tions and conditions. will naturally involve, to a greater or less extent, mutual Stipulastipulations and conditions. On the one hand, the sovereign may set forth the policy which, in his judgment ought to be pursued for the national good, and may stipulate for the carrying out of the same, as the condition on which alone he is willing to accept of their advice and assistance in the government of the country; and it will be for the consideration of the statesmen who are invited to accept office upon these terms, whether they are in a position to carry out such a policy, consistently with their own convictions, their party obligations, and their assurance of adequate parliamentary support. On the other hand, an incoming ministry are warranted in requiring from the king, as a condition to their acceptance of office, any assurances which are not incompatible with the independence of the crown, or with the legitimate exercise of the royal prerogative. But a ministry have no right to bind either themselves or their sovereign by Pledges, pledges in regard to proceedings in hypothetical cases; or to forestall their own freedom of advice in respect to contingencies not immediately occurrent, but that may afterwards arise." This point was finally established, by general consent, as a result of the dismissal of the Grenville ministry, in 1807, by George III., for recording, in a Minute of Council, that it was their right and duty to submit their views upon the Catholic question-which they had consented to forego, for a time, in deference to the opinions of the king-at any future period, when they might see fit to urge them. The king insisted upon the withdrawal of this minute, and the substitution of a pledge never again to propose for his consideration See the conduct of Pulteney, when George II. offered him full power to construct a ministry, after the resignation of Sir Robert Walpole, provided he would pledge himself to screen Sir Robert from prosecution (Mahon's Hist. of England, vol. iii. pp. 162–165). In 1779 during the progress of the American war, George III. declared that he should expect a written declaration from all new ministers that they anything in favour of the Catholic claims. Upon their refusal to comply with this demand, his Majesty dismissed them from his councils. The constitutional question involved in the conduct, both of the king and of his ministers, was fully discussed in Parliament, and resolutions were submitted to both Houses, declaring that it was contrary to the first duties of the confidential servants of the crown to restrain themselves by any pledge, express or implied, from offering to the king any advice that the course of circumstances might render necessary for the welfare and security of any part of the empire.' The doctrine embodied in this resolution met with little opposition in either House, although, as a matter of expediency, and to avoid collision with the new ministry, it was agreed that no direct vote should be taken thereupon. But we may freely accept the conclusions of May on this subject, when he " that says question of policy, it had obviously been a false step, on the part of ministers, to give expression to their reservations in the minute of the cabinet. They had agreed to abandon the Bill which had caused the difference between themselves and his Majesty; and by virtue of their office, as the king's ministers, were free on any future occasion to offer such advice as they might think proper. By their illadvised minute they invited the retaliation of this obnoxious pledge. But no constitutional writer could now be found to defend the pledge itself, or to maintain that the ministers who accepted office in consequence of the refusal of that pledge had not taken upon themselves the same responsibility as if they had advised it.' as a It was charged against Mr. Canning that, upon his acceptance of office, in 1827, he had given George IV. a pledge in respect to the Roman Catholic question, similar to that which had been refused by the Grey ministry in 1807. This accusation received considerable currency at the time, and was afterwards repeated in the private diary of the Duke of Buckingham, on the alleged authority of the king himself. But Sir Robert Peel, who was the friend and follower of Canning, discredits the impu Parl. Deb. April 9 and 13, 1807; Mr. Speaker Abbott's Comments on the Debate: Colchester Diary, vol. ii. p. 119; and ante, vol. i. pp. 89-91. May, Const. Hist. i. 96, 97. See also Sir Robert Peel's speech in the House of Commons on the 2nd of March, 1835, wherein he declared that it would be unbecoming in · him, as a minister of the crown, to consent to place any prerogative of the crown in abeyance, or, upon the principle of a hypothetical case, to pledge himself, as a minister of the crown and a privy councillor, how he should advise the crown as to the course it should pursue.'-Annual Register, 1835, p. 110. tation, and it appears to be now admitted that it was wholly unfounded." The constitutional doctrine on this subject has since Freedom received still more authoritative confirmation. of action between the crown and minis In 1851, upon the resignation of the Russell ministry, Lord Stanley (now Earl of Derby) was invited by the Queen to form an ters. administration; but was unable to succeed, owing to the Conservative party being in a minority in the House of Commons. In giving to the House of Lords explanations of his conduct during this political crisis, Lord Stanley adverted to an erroneous impression which prevailed, that his relinquishment of the attempt to construct a cabinet arose from the refusal of her Majesty to grant him the power of dissolving Parliament whenever he might think it desirable to do so a dissolution at the time of his accepting office being confessedly impracticable, owing to the state of the public business, and unadvisable perhaps on other grounds. This rumour, his lordship declared, had not the shadow of foundation in fact. He had not ventured to recommend a dissolution at this time, because he considered it impossible; and he added, 'I hope I know my duty to my sovereign too well to insist upon a pledge upon a question with respect to which no sovereign ought to give a pledge. On the other hand, I am confident that her Majesty knows too well, and respects too highly, the mutual obligations, if I may venture to use the phrase, which subsist between a constitutional sovereign and her responsible advisers, to refuse to me, or to any minister who may be honoured with her confidence, the ordinary powers entrusted to a minister, or to depart from the ordinary understanding of being guided by his advice; and I am authorised, on the part of her Majesty, distinctly to state that no person would be justified in saying, or holding out the belief that if I had felt it my duty to recommend to her Majesty the dissolution of Parliament, her Majesty's consent would have been withheld.' c If a complete freedom of action, in respect to advice to be offered to the sovereign, is essential to the due independence of a ministry from unconstitutional influence on the part of the crown, it is no less imperative that they should suffer no encroachment upon their liberty of action from any other quarter. Thus, when Lord John Russell was urged, in the House of Commons, on July 24, 1854, to agree to a proposal for the holding of an Peel's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 275. And see Knight's Pop. Hist. of Eng. vol. viii. p. 206. e Hans. Deb. vol. cxiv. p. 1014, Stipula tions upon accepting office. autumnal session of Parliament, on account of the disturbed state of Europe, he refused, 'on the part of the ministers of the crown, to accept at the hands of members restrictions on their freedom in giving to the sovereign such advice as they may think proper. We must be left at full liberty to give such advice as the circumstances of the times at the time may seem from us to demand . . . we must be unfettered as to the time at which we may advise her Majesty to take the advice of Parliament.' Authorities having been adduced in proof of the irregularity of pledges, in regard to advice to be tendered, or received, in hypothetical cases, between the sovereign and his constitutional advisers, it may be desirable to furnish a few examples of stipulations made, as conditions precedent to the acceptance of office. Such stipulations. are of frequent occurrence, and if kept within due bounds are quite justifiable. For the king has an undoubted right to require that any administration about to be formed shall be constructed upon certain definite principles, which would in his judgment best promote the interests of the nation. And on the other hand, ministers, before agreeing to assume the responsibility of office, must be free to stipulate for permission to carry out such a policy as they may deem essential for the public good. Security against abuse, in either case, is afforded by the necessity for mutual agreement upon a line of action that will satisfy their own sense of right, and will be likely to obtain the approval of Parliament. In 1765 the Grenville ministry consented to remain in office, after fruitless attempts on the part of the king to form another administration, upon condition that Lord Bute, who had made himself notorious, by frequent interferences, in secret, between the king and his ministers, should not be suffered to take part in his Majesty's councils in any manner or shape whatever.' To this the king agreed, and there is every reason to believe that he kept his word. Similar conditions were made by the Rockingham administration in 1766, and were acquiesced in by the king. On the other hand, the king himself, in 1779, determined to admit none to his councils without exacting from them a pledge to preserve the integrity of the empire, and to prosecute with vigour the war against the d Hans. Deb. vol. cxxxv. p. 612. And see pp. 716, 764. e May, Const. Hist. i. 27. ↑ Ibid. 29. rebellious American colonies. So long, indeed, as ministers were willing to be personally responsible for such a policy, and could carry Parliament with them, the right of the king to impose such conditions cannot be questioned, without reducing the sovereign to a mere automaton. But ere long George III. was himself obliged to submit to the urgent representations of the House of Commons in favour of peace with America. Lord North, his favourite minister, who had for a considerable period persisted in the war policy, to please the king, and against his own secret convictions, was forced, by an adverse vote of the House, in 1782, to declare that he was prepared to advise the king to agree to propositions of peace. This tardy concession came too late to save the ministry; they were soon afterwards obliged to resign office on account of the hostility of the House of Commons. On the retirement of Lord North, the king was reluctantly compelled to call to his counsels the Rockingham administration, whose first stipulation was, the concession of independence to America. Again, upon Mr. Pitt's return to power, in 1804, the king stipulated that he should not again renew the agitation of the Catholic question, the advocacy of which had led to his dismissal from office in 1801. Mr. Pitt consented to these terms, but contrived to evade a more stringent condition, which the king sought to impose upon him.h cabinet. The cabinet is composed of the more eminent portion Number of the administration, but it does not ordinarily include of the more than a fourth part of the same. Its numbers, however, are indefinite and variable; for it is competent to the statesman who is charged with the formation of a ministry, with the consent of the sovereign, to put as many persons as he pleases into the cabinet. The first cabinet of George I. consisted of eight members, of whom not more than five or six were in regular attendance, the others being either resident abroad, or not invariably invited to attend the council meetings. The first cabinet of George III. (in 1760) consisted of fourteen members, of whom eight were of ducal rank, five earls, and but one a commoner. In 1770, on the first formation of his ministry, Lord North introduced seven persons k May, Const. Hist. i. 42, 47, 51. b Ibid. p. 85. And see Stanhope, Life of Pitt, vol. iii. pp. 310-313; Jesse, Life of George III. vol. iii. 537. Yonge, Life of Lord Liverpool, P. vol. iii. pp. 210-212. Rep. Com. on J Mahon, Hist. of England, i. 153. k p. 59. |