fear God, and how to keep his commandments. All books, and all learning, which minister to this end, partake of the goodness of the end; but that which promotes it not, is not to be regarded: and therefore the Chaldee paraphrast reads these words into an advice of making many books tending to holiness: "Fili mi, monitus esto ut facias libros sapientiæ plurimos, adeo ut non sit finis; et ut studeas verbis legis, conspiciasque defatigationem carnis :" "Make books of wisdom very many, and study in the words of the law till thou

t Seneca ad Lucil.

u Eccles. xii. 12.