right for him to observe.' He therefore held himself aloof from all the trammels of party, its jealousies and animosities, and resolutely abstained from even the appearance of political partisanship. And not only so, but the feelings of that nature by which the queen so candidly admits that she was herself biassed at this time, soon ceased to show themselves, under the influence of his judicious counsels; and all parties have long borne willing testimony to the cordial and constitutional support which, when charged with the administration of the government, each party in turn received from the queen, and from the prince as her natural confidential adviser.'t In his wise and patriotic endeavour to inculcate upon her majesty the duty of strict neutrality in political matters, Prince Albert was ably seconded by Lord Melbourne, the then Prime Minister, who, though himself a Whig, took the opportunity of the royal marriage to urge upon the queen that the time had come when she should have a general amnesty for the Tories.' And upon another occasion, speaking of the Tories, against whom the queen was very irate, Lord Melbourne said, 'You should now hold out the olive-branch a little."" The queen's predilection for the Whigs at the commencement of her reign may be easily accounted for. It was partly attributable to her personal regard for Lord Melbourne, who guided her first steps as a sovereign with the most affectionate, loyal, and devoted care. It was also fostered and increased by certain proceedings in Parliament in relation to the naturalisation of Prince Albert, and the sum to be granted for the expenses of his household, wherein the Tory opposition evinced an unusual degree of party asperity. These circumstances, however, although sufficient to account for and to explain her majesty's bias, afford no justification for it, as she herself has simply and touchingly confessed. But allowance Grey, Early Years of the Prince Consort, pp. 276, 284, 327. u Ibid. V p. 327. Ibid. chapters xi. xii. xiii. xiv. Right of access to the sovereign. must be made for the queen's youth and inexperience at this trying juncture: the more so, as since her marriage she has uniformly co-operated, in the most frank and unreserved manner, with every leading statesman, of whatever party, who has in turn enjoyed her political confidence." The privilege of access to the sovereign is accorded to every political head of an administrative office, who is at liberty to make whatever communications may be neces sary on behalf of his own department. But all correspondence between the sovereign and a subordinate minister should be submitted to the Premier; if not beforehand, at any rate immediately after it has taken place.* The sovereign is never present at meetings of the Cabinet Council. Formerly, as we have seen,' a different practice prevailed. But it needs no argument to prove that in order to be impartial, the deliberations of the responsible advisers of the crown upon affairs of state must be private and confidential. Until ministers have come to an understanding as to the advice they will tender to their sovereign, upon any given occasion, it would be premature for them to communicate with the crown thereon. The Premier himself is under no obligation, either of duty or of courtesy, to confer with the sovereign upon any matter which is still under the consideration of the Cabinet. Decisions But so soon as any particular project, or line of policy, of Cabinet has been agreed to, with a view either to legislative or mitted for administrative action, it becomes the duty of the Premier, the royal approval; as the minister in whom the crown has placed its constitutional confidence, to take the royal pleasure thereupon; and to afford his sovereign an opportunity for the exercise of that constitutional criticism in all departments to be sub of the state,' which is the right and duty of the Crown, and which in its operation is confessedly most salutary' and efficacious." A neglect of this rule by Mr. Pitt when, in the year 1800, his colleagues had coincided with him as to the expediency of a certain concession to the claims of the Roman Catholics, led to his loss of office, and to the withdrawal of the king's confidence from the ministry.” neglect of this rule by Mr. Pitt in 1800; It is somewhat remarkable that Mr. Addington, who succeeded Mr. Pitt as Prime Minister, should also have exposed himself to the charge of forgetting the deference due to his sovereign, when, in 1803, he made overtures to Mr. Pitt to resume the premiership, without having been authorised to do so by the king." Mr. Pitt's reply was, that before considering the matter, he should first desire to know what his majesty's wishes might be on the subject." He afterwards communicated to Mr. Addington the exact conditions upon which alone he would consent to take office; but intimated that any discussion thereof must be considered merely as common conversa- his defence tion. Adding that he must be fully acquainted with his majesty's pleasure, before he could say a word or occasion. pronounce a name which should be considered as binding.' These terms proved to be unacceptable to the Cabinet, and the negotiation ended, whereupon Mr. Pitt declared that he would in future receive no overtures but such as might be made by the express command of his majesty.' Several days afterwards, Mr. Addington informed the king of the matter, and offered to lay before him the whole correspondence. But his majesty, being annoyed that he had not been earlier consulted, refused to read Mr. Disraeli, Hans. Deb., vol. clxxxviii. p. 1113. And see ante, vol. i. pp. 201, 231. Massey, Geo.'III., vol. iv. p. 550. Russell's Life of Fox, vol. iii. p. 202. Stanhope's Pitt, vol. iii. pp. 268– 276. Mr. Pitt afterwards blamed himself for not having earlier enVOL. II. Р deavoured to reconcile the king to See SirG. C. Lewis's remarks on Stanhope's Pitt, vol. iii. p. 432; vol. iv. p. 32. on a later What matters the letters, or to take any notice of them. Two days later he said to Lord Pelham, It is a foolish business from one end to the other. It was begun ill, conducted ill, and terminated ill.'d It may seem difficult to determine, in every instance, require the precisely what matters ought to receive the assent of the Prnction of crown, beforehand, and what might be properly underthe Crown. taken at the discretion and upon the responsibility of the previous Cabinet minutes several heads of executive departments. But this much, at any rate, is clear, that no important acts of Government, which would commit the crown to a definite action, or line of policy, which had not already received the royal approbation, should be undertaken without the previous sanction of the sovereign. This rule is not meant to apply to the ordinary course of official communications, but to such only as, to any extent, may initiate a new line of policy, or upon which it might be conceived that a doubt would arise as to the sentiments that would be entertained by the sovereign, either in regard to the act itself, the method of its performance, or the language employed in relation thereto. On the other hand, it is not necessary to consult the crown upon ordinary matters of official routine, or upon minor points of administration, which are suitable to be transacted by the direct authority of the head of the particular department of state responsible for the same." Any minutes that may be agreed upon by the Cabinet, sent to the and which are intended to be communicated to the sovereign. sovereign, should be conveyed through the Premier, either by letter or at an audience, to be requested for the purpose. Such minutes should invariably record the names of the ministers present when they were adopted. The conclusions of the Cabinet in less important matters are usually made known to the sovereign by letter from the Prime Minister. If any ministers present at a Cabinet Council dissent from a minute which has been agreed to by a majority of the ministers present, the names of the dissentients, and the extent of their opposition, should be communicated to the king. Sometimes the substance of the deliberations of the Cabinet, upon a particular question, is explained to the king by the Premier at a personal interview, when if the matter be of sufficient gravity and importance, written minutes would be prepared of the conversation between the sovereign and his chief minister, in order to prevent misapprehension in communicating the same to other members of the Cabinet.' In 1825, under the Liverpool administration, the king (George IV.) made an attempt to obtain separate memorandums from each Cabinet Minister upon a particular question, in lieu of a regular minute emanating from the Cabinet collectively. The king's object was to fix upon Mr. Canning, the Foreign Secretary, the responsi bility for a policy which had been adopted by the Cabinet upon his recommendation, and to which the king was decidedly averse. It concerned the recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies in America, which had been urged upon the Cabinet by Mr. Canning. George IV. was much opposed to this step, fearing that it was at variance with the engagements of Great Britain with the European powers. Accordingly, in reply to a Cabinet minute on the subject, the king requested to be informed by his Cabinet, 'individually (seriatim),' whether it was proposed to abandon the principles which had heretofore governed the relations of this country towards her European allies. Council who were present at any meeting uniformly mentioned. Minutes agreed upon are signed by the members present, before they are entered in the Book of the Council.' (Nicolas, Pro. Privy Council, vol. i. pp. xvii., xviii.) After the revolution of 1688, the opponents of an inner council, or Cabinet, attempted to introduce a regulation requiring all state affairs to be transacted in the Privy Council, and the resolutions agreed upon to be signed by the ministers who had con In reply, the Cabinet |