equally plain, namely, that he will not: for whatsoever the Lord pleaseth, that does he in heaven and on earth. It is said, indeed, by the apostle, that God would have all men saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth? i. e. as Austin,* consonantly with other scriptures, explains the passage, "God will save some out of the whole race of mankind," that is, persons of all nations, kindreds and tongues. Nay, he will save all men; i. e. as the same father observes, แ "every kind of men, or men of every kind," namely, the election of grace, be they bond or free, noble or ignoble, rich or poor, male or female. Add to this, that it evidently militates against the majesty, omnipotence, and supremacy of God, to suppose that he can either will any thing in vain, or that any thing can take effect against his will: therefore Bucer observes very rightly, ad Rom. ix. "God doth not will the salvation of reprobates, seeing he hath not chosen them, neither created them to that end." Consonant to which are those words of Luther, "This mightily offends our rational nature, that God should, of his own mere unbiassed will, leave some men to themselves, harden them, and then condemn them but he has given abundant demonstration, , and does continually, that this is really the case; namely, that the sole cause why some are saved, and others perish, proceeds from his willing the salvation of the former, and the perdition of the latter, according to that of Paul,He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." * Enchir. c. 103. & de Corr. & Gr. c. 14. † De Serv. Arb. c. 161. Pos. 9. As God doth not will that each individual of mankind should be saved; so neither did he will that Christ should properly and immediately die for each individual of mankind; whence it follows, that though the blood of Christ, from its own intrinsic dignity, was sufficient for the redemption of all men, yet, in consequence of his Father's appointment, he shed it intentionally, and therefore effectually and immediately, for the elect only. This is self-evident. God, as we have before proved, wills not the salvation of every man : but he gave his Son to die for them whose salvation he willed; therefore his Son did not die for every man. All those, for whom Christ died, are saved; and the divine justice indispensably requires that to them the benefits of his death should be imparted; but only the elect are saved; they only partake of those benefits; consequently, for them only he died and intercedes. The apostle, Rom. viii. asks, "Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God's elect? it is God that justifies," i. e. his elect, exclusively of others: "who is he that condemneth? It is Christ that died" for them, exclusively of others. The plain meaning of the passage is, that those whom God justifies, and for whom Christ died, (justification and redemption being of exactly the same extent,) cannot be condemned. These privileges are expressly restricted to the elect: therefore God justifies and Christ died for them alone. In the same chapter, Paul asks; "He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, (i. e. for all us elect persons) how shall he not, with him, also freely give us all things?" i. e. salvation, and all things necessary to it. Now, it is certain that these are not given to every individual; and yet, if Paul says true, they are given to all those for whom Christ was delivered to death; consequently, he was not delivered to death for every individual. To the same purpose St. Austin argues, in Johan. tract. 45. col. 335. Hence that saying of Ambrose,* "si non credis, non tibi passus est," i. e. if you are an unbeliever, Christ did not die for you. Meaning, that whoever is left under the power of final unbelief, is thereby evidenced to be one of those for whom Christ did not die: but that all for whom he suffered, shall be, in this life, sooner or later, endued with faith. The church of Smyrna, in their letter to the diocese of Pontus, insist every where on the doctrine of special redemption.t Bucer, in all parts of his works, observes, that "Christ died restrictively for the elect only; but for them universally." Pos. 10. From what has been laid down, it follows, that Austin, Luther, Bucer, the scholastic divines, and other learned writers, are not to be blamed for asserting that God may, in some sense, be said to will the being and commission of sin." For, was this contrary to his determining will of permission, either he would not be omnipotent, or sin could have no place in the world but he is omnipotent, and sin has place in the world; which it could not have, if God willed otherwise; for "who hath resisted his will?" Rom. ix. No one can deny that God permits sin: but he neither permits it ignorantly, nor unwillingly; therefore, knowingly and willingly. Vid Aust. Enchir. c. 96. Luther steadfastly maintains this in his book de Serv. Arbitr. and Bucer in Rom. 1. However, it should be * Ambros. Tom. 2. de fid. ad. Grat. 1. 4. c. i carefully noticed, (1.) That God's permission of sin does not arise from his taking delight in it: on the contrary, sin, as sin, is the abominable thing that his soul hateth: and his efficacious permission of it is for wise and good purposes. Whence that observation of Austin,* "God, who is no less omnipotent than he is supremely and perfectly holy, would never have permitted evil to enter among his works, but in order that he might do good even with that evil," i. e. overrule it for good in the end. (2.) That God's free and voluntary permission of sin lays no man under any forcible or compulsive necessity of committing it: consequently, the Deity can by no means be termed the author of moral evil; to which he is not, in the proper sense of the word, accessary, but only remotely or negatively so, inasmuch as he could, if he pleased, absolutely prevent it. We should, therefore, be careful not to give up the omnipotence of God, under a pretence of exalting his holiness: he is infinite in both, and therefore neither should be set aside or obscured. To say that God absolutely nills the being and commission of sin, while experience convinces us that sin is acted every day, is to represent the Deity as a weak, impotent being, who would fain have things go otherwise than they do, but cannot accomplish his desire. On the other hand, to say that he willeth sin, doth not in the least detract from the holiness and rectitude of his nature; because, whatever God wills, as well as whatever he does, cannot be eventually evil: materially evil it may be ; but, as was just said, it must, ultimately, be directed to some * Enchir, c. 11. wise and just end, otherwise he could not will it for his will is righteous and good, and the sole rule of right and wrong, as is often observed by Austin, Luther, and others. Pos. 11. In consequence of God's immutable will and infallible foreknowledge, whatever things come to pass, come to pass necessarily; though, with respect to second causes, and us men, many things are contingent: i. e. unexpected, and seemingly accidental. That this was the doctrine of Luther, none can deny, who are in any measure acquainted with his works: particularly with his treatise De servo Arbitrio, or free will a slave: the main drift of which book is, to prove, that the will of man is by nature enslaved to evil only, and, because it is fond of that slavery, is therefore said to be free. Among other matters, he proves there, that, "whatever man does, he does necessarily, though not with any sensible compulsion : and that we can only do what God from eternity willed and foreknew he should; which will of God must be effectual, and his foresight must be certain." Hence we find him saying, "It is most necessary and salutary for a Christian to be assured, that God foreknows nothing uncertainly; but that he determines, and foresees, and acts, in all things, according to his own eternal, immutable, and infallible will;" adding " Hereby, as with a thunderbolt, is man's free will thrown down and destroyed." A little after, he shews in what sense he took the word necessity; "By it," says he, "I do not mean that the will suffers any forcible constraint, or coaction; but the infallible accomplishment of those things, which * Cap. 17. in Resp. ad. præf. * |