Americans as any in the house, unless Mr. Gadsden should be excepted. Nevertheless, I thought this resolution a triumph, and a most important point gained.

Mr. John Rutledge was now completely with us in our desire of revolutionizing all the governments, and he brought forward immediately some representations from his own State, when

"Congress, then taking into consideration the State of South Carolina, and sundry papers relative thereto being read and considered,

"Resolved, That a committee of five be appointed to take the same into consideration, and report what in their opinion is necessary to be done. The members chosen, Mr. Harrison, Mr. Bullock, Mr. Hooper, Mr. Chase, and Mr. S. Adams." On November 4th,

"The committee appointed to take into consideration the State of South Carolina, brought in their report, which being read," a number of resolutions passed, the last of which will be found in page 235 of the Journals, at the bottom.

"Resolved, That if the Convention of South Carolina shall find it necessary to establish a form of government in that Colony, it be recommended to that Convention to call a full and free representation of the people, and that the said representatives, if they think it necessary, shall establish such a form of government as in their judgment will produce the happiness of the people, and most effectually secure peace and good order in the Colony, during the continuance of the present dispute between Great Britain and the Colonies.

JOHN ADAMS, Works. III. 17-22.

CRITICAL COMMENT

HITCHCOCK (1887)

But these constitutional enactments are also social and political phenomena. We may study them in order to learn, not only what they prescribe, but, so to speak, what they reveal. As such phenomena they have, not only for the student of historical jurisprudence but for every thoughtful man, concerned for the future of his country, a significance quite distinct from that which they have either for the officer who

...

must execute, or for the citizen who must obey them. . They signify and express, not the "civium ardor prava jubentium,” but the conclusions of a free people as to what changes in their organic law will best promote the common welfare.

HENRY HITCHCOCK, American State Constitutions. 8, 9.

J. A. JAMESON (1887)

The mode adopted by Virginia was similar to that followed in those colonies (N. H. and S. C.). The Provincial Convention elected in April, 1776, to continue in office one year, met at Williamsburg on the 6th of May thereafter, and on the 29th of June following framed and established the first constitution of Virginia. This Convention was elected as a revolutionary assembly, to carry on, as Mr. Jefferson expresses it," the ordinary business of the government," in default of the House of Burgesses, and to "call forth the powers of the State for the maintenance of the opposition to Great Britain." It was not pretended, if the same authority is to be credited, that, in assuming to frame a constitution, the Convention had any warrant or authority whatever, except such as enured to it by virtue of its revolutionary character. In so doing, then, it is regarded, not as a constitutional, but as a Revolutionary Convention. It was not empowered to discharge the special and high function of enacting a fundamental code, by any law or by the express desire of the people, but acted on its own authority and it did not deign to take upon its work the sense of the people whom it pretended to represent.

JOHN A. JAMESON, Treatise on Constitutional Conventions. 125, 126.

GEO. T. CURTIS (1889)

It is a singular circumstance that, while the Revolutionary government was left to conduct the great affairs of the continent through the mere instrumentality of a congress of delegates, and was thus failing for the want of departments and powers, the states were engaged in applying those great principles in the organization and construction of popular governments, under which they may be formed with rapidity and ease, and which are capable of the most varied adaptation to the circumstances and wants of a free people.

Fortunately, as we have seen, the previous constitutions of all the colonies had accustomed the people, to a great extent, to the business of government; and when the recommendation of the Continental Congress to the several colonies to adopt such governments as would best conduce to their happiness and safety was made immediately after the first effusion of blood, it was addressed to civil societies, in which the people had, in different modes, been long accustomed to witness and to exercise the functions of legislation, and in all of which there were established forms of law, of judicature, and of executive power.

The new political situation in which they now found themselves required, in many of the colonies, but little departure from these ancient institutions. The chief innovation necessary was to bring into practical working the authority of the people in place of that of the crown of England, as the source of all political power. The changes requisite to effect this were of course to be made at once; the materials for these changes existed everywhere, in the representative institutions which had long been a part of the system of every colony since the first settlement of the country. . . . The foundations . . . for popular governments existed in all the colonies, and furnished the means for substituting the new source of political power, the will of the people, in the place of that of an external sovereign.

But there were other materials, also, for the formation of regular and balanced governments, with nearer approaches to perfection and with far greater completeness than a mere democracy can afford to any people, however familiar they may be with the exercise and the practice of government. The people of these colonies had been so trained as to be able to apply those principles in the construction and operation of government which enable it to work freely, successfully, and wisely, while resting on a popular basis. They were able to see that the whole of what is meant and understood by government is comprehended in the existence and due operation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. They had lived under political arrangements, in which these powers had been distributed so as to keep them for the most part distinct from

each other, and so as to mark the proper limitations of each. If, in some instances, the same individuals had exercised more than one of these powers, the distinctions between the departments, and the principles which ought to regulate such distinctions, had become known. The people of the colonies, in general, therefore, saw that nothing was so important, in constructing a government with popular institutions, as to balance each of these departments against the others, so as to leave to neither of them uncontrolled and irresponsible power.

66

... Three of the colonies, namely, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Virginia, proceeded to form constitutions of government before the Declaration of Independence was adopted, under a special recommendation given to each of them by Congress, in the latter part of the year 1775, addressed to the provincial convention, advising them to call a full and free representation of the people, to establish such a form of government as in their judgment will best promote the happiness of the people, and most effectually secure good order in the province during the continuance of the present dispute between Great Britain and the colonies." . . . On the 15th of May, 1776, the Provincial Convention of Virginia proceeded to prepare a declaration of rights and a constitution. The latter declared that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be distinct and separate, and divided the legislative department into two branches, the house of delegates and the senate, to be called "the General Assembly of Virginia." The members of the house of delegates were chosen from each county, and one from the city of Williamsburg, and one from the borough of Norfolk. The senate consisted of twenty-four members, chosen from as many districts. A governor and council of state were chosen annually by joint ballot of both houses. The legislature appointed the judges, who were commissioned by the governor, and held their offices during good behaviour.

G. T. CURTIS, Constitutional History.1 I. 80-84.

BORGEAUD (1892)

European critics of American democracy almost always make the mistake of looking only at the Federal Constitution of the 1 Copyright, 1889, by George Ticknor Curtis.

United States and of leaving unexamined the institutions of the several States. It may be said, in their defence, that the Americans themselves are the cause of this, since, for a century, they have devoted all their zeal to the history and criticism of Federal public law and are only now beginning the systematic study of their local constitutions. But the mistake,

though explicable and pardonable, is none the less grave. Recently two masters of political science, M. E. Boutmy, in France, and Mr. James Bryce, in England, have called attention to its unhappy consequences. They have easily shown that the institutions of the States are the edifice itself of which the Federal constitution is but the completion, that they are the real foundation of the national institutions, and that American democracy cannot be understood or judged apart from the environment in which its development has taken place.

CHARLES BORGEAUD, Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions in Europe and America, translated by C. D. Hazen. 137.

BRYCE (1896)

When, in 1776, the thirteen colonies threw off their allegiance to King George III., and declared themselves independent States, the colonial charter naturally became the State constitution. In most cases it was remodelled, with large alterations, by the revolting colony. But in three states it was maintained unchanged, except, of course, so far as Crown authority was concerned, viz., in Massachusetts till 1780, in Connecticut till 1818, and in Rhode Island till 1842. The other States admitted to the Union in addition to the original thirteen, have entered it as organized self-governing communities, with their constitutions already made by their respective peoples. Each Act of Congress which admits a new State admits it as a subsisting commonwealth, sometimes empowering its people to meet and enact a constitution for themselves (subject to conditions mentioned in the Act), sometimes accepting and confirming a constitution so already made by the people. Congress may impose conditions which the State constitution must fulfil; and in admitting the six newest States has affected to retain the power of maintaining these conditions in force. But the authority of the State constitutions does not flow from